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Abstract 
The current study aimed to explore peoples’ experiences of social and organisational justice, 
and in doing so asked three central questions. The first focused on whether there was a 
relationship between the different dimensions of justice, and the second on the commonalties 
and differences in peoples’ perceptions of justice. The third question looked at whether 
demographic variables, as markers of social identity, were predictive of such justice 
perceptions. The study was quantitative in nature, and made use of a non-experimental, 
partially exploratory, cross-sectional design. Four hundred and eight six employees of a large 
South African manufacturing organisation completed a self report questionnaire containing 
questions about a range of biographic, domestic, financial, employment, and religious 
information, as well as two measures of social and organisational justice perceptions.  Once 
preliminary analyses were carried out to ensure the psychometric properties of the measuring 
instruments and explore the data set, two key statistical procedures were used to answer the 
research questions, namely a cluster analysis and a Chi Squared Automatic Interaction 
Detection or CHAID analysis. Results of these analyses provided some evidence to argue that 
justice perceptions in different contexts, while not strongly related, cannot be seen in isolation 
from another, and that a more integrative or reciprocal approach to understanding different 
justice perceptions needs to be adopted. Further, the results of the cluster analysis demonstrated 
that a range of key justice concerns differentiated groups from another, including collective 
versus individual concerns, personal versus impersonal events, as well as concerns related to 
the different types of relationships that exist. Finally, the CHAID analysis provided some 
indication of which demographic variables were the best determinants of social and 
organisational justice perceptions, and the ways in which demographic variables interacted with 
one another in relation to peoples’ experiences of justice.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The current study has perceptions of justice as its central focus. Justice can be seen to be an 
emergent characteristic of social aggregation. Such aggregation occurs as people identify 
important common elements in one another, and recognise the need for coexistence. This 
coexistence allows for the creation of individual and group resources. These resources include 
not only material goods, but also conditions such as status and social opportunity. The basis 
upon which these resources are distributed to the members of the group is complex and 
becomes contested, particularly given the increasing intricacy of social aggregation. The 
differential allotment of goods and conditions to individuals or groups is central to the 
concept of justice, and issues about the ownership of things such as skills, money, education, 
and material goods, the rights of individuals versus groups, as well as notions of what 
constitutes group membership emerge as important related concerns. Justice is considered by 
many to be the prime social value of sound social institutions.  It is generally held to be 
second only to economic prosperity as the principal value of social and political organisation. 
(Campbell, 1998). 
 
Given this primacy, as well as the fact that justice concerns clearly underpin so many aspects 
of our social functioning, it is not surprising that it has received academic attention from so 
many disciplines. Exploration into the definition and nature of justice has its roots in the 
philosophical study of ethics (Singer, 1994). Ethics, one of the main branches of philosophy, 
is the study of morality, which refers to the informal public system that governs behaviour 
that affects others (Audi, 2001). Questions central to this field of enquiry are what ends fully 
rational beings such as ourselves ought to choose and pursue, as well as what moral principles 
should govern our choices and pursuits (Audi, 2001). Psychology, on the other hand, in 
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exploring the individual’s subjective experience of justice, has focussed on questions such as 
why will one person judge a given outcome to be fair while another might not, what criteria 
do people use to make justice judgements, in what ways do justice judgements effect our 
attitudes and behaviour, and what role do justice perceptions play in perceptions about 
decisions and decision makers? In addition, the impact that context has on concerns such as 
these, has taken psychological research into justice perceptions into, among others, school, 
work, home, hospital, and legal settings. 
 
 
Clearly there are different levels at which issues of justice manifest themselves, and which 
form the focus of different disciplines. At its broadest, questions of justice pertain to the major 
institutions of society, and incorporate concerns about the construction and role of the state, 
fundamental rights of human beings, and the function of key institutions, and the ways in 
which these inform and are informed by principles of justice (For examples see Rawls, 1971, 
Nozick, 1974, Young, 1990, Sen, 1997). At an interpersonal level questions about justice 
emerge in relation to the relationships between people and groups, the ways in which justice 
defines relationships, the effects of injustice on relationships, as well as in matters such as 
discrimination and redress (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997, Cropanzano, 2001). At an 
intrapersonal level, justice has been looked at in relation to the moral development of people, 
as well as the role that personality and other individual differences play in justice perceptions 
(e.g. Kohlberg, 1963, Piaget, 1932/1965 , Lerner, 1980). Different disciplines tend to focus on 
particular levels, often dictated by a larger disciplinary orientation or view of the discipline’s 
scope.  
 
The discipline of psychology, because of the way in which it defines itself and its research 
practices as being most primarily about individual functioning and well-being, has been active 
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most predominantly in the inter and intra personal dimensions of justice research. At an 
individual level our focus is on the way individuals acquire a sense of justice, how cognitive 
processes work in relation to making justice judgements, and what the reactions to perceived 
injustice are. At a group/organisational level the focus is on the distribution of resources 
within the context of a need for cooperation and competition, as well as the influence of group 
relations on the development of justice principles and the interplay between group and 
individual reactions to perceived injustice. At a broader societal level, the focus is on people’s 
perceptions of the distribution of rewards, income and social security. (Vermunt, & Steensma, 
1991). 
 
Another dimension along which different disciplines diverge in their study of justice is that of 
context. Questions of justice emerge in almost every context that can be thought of: 
educational facilities, the home, the workplace, religious institutions, courts of law, 
government departments, and many others. These contexts often have overriding concerns 
about justice in common, but they also raise questions that are particularly pertinent and at 
times unique to the context. Concerns about paternalism and the role of woman, for example, 
are relevant in many different contexts, such as the family, the workplace, or religious 
institutions. Questions about performance appraisals, however, may be particularly pertinent 
to the workplace. Psychologists have been active in researching justice in a number of 
contexts, including legal settings such as courts, schools and universities, as well as, quite 
predominantly, the workplace. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, psychology’s study of 
justice in the workplace has developed into a domain of research and application that accounts 
for a large proportion of work being done on interpersonal aspects of justice in the discipline 
of psychology. Workplace justice concerns itself with the ways in which employees determine 
whether they have been fairly treated in their jobs, and the way in which perceptions of justice 
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impact on other work related variables (Moorman, 1991). While organisational justice 
researchers acknowledge their roots in social psychology, they assert that this area has 
developed an identity that is now independent of these origins (Cropanzano, 2001). The 
psychological study of justice in the workplace has become known more commonly as 
organisational justice research. While this can be misleading, as the term organisation can 
refer to any number of agglomerations of people other than the workplace (and this research 
does focus almost exclusively on the workplace), this is the term that is used in the current 
study in order to remain consistent with the vast amount of research and literature available.  
 
As can be seen, psychological approaches to the development of justice theory have been 
influenced by the level as well as the context of the enquiry. It is these two concerns that have 
laid the foundation for the current research. The broad aim of the current study is to explore 
the ways in which demographic variables, as markers of social position, determine peoples’ 
experiences of both social and organisational justice. As such it focuses on individual 
characteristics that determine or influence experiences of justice at an interpersonal level. 
Further, some aspects of the study are located in the specific field of organisational 
psychology, while others pertain to larger social institutions and practices. As such the study 
is looking at different aspects of justice that operate within different contexts. This begins to 
raise questions regarding the similarity or disparity between the different aspects of justice 
under investigation- Are these the same constructs, different aspects of the same construct, or 
at times are they something completely different? More specifically stated, can we expect 
perceptions of organisational justice to function in the same way as perceptions of social 
justice? The investigation of such considerations form secondary aims of the current study.  
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The broader context in which these questions are being explored, that is in South Africa,  
brings particular meaning to bear on the research. This is because given our unique history, 
questions about justice are at the forefront of our society’s collective mind, and underpin  
much of our current discourse. The reasons for this become clearer when looking at the 
history of Apartheid and the challenges it has left for current and future generations.  
 
When Union was declared in South Africa in 1910, the country was deeply marked by its 
colonial past. The onset of modernisation had resulted in burgeoning urban centres to which 
the erstwhile pastoral and subsistence farming black community flocked, taking up positions 
in the emerging mining and industrial sectors. Governed increasingly by the logic of 
segregation, a range of legislative acts were passed to preclude the full and meaningful 
participation of black South Africans in the industrialising economy, as well as clearing the 
land for the modernisation of the (white controlled) agricultural sector. The Lands Act of 
1913, for instance, limited back ownership of land to 13% of the country, resulting in 
excessive farming and the gradual environmental degradation of these areas. 
 
Alongside the black majority of subjects, were impoverished Afrikaans citizens who had 
similarly engaged urbanisation in the face of their increasing proletarianisation. This 
ostensibly marginal group, whose fate had seemingly been sealed by the outcome of the 
Anglo-Boer War, began a systematic process of political and ideological consolidation. By 
the early 1940s, this group had begun to challenge the English colonial hegemony with an 
increasingly nationalist agenda. In 1948, the National Party ousted the government of Jan 
Smuts to take power. 
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From 1948 on, segregation (which had hitherto been somewhat piecemeal and was riddled 
with inconsistencies) was formalised and systematised into ‘apartheid’. The ostensible 
principle was to establish self-governing territories called ‘homelands’ (or, more appositely, 
‘bantustans’) in which black South Africans could achieve self-determination under the 
guidance of so-called traditional leaders. In reality, the system was an attempt to hypostasise 
black South African subjects in an archaic and anachronistic version of social organisation 
that would ensure that the could not be competitive in economic, and, therefore, in political 
terms. The bantustans served the emerging industrial complex as reservoirs of cheap labour in 
which migrancy became the dominant mode. The consequences of this were the eradication of 
social and cultural coherence and an increasing reliance in non-commercial economic 
activities on the labour of women. 
 
Alongside the more overtly economic legislation emphasising job protection for whites and 
limiting the organisation of black labour, a range of more overtly ideological measures 
became entrenched. These sought to police subjectivity by driving a wedge between the white 
community and black, Indian and (so-called) Coloured community of hybrid origin. Among 
these The Group Areas Act designated areas in cities for the exclusive habitation of whites 
(which were plush and suburban as a consequence of the wealth profile of this community) 
and others for black South Africans (which were impoverished and designed for effective 
policing). White areas were separated from black townships by cordons sanitaire, the 
implication of the name being that black South Africans threatened, in some metaphorical 
sense, to infect white South Africa. Thus ideology is rendered in spatial terms in the South 
African landscape. Other cornerstones of apartheid legislation included the Population 
Registration Act, the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act (which forbade sexual 
relations across the colour line). 
   
   7 
 
While the history of resistance to colonial injustices began with their emergence, it was in 
1912 that the African National Congress was founded. The organisation became increasingly 
militant in 1960s following the Defiance Campaign during the preceding decade, which had 
been based on the principles of passive resistance inspired by the example of Mahatma 
Gandhi. Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, was formed in 1960 under the 
immediate command of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. Along with the increasing 
militancy of resistance to apartheid came increasingly systematic oppression. All resistance 
organisations were banned in the early 1960s, and leaders who were unable to flee into exile 
were imprisoned. The 1960s are still known as a ‘silenced’ period, during which state 
mechanisms of control became steadily elaborated and consolidated.  
 
In 1976, inspired by the philosophy of Black Consciousness and a growing sense of alienation 
and frustration, a student-led protest began in the streets of Soweto, a township in 
Johannesburg. Between 1976 and 1990 this internal resistance was increasingly accompanied 
by the flight of young militants into neighbouring territories from which a systematic military 
campaign against the apartheid state was conducted. With, among others, Russian, Cuban and 
Chinese assistance, the South African Defence Force (SADF) found itself increasingly on the 
receiving end of more advanced weaponry and more motivated troops. Although it remains 
rather under acknowledged, the military defeat of the SADF in the Angolan War in the late 
1980s struck at the heart of the military-ideological complex of the Afrikaner nationalist state. 
 
By the late 1980s, it emerged that the Nationalist Party was seeking some version of 
rapprochement, and secret talks were begun with the leadership of the ANC. In 1990 Nelson 
Mandela, who was increasingly taken to embody the hopes for a new South Africa, was 
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released from Robbin Island, where he had been imprisoned for treason for the last 27 years. 
The country’s first democratic election was held in 1994, and the ANC swept to power. With 
the transformation of black South African from subjects to citizens and the institutionalisation 
of liberal democracy, it was generally assumed that apartheid had been conquered and a new 
order installed. Of course, historical transformations are never of this order. Colonial and 
apartheid history meant that the country remained trapped in the realities of economic 
inequalities and that it would be haunted by its traumatic history. 
 
An attempt to redress the latter was formalised in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC). The TRC conducted public hearings involving the confessions of perpetrators and the 
opportunity for victims of apartheid to tell their stories. Intended as both cathartic and 
restorative, the success of the Commission was qualified. The wounds inflected by the long 
and brutal history of apartheid could not be that ritualistically healed, it seemed. 
 
But the major ways in which apartheid history persists relate to economic disparity between 
black and white South Africans. Although the history of the struggle against apartheid has 
been steered by organised labour structures, most persuasively the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU), black labourers continue to constitute by far the largest 
constituency in the unskilled and semi-skilled labour force and often work in adverse 
conditions. Many continue to be subjected to exploitative and unsafe working conditions. 
Thus, although the political and institutional apparatus of apartheid has been dismantled, its 
effects are still felt in the ways that probably matter the most. Further, the division of wealth 
that is based in colonial and apartheid history is still pronounced and persists despite the 
ostensible achievement of wage equity between black and white workers and various attempts 
at black economic empowerment.  
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Given this history, along with its legacy for current day South Africa, it is unsurprising that 
justice concerns emerge as particularly salient in almost every context in this country. From 
larger social institutions to individual rights and responsibilities, questions of justice, both in 
relation to matters of redress as well as creating a just future society, are paramount, and form 
part of the every day discourse of the country. It is thus important that questions about justice 
be addressed by social researchers, particularly as an attempt to begin building indigenous 
knowledge systems that can assist the challenges of transformation that face our particular 
society. Arguably a useful point of departure for such investigations would be to challenge the 
value of justice theories which have largely been imported wholesale from North America and 
Western European countries, and to start relooking at how questions about justice can be 
asked and explored in different ways.  The current study is an attempt to begin shifting our 
understanding of justice away from more traditional models in order to explore some of the 
complexities that exist in our society.  
 
The first half of this thesis provides the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the 
current study. The literature and research review presented in this first half highlight two sets 
of challenges – the first relates to theoretical questions that beg investigation and thus have 
bearing on the research questions, while the second concerns the methodological approach to 
be adopted, with particular reference to the definition and measurement of variables as well as 
the statistical analyses used. Theoretical concerns related to the relationship between different 
types of justice as well as the relationship between demographic variables (as indicators of 
social position) and perceptions of justice have informed the research questions being 
investigated. Further, concerns about the way in which social psychologists investigate 
questions about justice and demographic variables have directed the methodological approach 
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of the current study. This is particularly in relation to the way in which the variables under 
consideration are being defined and measured, as well as the types of statistical tools 
employed to analyse the data. 
 
The first half of the thesis comprises chapters 2, 3, and 4. Chapter 2 starts with an exploration 
and critical discussion of the notion of social justice. This chapter has one primary aim, that is 
to chart the history of the study of social justice in order to provide a ‘map of the terrain’ – 
where does the study of justice have its roots and how has thinking in this area developed and 
changed over the years. This chapter aims to focus in particular on the psychological study of 
social justice – that is the emphasis is on psychology’s attempts to understand justice as a 
social phenomena, rather than an individual developmental concern. In doing this a 
psychological framework for understanding justice will be used, one that understands 
perceptions of justice to comprise distributive , procedural, and interpersonal concerns. This 
tripartite model will be used firstly as a way to structure the historical discussion of the study 
of justice, but also to introduce concerns about the structure itself.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on organisational justice, with two key aims in mind. The first, which is 
similar to Chapter 2, it is to provide an overview of the research trajectory of organisational 
justice in order to provide a point of departure for the current study. This chapter also aims to 
provide a critical review of the methodological underpinnings of the research done in this 
area, once again in order to assist with a point of departure for the current study. Given that 
there is no justice theory unique to organisational justice research and that this theory is 
discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter largely focuses on organisational justice research, of 
which there is a considerable amount. This research is discussed in relation to four broad 
areas, that of antecedents of justice perceptions, outcomes of justice perceptions, the 
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relationship between individual characteristics and perceptions of justice, and finally justice 
perceptions as a mediator of other workplace relationships 
 
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the third variable under study, namely demographic 
variables. While Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the broad area of justice, both in terms of social 
justice as well as in relation to questions about justice in organisations, this chapter aims to 
propose a specific set of problems that are arguably in need of investigation – that is the study 
of individual characteristics, with particular reference to demographic variables, in relation to 
experiences of justice. The chapter begins with a discussion of theories that indicate the 
importance of individual characteristics, particularly demographic variables such as race and 
gender, for notions of social position. The discussion then moves more specifically into the 
area of justice, and the role that demographic variables and social position play in shaping 
perceptions and experiences of justice. The second part of this chapter then provides a critical 
review of research that has explored demographic variables and perceptions of justice. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the key arguments to emerge from this chapter – 
specifically the importance of exploring demographic variables in relation to questions about 
justice, as well as the importance of using methodologies that are considered and that can 
account for the complexity of this area.  
 
The second half of this thesis focuses on the current study itself, and comprises chapters 5, 6, 
and 7. Chapter 5 is divided into four main sections. The first section provides an overview of 
the arguments made in the preceding chapters, and outlines the rationale for the current study. 
It ends with the presentation of the research questions that have emerged from these 
arguments. The second section provides an overview of the methodological concerns that 
have influenced the current study and focuses more specifically on the research design and the 
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nature of the sample, and provides information about procedures used, as well as biographical 
information on participating subjects. The third and fourth sections address two particular 
issues that have emerged as central methodological concerns, that is the definition and 
measurement of the variables under investigation, and the statistical analyses used. In the third 
section, information about the psychometric properties of scales being used is provided. In 
addition to this information is provided about the development and validation of a new 
organisational justice perceptions measure. Details about the pilot study, including 
information about the sample, procedures used, statistical analyses and results are presented. 
The fourth section details the statistical analyses to be conducted in light of the 
methodological concerns raised in the first half of the report.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the statistical analysis carried out. The analyses are 
conducted, and results presented, in a number of steps. First the psychometric properties of 
the scales are explored, and Cronbach Alphas and factor analyses are presented for each 
measure. Following the exploration of the measuring instruments, the data set is explored, 
with descriptive summary statistics being presented, followed by distribution analyses for 
each set of measures. Once the preliminary analyses are complete, the research questions are 
explored. Firstly a correlation analysis is conducted in order to explore the relationship 
between organisational and social justice perceptions. The next stage in the analysis is a 
cluster analysis, which is conducted on each of the dependent variables. Using the clusters as 
dependent variables, the CHAID explores the relationship between the demographic variables 
and justice perceptions. A separate analysis is conducted for each of the justice dimensions. 
Finally the chapter is concluded with a review of the main results found through the analyses 
conducted.  
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Chapter 7 presents a discussion of these findings, both in relation to the conceptual framework 
of this study described in chapters 2, 3, and 4, as well as in relation to the research questions 
framed in chapter 5. The implications that this study has for future research as well as the 
limitations of the study are also discussed. Finally, Chapter 8 comprises a list of references 
used in this thesis.  
 
One final note with regards to a stylistic point. Given that this thesis spans 400 pages and 
makes several arguments towards a rationale and methodology, each chapter is concluded 
with a summary of the key arguments. Further to this, a summary of arguments made in the 
first half of the report is provided at the beginning of the second part. While this undoubtedly 
becomes repetitive, it is intended as ease of reference to the reader.  
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Chapter 2: Social Justice  
 
Overview 
 
 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, there are two aspects or dimensions of justice under 
investigation in the current study, that of social and organisational justice. Of the two of these, 
social justice can be understood to be the broader – it has as its focus the wider social 
institutions and systems of which the workplace forms one constituent. Given this 
predominance, it seems logical that an understanding of social justice will contribute to an 
understanding of organisational justice. The theoretical underpinnings of the current research 
will begin, therefore, with an exploration and critical discussion of the notion of social justice.  
 
This chapter has one primary aim, that is to chart the history of the study of social justice in 
order to provide a ‘map of the terrain’ – where does the study of justice have its roots and 
how has thinking in this area developed and changed over the years. While the first questions 
asked about justice originate in what we now know as the discipline of philosophy, the study 
of justice has evolved into a multi-disciplinary concern, with, among others, sociologists, 
political scientists, educationalists, lawyers, geographers, and psychologists applying 
themselves to the exploration of this topic. It would appear that most researchers  start from a 
very similar base when exploring questions about justice. As discussed in Chapter 1, that is 
with an understanding that justice is an emergent characteristic of social aggregation that 
occurs as people identify important common elements in one another, and recognise the need 
for coexistence. This coexistence allows for the creation of individual and group resources, 
which include not only material goods, but also conditions such as status and social 
opportunity. The basis upon which these resources are distributed to the members of the 
group is complex and becomes contested, particularly given the increasing intricacy of social 
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aggregation.  As such, the development of these forms of social coordination is accompanied 
by the development of moral codes that underpin the differential allotment of goods and 
conditions to individuals or groups (Vermunt & Steensma, 1991). Justice is, therefore, 
generally understood to be about the ways in which the benefits and burdens of social co-
operation are distributed among group members. Despite this common point of departure, 
different disciplines have followed a varied and wide-ranging research trajectory with 
regards to social justice. This chapter aims to focus in particular on the psychological study 
of social justice – that is the emphasis is on psychology’s attempts to understand justice as a 
social phenomena, rather than an individual developmental concern. In doing this a 
psychological framework for understanding justice will be used, one that understands 
perceptions of justice to comprise distributive, procedural, and interpersonal concerns. 
Distributive justice is understood to concern itself with “…the distribution of the conditions 
and goods which effect individual (psychological, social and economic) well being” 
(Deutsch, 1975, p137), procedural justice with the perceived fairness of procedures used to 
reach distributive decisions, and interpersonal justice with the quality of treatment an 
individual believes he or she has received from decision makers (Leung, Chiu and Au, 1993), 
and the perceived fairness of the symbolic and intangible outcomes of procedures (for 
example respect) (Folger and Konovsky, 1989). It is important to note that this is a 
psychological model, and is not one that easily crosses disciplinary barriers. So while 
psychological theories of justice fit more neatly into this framework, philosophical theories 
included in this chapter are more awkwardly located. Despite this, the framework represents 
dominant psychological thinking within the area of justice, and it is criticisms of this 
framework that form the point of departure for this study. For this reason, this chapter will 
use the structure of the tripartite model, firstly, as a way to structure the historical discussion 
of the study of justice, but also to introduce concerns about the structure itself. Given that 
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psychological research into the area of justice is so prolific and that the discussion in this 
chapter aims to provide an historical overview, the focus will be on presenting  
seminal research.  
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of distributive justice, the first aspect of justice to 
receive attention by theorists. Work in this area attempted to explore what constituted the 
rules or values of distributive justice. The point of departure for this discussion is the 
philosophical study of justice, where the earliest theories of justice began and from which the 
psychological studies of justice emerge. An initial discussion of the key debates within 
philosophy that have given rise to current day thinking and research is provided. This begins 
with an overview of utilitarianism and Rawls’ (1971) libertarian response to this once 
dominant set of principles. Further, it explores how, despite being fundamentally in 
opposition to one another as far as their normative arguments about the principles along 
which social goods should be distributed are concerned, these theories arguably have 
common understanding of the scope of justice – an understanding that has been criticised as 
being narrow and static.  
 
It is at this juncture that social psychology’s early attempts to address concerns about justice 
begin. These initial discussions took place at approximately the same time that Rawls (1971) 
was formulating his theory of justice, and they mark an attempt to develop a theory about the 
actual standards that people use when making justice judgements as opposed to the normative 
discussions emerging from philosophy. This split between the psychological and philosophical 
approach to the study of ethics was precipitated by Moore (1903) with the introduction of his 
notion of the naturalistic fallacy – “…the fallacy of conflating what people ought to do with 
what people actually do” (p. 1).  Moore  (1903) asserted that there is no or little relationship 
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between “what we ought to do” and “what we do do”, and he thus proposed that the study of 
ethics (the study of what we ought to do) bore no relation to psychology (the study of what we 
think that we actually do). He clearly distinguished between the normative and the descriptive 
in this regard, and said that any conflation of these two notions would be committing the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’.  This view appears to have largely dominated thinking and research 
among psychologists and philosophers even up to the current day. In a book aimed at 
reviewing social psychological justice research over the past twenty years, Cropanzano and 
Greenberg (1997) state, “In keeping with social science tradition, our treatment of justice is 
completely descriptive in orientation … This is in contrast to the large body of work in moral 
philosophy… which is inherently prescriptive, specifying what should be done to achieve 
justice” (1997, p. 318). While this is a somewhat debated and contested division, with many 
philosophers and psychologists wishing to link morality and psychology as it is argued that an 
understanding of the way people actually make moral judgements is crucial for understanding 
what good moral judgements are (May, Friedman, & Clark, 1996), the psychological study of 
justice is dominated by descriptive, empirical research.    
 
The discussion of the psychological study of distributive justice starts with a focus on equity 
theory, which marks social psychology’s first attempts to develop a theory of justice. This 
theory was developed and expanded in a number of stages - first by the work of Homans 
(1961) then by Adams (1963, 1965) and Walster, Berscheid and Walster (1973),  and finally 
by Jasso (1977, 1978, 1980). It posited a model of weighing inputs against outcomes as the 
basis for justice judgements, and thus laid the foundation for an approach to justice that is, to 
this day, considered fundamental. One of the central concerns with equity theory was its 
assumption that people are essentially selfish and as such it understood justice perceptions to 
be based on self-interest. Two major challenges to this notion are discussed in this chapter. 
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The first came from Deutsch (1985) who argued that equity was not the only value that 
underpinned distribution decisions and that equality and need also form the basis for decision-
making, and the second from Lerner (1980) who rejected notions that concern about justice 
emanate from egoistical self-interest and who developed the ‘just world hypothesis’ as a 
response to these concerns.  
 
While this body of work focussed most specifically on questions of distributive justice 
theorists challenged this singularity of focus, and began emphasising procedural concerns. 
The chapter thus moves on to looking at procedural justice theories, starting with Nozick 
(1974). Emanating from criticisms of Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice, Nozick (1974) 
introduced a Procedural or Entitlement Theory of Justice. While also a libertarian, Nozick 
(1974) argues that any understanding of justice cannot be ahistorical or focus on an end state 
of distribution as Rawls (1971) does. He therefore promotes a ‘procedural’ understanding of 
justice, one that considers  past patterns of distribution and accounts for how people have 
come to acquire the goods that they have. A similar shift in thinking  was wintnessed within 
psychology, which began focussing on procedural concerns. This focus on what became 
known as the second dimension of the tripartite model - procedural justice – began with the 
work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), and was extended by and Folger (1977) and Leventhal 
(1976). These theorists all focussed on characteristics of the procedures used to make 
outcome decisions, and the impact such procedures have on perceptions of fairness. Thinking 
in the area of justice thus centred on this bipartite model until the 1980’s when Bies (1987) 
introduced the notion of interpersonal or interactional justice. There has been extensive 
debate over whether this dimension of justice is separate from procedural justice concerns, 
but for the most part this facet of justice has emerged as a third aspect of what has developed 
into a tripartite justice model. In concluding the historical account of social psychological 
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research into justice, two interpersonal justice theories, that of Bies (1987) and the group-
value model posited by Lind and Tyler (1988), are discussed. 
 
As stated earlier, while it is the primary aim of this chapter to map the terrain of social justice 
research, this is done in order to argue a number of points central to the current research. 
Firstly this chapter will argue that the psychological study of justice has emerged from a linear 
and somewhat economic understanding of the construct, the fundamentals of which still persist 
in current approaches to the topic. This type of model, seen in the tripartite model described, 
may be considered over-simplified and not necessarily reflective of the way in which people 
experience justice, and as such limited in its usefulness for answering a range of questions.  It 
is also argued that this reductionism is echoed in the methodologies used to research justice as 
a construct. In addition through the review of the literature it will be argued that this tripartite 
model is, to some extent, reliant on an apriori understanding of justice – theorists have 
developed a construction of justice that they bring to bear on their research, thereby 
continuously supporting the original theoretical structure. Thus it is an aim of this chapter to 
argue that research is needed that attempts to tease out some of the real world complexities 
that could be brought to bear on an understanding of justice.  
 
Distributive Justice  
 
As discussed above, the first aspect of justice to receive attention by theorists and researchers 
was that of distributive justice, which has its roots in the philosophical study of ethics (Singer, 
1994). As discussed in Chapter 1, questions central to this field of enquiry are what ends fully 
rational beings such as ourselves ought to choose and pursue, as well as what moral principles 
should govern our choices and pursuits (Audi, 2001).   It would appear that it is this second 
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question that has dominated much of the early work in the area of justice, both within 
philosophy and psychology – philosophers ask what values ought to underpin our distribution 
of benefits and burdens within a society, and psychologists attempt to explore what values 
people do use when making such distributions.   
 
Sidgwick (1907) proposed three ways in which ordinary people make decisions about moral 
behaviour. The first is encapsulated in the theory of intuitionism (that people will know 
intuitively what is the right or wrong thing to do). The second method is related to the concept 
of philosophical egoism (that we should act in order to maximise our personal good), and as 
will be seen further on in this chapter, it is this understanding of human nature that formed the 
foundation for psychological thinking in the area of justice. The third method is related to 
utilitarianism (we should maximise the good for everyone affected). It is this third approach 
that up until relatively recently has dominated thinking about distributive justice, particularly 
within the discipline of philosophy.  
 
Utilitarianism can be seen as the extension of the principle of philosophical egoism - an 
extrapolation of one person choosing to maximise their own good to maximising good for the 
whole group. The central idea of utilitarianism is that society is just when its major institutions 
are arranged so as to achieve the greatest total satisfaction summed over all the individuals 
belonging to it (Rawls, 2000). As such they understand the just action in any situation to be the 
one that brings about the highest possible total sum of utility (Wolff, 1996). The meaning of 
utility is understood differently by different theorists, and includes definitions such as 
happiness, pleasure, or satisfaction. Utilitarian theorists would suggest that a just action is one 
that maximises happiness, pleasure, or satisfaction (depending on their understanding of 
utility) for the people concerned, more than any other action available at the time (Wolff, 
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1996). Such an approach calls for some way of being able to measure utility, and to compare 
the utility of one action to that of another. The complexities of such a need is referred to as the 
problem of ‘interpersonal comparisons of utility” (Wolff, 1996). This concern, however, is 
only one of the problems with utilitarianism identified by critics.  
 
Few justice theoreticians would now accept utilitarianism as a suitable principle of justice, as 
it is argued that it has morally unacceptable consequences. Key opponents of this approach 
claim that utilitarian morality allows, or even requires, injustices (Wolff, 1996).  One key 
difficulty is that of the ‘scapegoat objection’. An example of this is where critics ask us to 
imagine there has been a terrible act of terror, where many people are killed and injured. The 
public is angry and panicked and wants the assurance that such an attack will not reoccur. As 
such the police are under a tremendous amount of pressure to apprehend the perpetrators. 
There is no question that under these circumstances the greater good would be served by the 
arrest of the guilty parties. However, the greater good would also be served if people believed 
by the public to be the perpetrators were arrested, found guilty, and imprisoned. Whether 
guilty or not, plausible suspects being caught would satisfy the public need for vengeance and 
a belief in their own security. While a couple of innocent people might suffer by being 
wrongly imprisoned, the greater good of the community would be served, and this, in 
utilitarian terms, would outweigh the negative consequences. The key criticism thus levelled 
against utilitarianism is thus that some miscarriages of justice would be defensible within their 
terms.    
 
Much of the thinking about justice over the past forty years has been shaped by reactions to 
utilitarianism.  Possibly the most noted of these responses is the one proposed by Rawls 
(1971) in his theory of ‘Justice as Fairness’. Rawls (1971), a Libertarian, prioritises the rights 
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and liberties of individuals as being inviolable. The primary aim of Rawls’ (1971) theory was 
to provide an alternative conceptualisation of justice to that of utilitarianism. It is this 
paradigm that has formed the foundation for much of the current debate about the nature of 
justice, and it is from this basis of libertarianism that the thinking about justice has changed, 
broadened, and been challenged by a range of theoreticians, including economists, political 
scientists, political and moral philosophers, as well as feminist writers.  
 
Rawls’ (1971) theory, in the tradition of Kant and Rousseau, is a social contract theory which 
takes the view that an (often tacit or unspoken) agreement exists between people in a 
community or between people and their leaders, about the creation of political institutions, 
which then define the obligations of the parties to the contract (Audi, 2001). Rawls (1971) 
makes use of the idea of a social contract, particularly with reference to the agreements 
between individuals in a community, to define and justify his conception of justice.  
 
Contractarian theories, such as Rawls’ (1971), are individualistic in that they assert that moral 
and political policies must be justified in relation to the needs and rights of individuals. As 
such they stand opposed to utilitarian theories with their emphasis on maximising benefit for 
the entire community over that of the individual (Audi, 2001).  Rawls’ (2000) anti-utilitarian 
stance regarding the conception of justice is central to his theory - in the preface to his book he 
states that the aim of his theory of justice is to provide a viable alternative to that of 
utilitarianism, something he views previous critics of utilitarianism unable to do.  It is with this 
anti-utilitarian stance that Rawls (2000) lays the foundation for his theory of justice. He states 
that, “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for 
some is made right by a greater good shared by others” (Rawls, 2000, p. 3). He asserts that in a 
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just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as agreed upon and an injustice is 
justified only when it prevents a greater injustice. 
 
Rawls (1971) defines the scope of his theory as pertaining specifically to that of social justice, 
which he differentiates from other justice concerns.  He acknowledges that it is not only laws, 
institutions, and social systems that can be considered just or unjust, but people, actions, 
decisions, accusations, even attitudes or traits. Social justice, however, focuses on the basic 
structure of society, and more specifically on the ways in which the major institutions of 
society distribute basic rights and duties as well as the benefits resulting from social co-
operation. In this way he differentiates social justice from questions about justice in other, 
possibly smaller, contexts. This question of differentiating different ‘types’ of justice and 
exploring the way in which these ‘types’ might articulate with one another, is central to the 
aims of this study, and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, where the notion of 
organisational justice as something separate from other ‘types’ of justice, such as social 
justice, is debated. This focus on social justice is based on what Rawls (2000) considers to be 
its primacy in influencing the life prospects of people. He states that, “ The intuitive notion 
here is that [the] structure contains various social positions and that men born into different 
positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well 
as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favour certain 
starting places over others” (Rawls, 2000, p. 7). Social justice applies to these inequalities. 
Given the profundity of the effects of these structures, Rawls (2000) has identified them as the 
primary subject of justice.  
 
Since this is his focus, Rawls (2000) concentrates his theory on the distribution of what he 
terms ‘primary goods’ - the things that could be supposed a rational man would want more of, 
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rather than less. These goods would ensure a person greater success in advancing their own 
ends. He identifies primary social goods to be rights, liberties, opportunities, income, and 
wealth (Rawls, 2000). He argues that their primacy is evident, and they can be termed social 
due to their inherent connection with the basic social structure – the rules of major institutions 
of society define liberties and opportunities and regulate the distribution of wealth (Rawls, 
2000). 
 
Rawls (1971) argues that justice is fundamental to any society because it helps to regulate the 
collective life of people. This assertion stems from Rawls’ (1971) view of society as a 
relatively self-sufficient association of people who recognise that certain rules of conduct are 
binding, and for the most part act in accordance with these rules. This is so because such rules 
ensure a system of co-operation that will work to everyone’s advantage, and are necessary 
because there are competing interests or claims in any society. As such society is characterised 
by a mutuality of interests (an individual can live far better in association with a society then 
he/she could on their own) as well as conflict (as there are competing claims to the benefits 
and burdens that the association of people produces). As such, a set of principles is needed to 
guide the distribution of the advantages. It is these principles that Rawls (1971) asserts are the 
principles of social justice in that they enable societies to assign rights and duties to their 
members, as well as to define the most appropriate way in which to distribute the benefits and 
burdens of social co-operation. (Rawls, 1971). As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
it is this understanding of society and human functioning that underpins most work in the area 
of justice, both within philosophy and psychology.  
 
Rawls (1971) contends that the principles of justice are central to keeping a society functional. 
He states that a society is well ordered if, among other things, it is regulated by an accepted 
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conception of justice, i.e. the same principles of justice are accepted by all, and the social 
institutions of that society satisfy, and are seen by its members to satisfy, these principles. 
Where there are divergent interests, a shared conception of justice ensures “civic friendship” 
(Rawls, 2000, p. 5).  Unfortunately this is seldom the case, as what constitutes justice is often 
disputed. However, despite the disagreement on the actual terms or principles of just 
distribution, there is still agreement on the need for a set of principles.  
 
Rawls (1971) thus differentiates between the concept of justice (i.e. the recognition of the need 
for a set of principles for the allocation of rights and duties and for the proper distribution of 
the benefits and burdens of social co-operation) and conceptions of justice (i.e. the nature of 
these principles). He states that even if people have different conceptions of justice, they can 
still agree on a common concept of justice. He proposes that all people can agree that               
“ …institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the 
assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between 
competing claims to the advantages of social life” (Rawls, 2000, p. 5).  What constitutes 
‘arbitrary distinctions’ and ‘a proper balance’ are open to interpretation based on the principles 
of justice that are found to be acceptable – it is these that comprise the conception of justice. 
As will be seen further on in this section, much of the social psychological exploration of 
justice aims at understanding what conceptions of justice operate in the social world – i.e. 
what principles do people use in determining whether justice has been served. Rawls (2000) 
goes on to say that these principles identify specific similarities and differences between 
people that are considered relevant when determining rights and duties. As discussed in the 
introduction the current study aims at exploring how one such category of similarities and 
differences – that of demographic variables – do impact on peoples’ experiences of justice, 
both in their social and organisational worlds. Demographic variables such as race, gender, 
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religion, and age have historically been used, often unjustly, as a way of determining 
differential distribution of benefits and burdens in a society as well as its sub systems. At a 
broad level this can be seen in, for example, the Apartheid government’s use of race to 
account for differential allotment of goods and conditions to millions of people, the Third 
Reich’s use of religion, nationality, and sexual preference as a way of perpetuating genocide, 
or countries that prohibit access to state and societal resources on the basis of gender. Broader 
social practices that use demographic variables as a way of determining rights and duties filter 
down to smaller systems where, for example, in the workplace women might receive different 
wages for doing the same jobs as men or older people might be prejudiced in job selections. 
The relationship between demographic variables and experiences of justice will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
In his theory, Rawls (1971) examines principles of justice based on the question “What would 
an ideal society be like?”  (i.e. ‘complete compliance theory’) as opposed to addressing 
questions about how to deal with injustice (i.e. a ‘partial compliance theory’ that concerns 
itself with  corrective justice, retributive justice, punishment, and notions of a just war). Given 
this concern, he sets out to argue for a set of principles of justice that would govern a well-
ordered society, where everyone is assumed to be acting in such a way as to uphold just 
institutions. The central idea of Rawls’ (1971) theory is that the principles of justice for the 
basic structure of society are “…[those] principles that any rational person, aiming to further 
their own goals and needs, would accept in an original position of equality as being the 
principles that will govern their association” (Rawls, 2000, p. 10). In this theory, as in the 
social contract theories of Kant and Rosseau, the original position (or ‘state of nature’) is a 
hypothetical situation, and is not intended to represent an actual or historical account of 
events. In this hypothetical situation no one knows his/her place in society. They don’t know 
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their class, position, standing as well as their strengths or weaknesses, intelligence, abilities, or 
any of their other natural assets.  
 
The principles of justice are chosen in this state – behind a veil of ignorance. Under these 
conditions any agreement reached on the principles of justice is fair, as no one can attempt to 
favour themselves: they are all similarly situated without any knowledge of what position they 
will assume in society. Parties in the original position are equal, and all parties have the right 
to suggest and decide on principles. This original position is one that is fair to all participants, 
and is a suitable status quo from which to begin. Rawls (1971) termed this the notion of 
‘justice as fairness’ – “ …that parties to a common practice are understood to have an basic 
and equal liberty and that their common practices be considered unjust unless they accord with 
principles which persons so circumstanced and related could freely acknowledge before one 
another, and so could accept as fair” (Rawls, 1958, p. 70). 
 
Rawls argues that the principle of utility is not compatible with this idea of co-operation 
between individuals for mutual advantage. He argues that an individual in the original position 
is unlikely to agree to the chance of living a lesser life so that other parties may have a better 
life (Rawls, 2000). Instead he argues that people in the original position would choose two 
principles: firstly that every person participating in or affected by a practice has an equal right 
to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all (i.e. the maximum amount of 
liberty before it starts infringing on the liberty of others), and secondly that inequalities are 
arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and 
provided the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are 
open to all (Rawls, 1958, p. 48). 
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The first principle is termed the Liberty Principle, and it refers to those institutions that define 
and secure basic liberties in a society – it is concerned with political and civil rights (Barry, 
1973). Rawls (1971) identifies a number of basic liberties that he sees as being important, 
including political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of 
thought, freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault, freedom from arbitrary 
arrest, and the right to hold personal property. According to the first principle, all these 
liberties should be equal. Liberties that are not basic, such as the right to own property, are not 
protected by this principle. The second principle refers to the institutions that specify social 
and economic inequalities, and is concerned with distribution of wealth, as well as the 
arrangement of organisations that utilise differences in authority and responsibility. Rawls 
(1971) structures this principle according to two parts, which he terms the Difference Principle 
and the Fair Opportunity Principle respectively.  
 
The Difference Principle states that the distribution of wealth and income need not always be 
equal, but that if it is not, it must be to everybody’s advantage. As such this principle outlines 
what inequalities would be permissible, when the presumptions of the first principle, that of 
equal liberty, could be set aside. Rawls (1971) argues that while there must always be a 
justification for departing from the initial position of equal liberty there can, and often is a 
justification for doing so - i.e. there may be different positions or distributions in a society, but 
that in itself is not a divergence from the principles of justice. The Fair Opportunity Principle 
states that the positions to which special benefits or burdens are attached must be open to all 
and must be obtained on the basis of fair competition. Even if a person benefits from a 
position being filled, but they had no access to that position, they would be justified in feeling 
unfairly treated. Once again, pertinent to the current study is the argument that the violation of 
these two principles is often based on demographic variables. An example of this in relation to 
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the Difference Principle is how race was used as an explanation for differential practices of the 
Apartheid state, or gender for the differential treatment of men and woman in a society. 
Demographic variables can also be seen to be used to violate the Fair Opportunity Principle in 
that many public positions have been denied to people on the basis of race, gender, social 
class, marital status, and even age. This relationship between demographic variables and 
perceptions and experiences of justice is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.   
 
Rawls (1971) thus argues for a conception of justice as a composite of three ideas: liberty, 
equality, reward for services contributing to the common good. This plurality of principles 
raises the issue of the ordering or weighting of these principles: which principle, if any, should 
supersede the other if a conflict exists? This dilemma is referred to as ‘The priority problem”, 
and needs to be considered by any theory attempting to account for a conception of justice. 
Opposed to using a utilitarian standard (i.e. the principle that will maximise benefit for the 
majority of members should take priority over other principles) Rawls (2000) attempts to 
provide an alternative view. He acknowledges that we will need to use some degree of 
intuition to settle questions of priority, but emphasises that such questions are primary to a 
common conception of justice, as parties with different ideas of principle priority do not share 
a common conception of justice. Given the importance of this matter, Rawls (2000) argues 
that we should attempt to reduce the extent to which we rely on intuition by formulating 
explicit principles for resolving the priority problem (Rawls, 2000). As such he offers some 
possibilities with regards to the ordering or weighting of principles.  
 
The first possibility is that the matter of principle weighting must be agreed upon in the 
original position, as an inherent part of formulating a conception of justice. The second 
possibility is based on what Rawls (1971) terms ‘lexical’ or lexicographical’ ordering. This is 
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an order that requires the satisfaction of the first principle before one can move onto the 
second and so on. A principle does not come into consideration until all those ordered above it 
are met or do not apply. Rawls (1971) ranks the principle of equal liberty above the principle 
that regulates economic and social inequalities – in other words society should arrange 
inequalities of wealth and power in ways consistent with the equal liberties required by the 
first principle.  He also ranks the Fair Opportunity Principle over the Difference Principle. As 
such the Liberty Principle has ‘lexical priority’ over the other two principles, the Fair 
Opportunity Principle priority over the Difference Principle (Wolff, 1996). This is a marked 
divergence from a utilitarian principle, as this ordering means that the liberties protected by 
the first principle cannot be violated for the greater social or economic advantage. 
 
Very little empirical testing of Rawls’ (1971) theory has been conducted. Frolich, 
Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987) state that the testing of ethical theories is essential, 
particularly if such theories implicitly contain a model of human psychology as they argue 
Rawls’ (1971) does. They argue that a theory such as Rawls’ (1971) is based on the 
presumption that a reasonable person can be convinced of its claims, and as such it then 
becomes necessary to specify what constitutes the psychology of such a reasonable person 
(Frolich et al, 1987). In addition they state that if the impact of an ethical theory derives from 
the projected consequences of its rules, then such an impact can only be compelling if the 
consequences mirror the real world – and as such testing of such theories is imperative 
(Frolich et al, 1987).  
 
In response to this identified need, Frolich et al (1987) conducted an experiment that aimed to 
test what they termed the behavioural underpinnings of Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice – 
firstly whether people operating behind a veil of ignorance would be able to reach unanimous 
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consensus on a principle of distributive justice, and secondly whether they would show a 
preference for Rawls’ (1971) Difference Principle. In this study a total of 44 runs of four 
experimental designs were conducted in three locations in America. In the first part of the 
experiment subjects were introduced to four principles of distributive justice, one of which 
was Rawls’ (1971) Difference Principle. Subjects were then asked to rank the four principles 
in order of preference. Subjects were then presented with an income table that illustrated each 
of the four distribution principles for five different income groups. They were then asked to 
select one principle. After doing this subjects were then randomly allocated to one of the 
income groups on the incomes table, and were paid an amount in line with that income group 
and the principle that they had chosen. When they were paid they were also told what they 
would have been paid had they selected any of the other three principles. They were then 
asked to rank the principles in order of preference again. In the second part of the study 
subjects were randomly divided into groups of 5, and asked collectively to adopt, by a 
unanimous vote, a principle for their next payment. In this part of the experiment subjects 
again did not know to which income group they would be allocated and were thus operating 
behind somewhat of a veil of ignorance. Once again they were paid in relation to their chosen 
principle according to the random allocation of an income group. Students then once again 
ranked the principles in order of preference.  Finally subjects answered a questionnaire 
designed to extract demographic, psychological, attitudinal and sociological data about 
themselves (Frolich et al, 1987).  
 
Results from these 44 experiments supported Rawls’ (1971) notion that people operating 
behind a veil of ignorance will be able to reach unanimous consensus on a principle of 
distributive justice. However there was very little support for Rawls’ (1971) assertion that the 
principle of choice would be the Difference Principle. Under all of the experimental conditions 
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all the groups reached unanimous consensus, but no group ever selected the difference 
principle of maximising the lowest income as their preferred principle. With regards to the 
rankings of the four distributive principles, this difference principle has the lowest number of 
first place rankings and the highest number of last place rankings. This study thus indicates 
that people do not act in accordance with Rawls’ (1971) assumptions.    
 
Frolich et al’s (1987) experiment was duplicated, with some minor modifications, by Bond, 
Doug and Jong-Chul Park (1991) who were attempting to explore whether there were any 
cultural differences in preferences for justice principle choice. The researchers used an 
American and Korean sample, and they found partial support for Rawls’ Difference Principle 
among the Korean sample only. Another study using Polish and American samples found no 
support for Rawls’ (1971) assumptions (Lissowski, Tyszka, & Okrasa, 1991).  
 
A fifth study, conducted by Brickman (1977), attempted to explore whether people would be 
more likely to deviate from the principle of equality in the original position, as hypothesised 
by Rawls (1971). The study involved 80 groups comprising three undergraduate students who 
were competing for lottery tickets for a 100-dollar prize. In the first part of the experiment 
participants were asked to complete a test involving arbitrary exercises. At the end of the test 
each group was told that group members differed in ability (based on test results), but only 
half the groups were told who had scored high, medium and low on the test, while the other 
half were told nothing about members performance. Groups were then given a number of tasks 
to allocate to members, the successful completion of which would determine how many lottery 
tickets an individual would be given.  Groups could either share the tasks equally or could 
allocate tasks to individuals, and were told how many tickets they could expect to win under 
each principle of distribution (i.e. if tasks were equally allocated or delegated). In half the 
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groups the unequal task assignment resulted in a net gain for the high ability person and in half 
a net gain for the low ability person, either without cost to anyone or at the expense of the 
person at the other end of the distribution. Results showed that knowledge of ability (position) 
made no difference when participants considered inequalities that would not cost anyone 
anything, or where inequalities would benefit the high-ability people. Knowledge of ability 
did, however, make a substantial difference when the inequality would benefit the low-ability 
individuals at the expense of the high ability individuals.   Brickman (1977) concludes 
“…where possible, we should ask people to make moral decisions before they know with 
certainty their own standing and likely outcome in the situation” (1977, p. 303). He thus views 
the results as support for Rawls’ (1971) assertion that people would be likely to deviate from 
the principle of equality from the original position.  
 
Despite the importance of empirically testing theories such as Rawls’ (1971), these five 
studies represent the bulk of research conducted in this area. Given the paucity of research 
testing Rawls’ (1971) assumptions as well as the inconsistency of the results obtained, it is not 
possible to say with any conviction that there is, or isn’t, empirical evidence for Rawls’ (1971) 
theory. In addition to this these experiments may be considered starting points for this type of 
research, but they have fundamental flaws that make their value questionable.  Firstly, as 
stated earlier in this chapter, Rawls (1971), while acknowledging that justice also pertains to 
people, actions, decisions, attitudes and traits, explicitly stated that his theory focussed on 
social justice i.e. the basic structure of society, and more specifically on the ways in which the 
major institutions of society distribute basic rights and duties as well as the benefits resulting 
from social co-operation (Rawls, 1971). In attempting to operationalise questions about 
distribution, it can be argued that these experiments reduce the questions of justice to more 
personalised decisions and actions. It cannot be assumed that people will respond in the same 
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way to questions about how society distributes benefits and burdens as they will to the 
distribution of lottery tickets or relatively small payments for arbitrary tasks.  It could be 
argued that it would be almost impossible to operationalise the notion of the original position 
in relation to questions of social justice as Rawls (1971) understood it – as mentioned earlier 
in this chapter Rawls (1971) stated that the original position was purely hypothetical - and 
these experiments cannot, therefore, be said to be providing evidence for or against Rawls 
(1971) theory. They perhaps do contribute to an understanding of justice in other contexts, but 
this cannot be generalised to choices about primary social goods as described by Rawls 
(1971).  
 
Secondly, while social psychological research is heavily indebted to the experimental 
paradigm, the limitations of such a research design are well documented (Rosenthal & 
Rosnow, 1991). While these are discussed in more detail later in this chapter and in Chapter 3, 
there are two such limitations that have particular relevance for these studies. The first relates 
to the artificiality of the experiments. The environments in these studies are contrived, and the 
tasks the participants were asked to conduct were unusual and perhaps even strange. This lack 
of ecological validity makes the findings of these studies difficult to generalise to other real 
life contexts. The second relates to the nature of the samples used. In all five studies the 
samples comprised university students, who cannot be considered to be representative of even 
the populations from which they were derived, let alone other populations. Because of these 
limitations, these experiments, while interesting attempts to empirically explore Rawls’ 
(1971) theory, do not in any conclusive way provide an argument for, or discount, the validity 
of Rawls’ (1971) assumptions.  
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Despite this lack of any supporting empirical evidence, it has been argued that Rawls’ (1971) 
theory of justice has set the agenda for much of what is currently being written about liberal 
theories of justice (Audi, 2001). While he has many critics, it is generally agreed that he 
presents a powerful case for his theory as well as provides us with a “…revamped theoretical 
foundation for the dominant liberalism of our time, which is committed to personal liberty and 
to reducing social and economic inequalities” (Arthur & Shaw, 1992, p. 61). The importance 
of Rawls’ (1971) theory is that it can be seen to have opened a debate about how individual 
rights can be respected concomitantly with principles of justice. In addition to this, by 
proposing a set of liberal (as opposed to utilitarian) values that might constitute one 
conception of justice, he provided a ‘benchmark’ of sorts – a liberal conception of justice 
against which other conceptions of justice can be argued. As will be seen from the ensuing 
discussion, social psychological attempts to explore questions about justice started from a 
similar basis as Rawls (1971) – by proposing and exploring different principles that might 
underpin perceptions of justice.   
 
The study of justice within the discipline of psychology has fallen primarily into two areas – 
developmental psychology and sub-fields of social psychology. Within developmental 
psychology theorists have explored the ways in which people develop moral reasoning. The 
approach has been primarily cognitive in nature, and explores the ways in which people 
make decisions about what is moral or just, and what is not. This focus is on the 
intrapersonal aspects of justice, as it looks at factors internal to the individual in attempting 
to explain the development of morality. For example theorists such as Kholberg (1963) and 
Piaget (1932/1965) have looked at infant and child development, with a specific focus on 
how the capacity for moral reasoning evolves within children. Social psychologists, on the 
other hand, laid the foundation for research focussed on justice in the context of 
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interpersonal relationships through their exploration of the ways in which social forces 
governed such perceptions.  It is the work that emanated from this field that is the 
predominant focus of the current study, and thus this chapter.  
 
Justice as an important phenomenon for social life has only relatively recently been 
recognised by social psychologists. Deutsch (1985) argues that the term ‘justice’ was not 
even included in successive editions of the Handbook of Social Psychology, and that this 
subject only received attention by psychologists in the mid-70’s. Theorising about and 
research in the social psychology of justice began with the development of equity theory, 
which remained the dominant approach in this area until the mid-1980’s (Deutsch, 1985). 
These initial theories derived from the work of Aristotle - Homans (1961), the social 
psychologist who introduced the underpinnings of equity theory to social psychology, 
explicitly borrowed the term distributive justice from Aristotle’s account of justice in 
Nichomachean Ethics. Homans (1961) thus understood justice to be concerned with the 
distributions of rewards among individuals and groups. He proposed that people experience 
injustice when they do not receive the amount of reward expected relative to the reward 
somebody else receives (Homans, 1961). This process of experiencing injustice as a result of 
comparing one’s rewards with other people’s rewards was termed relative deprivation – a 
term that Homans (1961) used as a synonym for distributive justice (Deutsch, 1985). 
Relative advantage, on the other hand, has now come to refer to exchanges where one 
receives more reward relative to others. 
 
Homans (1961) further hypothesised that people expect their rewards, or outcomes, to be 
equal to their contributions to, or investments in, an exchange. As such they would expect to 
receive more reward if they have contributed more than others, and would expect to 
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contribute more if they are rewarded more. This ‘rule of distributive justice’ – “A man in an 
exchange relation will expect that the rewards of each man be proportional to his costs – the 
greater the rewards the greater the costs – and the net rewards, or profits, of each man be 
proportional to his investments – the greater the investments the greater the profit” (Homans, 
1961, p. 75) – was defined by Homans (1961) and became the basis for initial research and 
work in the social psychology of justice.  
 
Homans (1961) also hypothesised about people’s responses to perceived relative deprivation 
or advantage. He postulated that a person who perceives himself to be a victim of injustice 
will experience some anger and express some hostility towards those who caused or 
benefited from the injustice. On the other hand, a person experiencing relative advantage and 
thus perceiving himself as a beneficiary of injustice will experience some guilt and will 
attempt to alter the proportions of the exchange by increasing their own contribution if 
possible. Homans (1961) further proposed that while people may agree on the rule of 
distributive justice, they may disagree whether particular instances of distribution are fair, as 
they may not agree on their assessments of the value of particular contributions or rewards. 
This is similar to Rawls’ (1971) differentiation between the concept of justice (i.e. the 
recognition of the need for a set of principles for the allocation of rights and duties and for 
the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social co-operation) and conceptions of 
justice (i.e. the nature of these principles), and his statement that even if people have 
different conceptions of justice, they can still agree on a common concept of justice.  
Homans (1961) stated that people are most likely to assess whether they have been fairly 
treated by comparing themselves with others who are similar to them - who share 
nationality, aspects of demography, who work in the same organisation  - rather than with 
those who are different.  
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Homans (1961) demonstrated the way in which his distributive justice theory operated by 
observing relations between ‘cash posters’ and ‘ledger clerks’ in the accounting department 
of an organisation he studied. The ledger clerks, while satisfied with their pay, felt they were 
being unjustly treated relative to the cash posters who were earning the same pay as them. 
The ledger clerks believed that their jobs were more senior and responsible than the cash 
posters, and as such they should be earning more money than them. They thus felt relatively 
deprived, which resulted in protests being made to management and their union.  
 
Homans (1961) illustrated the rule of distributive justice in a number of different contexts, 
but it was Adams (1963, 1965) who extended these propositions and began developing their 
implications in a more systematic way (Deutsch, 1985). Adams (1963) substituted the term 
‘distributive injustice’ with ‘inequity’, and as a consequence gave rise to the term ‘equity 
theory’ – the phrase used to characterise the original work done by Homans (1961) and 
expanded on by Adams (Deutsch, 1985). Adams’ (1963, 1965) focus was specifically on 
what he termed exchange relations, and he used the employment relationship extensively in 
order to elucidate his theories. Despite this, he believed his ideas to be applicable to all kinds 
of social exchanges (Deutsch, 1985). So it is at this point that justice research began falling 
into the domain of organisational psychology, a point that will be further discussed in 
Chapter 3.     
    
Like Homans (1961), Adams (1965) proposes that justice is upheld when the individual 
perceives that his/her outcomes (such as pay) are allocated in proportion to his/her perceived 
inputs. He avers that whenever an exchange occurs between two parties, the possibility exists 
that either party might perceive that exchange to be inequitable (Adams, 1963).  Each party 
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brings certain contributions to the exchange, for which they expect a just return. These 
‘inputs’ are as perceived by the contributor, and may not be congruous with those of the 
other party.  An individual, for example, may perceive his relevant ‘investments’ into an 
employment relationship to be his intelligence, qualifications, and creativity, and will expect 
his financial remuneration to be in line with such inputs. If, however, his employer does not 
see one or more of those inputs, for example creativity, as being relevant to the exchange, it 
will not be taken into account when remuneration is calculated. Adams (1963) thus argues 
that inputs need to be both recognised and considered relevant by their recipient.  If only the 
person possessing the attribute considers it to be relevant to the exchange, then problems of 
inequity will arise (Adams, 1963).  Crozier (1960, in Adams, 1963) illustrates this point 
using an example involving Parisian bankers. Paris born clerks worked along side Province 
born clerks in a bank in central Paris, all doing identical work and earning identical wages. 
The Parisians were dissatisfied with their wages, as they perceived their Parisian breeding to 
be an input into the employment relationship that was deserving of financial compensation. 
The bank management did not see that attribute as being relevant within the exchange 
relationship and therefore did not afford them any more compensation than Province born 
employees.  
 
In exchange for inputs, people expect certain rewards or ‘outcomes’. Outcomes can include 
pay, status symbols, fringe benefits, and job status among many others. Similar to inputs, 
outcomes are as perceived by the parties, and can therefore also be characterised by 
recognition and relevance (Adams, 1963).  For example, a manager might give an employee 
verbal recognition for having worked overtime in order to reach an important deadline. The 
employee does not see any utility in that outcome (praise), and therefore does not perceive it 
as relevant to the exchange. He would have preferred monetary compensation, which has 
   
   38 
some utility to him, and is thus dissatisfied with the outcome. In contrast, however, another 
employee might feel that the praise has psychological utility, will thus see the outcome as 
being relevant, and we be satisfied.  
 
It is clear that many factors may be considered to be inputs by the contributor, the recipient, 
or both. Adams (1963) identifies education, intelligence, experience, seniority, age, gender, 
social status, and ethnic background to be just some of the attributes that parties to the 
exchange may perceive as being relevant. He hypothesises that these  ‘principal inputs’, as 
he terms them, vary in their degree of relationship to one another, with some being closely 
correlated to each other, and others functioning largely independently.  For example, he 
suggests that an input such as gender is primarily independent of other inputs, while age may 
be highly correlated with seniority or experience. Clearly Adams (1963) recognises the 
importance of social position, gender, age and a range of other demographic variables in 
contributing to perceptions of justice. Despite this, neither Homans (1961) nor Adams (1963, 
1965) elaborate on or hypothesise about the psychological interrelationships that might exist 
among the different inputs and outcomes. This becomes relevant to the current study, which 
has as one of its aims the exploration of the interrelationship between demographic variables 
and their association with experiences of justice.  This will be elaborated on in Chapter 4, 
which focuses on this issue. 
 
Adams (1963) extends beyond Homans’ (1961) discussion of responses to inequity. He 
employs Festinger’s (1957) Cognitive Dissonance Theory to explain reactions to perceived 
injustice by likening the consequences of inequity to those of cognitive dissonance – as with 
dissonance the perception of inequity creates a proportional tension which will motivate the 
person to eliminate or reduce it. The strength of the motivation is proportional to the 
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inequity tension.  Adams (1965) hypothesised a number of different psychological strategies 
that a person might use in order to reduce inequity tension, including altering their own or 
others inputs and outcomes, altering ones perceptions of their own or others inputs or 
outcomes, withdrawing from the exchange relationship, or changing one’s referent other. 
Adams (1965) went on to hypothesise about which of these tension-reducing strategies a 
person would be likely to adopt.  
 
A considerable amount of research has been done, both by Adams (1963, 1965) and others, 
to test his hypotheses (Deutsch, 1985). There has been a particular focus on researching the 
hypothesis that inequity will be reduced by altering one’s own inputs (Deutsch, 1985). 
Deutsch (1985) describes a series of experiments that were conducted by Adams and his 
colleagues (Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962; Adams, 1963; Adams and Jacobson, 1964) 
designed to test whether an employee who believes he has been over rewarded will firstly 
experience inequity tension, and secondly will attempt to reduce such tension by increasing 
their inputs. These experiments were conducted using samples of students who were 
employed to proofread galley pages. Students were divided into two groups, one of which 
was a high inequity condition – students were encouraged to believe that they were not 
qualified to earn what they were being paid – and the other a low inequity condition – where 
students were led to believe that they were adequately qualified to earn their pay. Results 
indicated that those who believed they were being overpaid (the high inequity group) 
increased their inputs, either the quality or the quantity of their work, relative to those who 
believed they were being equitably paid (the low inequity group). A similar series of 
experiments also provided evidence for the hypothesis that people believing themselves to 
be underpaid would be likely to reduce their inputs in order to rectify the inequity tension 
(Deutsch, 1985). Similar to the experiments carried out by Frolich et al (1987) described 
   
   40 
earlier in this chapter, this research is also based on student samples within a laboratory type 
setting, which, as mentioned previously, raises a number of similar concerns. These are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3, as such criticisms apply to a wide range of social 
psychological justice research.  
 
Adams’ (1963, 1965) main contribution to equity theory was characterising processes 
involved in reducing inequity tension (Deutsch, 1985). Walster, Berscheid and Walster 
(1973) identified the need for what they termed a more general social psychological theory, 
and thus attempted to extend the work being done in equity theory. They put forward four 
propositions that formed the core of their theory. The first proposed that individuals will try 
to maximise their outcomes, the second that groups will maximise collective reward by 
developing systems for the equitable distribution of rewards and costs among members and 
will induce members to adhere to such systems by rewarding those who treat others 
equitably and punishing those who treat others inequitably, the third that individual become 
distressed when participating in an inequitable relationship, with the distress being 
proportional to the extent of the inequity, and finally the fourth that individuals in an 
inequitable relationship will attempt to restore equity in order to eliminate their distress, 
trying harder the more distress they feel (Walster et al, 1973).  
 
These principles appear to combine the arguments of both Homans (1961) and Adams 
(1963, 1965), and were clearly an attempt to develop a comprehensive equity theory. These 
principles thus embody much of the work done in the area of equity theory, and as such 
many of the criticisms of Walster et al’s (1973) principles can be extended to the work of 
both Homans (1961) and Adams (1963, 1965) and equity theory in general. Such criticisms 
can therefore, possibly be best understood by looking at equity theory as a whole. 
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Equity theory contributed three main notions to the psychological study of justice. The first 
relates to an understanding of human nature and the notion of justice perceptions being 
closely linked to self-interest. It is clear that a number of assumptions about human nature 
and society underpin the propositions put forward by equity theorists, particularly Walster et 
al (1978).  A first assumption is that man is essentially selfish, while a second is that these 
selfish people, in competition with one another, will collectively attempt to maximise reward 
for their group. Thus equity theory can be understood to be based on the principles of 
philisophical egoism and utilitarianism - as described earlier in this chapter – in that it 
asserts that that people act to maximise their own good as well as the good of everyone 
affected. It can, therefore, be argued that social psychological theory was initially influenced 
by the dominance of utilitarianist thinking within philosophy, and as will be seen, went 
through a similar challenge to its underlying assumptions. A third assumption of equity 
theory is that man is largely rational (Deutsch, 1985). All these assumptions have very little 
support, both empirically as well as anecdotally (Deutsch, 1985; Lerner, 1974, 1975). Lerner 
(1980) rejects the assumption that concern about justice is actually a reflection of egoistic 
self-interest. He argues that justice perceptions are, in fact, central organising themes in 
people’s lives that emanate from early development where children learn to forgo immediate 
gratification for the promise of more desirable future outcomes (Lerner, 1980). An 
alternative perspective was also put forward by Folger (1998) who proposes that people care 
about justice because they have a basic respect for human worth and dignity. He argues that 
people care about justice even when there is no apparent economic benefit to them for doing 
so. In this view, as is argued by Rawls (1971), justice is seen as a virtue in itself. 
  
   
   42 
The second notion that equity theory proposes is that people will respond negatively to, and 
will attempt to alleviate negative affect resulting from, perceived injustice. The second 
proposition has received general consensus and is supported anecdotally as well as by 
research albeit somewhat sparse (Deutsch, 1985, Adams & Freedman, 1976; Ross, Thibaut 
& Evenbeck, 1971; Austin & Walster, 1974). This proposition is not the site of contestation. 
It is the third notion  - that a society will agree that equity is the appropriate basis upon 
which to distribute benefits and burdens – that has been the source of extensive 
disagreement (Furby, 1986). It is argued that inequity cannot be equated with injustice, as 
there are standards of justice other than the equity rule that can be used in making justice 
judgments. Deutsch (1985) argued that up until the mid-eighties theorising and research into 
the social psychology of justice had been heavily dominated by “…the assumption that 
equity is the sovereign principle of distributive justice” (Deutsch, 1986, p. 172). It is this 
criticism that has evoked the most cohesive response to equity theory. Lerner (1974), 
Leventhal (1976), Sampson (1983) and Deutsch (1975) propose a number of different values 
that could underpin the distributions of benefits and burdens. These include, among others,  
on the basis of need (those who are more needy will be entitled to more than those who are 
not), equality (goods get distributed equally to all members of the group), ability, according 
to the social value of their contribution, and on the basis of what is best for the common 
good (a utilitarian principle). A focus of post-equity distributive justice research has been to 
specify when different standards are employed (Furby, 1986). Deutsch (1975) proposed that 
equality and need were two important distributive values, and he hypothesised the following: 
equity will be the dominant principle of distributive justice where economic productivity is 
the dominant goal; equality will be the dominant principle of distributive justice where 
enjoyment of social relations is the common goal; and need will be the dominant principle of 
distributive justice where personal development and welfare is the common goal.  
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Some attempts have been made to test these, and similar, hypotheses (Mann, Radford, & 
Kanagawa, 1985; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992; Notz & Starke, 1978). For example Pratto, Tatar 
and Conway-Lanz (1999) explored how people allocate social resources between 
meritorious and needy parties i.e. the extent to which allocations were based on principles of 
equity or need. They argued that merit and need are two dominant societal ideologies, and as 
such these two principles would be invoked by people in order to justify allocation 
decisions. They further hypothesised that when the social context has not made clear which 
of these two values to use in making an allocation decision, people’s social values and 
ideological habits will influence which principle they invoke (Pratto, Tatar and Conway-
Lanz, 1999).  In a series of four experiments, a sample of university students read a number 
of scenarios that asked them to imagine that certain allocation decisions needed to be made, 
and which set the need and merit principles in opposition to one another, i.e. for each 
scenario subjects had to make an allocation either to a meritorious group or a needy group. 
Once they had made their decision they were asked to write a few sentences explaining why 
they had made that particular choice. In order to assess ideological habits of the participants, 
each student completed a Social Dominance Orientation questionnaire that assesses whether 
people prefer group-based equality or group based inequality (with a low score indicating a 
preference for group-based equality and a high score indicating a preference for group-based 
inequality). Results indicated that participants with a high social dominance orientation 
favoured meritorious parties in contrast to participants with a low social dominance 
orientation who favoured needy parties.  In addition to this, in their written responses 
explaining the reasons for their choice, participants provided ideological reasons for their 
decisions based on the values of merit and need. The authors argue that unlike Walster et al 
(1973) who claim there is one psychological principle that people feel is just, or like Deutsch 
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(1975) who asserts that the justice principle will differ based on context, they are arguing 
that different people’s orientation towards social relationships influence the justice principle 
they believe to be fair (Pratto, Tatar and Conway-Lanz, 1999). 
 
Clearly this is still a much contested space, one that is, in fact, unlikely to be resolved to 
everyone’s agreement. This type of debate is essentially a normative one in that it is an 
attempt to develop a conception of justice i.e. the thrust of efforts in this area is to determine 
what constitutes someone’s (or group’s) due. Is it based on what they contribute, or what 
they need, or alternatively should it be based on equality, or any other range of values 
thought of by researchers and theorists? In this way psychological research into distributive 
justice somewhat resembles the efforts of philosophers such as Rawls (1971). As indicated 
earlier in this chapter, Rawls’ (1971), in his theory of justice, attempts to argue for a 
conception of justice that can be seen to be based on notions of equality and need. Despite 
centuries of debate about what justice is, or ought to be, there is still no common consensus 
either within disciplines, or between them. This is, perhaps, unsurprising. As hypothesised 
by Deutsch (1975) and somewhat supported by research, the values that underpin justice 
judgements are not consistent for all people in all contexts. This is perhaps one of the most 
salient observations to emerge from efforts in the arena of distributive justice.  
 
While some theorists and researchers were contensting the notion of equity as the basis for 
justice judgements, other theorists responded to equity theory by emphasising the need for a 
broader approach, one that moves beyond distributive concerns and focuses on the roots of 
justice perceptions i.e. how do people develop a concept of justice? In this regard, Lerner 
(1980) proposed his just world theory. Based on his observations of North American adults 
(Furby, 1986),  Lerner (1980) proposes that people need to believe that the world is a fair 
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place, where people get what they deserve. He argues that this belief in a just world develops 
as a result of childhood developmental experiences, where children learn that it is often 
advantageous to delay gratification for some deferred greater pleasure (Lerner, 1980). By 
doing this children learn to anticipate different consequences for different kinds of actions, 
as well as to anticipate or expect certain outcomes if they meet the preconditions for 
obtaining them (Furby, 1986). These expectations in turn form the basis for the concept of 
deserving and entitlement, where a person should be entitled to particular outcomes if they 
fullfill certain preconditions (Furby, 1986). However, in order to sustain this understanding 
of exchanges, Lerner (1980) argues that people need to believe in a constant and consistent 
environment in which everyone gets what they deserve.  
 
By extension, a belief in a just world suggests that people will have a need to believe that 
fortunate people have deserved their reward, while victims of misfortune will have done 
something bad to deserve such a fate. As such when one is faced with seeming injustice i.e. 
the suffering of innocent victims, people with a high belief in a just world will tend to 
derogate the victim (i.e. find some way in which the victim ‘deserved’ the misfortune) in 
order to avoid a cognitive imbalance that would threaten their belief in a just world. This is 
because a disruption in such a belief would imply that they too could be the undeserving 
victim of some misfortune. Believers in a just world are therefore invested in upholding and 
protecting their faith, even in the face of incongruent or disrupting evidence (Dion & Dion, 
1987). Lerner and Miller (1978, cited in Furnham and Procter, 1992) postulate that this 
ontological cathexis in holding a belief in a just world may serve such an important 
‘adaptive function’ so as to be considered a personality variable.  
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While Lerner’s (1980) theory generated considerable interest and research, it also has 
become the site of much contention. Such contention centres around the extent to which 
belief in a just world can be considered a personality trait or rather a normal reaction to the 
functioning of a society. Critics of Lerner (1980) have argued that North American adults 
are not a generalisable population group, and that this theory does not account for societies 
in which actual injustice exists. As such to assume that the belief in a just world is the 
function of personality (an intrinsic and stable characteristic of the individual) rather than of 
the social context in which people find themselves is to negate the reality of actual injustice. 
In other words, many people might have a low belief in a just world because the world in 
which they live is in fact unjust. For example Furnham (1993) conducted research in 12 
societies in order to explore differences in belief in a just world. He found that people in 
wealthier and more prosperous countries had a much higher belief in a just world than those  
in poorer and disenfranchised countries.  He argues that “…some people believe in a just 
world because of their personal pathology and experiences, but there is evidence that just 
world beliefs are a function not only of a personal experience, but also of societal 
functionalism (i.e. a country’s societal and structural factors).”  (Furnham, 1993).  At best, 
the notion that the belief in a just world is a function of personality has received very 
qualified support (Joseph & Stringer, 1998).  
 
Despite these concenrs, the notion of a belief in a just world elicited interest from 
researchers in relation to a number of concerns. One such focus has been the relationship 
between the belief in a just world and individual differences, such as personality traits. For 
example, belief in a just world has been explored in relation to authoritarianism (Rubin & 
Peplau, 1973), conservatism (Wagstaff & Quirk, 1983), internal locus of control 
(Suckerman& Gerbasi, 1977), religious beliefs (Zweigenhaft, Phillips, adams, Morse & 
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Horan, 1985) and work ethic (Smith & Green, 1984). A great deal of emphasis has also been 
placed on demographic correlates of belief in a just world, particularly that of gender 
differences. A number of studies and meta-analytic reviews have been conducted in an 
attempt to explore whether men and women differ in the extent of their belief in a just world 
(O’Connor & Morrison, 1996). Results have been largely inconsistent.  
 
Despite this the controversies, most particularly in relation to y about the value bases for 
distribution,  that equity theory gave rise to, it was not related questions that dictated the 
next dominant line of enquiry. Rather this emerged from concerns about what theorists 
argued was the solely distributive focus of these justice theories. Equity theory was criticised 
for having an over-emphasis on the outcomes that people receive (Leventhal, 1976, Folger & 
Cropanzano, 2001) and its neglect of the impact that procedures have on how people make 
justice judgements (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel & Rupp, 2001). 
Theorists thus began hypothesising about and researching the role that decision-making 
procedures have on experiences and perceptions of justice. These theories and research 
became known as procedural justice theories, and in this way defined equity theory as a 
distributive justice theory. It is in this way that what eventually became the tripartite justice 
model, discussed earlier in this chapter, began to emerge. While the distributive justice 
dimension of the psychological model of justice remained heavily indebted to, and shaped 
by, equity theory, researchers attention became largely focussed on questions about 
procedures and their relationship to perceptions of justice. It is the theories and research that 
emerged from this focus that will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Procedural Justice 
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While social psychologists where challenging what they saw to be an overly distributive focus 
on questions about justice, a similar process was emerging within the field of philosophy 
where concerns about the procedures underpinning distributions were being raised. One of the 
most notable challenges to the distributive focus of justice in this arena came from Nozick 
(1974) whose procedural justice theory emerged in response to what he viewed as the 
shortfalls of Rawls’ (1971) theory.  His criticisms emerge from the belief that the principles of 
liberty and equality (which are, as described above the two fundamental principles of Rawls’ 
(1971) theory) are incompatible – he argues that any attempt to maintain an equal distribution 
of goods will interfere with people’s liberty. This argument is based on two sets of distinctions 
that Nozick (1974) makes regarding theories of justice.  
 
Firstly, Nozick (1974) distinguishes between what he terms ‘end-state’ (or ‘current time-
slice’) principles and ‘historical’ principles of justice. End-state principles presuppose that you 
can judge the justice of a situation based on its current structure, and adopt the view that  “all 
that needs to be looked at is who ends up with what” (Nozick, 1974, p. 67). Historical 
principles place emphasis on the way in which past patterns of distribution have resulted in the 
current distribution, and would assert that a distribution is just depending on how it came 
about. For example one might look at the education and salary structure in an organisation 
where the more educated, highly skilled (and as such valued) positions are more highly paid. 
Based on the description of the distribution, as well as a particular conception of justice, you 
may judge this distribution pattern to just. Such a view would be based on an end-state 
principle of justice. If, however, you decided that you wanted more information about how the 
people concerned came to acquire their education or valued skills, or how the organisation has 
previously distributed resources (such as training and development opportunities), you ascribe 
to historical principles. What if the skills or education were acquired through unjust means, 
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such as through the Apartheid policy of Bantu Education which, among other things, allocated 
a disproportionately high amount of resources to white schools? Nozick (1974) criticises most 
distributive justice theories (including Rawls’ (1971) theory) as being end-state theories. He 
proposes an historical approach to justice that does not just look at the ‘end state’ of a person’s 
distributive holdings, but rather refers to how people came to possess their holdings.  
 
The second distinction that Nozick (1974) makes relates to what he terms the ‘patterning’ that 
is endorsed by most distributive justice theories. He distinguishes two types of historical 
theory, namely patterned and unpatterned. Patterned theories endorse the view that 
distributions should be made according to some kind of pattern based on the statement ‘To 
each according to their____” (Wolff, 1996). As discussed earlier, different theories suggest 
different bases for the distribution of resources, such as to each according to their merit, to 
each according to their need, or to each according to their ability. Unpatterned theories, on the 
other hand, do not do this, but rather focus on the procedural aspects of distribution. In such a 
theory the basis of just distribution is people acquiring goods through legitimate procedures 
(Wolff, 1996).  
 
Nozick (1974) asserts that almost all theories of justice are either patterned or end-state. It is 
these features of justice theories that present a problem with regards to the compatibility of 
liberty and equality. He asks us to imagine that a distribution, based on a pattern of choice, has 
at last been achieved. In other words shares of the resource vary according to the dimension 
most favoured, be it equality, merit, need or any of the other suggested dimensions. What is 
likely to happen from there on? Nozick (1974) argues that people will begin trading with one 
another, upsetting the original distribution of resources. He gives the example of a sportsman 
who is exceptionally popular and who signs a contract with his managers stipulating that he 
   
   50 
receives a portion of the ticket price for himself. A large number of people enjoy watching him 
play sport, and they are willing to use some of their resources to do so. As such, millions of 
tickets are sold over the course of the season, and the sportsman accrues more wealth than 
people who are not good or popular sportsmen (or other marketable talents). The sportsman 
made his or her money through legitimate transactions that were entered into fairly, yet the 
distribution is no longer the same as the initial favoured distribution. In order to maintain the 
desired distribution, people’s liberty (their freedom to use their resources as they wished) 
would have to be interfered with.  
 
It is this argument that Nozick (1974) claims refutes much of Rawls (1971) theory of justice. 
He argues that the Difference Principle is a patterned conception of justice in that resources 
must be distributed in order to make the least well-off as well-off as possible.  Should such a 
distribution be achieved, people will then use their resources as they wish, some spending, 
some gaining more. As such the Difference Principle will, at some point, no longer be 
satisfied. In order to once again satisfy this principle, resources will need to be re-distributed. 
This will require the interference in people’s liberty. Given that Rawls (1971) prioritises the 
Liberty Principle over the Difference Principle, Nozick (1974) argues that if the Difference 
Principle does in fact interfere with the Liberty Principle, then the Difference Principle must 
be forfeited. As such, Nozick (1974) argues that liberty upsets patterns. In fact he states that    
“ …no end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously 
realised without continuous interference with people’s lives” (Nozick, 1974, p. 73). Nozick 
(1974) attempts to provide an alternative theory of justice that accounts for these criticisms, 
which he terms a Historical Entitlement theory of Justice. He does not present a fully 
developed version of this theory, but rather attempts to account for the general features of this 
theory. 
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Nozick (1974) begins his account by arguing that the term ‘distributive justice’ is not neutral 
as it implies some form of centralised body whose function it is to dole out a supply of things. 
Theories of social justice presuppose that a society’s resources and wealth can be likened to a 
cake, and questions about justice pertain to how the cake can best be divided up (Simmonds, 
2002). According to Simmonds (2002), within this paradigm, equal distribution of the cake 
has the most supporters, with distribution on the basis of need being the second most popular 
view (It is not clear what evidence there is to support this notion). Other arguments might 
focus on how the distribution of the cake will effect the size of the cake in the future, or 
counter to this, how such concerns cannot be a consideration for distribution of the cake now 
(Simmonds, 2002).  Equity theory argues that people will favour the cake being divided up on 
the basis of what individuals contributed to the making of the cake. This paradigm, Nozick 
(1974) argues, is faulty for a number of reasons. Firstly it does not account for the idea of 
redistribution – where error was present in the initial distribution, and needs to be corrected. 
Secondly he argues that there is no such thing as a central distribution, no one individual or 
group who has the right to control all resources. Instead, a free society will comprise different 
people controlling different resources. He states that the total result of distributions in a society 
is in fact the product of numerous individual decisions, decisions that these individuals are 
entitled to make. As such his focus is on the ‘holdings’ people possess, and how they came to 
have them. As such he terms his specific focus that of ‘justice in holdings’ (Nozick, 1974). 
 
The subject of justice in holdings consists of three topics. The first is the ‘original acquisition 
of holdings’, which focuses on the ways in which unheld resources come to be appropriated. 
Principles or rules emerging from concerns related to this topic are referred to as ‘principles of 
justice in acquisition’. Secondly there is the topic of ‘the transfer of holdings’, which is 
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concerned with the ways in which holdings get passed from one person to another. Principles 
governing such matters are referred to as ‘the principle of justice in transfer’. The final topic is 
that of ‘the rectification of injustice in holdings’. This topic focuses on past injustices that 
have shaped current holdings, and is concerned with notions of rectification (Nozick, 1974).  
 
Nozick (1974) argues that the subject of justice could be accounted for on the basis of the 
acquisition and transfer of holdings, in the following way: Firstly, a person who appropriates a 
holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
Secondly, a person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. And finally, no 
one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. (1974, p. 69). Nozick 
(1974) views the principle of distributive justice to be one where everyone is entitled to the 
holdings they have under the distribution. A just distribution is one that arises from another 
just distribution that is based on legitimate means. ‘Legitimate means’ are defined in relation 
to the principles of transfer and acquisition – i.e. what he terms the legitimate ‘first moves’ 
(how an unheld holding initially came to be held) must be done in accordance with the 
principles of justice in acquisition. Further, to transfer holdings legitimately from one 
individual to another means doing so in accordance with the principles of legitimate transfer.  
In this way, Nozick’s (1974) theory of justice in holdings is historical as it does not only look 
at the end-state distribution, but rather the legitimacy of how holdings have come to be 
possessed.    
 
Nozick (1974) describes a number of illegitimate means of acquiring or transferring holdings: 
theft, fraud, slavery, and forcible exclusion. It is such past injustices that demand the existence 
of the third topic of justice in holdings, that of the rectification of past injustices. This topic 
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would derive principles of justice based on questions such as what should be done, if anything, 
to rectify past injustices; what obligations do benefactors of past injustice have to those whose 
situations were worsened by the injustice; if one attempts to rectify past injustices, how far 
back need one go in order to erase past injustices; and what can victims of past injustice 
rightfully do in order to rectify the injustice? Nozick (1974) acknowledges that it is very 
difficult to devise a thorough treatment for such questions, and as such a principle of 
rectification.  He argues that should this, in an ideal state, be possible, such a principle would 
use historical information to determine where holdings were acquired or transferred 
illegitimately, to trace events that followed from these injustices and would provide a 
description of the current state. Nozick (1974) presumes that the principle of rectification 
would then make use of this information to predict what would have occurred if the injustice 
had not been perpetrated. As such Nozick argues that “ the general outlines of the theory of 
justice in holdings are that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the 
principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of injustice 
(as specified by the first two principles). If each person’s holdings are just, then the total set 
(distribution) of holdings is just” (1974, p. 66).  
 
It is interesting to note that while Nozick’s (1974) theory attempts to move beyond a static 
notion of justice by incorporating ideas about procedure and historical entitlement, it still 
remains a theory about the distribution of goods and conditions, i.e. it addresses a procedural 
concern within a distributive justice paradigm. There are a number of theorists who argue 
that this is a severe limitation of most of theories of social justice (Young, 1990; Sen, 1999; 
Nussbaum, 1996). This debate will be looked at more closely in Chapter 4 when discussing 
demographic variables and social position in relation to experiences and perceptions of 
justice, as research into demographic variables can be seen as an important factor in 
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developing theories of justice that move beyond notions of simple distribution. Nozick 
(1974) does, however, introduce important concerns about the limitations of looking at 
distributive justice purely in relation to end-state outcomes, as the distributive theories 
discussed above all do. By looking at the way in which what leads up to a particular outcome 
decision is central to questions about the fairness of the outcome itself, Nozick’s (1974) 
theory mirrored developments in the area of social psychological research. An important 
deviation of these theories, however, is that they focus on more micro processes, as opposed 
to Nozick (1974) who, like Rawls (1971), has broader societal processes as his focus.  
 
As discussed earlier, equity theory was criticised for its exclusive focus on outcomes of 
distributions. It can be argued that equity theory, like Rawls’ (1971) theory, is an end-state 
theory in that it does not consider historical or procedural processes when accounting for 
perceptions of justice. Social psychologists were alerted to the importance of procedural 
justice by Thibaut and Walker (1975) who conducted a series of studies within a legal setting 
aimed at exploring the importance of procedures in determining perceptions of fairness about 
outcomes. They hypothesised that the procedure followed in determining the outcome of a 
dispute resolution process will influence the litigant’s satisfaction with the outcome of the 
case (Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  A number of laboratory experiments were conducted in 
order to test this hypothesis as well as to explore further this notion of procedural justice 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In these studies two dispute resolution processes were used – an 
adversary and inquisitorial procedure. The adversary procedure placed control over defining 
the dispute and presenting the arguments and evidence in the hands of the disputants, i.e. 
they had some control over the process. The inquisitorial procedure, on the other hand, gave 
control of the process to the judge or arbitrator.  Thibaut and Walker (1975) used samples of 
university students, lawyers and judges in a series of experiments involving simulated 
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disputes aimed at determining if the type of procedure used (i.e. the adversary or inquisitorial 
procedures) affected ‘litigants’ perceptions of the ‘judge’s’ decision. Results from these 
experiments indicated that use of the adversarial procedure elicited more favourable 
perceptions of the outcome than use of the inquisitorial procedure, irrespective of whether 
the litigants won their case or not.  
 
An example of such an experiment was a study conducted by Walker, LaTour, Lind, and 
Thibaut (1974 in Thibaut & Walker, 1975) where university students participated in a 
business simulation exercise that allowed participants to benefit from cheating. At a point in 
the experiment a member of the team was accused of cheating and a process was set up to 
determine their guilt. In certain conditions the participant was made to appear guilty while in 
other they appeared innocent, and the outcome of the process (i.e. the determination of guilt 
and innocence) was unrelated to the actual innocence or guilt of the subject. Both adversarial 
in inquisitorial processes were used, and participants’ satisfaction with the range of outcomes 
was assessed. As hypothesised, participants were more satisfied with the verdict, regardless 
of the guilt or innocence of the subject, when the adversarial procedure was used rather than 
the inquisitorial procedure. A second experiment (Thibaut, Friedland, & Walker, 1974) 
aimed to investigate whether subjects would be more likely to adhere to rules that they had 
participated in making. This study, also involving a business simulation involving 96 
undergraduate students, showed that participants observed rules more closely in what was 
termed the correspondent rule condition – where students had the opportunity to participate 
in the rule making – than in the non-correspondent condition – where they were unable to 
participate in the rule-making process.  
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Thibaut and Walker (1975) thus proposed a psychological model that looked at procedural 
justice preferences, where it is issues of control distribution between participants and the 
third party that are central to perceptions of fair processes (Tyler, 1989). They distinguish 
between two types of control that occur at two stages in any given procedure, namely process 
control and decision control. Process control refers to the individuals control over the 
presentation of facts, information and evidence, while decision control refers to the 
participants control over the actual decision made (Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 
1978). They state that dispute-resolution procedures can be classified according to process 
and decision control, and that these factors may be a key determinant of preference for 
procedures (Houlden et al, 1978). Adversarial procedures are preferred because they allow 
litigants to retain more process control than inquisitorial procedures.  A demonstration of 
these hypotheses was provided in an experiment involving 82 law students and 
undergraduates. Participants were placed in a situation where they were expected to take on 
the role of a third-party or a litigant, and where four dispute resolution procedures were used 
– each one varying in the extent to which the third-party had control over the presentation of 
evidence (i.e. process control) and over the final decision (i.e. decision control).  Results 
indicated that both the litigants and the third parties preferred high third-party decision 
control. Further, results indicated that process control was viewed as more important than 
decision control, and that process control is important even if it is not linked to decision 
control (Houlden et al, 1978). This experiment also demonstrated the importance of 
procedural justice as it indicated that injustice is most likely to be perceived to have occurred 
if an individual perceives a lack of process control (Randall and Mueller, 1995).  
 
Another experiment using 283 graduate students aimed to explore whether process control 
yielded more favourable perceptions of outcomes than the absence of process control. 
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Results indicated that regardless of whether the participants assumed the role of accuser or 
accused those who exercised process control evaluated all aspects of the trial more positively 
than those who did not have process control (Musante, Gilbert & Thibaut, 1983). A critical 
element of Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) procedural justice theory is, therefore, that the 
perceived fairness of the procedure will result in satisfaction with the outcome itself, 
regardless of whether the outcome is positive or not (Barrett-Howard and Tyler, 1986). Many 
theorists have noted the relationship between procedural and distributive justice (Randall and 
Mueller, 1995; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Folger (1977) refers to a mutual influence 
or co-determination, where perceptions of the procedures used will impact on the perceptions 
of the outcome itself, and vice-versa.  
 
While Thibaut and Walker (1975) relied on experimental enquiries to provide evidence for 
their theories, a number of studies conducted in the field and using correlational designs were 
conducted in order to enhance the robustness of the evidence. For example Tyler (1984) 
conducted research using actual litigants in a misdemeanour court in America.  He 
interviewed the participants, asking them about their experiences in the courtroom, their 
perceptions of the case, the outcome of the case, their perceptions about the fairness of the 
verdict as well as the procedures used to try their case. Tyler (1984) found that judgements of 
procedural and distributive justice were distinct from one another, and he argued that this 
implied that justice perceptions were not simply linked to the favourability of outcomes. 
Using a regression analysis, Tyler (1984) found that perceptions of fairness accounted for 
more of the variance in the dependent variables than did outcome favourability (Tyler, 1984). 
Moving to a different field setting, Alexander and Ruderman (1987) conducted research 
using 2800 American federal employees. Participant’s judgements about their work 
environment, including those about perceptions of decision-making fairness, were used to 
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predict job satisfaction and intention to turnover. Results indicated that both job satisfaction 
and turnover intention were influenced by perceptions of procedural justice. According to 
Tyler and Lind (1991) a range of similar correlational studies in natural field settings provide 
support for the procedural justice hypothesis.  
 
In trying to explore why process control was emerging as so central to perceptions of 
fairness, researchers started focussing on what was termed the value-expressive function 
of speech.  It was argued that the opportunity to ‘tell one’s side of the story’, i.e. the 
opportunity to speak, might, in many instances, be an important part of speech other than 
just its utility to secure other outcomes (Tyler & Lind, 1991). Folger (1977) thus 
identified two further characteristics of procedures that enhance or decrease an 
individual’s sense of participation in procedures and outcomes, namely those of voice or 
mute procedures. Voice procedures are those that allow the individual to contribute to the 
decision-making, and mute procedures are those that deny people that opportunity.  
 
Folger (1977) conducted an experiment in order to explore the impact of voice on 
perceived inequity. Eighty sixth-grade boys assumed the role of worker and were given a 
card-sorting task for ten work periods. A manager, unknown to the participants to be part 
of the experiment, decided after each work period how a monetary reward would be 
divided between himself and the participant. The way in which this reward was divided 
was varied between two conditions (equal pay or unequal pay favouring the manager). 
Participants were then either given an opportunity to voice their opinion or they were not. 
In certain cases the manager changed the allocation after hearing the participants opinion 
of the allocation decision, while in other cases the decision remained unchanged. 
Regarding distributive justice perceptions, results indicated that among participants who 
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received the same reward, those who had voice perceived the outcome to be fairer than 
those who had no voice. In relation to procedural justice perceptions, participants with 
voice were more satisfied with the allocation process than participants in the mute 
condition.  
 
While Folger (1977) did alert researchers to the potential importance of voice in 
procedural justice perceptions, this experiment raises a number of concerns. Similar to the 
concerns raised about other experiments described in this chapter, this study used a 
sample of students who were asked to pretend to be employers, something they were ill 
equipped to do having presumably never been in any kind of employment (considering 
their age). The importance or the value that the money that eleven or twelve year old boys 
earn from participating in a game at school cannot be likened to that of a self-sufficient 
person working in order to support themselves, and possibly a family. Within the real 
context of an organisation, it can be argued that considerably more emotion, anxiety and 
concern is invested in reward allocation processes than can be experienced by school 
children. As such the results of such an experiment might not be reflective of what would 
actually happen in a real world setting. Employees might not care as much about 
procedures, being heavily invested in outcomes, or might be even more heavily invested 
in the procedures given the significance of the outcome. Despite the problems with this 
experiment, it was considered to be seminal study that laid the foundation for further 
investigation into the importance of procedures for justice judgements.  
 
While process and decision control as well as voice were all considered important aspects of 
procedures, Leventhal (1980) argued these were only a few of the characteristics of 
procedures that could potentially impact on perceptions of fairness. He developed a theory 
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relating to the characteristics of procedures used in order to make allocation decisions, where 
he proposed six criteria that could be used to evaluate the fairness of allocation procedures 
(Leventhal, 1980). These six criteria include consistency (the application of rules equally to 
all concerned over time), bias suppression (the prevention of self-interest in the allocation 
process), accuracy (the basing of decisions on accurate information), correctability ( the 
modifiability of decisions where appropriate), representativeness (the representation of all 
parties concerned in the process), ethicality (the reflection of current ethical and moral 
principles in the process). As can be seen this is a much broader model than Thibaut and 
Walker’s (1975) model which only accounts for the control aspect of procedures or Folger 
(1977) who focuses on the role of voice in procedural justice judgements. Despite this, 
Leventhal’s (1980) has not received much attention from researchers and thus remains 
largely unsupported by empirical evidence (Tyler & Lind, 1991).  
 
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) procedural justice hypothesis is viewed as a pioneering theory 
within the social psychological study of justice (Tyler and Lind, 1991) and a retrospective 
analysis of the research trajectory in this area allows us to see how, through their work, 
procedural justice emerged as distinct from distributive justice as an area of research and 
analysis. While there does appear to be considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that 
these two dimensions of justice are distinct from one another and have separate effects, it is 
important to look more carefully at the implications this has for a model of justice 
perceptions. Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) hypothesis was an a priori one - they suspected 
that procedural issues were important in the assessment of justice perceptions, and thus set 
out to explore the validity of these suspicions. Upon asking people about their experiences of 
procedures, and through experiments that manipulate different aspects of procedures, they 
ascertained that procedures were important to people when assessing the fairness of 
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outcomes. Further research supported these findings. While this has obvious value in 
contributing to our understanding of justice perceptions, it might be presumptuous to assume 
that this constitutes a model of justice perceptions as research does not indicate that people 
might naturally distinguish between procedural and distributive justice concerns, nor does it 
explore what other dimensions of justice might be important to people. Procedural justice 
perceptions emerge as central because, to some extent, researchers centred questions about 
procedures – by asking people about procedures and their importance we can gain insight 
into the importance procedures have for them, not into what factors account for their 
perceptions of justice. Despite this there was an almost exclusive focus on theories about and 
research into procedural justice until the mid eighties, when questions about why people care 
about procedural justice led to the emergence of the third dimension in the tripartite justice 
model – that of interpersonal justice.  
 
Interpersonal Justice 
 
 
There is little clear agreement over the definition of interpersonal justice. Some authors refer 
to it as the manner in which outcomes are communicated to individuals on an interpersonal 
level (Greenberg, 1987), while other writers define it to be about the perceived fairness of the 
treatment received and the symbolic and intangible outcomes of procedures (for example 
respect) (Folger and Konovsky, 1989). Further to this, some authors identify interpersonal 
justice as the social (rather than structural) aspect of procedural justice, while others refer to 
it as a separate justice dimension (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). The dimensionality of 
the justice model has been the source of extensive debate, and this will be discussed further 
on in this chapter. What is central to most discussions about interpersonal justice is that it 
refers to the quality of treatment an individual believes he or she has received from decision 
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makers, and the extent to which they feel that the formal decision making procedures are 
properly enacted (Leung, Chiu and Au, 1993). 
 
Bies (1987, 1989) was one of the first researchers to refer to interpersonal justice perceptions 
and to treat it as a separate justice dimension. He argued that procedural justice researchers 
such as Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Folger (1977) had focussed exclusively on structural 
concerns related to procedures, but had neglected the social importance that procedures had 
for people. He further argued that other theorists, such as Leventhal (1980) had conflated 
structural and social procedural concerns. He proposed that rather than just procedures and 
outcomes, there were in fact three aspects of justice that people distinguished between – that 
of procedures, interactions, and outcomes – and that each of these three dimensions were 
assessed or judged separately by people (Bies, 1987).   As such he argued that interpersonal 
justice should be researched independently of distributive and procedural justice.  
 
On the basis of initial research conducted by Bies and Moag (1986 in Cropanzano et al, 
2001) interpersonal justice was defined and operationalised as comprising two aspects, 
namely the interpersonal treatment received from decision-makers (such as respect, 
courtesy and friendliness), and the use of adequate explanations and causal accounts for 
the outcome (informational justice). The importance of socially sensitive treatment for 
people and their perceptions of justice has been well researched and documented. A study 
conducted by Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, and Samuelson (1985) asked people to list 
perceived unfair behaviours that had been enacted towards them by others. The majority 
of behaviours reported focussed on issues such as being treated politely or with 
consideration, rather than a on distributive concerns. A similar study conducted by 
Mikula, Petri, and Tanzer (1990) involved the categorisation of 280 descriptions of unjust 
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events collected from various student samples in Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, and West 
Germany, using different methodologies. They found that a considerable portion of the 
events that were reported by participants referred to the manner in which people felt they 
were treated in interpersonal interactions with others. It is interesting to note that the 
sample was one comprised of university students, which again raises some of the concerns 
mentioned throughout this chapter.  
 
The impact of interpersonal justice perceptions has also been explored. A study conducted 
by Skarlicki and Folger (1997) aimed to explore whether employees propensity to take 
part in organisational retaliatory behaviour were related to, among other things, 
perceptions of interpersonal justice (defined as the respect and dignity shown by the 
employee’s supervisors).  Results indicated that when supervisors showed adequate 
sensitivity and concern toward employees, as well as being respectful, displeased 
employees were more accepting of the unfair situation and less likely to engage in 
retaliatory behaviour. Greenberg (1994) explored the relationship between socially fair 
treatment and the acceptance of a smoking ban within an organisation.  One of the 
hypotheses considers whether the degree of acceptance of a smoking ban will be 
determined by the degree of social sensitivity (interpersonal justice) shown in the 
communication and enforcement of the ban.  Findings showed that the higher the degree 
of social sensitivity the more people were accepting of the smoking ban (Greenberg, 
1994). 
 
The group-value model developed by Lind and Tyler (1988) can be understood to be a theory 
pertaining to socially sensitive treatment. While it was originally developed, and is often 
presented, as a theory that attempts to account for why people cared about procedural justice, 
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in doing so it focussed on the social importance of procedures. Shapiro (2001) argues that the 
group value model should not be seen as distinct from interpersonal justice theory. This 
model identifies three elements that become of value to people when making justice 
judgements, due to the value placed on social group membership, namely trust, standing and 
neutrality. Trust pertains to the perceived intentions of the third parties, and involves the 
belief that they desire to treat people in a fair and benevolent manner (Tyler, 1989). The 
intentions of the third party are particularly important as current interactions allow the 
individual to make assumptions of how things will be in the future. Standing refers to the 
individuals concern with their status in the group. If they are treated rudely, they are aware 
that the authority they are dealing with views them as having low standing within the group. 
However, if respect is shown for people’s rights as group members, they know that their 
rights will be respected. (Tyler, 1989). Neutrality refers to the extent to which an individual 
believes decision-makers are neutral and free from bias with regards to such decision-
making. Individuals value neutrality as it is an indication that their interests will not be 
disregarded and enhances the belief that they may benefit fairly from membership of the 
organisation (Tyler, 1989). 
 
A study conducted by Tyler (1989) aimed to test the group-value model as an explanation for 
the perceived importance of procedural justice perceptions. This study was specifically 
aimed at testing non-control issues, as had been done by procedural justice researchers such 
as Thibaut and Walker (1975). The sample comprised 652 residents of Chicago who were 
interviewed telephonically after they had had an experience with the legal authorities such as 
an appearance in court, a call to the police for assistance, or being stopped by the police. 
Outcome favourability, the independent variable, was assessed in what Tyler (1989) referred 
to as both absolute and relative terms. In order to assess the absolute favourability of the 
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outcome respondents were asked about the actual outcome of the experience, such as 
receiving a traffic ticket, being arrested or winning a court case. Answers were then rated 
accordingly. With regards to the relative favourability of the outcome, this was assessed in 
relation to four standards, that of control (assessed with one item for process control and one 
item for decision control), neutrality (assessed by measuring lack of bias with three items, 
behaviour with two items and factual decision making with two items), trust (assessed using 
a scale), and standing assessing with two items). There were four dependent variables, 
namely procedural justice perceptions (measured with a two item scale that was subsequently 
averaged into a single index), distributive justice (measured using two items that were 
subsequently averaged into a single index), affect towards authorities (measured using a 
three item scale that was subsequently averaged into a single index), and overall fairness of 
authorities in general (measured using three items that were subsequently averaged into a 
single index). A multiple regression was done the results of which indicate that neutrality, 
trust and standing consistently explain a significant amount of variance in absolute and 
relative outcome favourability. With regards to procedural justice perceptions, neutrality, 
trust and standing account for 65% of the variance when considered alone (p<0.001), 
whereas control issues account for only 39% of such variance when considered alone 
(p<0.001). Tyler (1989) argued that this study indicated that relationships with third parties 
are important to people, and they are affected by evidence about, among other things, the 
interpersonal dynamics of their interactions.  
 
This study, the first direct test of the group-value model, was an important contribution to the 
debate about social aspects of procedural justice concerns. Rather than using an experimental 
paradigm or a student sample, this study used a large and diverse sample of people who 
reflected on real life incidents that they themselves had experienced. The methodology, 
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however, presented one particular concern which, it will be argued further in this chapter and 
in Chapter 3, has been echoed in a large number of psychological studies of justice: the 
variables under consideration are reduced to one or two questions that are taken to represent 
the whole of that construct. As can be seen from discussions in this chapter, justice is a very 
complex variable that has many different facets and dimensions. Despite this, in this study 
different aspects of justice were measured using only one or two questions. Very often the 
questions in sub scales were so similar they were averaged and used as only one index. This 
is perhaps an indication that the questions needed to be designed in order to have more 
ability to discriminate between different aspects of the constructs. It seems that perhaps 
questions about how we define perceptions of justice were deprioritised in deference to the 
exploration of the relationships between variables.  
 
Despite these concerns, this study, as well as a number of others (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 
1996, Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996) have given a clear indication 
that people are concerned with the manner in which they are treated by people in authority. 
These types of findings were echoed in the second aspect of interpersonal justice that was 
focussed on by researchers, that of informational justice.  
 
Informational justice has been defined as the adequacy of the information used to explain 
how decisions are made and the thoroughness of the accounts provided (Greenberg, 1994). 
Initially this aspect of interpersonal justice was defined purely in relation to the notion of 
justification – whether or not the decision-maker provided a justification for the distribution 
decision (Bies, 1987). Early research in this area thus focussed on the role and importance of 
justification as well as investigating whether its effects were independent of those more 
structural concerns researched by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and Folger (1977). For 
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example, in a laboratory study using a sample 96 graduate students in a business school, Bies 
and Shapiro (1988) found that the type of procedure used (voice versus mute procedures) and 
justification by the decision-maker for outcomes (the absence or presence of a justification) 
had independent effects on perceptions of procedural justice.  They then conducted a second 
study in order to determine whether the findings emerging from the laboratory study would 
replicate themselves within a field setting (Bies and Shapiro, 1988). In this second study they 
used a sample of 78 M.B.A. students who were currently employed and had two years of 
work experience as well as 24 people employed in a range of industries. Participants were 
asked to recount a time when they had asked for more resources from their boss but the boss 
did not satisfy the resource demand. The three variables (procedural justice, voice and 
justification) were then measured using 7-point Likert scales. A multiple regression analysis 
was used in order to determine the relative influence of voice and justification on procedural 
justice judgements. Results indicated that both the type of procedure and the justification had 
a significant influence of procedural justice judgements (Bies and Shapiro, 1988).  
 
While the field study does seem to replicate the laboratory results, there are a number of 
methodological concerns that need to be noted. The samples used in both studies seem to be 
very similar in nature. While the field study sample does comprise people who are employed, 
for the most part these people were also business students. This raises concerns about the 
generalisability of the results to a more diverse working population, as M.B.A. students 
represent a very particular group of employees – most obviously they are likely to be, or are 
on their way to being, part of a management group. Further, the method of asking 
participants to recount an incident could present some problems. The accounts might not be 
comparable between participants – different organisations might have very different 
procedures related to resource allocation (some more rigidly defined then others), different 
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bosses might have different levels of influence, and some organisations might have resource 
constraints that others don’t - all of which might influence perceptions of the event. In 
addition to this the type of procedure (i.e. whether it was a voice or mute procedure) was 
measured using one item  - whether or not the subject felt they were given adequate 
opportunity to persuade their boss by representing their position. This item could be 
considered insufficient to measure this variable. Firstly it conflates two separate questions – 
whether they were given the opportunity to represent their position, and whether their boss 
was open to persuasion. In addition to this a voice procedure cannot simply be defined by 
whether or not the opportunity to represent oneself was given. Other questions such as in 
what way were you given voice (a direct audience, a written submission), the extent to which 
you felt heard, and who were you representing your position to (perhaps your boss has no 
influence over the decision) are just some examples of other factors that define the type of 
procedure involved. Further to this justification was also measured using only one item – the 
extent to which their boss provided a justification that the circumstances were beyond his/her 
control. As pointed out by the authors themselves (Bies and Shapiro, 1988) there are a 
number of types of justifications that can be used and this warrants further investigation. 
However in addition to this, even if they were only exploring one type of justification, this 
perhaps needed to be measured in more detail. For example how persuasive the argument 
seemed, the sincerity of the account and a range of other factors might be very important in 
defining a justification. . Finally, procedural justice perceptions were also measured using 
only one item (initially there were two items but these were summed as they had a 
correlation of r=.92) – the extent to which the decision making procedure was fair or unfair. 
This might, to some extent have been appropriate in order to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity, but perhaps a measure that accounts for more complexity would have been 
appropriate.   
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Despite these concerns, these studies, and others very similar to them (Bies, 1989, Bies and 
Shapiro, 1987) were very influential both in relation to the exploration of aspects of 
interpersonal justice as well as the debate about the independence of interpersonal justice 
from distributive justice perceptions.  However research in this area did expand in an attempt 
to develop a more sophisticated account of justifications. For example Shapiro (1991) 
conducted a laboratory study that assessed the perceived adequacy of three different types of 
causal accounts – those that used an external attribution, those using an internal attribution 
with an altruistic motive, and those using an internal attribution with a selfish motive. 
Results of this study indicated that external attributions were considered the most effective, 
with selfish attributions being the least effective. The medium through which the justification 
was given was also researched in a study that compared the perceived adequacy of face-to-
face verbal accounts and those done in writing, with results indicating that verbal 
communication was more effective at mitigating the negative effects of undesirable decisions 
(Shapiro, Buttner, and Barry, 1994). The conditions under which particular justifications are 
more effective were explored by Brockner, De Witt, Grover, & Reed (1990) on a sample of 
retrenchment survivors. They found that uncertainty about managerial procedures as well as 
the perceived importance of the event created a high need for information and social 
accounts (Brockner et al, 1990). In general, research seems to support the notion that 
perceptions of fairness are enhanced by accounts that provide information regarding the 
underlying reasons for the way in which outcomes are allocated (Cropanzano and Greenberg, 
1997) 
 
Despite a body of research that seems to indicate the importance of interpersonal justice 
perceptions, this area remains relatively neglected by justice researchers. This is perhaps due 
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to the controversy about the status of interpersonal justice in relation to procedural justice and 
the justice model as a whole. In a review article, Cropanzano and colleagues’ (2001) treatment 
of interpersonal justice was restricted to a discussion of the dimensionality of justice 
perceptions or, as they termed it ‘the structure of justice’. From this article it is clear that a 
considerable amount of debate has ensued and research been conducted in order to determine 
the factor structure of justice perceptions, with special reference to the location of 
interpersonal justice perceptions (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Bies, 1990, Bies 2001; 
Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg, 1990; Colquitt, 2001, Beugre & Baron, 2001). 
This has included three meta-analytic reviews (Bartle & Hayes, 1999; Cohen-Charesh & 
Spector, 2000; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001) which have called for the 
separation of interpersonal justice from procedural justice concerns (Cropanzano et al, 2001).  
 
This debate has perhaps been most useful in alerting researchers to the recent overemphasis on 
the structure of justice. In response to the review article by Cropanzano and colleagues (2001) 
Lind (2001) questions the value in drawing distinctions between types of justice perceptions. 
He argues that people can distinguish between different types of justice when responding to 
questionnaire items measuring different types of justice, but that the real impact of justice 
judgements depends on a more holistic or overall perception. He states “It seems to me…that 
justice researchers have put to much effort into the delineation and differentiation of various 
types of justice judgements and that we have ignored some common themes and close 
relations that exist across types of justice judgements” (Lind, 2001, p. 221). In a similar vein 
Greenberg (2001) argues that while he does not contest any of the research described by 
Cropanzano and colleagues (2001) outlining this debate, he does wonder “Does it really 
matter?” (Greenberg, 2001, p. 211). He too argues that people forming perceptions of justice 
are more likely to be making holistic judgements in response to information that is salient and 
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available, rather than distinguishing between different types of justice dimensions.  Similarly, 
Shapiro (2001) argues that people in the midst of an unjust or traumatic event are highly 
unlikely to naturally differentiate between types of justice, and that such thinking reflects the 
priorities of the researchers rather than the victims of injustice.  
 
These arguments raise concerns not only about the place of interpersonal justice perceptions, 
but the whole tripartite model of justice that has dominated social psychological enquiries into 
justice. This is an important point of departure for the current study as will be discussed in the 
conclusion.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
From the discussion in this chapter it can be seen that the tripartite model that social 
psychologists use as a framework for understanding and researching justice perceptions has 
evolved over a period of time, starting with equity theory and distributive justice, and ending 
with the emergence of interpersonal justice concerns. This model, which differentiates 
between three aspects of justice, has been useful particularly when exploring decisions that 
have emerged from clear procedures. A verdict that arises from a court case, a salary increase 
based on a performance appraisal, a disciplinary hearing that has a dismissal as its outcome, 
a job offered after a selection procedure – these are all examples of distributions of goods or 
conditions that were made by a clearly identifiable authority with power over a centralised 
resource and which emerged from an identifiable and observable procedure. It is clear to see 
how in such cases, where procedures and outcomes are distinct from one another, and where 
the procedure exists as a formal, observable means of reaching an outcome, the use of 
different dimensions of justice can be a valuable way of exploring and researching 
perceptions.  
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There are, however, many phenomena to which people are exposed, with respect to which 
there is no access to, or desire for, procedural or interpersonal information. An individual 
may hold justice perceptions of a particular organisational policy without knowing or caring 
about the procedure that was followed to create the policy. In organisations where 
communication, decision-making, and the dissemination of information is controlled through 
hierarchy and structure, it cannot be taken as given that all employees have the same kind of 
awareness or detail with regards to information underpinning procedures and outcomes. This 
is perhaps particularly true in South Africa, where past practices under Apartheid have 
served to create and maintain a workforce that is alienated from management and 
organisational decision-making structures, and where communication has historically been 
used as a means of political oppression or rebellion, not as a means of conveying 
information. While this has been taken into account theoretically (quality of communication 
and information sharing is recognised as an important element of interpersonal justice 
perceptions) there is no recognition in the measurement of justice perceptions that people 
may not be able to, or wouldn’t naturally, make distinctions between these three dimensions.  
 
There are also certain outcome decisions that do not lend themselves to a neat dissection into 
procedural, interpersonal, and distributive concerns. A criminal act, a fight with a friend, 
somebody contracting a serious illness, are all outcomes that do not necessarily emerge from 
any identifiable procedure. In such cases, decision-making procedures are not necessarily 
easy to locate in temporal space as they are not always bounded by a clear beginning or end.  
In addition to this procedures are put in place at one point in time to redress inequalities that 
happened in the past (e.g. affirmative action). In exploring justice perceptions in cases such 
as these, questions referring to procedures or interpersonal behaviours would not always add 
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any value to our understanding of those perceptions. Where the extraction of information 
about justice perceptions would be facilitated by an a priori categorisation of these 
perceptions, the use of these three dimensions might be valuable. However, imposing this 
when there is no need to do so might serve to force justice perceptions into the tripartite 
theoretical framework.  
 
While the link between distributive and procedural justice is widely discussed and well 
researched, account also needs to be taken of situations in which perceptions of procedural 
justice may not be related to perceptions of distributive justice. The death penalty provides a 
clear example of this. Opponents of capital punishment will never perceive the death penalty 
to be a just decision, regardless of the integrity of the procedure used to make such a decision. 
In such cases a fair trial (i.e. one that embodies all the criteria of a just procedure) may be 
acknowledged, but the outcome emerging from the procedure will, never the less, be 
perceived to be unjust. In such cases little emphasis is placed on the procedure as people may 
not be willing to accept the outcome under any circumstances. There are many such examples 
of this at broad political levels (e.g. terrorism or war) and within smaller systems of 
functioning (e.g. corporal punishment in schools), as well as in organisations. Employees may 
not accept performance appraisals being linked to pay, regardless of how fair the assessment 
procedure is, or may not regard a particular offence as being worthy of dismissal (e.g. sexual 
harassment) despite a fair hearing.  
 
Again, this may be particularly pertinent within the South African context, which is 
characterised by a strongly unionised workforce and a highly adversarial labour relationship. 
Given the high levels of commitment to the ideology of collectivism, strong feelings about the 
appropriateness of certain distributions are widely shared among employees. As such, while 
   
   74 
correct procedures may be in place to make allocation decisions, workers are opposed to a 
range of possible outcomes or sanctions. South African unions are, for example, very 
outspoken about their opposition to employee incentive schemes, regardless of the procedures 
used to implement them or the way in which incentive money is distributed among staff. At 
the heart of this divergence of views is the ideological basis for making distributive decisions. 
Management and owners work on the basis of equity as an appropriate standard for 
distribution, while most unions advocate the notion of equality as just grounds for resource 
sharing. Given this fundamental difference in views, it is likely that procedural fairness 
perceptions may not always be linked to distributive justice perceptions. 
 
In addition to these concerns, it is also important to note that the tripartite justice model relies, 
to some extent, on the notion of a centralised body of resources with a limited number of 
people having authority over how those resources get distributed. Once again there may be 
certain situations in which this may be accurate (many of these in an organisational setting), 
but there are also very many where such distinctions are not as clear. As pointed out earlier in 
this chapter, Nozick (1974) argues that there is no such thing as a central distribution where 
one individual or group has the right to control all resources. Instead he argues that the total 
result of distributions in a society is in fact the product of numerous individual decisions, 
decisions which these individuals are entitled to make (Nozick, 1974). For example a judge 
who listens to a case, assesses the individual’s guilt and then sentences him/her to a 
punishment is not making such decisions on his own – he is bound to enact the laws of that 
society which govern the definition of criminal wrong doing and relevant punishments, the 
standards of proof required to establish guilt, as well as the procedures to be used in order to 
run a criminal trial, which in turn are promulgated by politicians representing different 
interest groups who are, in turn, elected into such positions by all the enfranchised citizens of 
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that country. As such to assume that he is one person who is entirely responsible for a verdict 
or a sentence is perhaps erroneous, and as such to assess perceptions of fairness by asking 
people to focus on the procedure used, the verdict, and the way in which the judge behaved 
towards the accused, is not accounting for the complexities of the context. An investigation 
that accounts for interpersonal aspects of justice in isolation from broader institutional 
relations not only fails to account for the whole picture, but also misrepresents such 
interpersonal relations as being unaffected by such broader concerns 
 
There is a concern, therefore, that this theoretical paradigm is based on a dissection of justice 
into three (or sometimes two) ‘types’, which then direct lines of questioning, and in turn 
generate conclusions that are, in fact, misleading – they perhaps only offer a view of part of 
the picture, and as such present only circumstantial evidence about perceptions of justice, 
from which other information is inferred (for example “The judge was perceived to be unfair” 
when in fact it was a whole set of institutional practices and laws that are perceived to be 
unjust).  
 
Despite such concerns about the tripartite model, it forms the basis of almost all psychological 
research being conducted in the area of justice. All of the validated scales used to do 
quantitative studies in this area are based on this tripartite framework – questions are asked 
about distributions, procedures, and interpersonal treatment, and then are often summed in 
order to obtain an overall justice score, or individual sub scale scores. This raises concerns 
about the way in which knowledge systems are generated within this paradigm.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the psychological approach to research and knowledge 
generation is primarily empirical in nature. As can be seen from this review of seminal 
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research, the social psychological study of justice, and indeed the existing theoretical model, 
emanates in particular from an experimental research paradigm. While it is argued that the 
study of justice deals with real world issues that are of relevance to people, and that much 
field research is conducted (Cropanzano, 2001), a considerable amount of research is still 
conducted within the experimental paradigm, often using fairly homogenous groups of 
students as samples. This presents two concerns. The first pertains to the limitations of the 
experimental paradigm (some of which have been discussed in this chapter), which observes 
people’s reactions to situations that are removed from actual events or experiences – people 
are either asked to imagine scenarios, or the researcher attempts to simulate conditions. As 
such the researcher is defining the parameters of the ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ situation, rather than 
people’s actual experiences. Given the self-referential nature of the psychological body of 
research, they are often doing this on the basis of other research conducted in similar ways, 
and on the basis of an a-priori theoretical framework. There is, therefore, a danger that the 
responses being received are confirming a particular line of thought simply because of the 
way in which the questions are being asked and the experiments set up. As such when 
research is conducted in the field, it is on the basis of a framework that directs research and 
responses in a particular direction. 
 
The second concern regarding the experimental research paradigm relates to the nature of the 
samples upon which the research is being conducted. Many of the samples are, as mentioned 
previously, student samples, and are fairly homogenous with regards to demographic 
composition. Very little meaningful attention is paid to the limitations this presents to the 
research outcomes. The argument is often that ideas are tested out within the experimental 
setting on student samples in order to develop theoretical ideas. These ideas then need to be 
tested in the field. This is problematic in that it indicates that only particular types of ideas are 
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being tested in the field –those that emerge as interesting or significant within the 
experimental mode. As such what is being taken to the field are research questions based on 
the experimental experiences of predominantly white American or Western European 
university going students. While much of this may prove to be both significant and relevant in 
other ‘real world’ contexts, it is problematic to imagine that the theoretical framework 
emerging from this research is at all representative of the larger population’s experiences.  
 
A further concern regarding the systems of knowledge generation within the psychological 
paradigm is the tendency to reduce very complex issues into ‘variables’, which are then 
measured by a set of questions and taken to accurately represent the whole of that experience.   
 
It can be argued that the psychological framework of justice described above, is reductionist, 
distilling two or three ‘types’ of justice out of a complex set of emotions, cognitive processes, 
and experiences, which are seen to apply to all contexts. As mentioned earlier a considerable 
amount of quantitative research is based on the use of justice scales that reduce measurement 
of justice perceptions into the three subscales. These measures then further reduce such 
perceptions by adding up the scores for each question in order to produce one number that 
then indicates a low, medium, or high score. As such not only are perceptions of justice 
already being limited to the three types identified by researchers, but the complexities 
involved within each of these dimensions as well as the differences between people are being 
diminished. As such the knowledge and discussions generated about perceptions of justice are 
simplified and limited with regards both to their usefulness and their capacity to generate 
ideas outside of the existing paradigm.  
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Clearly the two central concerns being discussed – that of the limitations of the tripartite 
model and the methodologies used to explore such a model – are closely linked. More 
systemic thinking that acknowledges the complexity of justice will demand research 
methodologies that extend beyond linear thinking. The recognition of complexity demands 
that we move away from trying to simplify or reduce variables into measurable units, but 
rather find methodologies that can account for and help explore this complexity. As such what 
questions we ask, the way in which we ask them, to whom we ask them, and what tools we 
use to analyse them all need to fall under close and critical scrutiny – the limitations of current 
methodologies need to be given far more meaningful attention, and problems with such 
methodologies that are in fact insurmountable need to be acknowledged.  As will be seen 
when discussing the research questions and the methodology, it is these considerations that 
form a fundamental point of departure for the current study.  
 
This chapter has focussed on the notion of social justice, with particular emphasis on the 
social-psychological approach to the topic. However within psychology a second area of 
study has emerged – one that focuses on the workplace and the way in which justice concerns 
manifest themselves within that context.  Through these efforts organisational justice has been 
defined, by theorists working in that area, as a field of study independent of the social 
psychological study of justice (Cropanzano, 2001). In the next chapter this assertion will be 
explored along with the nature of organisational justice and its relationship to the body of 
knowledge and research discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Organisational Justice 
Overview  
 
As discussed in the introduction, this study explores two aspects of justice – that of social and 
organisational justice. Considered to be the more encompassing of the two, social justice was 
discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter will thus focus on organisational justice, with two key 
aims in mind. The first, which is similar to the aims set out in Chapter 2, it is to provide an 
overview of the research trajectory of organisational justice in order to provide a point of 
departure for the current study.  As stated in the introduction, organisational justice 
perceptions are being explored in relation to demographic variables and thus an understanding 
of this construct is essential. The second aim, to be discussed in more detail at the end of this 
section, relates to providing a critical review of the methodological underpinnings of the 
research done in this area, once again in order to assist with a point of departure for the 
current study. 
 
Vermunt & Steensma (1991) state that psychologists are interested in justice at an individual 
and at a group or organisational level. At an individual level the focus is on the way 
individuals acquire a sense of justice, how cognitive processes work in relation to making 
justice judgements, and what the reactions to perceived injustice is. At a group level the focus 
is on the distribution of resources within the context of a need for co-operation and 
competition, as well as the influence of group relations on the development of justice 
principles and the interplay between group and individual reactions to perceived injustice. At 
a broader societal level, the focus is on people’s perceptions of the distribution of rewards, 
income and social security.  
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As discussed in Chapter 2, in the 1960s, 70s and 80s much of the psychological research into 
justice was located broadly in the area of social psychology, and focused most primarily on 
individual perceptions of justice and the interplay between group and individual experiences 
of justice. However an overwhelming amount of the current literature and exploration is now 
focussed on the ways in which justice concerns manifest within the workplace. As such the 
field of ‘organisational justice’ – which concerns itself with the ways in which employees 
determine whether they have been fairly treated in their jobs, and the way in which 
perceptions of justice impact on other work related variables (Cropanzano and Greenberg, 
1997) - has developed into a domain of research and application that accounts for a large 
proportion of work being done on interpersonal aspects of justice in the discipline of 
psychology.  
 
Why has the study of justice emerged so dominantly in this sub-field?  Most obviously there 
are many characteristics of the workplace that make issues about justice a key concern, and 
that make the workplace an almost ideal setting for the empirical study of justice. Firstly, 
justice concerns are formalised in workplace settings through organisational policy and 
procedures. For example, people are graded in relation to a given set of criteria and are paid a 
salary and accorded status in relation to those gradings. In addition, behaviour is strictly 
governed by a clear set of standards that are based in the legal framework of broader society 
and that are central to organisational functioning and effectiveness. An additional 
characteristic of workplace settings is the idea that due to the profit-making motive of the 
organisation, the distribution of resources has to be limited. The success of such organisations 
lies in its management’s ability to limit expenditure (e.g. salaries, benefits) while maximising 
income (e.g. through increased productivity).  As such the distribution of resources within 
such settings has very immediate importance. Finally, there are domains that are unique to 
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workplace settings, such as wage negotiation, conflict resolution, labour disputes, and union-
management agreements, where concerns about justice are easily observable. It is argued that 
these and many other characteristics make organisations a “rich venue” for studying justice 
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997).  
 
While organisational justice researchers acknowledge their roots in social psychology, and 
grant that concerns about justice are not unique to organisations - and that much of 
organisational justice researchers’ understanding of justice is based on other settings and 
contexts (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997) - they assert that this area has developed an 
identity that is now independent of these origins (Cropanzano, 2001). Despite this assertion, it 
is not always clear on what basis such a distinction is made as organisational justice 
researchers ascribe to the same body of theory and research as mainstream social psychology 
justice researchers. This is evident when looking at the considerable number of books and 
articles that have been written by organisational justice researchers offering a review of 
literature and research in the area (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Cropanzano et al, 2001; 
Cropanzano, 2001; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2000; Colquitt et al, 2001; Greenberg & 
Cropanzano, 2001; Greenberg, 1990). All such reviews indicate that organisational justice 
research is based on the tripartite theoretical model described in Chapter 2, where justice is 
understood in terms of distributive, procedural, and interpersonal concerns. In an article aimed 
at reviewing organisational justice research and articulating new concerns, Cropanzano et al 
(2001) state, “…organisational justice scholars have identified at least three classes of events 
that are evaluated in terms of justice: outcomes, processes and interpersonal interactions.” 
(Cropanzano et al, 2001, p. 165). While it is undoubtedly clear that organisational justice 
researchers do operate within this tripartite framework, it is less apparent that this was a 
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model identified by organisational theorists – it is arguably a model that derived from social 
psychologists working in a range of contexts, one of them being organisations.  
 
While in many ways this is a minor distinction it does become important when trying to 
conceptually distinguish organisational justice research and other types of justice research, as 
organisational justice researchers would have us do.  Any theoretical review of the 
organisational justice literature draws on exactly the same content as that of the social 
psychological justice model – from equity theory, through to the procedural justice work of 
Thibaut and Walker (1975), Folger (1977) and Leventhal (1980), and the interpersonal justice 
work of Bies (1987) and Lind and Tyler (1988). It would thus appear that what distinguishes 
organisational justice research from the broader study of social justice is the context in which 
this theory is applied and researched. In fact Greenberg coined the term ‘organisational 
justice’ in 1987 in order to refer to theories of social and interpersonal justice that can be 
applied to the organisational context (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Despite this there is 
frequent reference made to organisational justice theories. It can be seen from the discussion 
in Chapter 2 that a fair amount of social justice theory was tested in the organisational 
context.  The reciprocal, and somewhat symbiotic, nature of the relationship between these 
two areas is somewhat acknowledged by organisational justice theorists - Meara (2001) 
argues that all justice could, in fact, be considered to be organisational and Cropnazano and 
Greenberg (1997) state that,  “…we have learned a great deal about organisations by studying 
justice and a great deal about justice by studying organisations.” (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 
1997, p 318).  There is, however, no theoretical area that is distinct to organisational justice 
and a review of the area is, then, a review of the research conducted in, and application of the 
social psychological theories of justice to, the workplace.  
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As such this chapter largely focuses on organisational justice research, of which there is a 
considerable amount. This research is discussed in relation to four broad areas, that of 
antecedents of justice perceptions, outcomes of justice perceptions, the relationship between 
individual characteristics and perceptions of justice, and finally justice perceptions as a 
mediator of other workplace relationships.  Given the abundance of research exploring the 
nature of justice in the workplace, only a small proportion of these studies is discussed in this 
chapter.  These studies are, however, arguably representative of the types of concerns and 
issues explored by organisational justice researchers, as well as the methodologies employed 
by such researchers.  
 
This final issue, that of the methodological underpinnings of the organisational justice 
research paradigm, forms the focus of the second aim of this chapter – that is to develop a 
critical understanding of how the research methodologies employed direct, and possibly 
restrict, our understanding of how justice concerns manifest and influence people in the 
workplace. As such the review of organisational justice research presented in this chapter is 
inflected with a focus on methodological concerns – how are research variables defined and 
measured, who comprises the samples used, how is data analysed, what research design is 
used? These questions are an important part of establishing the extent to which organisational 
justice exists as an independent variable, as well as developing an understanding of news 
ways in which research questions might be explored. This critical discussion thus aims to lay 
the foundation not only for the research questions asked in the current study, but also the 
methodologies used.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of research aimed at exploring the antecedents of justice 
perceptions. This area, while theoretically important, has not received a considerable amount 
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of attention from organisational justice researchers, particularly beyond that which has 
already been discussed in Chapter 2. Two studies that were designed to ascertain what factors 
influence perceptions of procedural justice – specifically in relation to work related processes 
- are presented and then are discussed in relation to their methodological underpinnings.  By 
far the most attention by organisational justice researchers appears to be focussed on the next 
area under discussion, that of reactions to perceptions of organisational justice (and injustice). 
A number of studies focusing on work-related outcomes of perceived injustice are presented 
and discussed. This is then followed by a discussion of research into the area of individual 
differences and perceptions of organisational justice, another area that appears to be popular 
among researchers. The emphasis in this section is on the role of culture on perceptions of 
justice, a topic that has received widespread attention from organisational justice researchers. 
The discussion of organisational justice research is completed with a presentation of research 
that has looked at justice perceptions as a moderator of other work-related relationships. The 
chapter is then concluded with an overview of the central points and arguments presented.  
  
Organisational Justice: Applying Justice Theory to the Workplace.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, social psychological justice research has been based on the 
theoretical notion that justice can be regarded from three different perspectives or in relation 
to three separate concerns, namely distributive, procedural, and interpersonal aspects. These 
are often referred to as ‘types’ of justice (Cropanzano, 2001) which are looked at either 
independently or in relation to one another. The division of justice into these three areas is 
based on an a priori logic that gained popular support by researchers. As discussed above the 
use of these three justice dimensions has become the most prevalent approach to 
understanding and researching organisational justice. Research in the area of organisational 
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justice is prolific and there seems to be a burgeoning interest in the area. Such research has 
focused on the antecedents of perceptions of justice, outcomes related to perceptions of 
justice, justice as a mediator, and individual differences in justice perceptions, all of which 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Working on the basis of the theory described in Chapter 2, organisational justice researchers 
have conducted studies in order to explore the antecedents of justice perceptions in relation to 
specific workplace practices. For example Ming (1990) set out to extend research based on 
Leventhal’s (1980) procedural justice framework to personnel selection practices. In two 
separate studies he aimed to explore the determinants of perceived fairness in selection 
practices. In the first study a sample of 290 undergraduate students who had applied for at 
least one entry-level job were asked to think of their own experiences of applying for a job 
and to identify the one most important factor that would make the job fair. Eighty-nine 
unrepeated stories were collected and were reduced, by two independent assessors, into 21 
determinants of fairness in selection. The same subjects were then asked to rate the 
importance of each of these 21 determinants on an 11-point Likert scale. A factor analysis 
with varimax rotation was used to examine subjects’ responses. Five factors accounting for 
69.9% of the total variance were identified. These included consistency and choice of 
selectors, two-way communication, ethicality, bias suppression, and information soliciting. A 
second study, using the identical methodology, was then conducted using a sample of 81 
human resources management trainers employed in a variety of private consultancy firms or 
public organisations. The factor analysis yielded six factors accounting for 69.6% of the 
variance –honest communication and choice of selectors, information soliciting, open 
objective competition, consistency and ethicality, bias avoidance, prior knowledge of future 
colleagues. The researcher states that the five factors identified in the first study closely 
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resemble the factors identified in the second study, and that both sets of results closely 
correspond with Leventhal’s (1980) six criteria. He argues that the results of this study extend 
the application of allocation preference theory to personnel selection practices (Ming, 1990). 
 
Greenberg (1986) used a similar procedure in order to explore determinants of perceived 
fairness of performance evaluations amongst a sample of 217 middle managers employed in 
three organisations. In the first stage of the study 56 participants were asked to think of an 
incident where they received either a particularly fair or unfair evaluation of their job and to 
write down the one most important factor that contributed to their perception of fairness. The 
phrases were then abstracted into simpler statements and were typed onto index cards. In the 
second stage of the study the cards were given to the same participants who were asked to sort 
the statements into similar groupings. This technique is known as an unstructured Q-sort 
technique as no predetermined number of categories was specified (Stephenson, 1953 in 
Greenberg, 1986). In order for a response category to be defined at least 75% of the subjects 
had to have grouped two or more of the statements together. In this way the original 56 
statements were reduced to 18, falling into seven different categories. In a third stage of the 
study these results were cross-validated by a sample of 46 subjects who categorised the 18 
statements back into the seven categories. In this phase there was a 98.6% hit rate with only 
12 statements being misclassified. Finally, in the fourth stage of the study a group of 75 
participants were asked to rate, on a nine-point Likert scale, the importance of each of the 
seven categories as determinants of fair performance evaluations.  Similar to the study 
conducted by Ming (1990), these responses were then factor analysed using a principal 
component analysis with varimax rotation. Results of this analysis indicated a possible two-
factor solution with these two factors accounting for 94.7% of the variance. These two factors 
were labelled procedural and distributive factors, with five items loading in on the procedural 
   
   85 
justice factor and two on the distributive. No significant difference was found between the 
two factors on the mean importance rating scores for each statement. Greenberg (1986) argues 
that these results provide evidence for some of Leventhal’s (1980) criteria (particularly 
correctability and consistency) as well as Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) concern for process 
control.  He also states that the research findings support to “…conceptual attempts to expand 
procedural justice conceptualisations by applying them to organisational settings in general.” 
(Greenberg, 1986, p. 341).  
 
These two studies have a considerable amount in common. Firstly they are both attempts to 
apply social psychological theory about justice to work-related concerns, with particular 
emphasis on factors affecting perceptions of organisational procedures. Secondly they make 
use of very similar research paradigms and methodologies – they use a quantitative paradigm 
that starts off by collecting relatively large amounts of data, which is then analysed for 
patterns of responses and through the use of particular procedures, is finally reduced to a 
much smaller number of factors. The results indicate some interesting things about 
perceptions of fairness in that they suggest some of the types of factors people may find 
important in assessing the fairness of particular workplace procedures.  This methodology 
allowed the researchers to distil the data in order to be able to extract information that is 
representative of patterns of beliefs and experiences. While this is often useful it also presents 
particular concerns.  
 
Firstly in both studies participants were asked to write down the one most important factor in 
determining the fairness of the procedure. In this way the amount of information that is being 
obtained from participants is reduced from the outset and this potentially excludes some 
possibly important and rich information. The researchers are working from the assumption 
   
   86 
that questions about justice are very simple, uncomplicated matters that people can easily 
identify and articulate. This might not always be true. What information we use, and in which 
particular ways we use it, when making a justice judgement is arguably a complex and not 
necessarily conscious process. Obtaining meaningful information from people about what 
impacts on their perceptions of fairness might, therefore, need some level of probing and 
directing. In addition to this the researchers are forcing participants to pick one factor when 
the respondent him/herself might have identified other, equally as important factors or might 
experience the procedure in a more complex way. It is arguably likely that a whole range of 
factors in combination with one another impact on perceptions of fairness.  
 
Secondly the basis on which the reduction of the original statements into a fewer number of 
statements and into categories is done is somewhat unclear. For example in the study by 
Greenberg (1986) participants were asked to group the statements into similar categories, 
while in the study by Ming (1990) this was done by two independent assessors. What 
determines similarity? Could all the positive statements be placed in one category and all the 
negative statements in another? Statements that reflect some level of negative affect such as 
anger or cynicism could be similar to one another while ones that reflect more positive 
emotions could be grouped together. At what point do the assessors decide to ignore 
differences between statements, and what differences exactly? In addition to this the 
background of the people doing the assessing is likely to be relevant. If it is done by people 
familiar with the justice literature, as is the case in the Ming (1990) study, they might be 
looking for patterns that are predicted by the theory. In the Greenberg (1986) study it was 
being done by middle managers who might be influenced by the fact that they conduct 
procedures such as performance evaluations themselves and might also have received training 
as to what constitutes a ‘good’ way in which to conduct these procedures. While statistical 
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checks are put into place to ensure that there is high level of agreement between the assessors, 
no account is given as to why this level of agreement has been reached and whether this is 
entirely a good thing – if a different person or group of people were looking at the data might 
they have come up with a different pattern or set of categories?  Arguably what is given back 
to participants in the final stage of the study (a short list of a number of factors) might not be 
entirely representative of what was originally written by the subjects.  
 
While it can be argued that an almost infinite number of configurations might exist for the 
sorting of a large number of statements and one solution with high agreement is as good as 
another solution with high agreement, what is concerning is the lack of emphasis that is 
placed on this stage of the research. Given that the research questions are specifically about 
the factors that determine perceptions of fairness, the analysing of the original statements is 
arguably the most important part of the study – they are the answers to the research question. 
It seems that a process that is more able to account for the diversity and the complexity in 
responses is needed. For example participants might be encouraged to write as many 
statements as they wish, and a qualitative method such as thematic content analysis could be 
used to determine themes in responses. Alternatively once the initial sort has been done this 
could be given back to participants to assess whether their original concerns are reflected in 
the list of determinants. Or finally a different statistical procedure – one that relies less on the 
reduction of data and is designed to analyse interactions between responses– might be used. 
Arguably the methodology used in these two studies is particularly focused on reducing the 
data and in doing so fails to account for the complexity of justice perceptions. While not all 
organisational justice research uses the methodology presented in these two studies, many do 
use techniques aimed at distilling information in this way. This is evident when looking at 
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another area of organisational justice research, that of responses or reactions to perceptions of 
injustice.  
 
Organisational justice research has explored a range of possible behavioural and cognitive 
responses to justice perceptions (Randall & Mueller, 1995; Katz & Miller, 1999; Moorman, 
1991), focusing on both positive and negative consequences of justice perceptions. A number 
of different variables have been looked at in relation to the negative or dysfunctional 
outcomes of perceptions of injustice. Some such behaviours and attitudes that were found to 
be significantly related to organisational justice perceptions include theft (Greenberg, 1990), 
vandalism (De More, Fisher & Baron, 1988), workplace retaliation (Skarliki & Folger, 1997), 
absenteeism, (Schwarzald, Kowslowsky and Shalit, 1992), low workplace commitment, job 
dissatisfaction (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997), poor performance (Cowherd & Levine, 
1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), as well as staff turnover (Schwarzald, Kowslowsky and 
Shalit, 1992) and employee theft and retaliation (Greenberg, 1990).  
 
A lot of these studies follow similar procedures and adopt similar methodologies in exploring 
such relationships - they tend to conduct either laboratory or field studies using self report 
measures that are designed to assess each dimension of organisational justice perceptions 
separately, which they then analyse by summing items for each sub scale and then using 
correlations or a regression technique in order to assess the nature of any relationship with 
other variables.  For example a study conducted by Fitzgerald (2003) aimed to explore the 
role of perceptions of injustice (operationalised in relation to distributive, procedural and 
interpersonal components) as a precursor to organisational cynicism. A sample of 316 
employees of a large manufacturing company electronically completed four questionnaires 
aimed at measuring feelings of cynicism (both cynicism towards the organisation and human 
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nature) as well as organisational justice perceptions (using an organisational justice scale 
developed by Colquitt, 2001). Results of a stepwise multiple regression indicated that higher 
scores on each dimension of justice (where a higher score meant higher perceptions of 
injustice) were predictive of organisational cynicism.  The combined effect of distributive, 
procedural, and interpersonal justice on organisational cynicism was 29% of the variance. 
Fitzgerald (2003) hypothesise that organisational cynicism is a coping response to perceived 
organisational injustice.  
 
This methodology and approach to exploring organisational justice is echoed in other studies. 
Aquino, Lewis and Bradfield (1999) developed a model that attempted to explain the 
relationship between, among others, justice perceptions (comprising all three dimensions of 
justice) and employee deviance, which they defined in relation to organisational deviance 
(acts directed against the company and its systems) and interpersonal deviance (acts that 
inflict harm on specific individuals). They hypothesised that perceptions of procedural justice 
would be negatively correlated with organisational deviance but not with interpersonal 
deviance, that distributive justice perceptions would be negatively correlated with 
interpersonal deviance but not with organisational deviance, and that perceptions of 
interpersonal justice will be negatively correlated with both organisational and interpersonal 
deviance.  A questionnaire - comprising a distributive justice scale adapted from a scale 
developed by Niehoff and Moorman (1993), a procedural justice scale adapted from one 
developed by McFarlin and Sweeney (1992), an interpersonal justice perceptions scale 
developed for use in the study, and a deviance scale also developed for use in the study (the 
scale listed a range of behaviours and asked respondents to indicate the number of times they 
had performed each of those acts in the past 6 months) – was distributed to a random sample 
of 475 employees in two organisations of whom 245 people responded. A regression analysis 
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was conducted in order to explore the unique contribution of each dimension of organisational 
justice perceptions to employee deviance. Results showed that organisational justice 
perceptions accounted for a significant portion of the variance in interpersonal deviance but 
not in organisational deviance. The researchers then conducted a structural model test using a 
covariance matrix of the proposed model (as reflected in their hypotheses) as data input. They 
found that their first hypothesis, that procedural justice would be significantly correlated with 
organisational deviance, was not supported, but that the second and third hypotheses, that 
distributive justice would be negatively correlated with interpersonal deviance and that 
interpersonal justice would be negatively correlated with both forms of deviance, were 
supported.  
 
Other studies exploring the relationship between perceptions of organisational justice and 
forms of employee deviance have also used comparable methodologies and found similar 
results. Greenberg (1990) used an experimental paradigm in order to explore employee theft 
as a reaction to perceptions of underpayment inequity. While he did manipulate perceptions of 
justice, he used very similar measuring instruments and statistical analyses to the other studies 
described above. The study was conducted in an organisation that was being forced to make 
wage cuts of 15% across the board in two out of three of its manufacturing plants in order to 
avoid having to make a series of retrenchments.  The two affected plants were randomly 
assigned to two conditions – one where adequate explanations for the cuts were given and 
staff were treated with high levels of interpersonal courtesy, and the other where insufficient 
explanation for the cuts were given and no apologies or expressions of remorse were given. 
The third, unaffected plant, acted as the control condition for the study. Greenberg (1990) 
used two methods of collecting data about employee theft. The first was actuarial data on 
employee theft, and the second was a self-report measure that asked employees questions 
   
   91 
about processes that were assumed to be underlying theft behaviour. Two additional 
questionnaires were used, one as a manipulation check and the other to establish differences 
in perceived payment equity. Results indicated that during the period of the pay cut, the theft 
rate in the inadequate explanation condition was significantly higher than in the adequate-
explanation condition. Further the theft rate in the adequate-explanation condition was higher 
than that in the control condition i.e. where no pay cuts were made at all. Greenberg (1990) 
argues that a possible explanation for these results is that employees, when perceiving 
payment inequity, will increase their outcomes through pilfering from their employer.  
 
Another study aimed at exploring retaliatory behaviours more broadly. Skarlicki and Folger 
(1997) investigated the relationship between each dimension of organisational justice 
perceptions and organisational retaliation behaviour, which they defined as “…adverse 
reactions to perceived unfairness by disgruntled employees toward their employer” (Skarlicki 
& Folger, 1997, p. 435). Two hundred and forty employees of a non-union privately owned 
manufacturing plant in the United States completed a questionnaire comprising four 
measures. Organisational justice perceptions were measured using a distributive justice scale 
that focussed on pay, Folger and Konovsky’s (1989) procedural justice scale, and a nine-item 
interpersonal justice scale. Organisational retaliatory behaviour was measured using a scale 
that was developed through the use of a critical incident technique – two groups of seven 
employees were asked to list examples of retaliatory behaviours, based on a definition that 
was provided to them, that they had observed over the past six to 12 months. Seventeen 
incidents were then extracted from the list and were developed into a behavioural observation 
scale. Employees in the study were then randomly assigned a peer who they were asked to 
evaluate in relation to the frequency with which they were seen to engage in the list of 
behaviours. A hierarchical multiple regression was used in order to explore the extent to 
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which each dimension of organisational justice predicted organisational retaliatory 
behaviours. Results indicated a significant three-way interaction between the justice 
dimensions predicting retaliatory behaviours. Further probing showed that the relationship 
between distributive justice and retaliatory behaviours was significant only when perceptions 
of procedural and interpersonal justice were low, indicating that higher procedural and 
interpersonal justice perceptions moderate the relationship between low distributive justice 
perceptions and retaliatory behaviours.   
 
Other researchers have used a combination of laboratory or experimental designs and field 
studies to explore questions about the impact of organisational justice perceptions on work 
related outcomes. For example in a study aimed at exploring whether the relationship between 
organisational justice perceptions and stress, Frances (2003) found that perceptions of 
distributive and procedural injustice were positively associated with reports of increased 
levels of stress. These results were found initially in a laboratory experiment that made use of 
vignettes, and were replicated in a sample of students as well as in a third study focused on 
school teachers. Frances (2003) thus argues the results demonstrate that perceptions of 
injustice and exposure to situations that are perceived as unjust are stressful. Stress, as a 
correlate of perceptions of injustice, was also explored by Kottraba (2003), who looked more 
specifically at role stress and absenteeism in relation to perceptions of organisational justice. 
Using a sample of 233 subjects from different organisations across a range of industries the 
researcher aimed to test the hypothesis perceptions of organisational justice were negatively 
correlated with role stress and absenteeism.  Participants completed an online survey and 
results of a correlation analysis indicated that there was a strong negative relationship between 
perceptions of justice but not with absenteeism.    
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Perceptions of organisational justice have also been explored in relation to favourable 
outcomes such as job satisfaction, organisational commitment, organisational citizenship 
behaviours and productivity (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Dailey and Kirk 
(1992) conducted a field study on a sample of 88 employees of an engineering design 
company and a development laboratory in order to explore the relationship between 
perceptions of justice and job satisfaction, organisational commitment, and intent to turnover.  
Distributive justice perceptions were measured using a scale developed by Greenberg (1986) 
and procedural justice perceptions by a scale developed by Folger and Konovsky (1989). 
Interpersonal justice perceptions were not explored. Job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment, and intent to turnover were measured using validated scales with adequate 
reliability. Correlations showed a relationship between perceptions of distributive and 
procedural justice and job satisfaction. A step-wise multiple regression showed that job 
satisfaction was strongly predicted by perceptions of distributive justice and intention to 
turnover was more moderately predicted by procedural justice perceptions.  
 
Afzalur (2000) conducted a study using a sample of 202 employed undergraduate students in 
order to explore the relationship between organisational justice perceptions and conflict 
handling styles. Specifically he was investigating whether justice perceptions influence 
employees’ styles of handling conflict with their supervisors. Self-report questionnaires were 
handed to the participants. Organisational justice perceptions were measured using the 
Organisational Justice Inventory, which comprises 23 items distributed across three subscales 
aimed at measuring each dimension of justice perceptions. Conflict management styles were 
measured using the ROCI-II an instrument aimed at measuring five different conflict styles – 
integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding, and compromising. A hierarchical regression 
indicated, among other things, that the three dimensions of justice, when considered jointly, 
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explained a statistically significant amount of variance in integrating, obliging and 
compromising conflict management styles. Taken separately, interpersonal justice perceptions 
explained a significant amount of variance in the integrating style and distributive justice 
explained a significant amount of variance in the avoiding style. Overall higher organisational 
justice perceptions were generally positively related to more co-operative conflict 
management styles.  
 
As can be seen all of these studies have certain methodological similarities. They all 
understand organisational justice in terms of the tripartite justice model, and they all separate 
out the three dimensions of justice and explore them independently of one another. They 
make use of a quantitative paradigm that relies on self-report measures as a method of 
collecting data. These scales are also used in similar ways – each item is added up in order to 
provide a total score. It is this total score that is then used in the statistical procedures used. 
While this does allow researchers to use statistical tools such as correlations or regression 
analyses that explore the relationships between variables, it does arguably have the side-effect 
of ignoring variance between individual participants– for example two people could end up 
with the exact same total justice score despite having answered individual questions very 
differently. In addition to this, all the questions in the scale are weighted as equally important 
although there is no real indication that this is true. A person might score very low on one or 
two particular items, which then brings their total score down, classifying them as someone 
with lower justice perceptions. However, they might still have an overall high justice 
perception as those particular items might not contribute as much to their perceptions of 
justice as the other items for which they scored highly – i.e. they give an item a low score but 
it isn’t really that important to them, or vice-versa. As such the way in which measurement 
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instruments are used serves to flatten information, looking at an overall picture that eliminates 
a lot of the detail, rather than highlighting differences, variance and complexity.  
 
These concerns are echoed in other types of organisational research, such as those in which 
justice perceptions are looked at as mediating variables - in addition to exploring the 
relationship between justice perceptions and work related outcomes, organisational justice 
researchers have also looked at the ways in which perceptions of justice influence or mediate 
the relationship between other work related variables. For example Korsgaard, Schweiger, 
and Sapienza (1995) conducted a study aimed at testing the hypothesis that perceptions of 
procedural justice will mediate the relationship between consideration of team members input, 
and influence over decisions and commitment to the team decision, commitment to the team, 
and trust in the team leader. An experimental design was set up using a sample of 20 intact 
teams of middle and upper level managers of a Fortune 500 company in America. Each team 
comprised three to six team members and a team leader. In total there were 89 team members 
and 20 leaders. A two-by-two factorial design was used in which the researchers manipulated 
consideration of team members input (high or low) and team members influence over the 
decision (high or low). Teams were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions where 
they conducted a decision-making exercise. Self-report measures were used to assess the 
variables being explored. Procedural justice was measured with a four-item scale adapted 
from Tyler and Cain (1981).  In order to test the hypothesis, an ANCOVA was conducted in 
order to determine whether when the variance due to procedural fairness was accounted for 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables diminished. An ANCOVA 
is used when there are factors, termed covariates, which are expected to influence the 
dependent variable, which cannot be controlled by the researcher. An analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA), a combination of an ANOVA and regression, is the statistical technique used to 
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take the effect of such variables into account. Results indicated that procedural justice 
perceptions do mediate – with varying strength - the effects of consideration and influence on 
decision commitment, attachment to the team, and trust in the team leader.  
 
This study introduces a new concern, over and above ones already discussed in this chapter 
(such as the use of scales that average responses into a single indicator, scales that measure 
complex variables using a very small number of items, and the use of samples that solely 
comprise managers) in that there appears to be some conceptual confusion. Procedural justice, 
as is evident from discussions in Chapter 2, is defined largely in relation to the variables of 
consideration and influence – these correspond to Leventhal’s (1980) criteria of 
representativeness and Folger’s (1977) criteria of voice, and Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) 
criteria of decision control. As such the independent variables and the mediator appear to be 
aspects of the same thing – procedural justice. This is perhaps indicative of the fact that 
researchers are not always able to differentiate between perceptions of organisational justice 
and other interpersonal behaviours. To some extent, justice perceptions are defined in such a 
way that they account for a very large range of behaviours and interactions, and this creates 
conceptual murkiness. As such the model being tested in this research is, to some extent, 
circular – the measures for consideration and influence will be measuring some of the things 
that are being measured by the procedural justice scale, thereby creating a significant 
relationship that is misleading.  
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the methodologies employed by organisational 
justice researchers reflect a research paradigm that has a tendency towards reductionism and 
carelessness regarding how justice is defined and measured. These concerns are also evident 
in other areas of organisational justice research, such as that focusing on individual 
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differences and perceptions of organisational justice. While this area of research forms the 
focus of Chapter 4, and will be discussed in more detail then, some consideration of these 
studies, with particular reference to their contribution to the overall body of organisational 
justice research and the methodological concerns being discussed in the current chapter, is 
warranted here.  
 
As can be seen from discussions in this, and the previous, chapter, justice researchers have 
looked at a range of different variables that impact on perceptions of justice, such as 
characteristics of the procedure, interpersonal treatment received, the value bases that people 
ascribe to, as well as contextual factors. Another characteristic, that of individual differences, 
has been recognised as an important element in influencing perceptions of fairness 
(Cropanzano et al, 2001). Researchers have been interested in how personal traits of the 
individual such as personality, gender, age, ethnicity and a range of other factors impact on 
perceptions of fairness. For example Ang, Van Dyne and Begley (2003) looked at the role 
citizenship (i.e. foreign versus local workers) played in perceptions of organisational justice. 
They hypothesised that people from overseas countries coming to work in a foreign country 
might have different work attitudes and perceptions from the local workers. Using a sample of 
213 Chinese workers and 253 local Singaporean workers they used a self-report measure to 
assess, among other things, perceptions of organisational justice. Results of t-tests indicated 
that the foreign workers had lower perceptions of distributive justice than the local workers. 
Similar research designs have been employed to look at differences in organisational justice 
perceptions based on gender (Lee & Fahr, 1999; Tata, 2000; Galea & Wright, 1999), 
nationality (Wenzel, 2000), and organisational role (Tata, 2000) among others, while race, 
gender, and job title have been compared as parts of larger studies (White, Tansky and Baik, 
1995; Skarlicki and Folger, 1997) 
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Culture is one individual characteristic that has received considerable attention from 
organisational justice researchers (Bhagat & McQuaid, 1982; Cascio & Bailey, 1995; 
Hofstede, 1993, McFarlin & Sweeney, 2001). Several studies have been conducted by 
organisational justice researchers in order to explore the impact culture has on perceptions of 
organisational fairness. For example White, Tansky and Baik (1995) conducted a study aimed 
at exploring the differences in perceptions of organisational justice (specifically distributive, 
procedural and interpersonal perceptions) between a group of 164 Virginian and 102 South 
Korean undergraduate students. They then used a model of culture developed by Hofstede 
(1980) to explain these differences. A scale developed by Dorfman and Howell, (1980) was 
used to measure different dimensions of culture as specified by Hofstede (1980) (This model 
is discussed in more detail further on in this chapter) and participants were asked to assess the 
fairness of three different vignettes, each one pertaining to a different dimension of 
organisational justice i.e. distributive, procedural, and interpersonal justice. T-tests were used 
to explore differences between the countries in relation to perceptions of justice and cultural 
dimensions, and correlations to test the relationships between the variables. Finally 
hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the effect of country on perceptions of 
justice while controlling for the cultural dimensions in order to assess the feasibility of using 
country as a surrogate measure of the cultural dimensions. Results indicate that there were 
significant differences between the two groups on all three dimensions of justice. Of the five 
dimensions of culture that were measured, the groups differed significantly on two – the 
South Korean students were higher on the masculinity/femininity dimension as well as on the 
paternalism dimension. Further, distributive justice was positively correlated with two of the 
cultural dimensions (paternalism and masculinity and femininity), and interpersonal justice 
with three dimensions (power distance, paternalism, and masculinity and femininity). The 
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hierarchical multiple regression showed that after controlling for the cultural dimensions, 
country had a significant effect on all three dimensions of justice perceptions.  
 
This study presents a number of concerns already discussed in this, and the preceding, 
chapter. It makes use of a student sample, the majority of whom have never worked in an 
organisational context. It also makes use of measures of justice that are reductionist and 
ignore any complexity in perceptions – in this study each aspect of justice is measured along 
one dimension only (for example in the interpersonal justice vignette a student goes to see a 
professor to discuss performance on a test and the professor responds by saying, “Why waste 
my time? It won’t make a difference anyway”. This scenario only evokes one interpersonal 
justice concern, and ignores issues such as justification, quality of information, trust etc). A 
further concern is that the researchers define this study as an organisational behavioural one, 
and they use organisational concerns and what they define as an organisational justice 
framework as the basis and rationale for the research. However the methodology does not 
bear this focus out – the cultural dimensions scale has an organisational orientation (it applies 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to the organisational setting by asking about agreement 
with statements such as  “Managers should help employees with their family problems”), but 
the vignettes given to the participants focussed on student life like receiving a low mark for an 
assignment or having an assignment not marked by a professor. As such what is being 
correlated becomes confusing – beliefs about organisational functioning based on different 
cultural orientations and justice perceptions of student life. In the discussion the researchers 
then talk about the implications the research has for organisational procedures and policies. 
They thus seem to be conflating organisational justice concerns (which have been specifically 
defined in relation to the workplace and workplace concerns) and justice concerns about 
university (which differ significantly from the workplace in that students do not earn a living 
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from doing university work, work is not regulated and evaluated in the same way that it is in 
the workplace, and professors cannot be likened to managers or supervisors). It is not clear 
then how this study can be defined as organisational justice research. Further to this there is 
some concern that the cultural dimensions scale is measuring some aspect of organisational 
justice – statements such as “Managers should make most decisions without consulting 
subordinates” in the culture scale can be likened to the procedural justice concern of 
representativeness (Leventhal, 1980) or voice (Folger, 1977), and “Group welfare is more 
important than individual rewards” reflects the debate between utilitarianist and liberal 
conceptions of justice, as well as equity theorists and their critics, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
One fundamental concern about this study refers to the use of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
model, and this is a concern that can be generalised to the much larger body of work in this 
area. Studies exploring the impact of culture on perceptions of justice often define culture in 
terms of the model developed by Hofstede (1980) – in fact most research on the effects of 
culture on perceptions of justice has been largely based on Hofstede’s (1980) model (White, 
Tansky and Baik, 1995; Morris & Leung, 2000). This model was developed as the recognition 
that culture can contribute to divergent beliefs and attitudes towards workplace variables 
resulted in researchers attempting to identify basic cultural dimensions along which different 
countries can be seen to vary, in order to categorise these countries in relation to such 
dimensions (McFarlin & Sweeney, 2001).  This is done so as to help international managers 
lead and motivate employees from different cultures in the best possible way (McFarlin & 
Sweeney, 2001). McFarlin & Sweeney‘s (2001) argue that Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
dimensions model is the most successful attempt emerging from this effort. Hofstede (1980) 
conducted a survey of over 100 000 workers in 40 countries from which he produced a model 
of four cultural dimensions into which all of these countries and workers can fit. These 
   
   101 
dimensions include individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, power distance, and 
uncertainty avoidance. The United States or the United Kingdom, for example, are classified 
as individualistic cultures as they value autonomy, individual achievement, and privacy.  
Mexico and Japan, on the other hand, are collectivist cultures as they are viewed as being part 
of groups that protect and take care of them in exchange for their loyalty.   Masculinity refers 
to whether the “assertive acquisition of money and power is highly valued” (McFarlin & 
Sweeney, 2001, p 69) such as in Venezuela, and femininity to “…whether people, the quality 
of life, and goods relationships with co-workers should take precedence…” ” (McFarlin & 
Sweeney, 2001, p 69) as in Sweden. Power distance (which is regarded as the extent to which 
people can accepts large differences in power between individuals or groups) is higher in 
cultures such as India, where people are “…more likely to feel that some individuals are 
destined to be in command and others are not.” ” (McFarlin & Sweeney, 2001, p 69), as 
opposed to the United States, where people fear the concentration of power. Uncertainty 
avoidance refers to how people in a country react to unambiguous events, where weak 
uncertainty avoidance countries such as Denmark are comfortable with the notion that life is 
unpredictable, while countries such as France prefer more stability.  
 
The concerns with such a model are numerous. It is clear that such an approach is extremely 
reductionist, both in the belief that an entire country can be characterised by a set of cultural 
dimensions, and the notion that four dimensions can encapsulate the whole experience of 
culture. Both the complexity of culture as well as multi-culturalist reality of all countries is 
ignored – no cognisance is given to the fact that different groups in every country have 
different accounts and experiences of culture. In addition to this the model cannot be seen to 
be exhaustive in that it does not account all dimensions along which cultures vary. While 
there has been acknowledgement that this model has limitations in that many eastern 
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European, African, and Asian countries were not included in the survey (which given that 
these countries may represent aspects of culture which are remarkably different from the 
United States and western Europe, could be considered an insurmountable problem), as well 
as the fact that ‘within-country differences’ were not accounted for (McFarlin & Sweeney, 
2001), these concerns are largely ignored by justice researchers..  
 
This unidimensional, static view of culture is perhaps even more apparent in descriptions of 
culture in African countries. McFarlin & Sweeney (2001), for example, state that, “In fact, for 
many Africans, ‘just management’ is captured by concepts like ubuntu. This cultural 
perspective views organisations much like an African village where an informal communal 
orientation holds sway. As such ubuntu stresses supportiveness, co-operation, and people 
working for the common good…” (2001, p. 76). This view is worrying not only in that it 
perpetuates a number of stereotypes about African countries and organisations (the idea of a 
communal village brings to mind images of primal, tribe-like people), but also because it 
ignores a range of cultural diversity and difference - Africa is a continent that comprises 
approximately fifty countries, all of which differ from one another considerably, 
economically, politically, historically, and culturally. To speak of ‘African’ conceptions of 
culture is not only to ignore the multi-culturalism within a country, but within an entire 
continent. It serves to reduce hundreds of different experiences, stories, and claims to one 
over-simplified notion – that of ubuntu. This use of the term ubuntu as a catchall phrase to 
describe a stereotypical notion of collectivist African culture is highly problematic in itself, 
and it’s use in this way is contested and resisted within South Africa. Unfortunately such 
reductionist views are perpetuated by the South African popular media (and very often 
management consultants) as is evident from this account - McFarlin & Sweeney are citing a 
South African management text (Khoza, 1994).  
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Further to this, it has been argued that general cultural structures might emerge statistically, 
when aggregated over a large sample, but that these structures do not exist in individual minds 
(Morris & Leung, 2000). It is further argued that while large generalisations may be useful for 
presenting a consolidated picture that might be valuable in describing differences between 
societies, these are not useful in representing the values or beliefs that influence perceptions 
and behaviours (Morris & Leung, 2000). As such the value of Hofstede’s (1980) model as a 
tool to explore and explain differences in individual perceptions of justice is arguably very 
limited.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In the introduction two aims were articulated for this chapter. The first relates to outlining and 
describing the domain of organisational justice research In attempting to address this first aim 
one particular concern was raised – in order to describe the area of organisational justice its 
identity as something separate from the justice discussed in Chapter two had to be ascertained. 
As stated earlier researchers have argued that organisational justice concerns are autonomous 
and independent from other justice concerns. This assertion has spawned a prolific amount of 
research that now constitutes the area of organisational justice. Despite this, there is no clear 
evidence that this claim to autonomy is true. Organisational justice research has not focused 
on providing empirical evidence for this contention, nor has a body of theory specifically 
aimed at addressing workplace concerns emerged - as the discussion in this chapter 
demonstrated, organisational justice does not in fact emerge from a theoretically distinct body 
of literature, it shares exactly the same theoretical foundations as the more broader social 
psychological field of justice as discussed in Chapter 2.  Currently, what delineates this 
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variable as something distinct is the context in which it is investigated – the workplace.  It is, 
therefore, clear that the notion that organisational justice is something separate from other 
types of justice - as well as the ways in which this may be, the implications thereof, and the 
ways in which it articulates with other justice concerns and the body of theory from which it 
emerged - requires some debate and empirical investigation. The current study thus aims, 
among other things, to begin an exploration into the question of differentiating types of justice 
and the ways in which these types might articulate with one another.  
 
This type of investigation becomes increasingly important in the face of the criticisms of 
reductionism and insularity made in relation to the conceptualisation and implementation of 
research in the area. As discussed in the introduction, in many ways the organisation functions 
as a microcosm of the larger society, with distinct rules, processes, boundaries, and ways of 
functioning, making it an interesting, as well as easy, context for the study of justice. There 
are, however, some negative consequences to maintaining such a bounded and insular focus 
on the workplace. Very little of the research conducted within this area accounts for the 
workplace as an institution of a broader society, with issues emanating in the workplace 
being, in many ways, just echoes of the practices and beliefs of the society in which they are 
located. As discussed in Chapter 2, the psychological framework tends to describe justice 
concerns in a very linear fashion, often failing to recognise the complexities of the phenomena 
manifesting themselves, in this case in the workplace. For example, in the South African 
context, black employee’s experiences of justice in the workplace could arguably be closely 
linked to their experience of Apartheid and the way in which work served to form part of their 
oppression. Perceptions of workplace relations, procedures and distributions will all be 
viewed through the lens of such experiences. It is not only past events and contexts that 
impact on perceptions – a person’s current living conditions will also influence the way in 
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which they experience the workplace (and many other contexts). Many people, for example, 
even those who are employed, are living under intractable conditions, and are confronting 
crime, poverty, HIV/AIDS and a range of other life threatening problems as part of their daily 
lives.  
 
Attempts to isolate these broader experiences from the experiences people have in the 
workplace are possibly both problematic and misleading. For example, when a person has to 
catch several taxis to work, and thus starts his/her day at 5:00a.m. and finishes it at 8:00p.m., 
is supporting a large family of people who are unable to find work, when access to even basic 
health care is exceptionally difficult, workplace policies, salary, and work sponsored medical 
aid take on a particularly urgent meaning.  To attempt to account for a person’s perception of 
a particular policy by simply questioning them about the procedure used to develop the 
policy, the way in which the policy was relayed to them, or even in terms of their perception 
of the policy itself, fails to account for how that policy is an echo of much larger policies and 
practices, both present and past.  
 
This becomes particularly pertinent within the South African context given our history of the 
perpetration of gross and systematic injustice at every level of society. There is no doubt that 
broader societal concerns about past discrimination, race relations, poverty, unemployment, as 
well as politics, are all emerging as important workplace concerns. In addition, new labour 
legislation is having a direct impact on almost every area of workplace functioning, including 
selection, recruitment, discipline, assessment, and training and development. Concepts about 
justice that emanate elsewhere in society are, therefore, clearly imported into the workplace. 
These cannot then be taken to stand independently as workplace concerns. The Employment 
Equity Act with its legislation of Affirmative Action is a clear example of this. Concerns 
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about redressing past injustice to black, coloured and Indian South Africans have resulted in a 
statutory policy with regards to recruitment of the previously disadvantaged. The 
psychological paradigm would, in attempting to explore this policy of affirmative action, 
explore people’s perceptions of the affirmative action policy, their attitudes to the way in 
which this policy was developed, and would attempt to account for a relationship between 
these sets of attitudes and other workplace behaviours or attitudes (such as job satisfaction, 
organisational commitment, or organisational citizenship behaviours) (Bobocel, McCline & 
Folger, 1997; Bobocel, Davey, Son Hing, & Zanna, 2001; Kravitz, 1995; Kravitz, Harrison, 
Turner, Levine, Chaves, Brannick, Denning, Russel, Conrad, 1997). What it would fail to do 
is account for how affirmative action policies are representative of a societies attempt to 
address past (and present) practices of oppression and human rights violations, and how such 
policies are associated with a range of other changes occurring in that society (such as a new 
constitution). In addition to this, such a policy is representative of huge social shifts, in which 
different groups have large investments. As such a person’s belief about the ‘fairness’ of 
affirmative action cannot be separated from their experiences and perceptions of what is 
happening in the much larger context of the society, as well as their past experiences of that 
society.  
 
While it is arguably not possible to account for all of these factors in empirical studies, it is an 
indication that research in the area of organisational justice needs to begin accounting for the 
influence of broader factors relating to perceptions of justice in the workplace. Who a person 
is when they are outside of the organisation can clearly have an important impact on how they 
experience justice in the organisation itself. As such even if organisational justice is 
understood to be a separate concern from that of social justice, account still needs to be given 
of broader social forces. Arguably the importance of researching justice in the workplace 
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settings is the recognition that workplace settings are influenced by, and in turn influence, the 
rest of society.  An open systems approach maintains that the organisation does not operate in 
isolation from the rest of society, but rather external factors such as the economy, politics, 
legal factors, historical context, social and demographic factors, as well as technological 
factors all act on the workplace as inputs (Tustin, 1994).  These inputs are processed through 
the workplace, and result in outcomes such as productivity, employment turnover, 
absenteeism, profit, strike action, and job creation all of which impact on broader society.  In 
turn, these become inputs into the organisation again (Tustin, 1994).  
 
A further concern about the insular focus of organisational justice researchers is that issues of 
fairness are explored to the extent that they emerge as a concern for managers. While justice 
has been researched rather considerably within organisations, it is arguably done so in relation 
to a particular set of managerial concerns. This may be because within this paradigm justice 
theory is seen predominantly as a theory of motivation. Tyler and Blader (2000), state “Justice 
must be able to motivate both the acceptance of rules and decisions and efforts to help the 
group even when either departs from individual or group self-interest. In terms of social co 
ordination, justice has little value if it does not influence how people feel and what they do.” 
(Tyler and Blader, 2000 , p. 70). They argue that research findings that support the notion that 
justice perceptions influence people’s attitudes and behaviours point to important policy 
implications in that “They suggest that we can encourage desirable behaviour from the people 
in groups by creating group frameworks that are experienced as fair.” (Tyler and Blader, 
2000, p. 8). The view that justice perceptions can be used to mitigate the negative effects of 
certain workplace policies or enhance employee functioning is a common thread running 
through this type of research - employee commitment, morale, turnover intentions, 
organisational citizenship behaviours, productivity, theft and a host of other attitudinal and 
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behavioural variables have all been explored in relation to perceptions of organisational 
justice. This is arguably resulting in a blurring of the distinction between psychological 
academic enquiry into organisational practices (which should be emanating from a particular 
theoretical base and have appropriate standards for argument construction) and that of the 
business sciences (which have different theoretical bases and applications of knowledge). 
 
This leads into issues raised in relation to the second aim of this chapter, that of critically 
evaluating this body of research described, with particular reference to methodological 
concerns. As was argued in this chapter research methodologies employed by organisational 
justice researchers have a tendency to reduce the amount and quality of information being 
gathered, and then to further reduce this information through the use of particular statistical 
procedures. More systemic thinking that acknowledges the complexity of justice will demand 
research methodologies that extend beyond linear thinking. The recognition of complexity 
require that we move away from trying to simplify or reduce variables into measurable units, 
but rather find methodologies that can account for and help explore this complexity. As such 
what questions are asked, the way in which they are asked, to whom they are asked, and what 
tools are used to analyse the responses all need to fall under close and critical scrutiny – the 
limitations of current methodologies need to be given far more meaningful attention, and 
problems with such methodologies that are in fact insurmountable need to be acknowledged.   
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Chapter 4: Individual Characteristics and Perceptions of Justice 
 
Overview 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3 the construct of justice was discussed, both in terms of broader notions 
of social justice as well as in relation to questions about justice in organisations. Concerns 
about the theoretical paradigm – which understands justice in relation to distributive, 
procedural, and interpersonal concerns – were identified and discussed, as well as about the 
methodological underpinnings of much of the social-psychological research conducted in this 
area. Chapter 3 was concluded with an argument that called for the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of research that accounts for more of the complexity involved in 
experiences of justice. In the preceding chapters three arguments that could constitute a point 
of departure for such a new conceptualisation have been made  – resisting the use of the 
tripartite framework for understanding perceptions of justice, looking at organisational 
justice concerns in relation to a much broader set of factors and concerns, and using research 
methodologies that do not operate in an overly reductionist manner.  This chapter aims to 
propose a specific set of problems that are firstly, arguably in need of investigation, and 
secondly, would best be investigated in these less conventional ways – that is the study of 
individual characteristics, with particular reference to demographic variables, in relation to 
experiences of justice.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of theories that indicate the importance of individual 
characteristics, particularly demographic variables such as race and gender, for notions of 
social and group identity. The first theory under discussion is that of social identity theory as 
proposed by Tjafel and Turner (1979) who discuss the importance of self-categorisation in 
   
   110 
relation to identity. A review of research that uses demographic variables as indicators or 
markers of social identity are discussed. The discussion then moves more specifically into 
the area of justice, and the role that demographic variables and identity play in shaping 
perceptions and experiences of justice. This includes arguments made by Young (1990) and 
Sen (1999) who propose a broader conceptualisation of justice than that posited by justice 
theorists across all disciplines, one that accounts for the intricacies of individual situations 
and the ways in which this may impact on how people experience justice. The first part of 
this chapter is then concluded with commentary from social psychological researchers who 
also argue for the importance of looking at social categories when exploring questions about 
justice.  
 
The second part of this chapter then provides a critical review of research that has explored 
demographic variables and perceptions of justice. Much of the research in this area has 
focused on gender, race, and nationality when exploring perceptions of justice, and as such 
this forms the majority of research described in this chapter. Other variables such as religious 
affiliation and socio-economic status have also received some attention, and are thus 
included in this section. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the key arguments to 
emerge from this chapter – specifically the importance of exploring demographic variables in 
relation to questions about justice, as well as the importance of using methodologies that are 
considered and that can account for the complexity of this area.  
 
Individual Characteristics and their Relationship to Justice Perceptions 
 
 
 
Self, self-identity, and self-concept are “virtually synonymous terms” (p. 73) used to refer to 
the set of perceptions that a person has of who he or she is as a distinct person (Pedersen, 
   
   111 
1999).  The concept of the self has been fundamental to many psychological theories 
including psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1963), phenomenological theories (Rogers, 1959) 
and personality and trait theories (Allport, 1961). The belief that identity is socially 
constructed is a central assumption underpinning much of the work in this area (Frable, 
1997), as is the understanding that identity labels are “fluid and multidimensional” (Day, 
Cross, Ringseis & Williams, 1999).   
 
Social identity theory, which argues that identity derives from peoples knowledge that they 
belong to a particular group, and the meaning that this association has for them (Tjafel, 
1981), has dominated identity research (Cassidy & Trew, 1998).  Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
argue that group identity is synonymous with social identity. They state that social identity 
refers to ‘…those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories 
to which he perceives himself belonging.” (1986, p. 16). As such they argue that group 
identity provides a definition of the self. This social identity theory argues that people’s 
psychological processes change within group settings. When we perceive ourselves as 
members of a social group, we adopt a social identity and think of ourselves in terms of that 
group membership. Individuals validate their social identity by favouring the group to which 
they perceive themselves as belonging (the ‘in-group’) at the expense of all other groups with 
which they have not associated themselves (the ‘out-group’) (Tjafel, 1981). Turner (1991) 
argues that people will adjust their attitudes, behaviours and perceptions to match the 
collectively defined attributes of their social group – i.e. similar identities are likely to have 
similar social representations or “shared cognitive constructs” (Hogg & Abrams, 1988).  
 
The process of defining oneself in relation to a particular group is referred to as self-
categorisation. This process is based on the use of prototypes [ i.e. a representation of the 
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features that best define a group (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998 in Cassidy & Trew, 1998)] 
where individuals evaluate themselves in order to assess the extent to which they match the 
group prototype (Cassidy & Trew, 1998). Group membership can be identified along many 
lines. Pederson (1994) developed a model in which four components of identity were 
identified. These included Spiritual factors such as religious affiliation, degree of religiosity, 
being a spiritual person etc, Personal/Social factors such as personal and social traits, Family 
factors such as family composition and relations, and Identifications factors such as gender, 
race, home address, nationality or place of birth (Pederson, 1994). Demographic variables 
can be seen to underpin all of these components (although certainly not account for them) – 
religious affiliation, number of dependants, number of children, area in which one lives, 
number of people living in a house hold, financial status age, race, and gender may all be 
very good population descriptors, but they are all also central to at least one of the 
components described above. However, as mentioned above, this identity is recognised as 
being multidimensional and dynamic rather than fixed or static. One’s identity may change 
across situations and contexts, and certain features of one’s identity may become more or 
less salient with shifts in time and context (Jaret & Reitzes, 1999).  
 
Stryker’s identity theory (Stryker, 1980) which is based on Mead’s notion of symbolic 
interactionism, recognises the multidimensional nature of identity. In this theory, Stryker 
(1980) proposes that individuals construct multiple identities in order to correspond with 
the multiple roles and statuses they have. Symbolic interactionism suggests that the 
meaning and relative importance of a particular identity may vary across contexts and 
settings – across settings individuals effect different identities, and the importance of 
identities may diminish or rise. Stryker (1980) uses the term salience to refer to the 
likelihood that a particular identity will be activated, and psychological centrality to refer 
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to the relative importance a particular identity has for an individual. There are a number 
of identity components that have been argued by social psychologists to carry ‘master 
status’ – that is this component will dominate all other components in nearly all social 
situations. These include race, gender, class, and sexual orientation (Jaret & Reitzes, 
1999). 
 
As such, demographic characteristics are seen to be central to notions of identity.  It is 
recognised that demographic characteristics such as age, gender, or race provide salient 
features against which individuals categorise themselves (Schneider, K. & Northcraft, G.B., 
1999). Considerable research has been done exploring demographic variables as markers of 
social identity. For example, in a study on 159 students at a Hong Kong university, Tong, 
Hong, Lee and Chiu (1999) looked at language as a carrier of social identity. In this study, 
the researchers used nationality as an indicator of social identity (they asked students to 
categorise themselves as being either a Hongkonger or Chinese). Using an experimental 
design, they then asked the students to listen to conversations between a Hongkonger and a 
Chinese person, conducted in different languages – the official languages of each group - and 
then complete an intergroup attitudes measure. Results indicated that those who have a 
strong Hong Kong identity were resistant to Hongkongers using the language of the ‘out-
group’, and expected other Hongkongers to speak in the ‘in-group’ language when speaking 
to members of the ‘out-group’. As such this research indicated that language is strongly 
associated with aspects of social identity (specifically nationality). In this study a 
demographic variable, that of nationality, was used as a direct measure of social identity. 
This is not unique to this research. Many other researchers used one or several demographic 
descriptors to define different aspects of social identity.  
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For example, Jaret and Reitzes (1999) explored the importance of racial identity in different 
settings (at home, in the neighbourhood, at work, and in the public) and in relation to other 
identities - that of gender, age, occupation, marital status, and social class. They also looked 
at the importance of racial identity for self-concept, and investigated the possibility of gender 
differences in relation to the perceived importance of racial identity.  As can be seen, in this 
study an array of demographic variables were looked at as defining different aspects of social 
identity. Their study was conducted on a sample of 533 adult residents of 48 states in 
America. Participants were interviewed telephonically. Results indicate that for black people 
racial identity is a more important component of self-concept than it is for white or multi-
racial people. The importance of racial identity also varied across settings for black and 
white people, with it being most important for black people at work, and least important at 
home. For white people racial identity was found to be most important when in public, and 
least important at home or when in their own neighbourhood. With regards to the relative 
importance of racial identity, contrary to the researcher’s expectations it was found that for 
all three groups, gender was identified as being the most important identity. Finally, no 
differences were found between men and women’s assessment of the importance of racial 
identity.   
 
A further example of the use of demographic details as indicators of social identity is evident 
in the following study in Northern Ireland. Cassidy and Trew (1998) explored the relative 
importance of national and religious identities in relation to four other identities (that of 
family, friends, boy/girlfriend, and university) for 216 university students. While insufficient 
detail is provided regarding how different identities were measured, it is indicated that the 
majority of scales had one item. As such participants were, for the most part, asked simply to 
classify themselves into a group. Participants completed salience and centrality measures for 
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each of the identities. Analyses revealed that while the students did value national and 
religious identities, they were accorded low salience and centrality relative to other identities. 
In addition to this there were some differences found in relation to religious and national 
identities between Catholics and Protestants (with Catholics displaying higher levels of 
affective commitment to national identity then Protestants).  
 
The importance of certain demographic variables as indicators of social identity has also 
been explored within the South African context. Heaven, Stones, Simbayi, and Le Roux, 
(2000) conducted research using a sample of 615 undergraduate Humanities and Social 
Sciences students drawn from three South African universities. In this study the researchers 
explored the relationship between social identity and two values, that of national strength and 
international harmony and equality. Social identities were defined in relation to the following 
groupings: African, South African, rural dweller, city dweller, conservative, progressive, 
global dweller, religious, English-speaker, and Afrikaans speaker. Race was also 
incorporated as a marker of social identity. The results of the research indicated that people 
who classified themselves as Afrikaans linked strongly with religious affiliation. Self-
identified black South Africans, on the other hand, associated themselves with more 
encompassing identities such as South African or global dweller.  
 
While demographic variables cannot be seen to be synonymous with identity, they are clearly 
important markers of one’s social position i.e. the space which one occupies in a given 
group, community, or society. This social position can, in turn, be seen to be central to the 
kind of access a person has to societal resources, respect, dignity, rights, as well as a range of 
other goods and conditions. This is arguably particularly true within the South African 
context where factors such as race and gender had, and continue to have, a direct relationship 
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with factors such as where you live, what you earn, the kind of education you are likely to 
receive, and at one time even whether you could vote or who you could have sex with. As 
such, these demographic variables (as indicators of social position) do have a direct 
relationship to experiences of justice.   
 
Chapters 2 and 3 provided an overview of the history and current status of theoretical and 
empirical investigations into the area of justice. Such theories and studies are now coming 
under criticism from theorists in that they are seen to be limited in their scope and 
understanding of justice, particularly in understanding how individual circumstances can 
impact on experiences of distribution and justice.  
 
The importance of accounting for social relationships and identity when exploring questions of 
justice is also emphasised by Young (1990). She argues that while matters of distribution are 
certainly important, the context of justice concerns needs to be widened to incorporate all 
aspects of institutional context, structures, and social relations that are subject to potential 
collective decision. She asserts that the way in which justice is defined needs to be broadened 
as people have an active interest in values of justice other than purely distributive ones, such as 
participation in processes, acquiring and using skills, receiving recognition for participation, 
communicating with others and enjoying rewarding social relationships. Young (1990) thus 
views social justice as the extent to which a society possesses and supports the development of 
institutional conditions necessary for the realisation of these values. She asserts that these 
values are encompassed in two general values, that of the ability to develop and exercise 
capacities and express experience, and participating in determining your own actions and the 
condition of your actions. Correspondingly, there are two conditions that define injustice, 
namely oppression (the institutional constraint on self-development) and domination (the 
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institutional constraint on self-determination). She, therefore, provides what she views to be a 
much broader concept of justice defining it as the elimination of institutionalised domination 
and oppression - it is the concepts of domination and oppression, rather than the concept of 
distribution, that she argues should be the starting point for a conception of social justice 
(Young, 1990, p. 16). 
 
Young (1990) argues that groups and social identity are central to the notion of oppression, as it 
is groups who are the target of oppressive actions. She states that our daily discourse 
differentiates people or allocates them to groups on the basis of factors such as gender, age, 
race, religion etc. A social group is thus a collective of people differentiated by cultural forms, 
practices, or way of life. Members of social groups develop an affinity with one another because 
of their shared experiences, even if they also view themselves as belonging to the same broader 
society. She argues that there is an important distinction between social groups and what she 
terms ‘aggregates’ – aggregates are the classification of people according to some attribute, 
where the attribute does not necessarily have any emotional or social salience (e.g. eye colour, 
whether you wear glasses or not and so on), while social groups are defined by a sense of 
identity that emerges from shared attributions. She argues that certain characteristics such as 
age, gender, local, occupational group, and religion are not mere descriptors as has been argued 
by some justice theorists, but rather form an important part of one’s identity and one’s 
experience of justice. These social groups are not homogenous, and they thus function in a 
complex way, with group differences cutting across one another – for example women are 
differentiated by age, race, class, sexuality, region, nationality etc, the salience of which could 
increase depending on the context. Young (1990) argues that oppressive behaviours (being one 
of the defining features of injustice) such as exploitation and marginalisation have historically 
been targeted at social groups who are defined in relation to a set of individual characteristics 
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such as race, gender or age.  Given the centrality of groups and group identity to the experience 
of justice, theories of justice need to account both for the importance of group identity as well as 
the complexity of these groups and identities.  
 
Similar concerns about the conceptualisation of justice are articulated by Sen (1999). Like 
Young (1990) he proposes an understanding of justice that moves beyond that proposed by 
current theorists, particularly utilitarian and libertarian ones. In exploring these theories Sen 
looks at the ‘informational bases’ that these approaches use in order to make a distribution 
decision. An informational basis is defined by Sen (1999) to be the information that is needed, 
or alternatively excluded, by a particular approach, in order to make a distribution decision. Sen 
argues that “In fact, the real ‘bite’ of a theory of justice can, to a great extent, be understood 
from its informational base: what information is – or is not – taken to be relevant.” (1999, p. 
57). He views both libertarian and utilitarian theories as using very limited informational basis - 
in Utilitarianism (most specifically in its classical form), utility, which is defined as happiness, 
pleasure or satisfaction is seen as the only basis upon which to make distributive rules. Factors 
such as individual freedom, liberty, or aspects of quality of life are not considered unless they 
have some direct bearing on utility. Their role is purely indirect (Sen, 1999). Another type of 
information that is excluded within this paradigm is the actual distribution of utilities – only the 
total utility to everyone is considered to be relevant (Sen, 1999). As such, Sen (1999) argues 
that utilitarianism uses a very limited informational base. Likewise, libertarian theories exclude 
information about happiness. Instead, their informational base focuses almost exclusively on 
rights and liberties of the individual.  
 
It is thus clear, Sen (1999) states, that given these contrasting informational bases, these two 
views of justice are incompatible and the appropriate theory of justice is neither the utilitarian 
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approach with its narrow focus on happiness, nor the libertarian view with its opposite but 
equally narrow focus on liberty. He maintains that there are many factors that effect the extent 
of the utility or range of opportunities one may get from a particular distribution. Two people 
with exactly the same amount of money but who operate in varying contexts will get a different 
degree of benefit from that money. As such he contends that when operating from such a 
narrow informational base, it is not possible to compare the values particular distributions will 
have for people.   
 
Sen identifies five sets of factors that effect the relationship between ‘real income’ and the 
advantages (either well-being or freedom) that can be obtained from it. The first he terms 
‘personal heterogeneities’, which refer to physical characteristics such as illness, age, disability, 
and gender that make people’s needs diverse. A person suffering from an illness, or a person 
with a disability, would not obtain the same quality of life from a particular income as a healthy 
or physically-abled person might. They would require more income (for medication, prostheses, 
etc) in order to enjoy the same quality of life, if that were even possible. Within this category, 
the need for ‘compensation’ due to the disadvantage would vary between people. The second 
set of factors, Sen refers to as ‘environmental diversities’ which incorporates all environmental 
conditions that may impact on the value one can extract from an income. He asserts, for 
example, that weather conditions such as extreme temperatures or rainfall, or the presence of 
infectious diseases such as AIDS or Malaria, alters the quality of life people living under those 
conditions may enjoy. The third set of factors to which Sen refers is ‘variations in social 
climate’, which concerns things such as educational facilities, levels of crime and violence, and 
the quality of community relationships. The fourth set of factors is ‘differences in relational 
perspectives’, which pertains to the “commodity requirements of established patterns of 
behaviours” (Sen, 1997, p. 71). Sen argues that different communities have different customs 
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and conventions that can impact on a person’s capacity to function within those communities. 
He proposes that in some wealthier communities for example, to be able to engage in activities 
without shame may require a higher standard of clothing or other visible consumables than in a 
poorer community. As such a person can be relatively poorer than someone else who has a 
lower real income than them. The final set of factors is that of ‘distribution within the family’. 
Sen contends that the family is the basic unit of income use – the family members, whether they 
are earners or not, share earned incomes. As such the rules used to distribute resources within 
the family unit, such as age or gender , can greatly influence the capacity of individual members 
to achieve.  
 
Sen asserts that these five sources of variation in people’s capacity to convert income and 
resources into quality of life means that wealth or opulence, in the form of a high income, is a 
very limited indication of welfare or quality of life. As an informational base for assessing 
justice, it is very limited. Given all the limitations of the predominant justice theories, 
particularly with regards to the informational bases they consider relevant, Sen attempts to 
provide an alternative paradigm that incorporates other types of information. He contends that a 
more encompassing approach would be one that considers the ‘actual living’ that people are 
able to achieve. Taking this further, he proposes that focusing on the freedom people have to 
achieve ‘actual living’ is a more accurate representation of the value of distributions to those 
people.  As such he advocates a focus on the freedoms engendered by income, rather than on the 
income seen on its own (Sen, 1997).  He states  
…for many evaluative purposes, the appropriate ‘space’ is neither that of 
utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of primary goods (as demanded 
by Rawls), but that of the substantive freedoms – the capabilities – to 
choose a life one has reason to value. If the objective is to concentrate on 
the individual’s real opportunity to pursue her objectives… then account 
would have to be taken not only of the primary goods the persons 
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respectively hold, but also of the relevant personal characteristics that 
govern the conversion of primary goods into the persons ability to promote 
her ends. (Sen, 1997, p. 74). 
 
 
Both Young (1990) and Sen (1999) are arguing for a broader conceptualisation of justice, one 
that accounts for, among other things, the context and set of circumstances that individuals 
operate in and that impact on their experiences of justice. Young (1990) argues that social 
groups, developed in relation to individual characteristics that form the basis for social 
identity, are central to oppression and domination, the defining features of injustice. Sen 
(1999) argues that personal circumstance and context impact directly on the potential value of 
distributions, and as such cannot be ignored by any conceptualisation of justice. Demographic 
variables, as they relate to questions of identity social position and context can, therefore, be 
seen to be central to notions of justice. However, the importance of these inter-related 
concepts for perceptions and experiences of justice has largely been neglected by social 
psychological research (Wenzel, 2000). This is particularly relevant in relation to distributive 
justice research and literature as inherent in the notion of distributive justice is the 
presupposition that boundaries exist that define membership and non-membership in a 
community (Wenzel, 2000, Cohen, 1991). Walzer (1983) argues that it is this membership that 
underpins all other forms of distribution. He says:  
The idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which 
distributions take place: a group of people committed to dividing, 
exchanging, and sharing social goods, first of all among themselves…The 
primary good we distribute to one another is membership in some human 
community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all our 
other distributive choices: It determines with whom we make those choices, 
from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate 
goods and services (Walzer, 1983, p. 31). 
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As such, Cohen (1991) argues that group membership is the primary good at issue with 
regards to concerns about distributive justice. He states that before any allocation or 
justice judgement is made, a group of recipients must be circumscribed. He therefore 
argues that researchers may learn as much about justice by exploring how boundaries 
are drawn and group-membership defined as by noting how resources are allocated 
within a particular group (Cohen, 1991). 
 
 Despite the centrality of identity social position to questions of justice, Cohen (1991) 
argues that it has been largely ignored by psychologists. He states “If we wish to 
understand justice and the role it plays in social life, then understanding how we draw 
the boundaries of the ‘moral community’ within which all matters of justice are 
confronted is crucial.’ (Cohen, 1991, p. 247). To this end, he argues, psychological 
researchers need to look beyond the individual as recipient, as most empirical research 
in this field does, and look towards other recipient units such as small or large groups. 
Relevant recipients may families, statistical aggregates (for example population 
groups), or self-conscious collectivities (such as gender or class groups). Even within 
groups of recipients, there may be other dimensions along which distributions differ. 
Status at birth, sex, ethnicity, age, religion, have all been used as a dimension against 
which people have been included or excluded from allocation decisions (Cohen, 1991).  
 
Wenzel (2000) shares these concerns about the neglect of questions of identity social groups 
in relation to distributive justice. He argues that, in particular, early exchange theories and 
the resultant equity theories were individualistic, and they failed to look at the social 
dimension of distributive justice. Despite attempts by some theorists to account for social 
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context in their conceptualisation of distributive justice – for example Lerner (1977) 
distinguished between identity, unit, and non-unit relationships in which distributions occur, 
and Deutsch (1985) incorporated conceptions of personal orientations in relation to 
perceptions of justice - these accounts were used for taxonomic differentiations, and identity 
social position was never explicitly discussed in relation to justice judgements (Wenzel, 
2000). Like Cohen (1991), Wenzel argues that identity processes are central to explorations 
of justice, as they are the basis of judgements about entitlement. Despite the neglect of this 
fundamental issue within the body of literature on distributive justice, Wenzel (2000) argues 
that in certain theories related to procedural justice, identity processes play a central role. In 
particular he refers to Lind and Tyler’s (1988) Group Value model. As discussed in Chapter 
2, this model asserts that instrumental concerns that maximise individual output are not the 
only motivation with regards to justice judgements. Instead relational concerns regarding 
group membership and status are viewed as being central to perceptions of fairness (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988). As such this model attempts to account for group membership and social 
identity as being directly related to questions of fairness, in a way that distributive theories of 
justice have not. Wenzel (2000) argues that a theory that clarifies the relationship between 
identity processes and distributive judgement is also needed. In this regard he argues that 
perceptions of entitlement, which are viewed as being central to distributive justice 
judgements, depend on the individual’s sociocategorical structuring of the situation, as well 
as their corresponding self-categorisation or identity (Wenzel, 2000). When individuals judge 
their own entitlements, they do so on the basis of self-categorisation, in that they perceive 
themselves to be entitled to the same outcomes as those who they see as being 
psychologically equal to them (Wenzel, 2000). As such “Self-categorization and 
identification structure the comparative context and influence which comparisons will be 
made against which normative standards” (Wenzel, 2000, p. 160). 
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Justice Perceptions and Demographic Variables 
 
 
As can be seen from this discussion, characteristics of the individual, particularly those that are 
markers of social identity and social locationposition, emerge as being central to perceptions or 
experiences of justice. There are any number of dimensions along which one individual might 
differ from another – ranging from easily recognisable features such as race or gender, to the less 
directly observable factors such as domestic features (where you live, with whom etc), financial 
status, or job title. These variables are likely to play an important role in defining a person’s 
experience, particularly within the South African context. In South Africa there have been a 
number of state policies based on race and gender. These range from policies of Apartheid, to 
the current Affirmative Action policy of the ANC government, and include matters related to the 
capacity of people of different races as well as woman, to live lives commensurate with other 
people in society. Such policies are not unique to South Africa, and are not confined to just race 
and gender. Retirement policies based on age, selection decisions based on level of education, 
and welfare policies based on level of income are all examples of how certain individual 
characteristics have the capacity to shape life experiences through broad social policy. At a more 
micro level, there are a range of policies that are also shaped by such characteristics. A bank’s 
loan policy and terms based on income and type of occupation, a social club’s membership 
policy based on social status, or school admission policy based on the area in which learners live 
are examples of this. As such it is clear that certain characteristics of the individual and their 
circumstances, can be central to questions of rights and distributions.   
 
In addition to this, as argued by Sen (1999) these characteristics are also central to the 
capacity people have to use different distributions. For example employees of an 
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organisation who live in areas further away from the work site will spend more of their salary 
on transportation costs than those who live closer by. Similarly those employees with a larger 
number of dependants will have less disposable income than those with few or no 
dependants.  It can be seen that these individual characteristics or descriptors are potentially 
a source of valuable insight into people’s experiences of justice.  Such variables are wide 
ranging, but they can be categorised under the heading of demographic variables - i.e. 
descriptive characteristics that differentiate one person or population from the next (Rouceck 
& Warren, 1968).  
 
While such demographic data is used most predominantly to describe groups in order to map 
population trends, such information can potentially be used for more than just descriptive 
purposes. The importance of demographic variables as impacting on a range of events and 
experiences of people has been recognised by, among others, sociologists, economists, 
anthropologists, and psychologists. Within the field of Demography [the social science 
discipline concerned with the study of human populations (http://demography.anu.edu.au)] 
demographic variables have received extensive research attention. Demographic variables 
have been researched in relation to, among others, crime (South & Messner, 2000), health 
behaviour (Pol & Thomas, 2001), child development (Riordan & Shore, 1997), as well as 
psychiatric disorder (Krznaric, 1999). The importance of demographic variables in helping to 
understand patterns of behaviour and perceptions is unsurprising. Many societal allocation 
decisions are made on the basis of demography – marital status, number of children, age, race, 
gender, level of education, and health status are just some of the variables that may determine 
access to resources and conditions within a particular society.  Resources would include things 
such as education, employment, housing, money, etc, while conditions could refer to 
prejudices, favourable treatment, inclusive/exclusive behaviours, respect, acknowledgement, 
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liberties etc.  It can, therefore, be argued that demographic data is indicative of an individual’s 
access to societal resources, and consequently their social position in society. This social 
position creates an access point to information, processes, and goods, and as such, is likely to 
influence one’s attitudes to and perceptions of a range of related constructs, including, if not 
primarily, perceptions of fairness of that society. Demographic variables can also be seen to be 
influential in determining particular conceptions of social identity. 
 
While the relationship between identity social position and perceptions of justice has largely 
been neglected by researchers, some attention has been given to particular aspects of 
identitydemography, most notably that of gender. Gilligan (1982), a developmental 
psychologist, proposed a theory related to gender differences in moral reasoning and 
approaches to justice. This theory was based on what she argued to be inherent gender biases 
in Kholberg’s (1976) cognitive-developmental stage theory of moral development. Following 
Piaget’s (1932/1965) stage approach to the development of moral reasoning, Kholberg 
(1976) developed a model of moral reasoning that had justice at its pinnacle. He argued that 
the development of moral reasoning was based on six stages, which were grouped into three 
levels. These different levels were indicative of a changing relationship between the self and 
societies rules and expectations (Crandall, Tsang, Goldman, & Pennington, 1999). In the first 
level, the pre-conventional level, moral reasoning is based on the possibility of reward or 
punishment. In the second level, the conventional level, moral reasoning is based on the idea 
of membership of the society and doing what is best for relationships and that society. In the 
final stage, the postconventional level, laws and rules are understood to be about individuals, 
not vice-versa. Moral reasoning is thus based on notions of justice and individual rights 
(Kholberg, 1976). The stages were viewed as hierarchical, and early research indicated that 
the modal stage for females was 3, while for men it was 4 (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). This, in 
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conjunction with the fact that Kholberg’s model was derived from an all male sample, led 
many researchers to criticise it as being gender-biased (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Most noted of 
these critics was Gilligan (1982), who argued that the Kholberg’s (1969, 1976, 1984) theory 
neglected to recognise a distinctively female mode of moral reasoning. Gilligan (1982) 
further argued that Kholberg defined moral reasoning in relation purely to what she termed a 
justice-concern. This justice-concern, the conventional basis for assessing moral reasoning, is 
concerned with principles of fairness, equity, and individualism. This orientation ignores 
what she terms a care-orientation, which is characterised by a focus on maintaining 
relationships, responding to the needs of others, and a responsibility not to cause hurt 
(Gilligan, 1982). Gilligan (1982) argued that while males and females may operate from 
either of these orientations, there was a fundamentally different approach to moral reasoning 
between the two genders - males predominantly used a justice-orientation, and females 
predominantly used a care-orientation. Gilligan (1982) argued that society imposes different 
expectations on men and women, and these different experiences affect one’s propensity 
toward a moral orientation of care or justice (Gilligan, 1982). She states: 
The sex difference question, when framed in this way, does not carry 
the implication that one sex is morally superior, nor does it imply that 
moral behaviour is biologically determined. Instead, it draws attention 
to two perspectives on morality. To the extent that biological sex, 
psychology of gender, and the cultural norms and values that define 
masculine and feminine behaviour affect the experience of equality and 
attachment, these factors will presumably influence moral development 
(1982, p. 282). 
 
As such Gilligan (1982) developed a theory of moral reasoning that argued for a broader 
conceptualisation of moral-reasoning – one that would encompass a ‘care-orientation’ as 
well as a ‘justice-orientation’ (Gilligan, 1982). This theory was based on the development of 
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a morality of care, and like Kholberg’s (1969, 1976, 1984) theory, this reasoning moved 
through a number of stages – first from the bases of caring as a selfish concept, then as a way 
of conforming to society’s expectations of female selflessness, and finally to care as a 
universal ethic expectations (Crandall, Tsang, Goldman, & Pennington, 1999). Gilligan 
argued that the ethic of care is a different construct to that of justice, and that a holistic view 
of moral development would need to encompass both constructs (1982).  
 
This exchange between Gilligan (1982) and Kholberg (1984) resulted in a body of research 
that has the gender differences in reasoning about morality and justice at its core. A 
considerable amount of psychological research about justice and gender is based on 
exploring or validating the core arguments of Gilligan (1982). Results of such research are 
inconsistent. Some researchers have found evidence for Gilligan’s claims (Gilligan & 
Attanuchi, 1988; Langdale, 1986; Johnston, 1988; Yacker & Weinberg, 1990). For example 
Wright and Galea (1998, in Galea & Wright, 1999) found support for the hypothesis that 
gender is related to how individuals evaluate the fairness of decisions in a workplace setting. 
They found that women and men judged the fairness of decisions differently, with women 
using a justice orientation more than men did. However, other studies have found no gender 
differences in moral reasoning at all (Beal, Garrod, Ruben & Stewart, 1997; Friedman, 
Robinson, & Friedman, 1987). Rest (1979) conducted a review of 17 different studies that 
looked at gender differences in moral reasoning. He found that there were only two 
significant gender differences, both of which favoured females. Walker (1984) conducted a 
meta-analysis of 79 studies that measured moral reasoning in relation to both justice and care 
components and that looked for gender differences in such reasoning. He found only limited 
evidence to support gender differences in moral reasoning – gender accounted for one 
twentieth of one percent of the variability of moral reasoning (Walker, 1984). Jaffee and 
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Hyde (2000) conducted a meta-analysis on 180 published articles and 66 dissertations 
looking at gender differences in moral reasoning. The analysis revealed small differences in 
care orientation in favour of females, and small differences in justice orientations favouring 
males.  
 
Researchers working in the area of justice perceptions have also looked at gender as a 
variable potentially related to different aspects of justice. For example Jasso and Webster 
(1999) conducted a series of studies aimed at exploring gender differences in relation to 
purely distributive concerns. In one study they aimed to explore whether a double standard 
existed for the assessment of justice earnings between men and women – i.e. do observers 
treat men and women differently when asked to assign the amount of reward they consider 
just for a target recipient. Results, based on the use of vignettes, indicated that respondents 
regarded as just a 15 percent wage gap between men and women – men were systematically 
assigned higher wages than comparable women, both by male and female respondents. 
 
Tata (2000) conducted a study aimed at exploring the influence of gender and organisational 
role on the use of distributive and procedural justice principles. In this study a sample of 44 
men and 38 women graduate students employed in various business organisations were asked 
to assess how likely they would be to consider factors related to both procedural and 
distributive justice when making decisions related to pay raises. A self-report questionnaire 
was used, comprising six items aimed at measuring the use of distributive criteria and 10 
items aimed at measuring the use of distributive criteria. These two measures were adapted 
from distributive and procedural organisational justice scales. Participants completed two 
versions of the questionnaire. In the first they were asked to imagine that they were a 
supervisor making a raise decision in relation to employees in their department. In the second 
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they were asked to imagine that they were an employee who had just received a pay raise.  A 
biographic blank, where the sex of the participants was indicated, was completed. Results of 
a multivariate analysis of variance (where gender was a between-subjects factor, 
organisational role a within-subject factor and distributive and procedural justice were 
dependent variables) indicated that when assuming the role of subordinates participants were 
more likely to use distributive justice principles, procedural justice principles when assuming 
the role of supervisor, and that men were more likely to use distributive justice principles 
than procedural justice principles when allocating and evaluating pay raises. Women did not 
differ in their use of distributive and procedural principles.  
 
Lee, Pillutla, and Law (2000) conducted a study aimed at exploring, among other things,  
whether gender moderates the relationship between distributive and procedural justice 
perceptions and evaluations of the organisation and management. A sample of 729 university 
employees completed a self report questionnaire – this comprised a procedural justice scale 
which was divided into a 6 item ‘formal procedure’ sub scale and a 9 item interpersonal 
justice sub scale, a 5 item distributive justice scale, as well as 3 item trust in management 
scale, and a 3 item psychological contract fulfilment scale used to measure organisational 
evaluation. Results of a hierarchical moderated regression indicated that while gender did 
moderate the relationship between procedural justice perceptions and organisational 
evaluations (the effect of procedural justice perceptions on organisational evaluations was 
milder for women than it was for men), it did not moderate any of the other three 
relationships hypothesised (i.e. procedural and distributive justice perceptions and trust in 
management, or distributive justice perceptions and organisational evaluation).  
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Gender has also been looked at in relation to belief in a just world - the belief that the world 
is a just place where people generally get what they deserve (Lerner, 1977) A number of 
studies have been conducted aimed at exploring whether there are gender differences in the 
belief in a just world, the results of which have been largely inconsistent. For example 
Furnham (1991) conducted a study on 1 659 psychology students from 12 different countries 
in which no gender differences in belief in a just world were found. Similar studies on a 
range of smaller samples also found no such gender differences (Smith & Green, 1984; 
Rubin & Peplau, 1975; Wagstaff, 1983; Ma & Smith, 1985, Durm & Stowers, 1998). 
However,  Whatley (1993), Moran and Comfort (1982), and Ambrosia and Sheehan (1990) 
reported sex differences in just world beliefs. A meta-analytic review of the relationship 
between gender and belief in a just world was conducted by O’Connor, Morrison, mcLeod & 
Anderson (1996). The researchers conducted a search of a number of sources in order to 
identify studies that measured belief in a just world using two particular scales. A total of 63 
studies were identified, but only 33 of those either reported, or the researchers provided, 
sufficient statistical information needed to calculate an effect size. The total sample 
comprised 3350 men and 4292 women. Results indicated that the weighted average effect 
size was .12 (1) (p<.05), suggesting that males had slightly higher just world beliefs than 
women. This is considered a small effect size, but the authors argue that the null hypothesis 
of no difference between men and women cannot be rejected.     
 
As can be seen, years of psychological research into the relationship between gender and 
justice have produced inconsistent results. Lee, Pillutla, and Law, (2000, p. 699) state that  
social psychological research on gender differences in relation to perceptions of justice 
“…has a long and confusing history…” (and they acknowledge that their research results 
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also did not yield consistent gender effects). Similarly surprising results have been found 
when looking at race – a second demographic variable that has interested justice researchers.  
 
Parker, Baltes and Christiansen (1997) conducted a study aimed at exploring whether race 
and gender moderate the relationship between perceptions of organisational justice and 
support for affirmative action. In this study 7 228 employees of a government agency in 
America completed a self-report questionnaire comprising, among others, measures of 
support for affirmative action as well as organisational and procedural justice perceptions. 
Overall the questionnaire comprised 120 items, but a sub set of 21 items – argued to 
represent the six constructs under discussion - were used in the statistical analysis. In relation 
to justice perceptions, 3 items focusing on the extent to which rewards and recognition were 
allocated on the basis of performance were used as indicators of distributive justice, and 4 
items focusing on the extent to which participants felt involved in organisational decision 
making were used as indicators of procedural justice. Four race-gender groups were 
identified, namely white men, white women, Blacks/Hispanics, and Asians. These categories 
were arrived at on the basis of theoretical concerns (these groups represent previously 
disadvantaged groups in America) as well as statistical analyses –a LISREL analysis using 
only white women, black, Hispanic, and Asian participants was conducted in order to 
ascertain if there were differences between these groups on the variables under discussion. 
As there were no significant differences between blacks and Hispanics they were combined 
into one group in order to maximise the power of between-group comparisons. Similarly, no 
differences were found between women and Asians, but these two groups were left separate 
in order to increase the interpretability of the between-groups comparisons. Four 
demographic variables were included as control variables, namely age, education, level in the 
organisation, and tenure.  
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Mean and covariance structure analyses (MACS) were used to examine the relationships 
between support for affirmative action, justice perceptions, as well as the other variables 
under investigation (career development, satisfaction, and loyalty). MACS analysis 
comprises two steps – firstly the equivalency of the measurement properties of the constructs 
and the effects of the control variables across the four groups are tested. Secondly, on the 
basis of metric invariance, a test for group differences and construct relationships is 
conducted. Results indicated, among other things that mean levels of procedural and 
distributive justice were not reliably different across the four demographic groups. Further, 
group membership did moderate the relationship between support for affirmative action and 
perceptions of organisational justice, but not always in the direction that the researchers had 
predicted - despite predicting a negative relationship between these variables for white men, 
perceived support for affirmative action was positively correlated with organisational justice 
perceptions. These relationships were, however, stronger for the other three demographic 
groups. In addition to these results, it is interesting to note the relationships between justice 
perceptions and the control variables. Procedural justice was negatively related to level of 
education, and positively related to level in the organisation. Similarly, distributive justice 
was negatively related to level of education, and positively related to level in the 
organisation, as well as being negatively related to tenure.  
 
While these are only some of the results, as the study had a number of different foci not 
relevant to the current discussion, it is evident that the demographic variables are not 
significant in the way that researchers might predict – there were no reliable differences 
between the four groups with regards to perceptions of organisational justice, the higher the 
level of education the lower perceptions of justice were, as tenure increased perceptions of 
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distributive justice decreased, white men did not perceive the organisation to be unfair 
despite perceiving high support for affirmative action.  This might partly be explained by 
looking at the research design and methodology. Given the nature of the research questions, 
how race and gender groups are defined may be considered fundamental. Despite this, the 
grouping of participants into the four demographic categories is arguable problematic. Firstly 
the researchers only defined gender differences in the white population group. As such they 
are assuming that gender is less relevant for the other groupings as, presumably the 
supposition is, that discrimination occurred against these groups on the basis of race and not 
gender.  There is no evidence to presuppose that black or Hispanic women feel the same as 
black or Hispanic men about affirmative action or experiences of justice. To the contrary – if 
you are exploring the relationship between race and gender and other variables it might 
arguably be very important to explore gender differences within the race groups. Black 
women, for example, might arguably have suffered a double oppression, and this might 
impact quite heavily on their perceptions and experiences. It is not really possible to have a 
meaningful discussion about gender differences if these are only identified for one race 
group. A second concern about how the demographic groups were identified refers to the 
way in which Black and Hispanic groups were combined as initial statistics indicated no 
differences between these two groups on the variables under consideration. A finding of no 
differences between these two groups could be considered an interesting finding on its own, 
and worthy of discussion and further investigation. There is no theoretical evidence to 
suggest that these groups are similar or that they share the same experiences of 
discrimination simply because they are both minority groups. As such combining the two 
groups might arguably be misleading in that it creates one large group of people, thereby 
impacting on statistical procedures, without any theoretical or even intuitive support for 
doing so. Furthermore, it reduces the amount of detail and complexity in the investigation, 
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fusing two sets of diverse groups together and representing their experiences and perceptions 
as the same (which is different from saying that there was no difference between the two 
groups in relation to particular measures). Again, if the purpose of the study is to explore 
race differences, then proper cognisance needs to be given to the different race groups. The 
research results may have been unpredictable and inconsistent partly because the four 
demographic groups identified might not be congruent with people’s actual experiences of 
their race and gender. 
 
A second concern about this study that might help account for the surprising results is the 
measures of organisational justice used. As reported, initially 120 items were included in the 
questionnaire but these were reduced to 21 for the analyses. Three items were used to 
measure distributive justice, which was defined in relation tot reward and recognition for 
performance, and another three for procedural justice which was defined in relation to 
involvement in decision making. As can be seen from discussions in the previous two 
chapters, this is not reflective of the extent of thinking and work done in the 
conceptualisation of these variables. Neither of these two definitions and measures could 
necessarily be said to be measures of organisational justice. As such it might be unsurprising 
that the differences between the groups were not as significant as expected by the 
researchers.  
 
A final concern about this study relates to the value of looking for race and gender 
differences in isolation from a range of other demographic variables that may be considered 
as important. While it is acknowledged that this particular study was exploring questions 
about affirmative action and justice, and affirmative action is a gendered and race based 
policy, it is arguably slightly reductionist to suppose that these two demographic variables on 
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their own would have a large impact on perceptions. For example it could be argued that 
variables such as class, education, marital status, parents occupation, whether or not one is 
unionised could, in combination, be as important as race and gender in predicting people’s 
experiences of affirmative action and organisational justice. Factors such as whether 
someone is likely to find it easier to obtain work (e.g. more educated), relies on their income, 
and thus their job, less than others (e.g. someone who has a n income earning spouse, 
someone with no children), or who is less threatened in their job (e.g. someone lower down 
on the organisational hierarchy) might have as strong an influence as, or might interact with, 
race and gender in explaining feelings about organisational fairness and affirmative action. 
This was indicative even in this study, when looking at the significant relationship between 
the control variables and perceptions of justice. Race and gender do not operate in isolation 
from other demographic variables, and as such a research design that incorporates some of 
that complexity into its design might produce results that are more meaningful.  
 
Similar concerns are echoed in several other studies. For example Calhoun and Cann (1994) 
looked at racial differences in belief in a just world. One hundred and forty undergraduate 
students at a university in America completed a self-report questionnaire comprising a belief 
in a just world scale as well as a Worlds Assumption Scale. Of these 140 participants 65 
were black, 73 were white, and 6 were members of other minority groups such as Hispanic or 
Asian.  Results indicated differences between black and white respondents, with white 
Americans viewing their personal worlds as being more just than the world in general, and 
black respondents seeing the world in general as being less just. This type of study raises 
similar concerns to the study described above – race categories cannot be considered 
encompassing (a number of race groups were not represented sufficiently or at all) the 
researchers still managed to perform, race is looked at in isolation from other variables, and 
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measures may be considered somewhat reductionist. In addition to this, the study eliminates 
differences between subjects by summing the scales in order to get a single index for the 
variable under investigation. As such people who answered the set of questions very 
differently might end up with the identical total score, and as such in the results would be 
considered to hold the same perceptions of justice. As discussed in this, and the previous two 
chapters, using a student sample is also not ideal, particularly for studies of this nature. The 
fact that these people are studying in a university arguably means that their circumstances are 
somewhat better off than people who cannot afford university or who were not eligible for 
university entrance. As such this sample will, for the most part, represent populations (both 
black and white) who have access to resources that many Americans do not. When looking at 
questions of justice, this can be seen to be a very important bias.   A sample that 
encompassed people from a range of different contexts might have been more appropriate.  
 
A few studies have tried to account for some of the complexity of demographic variables in 
the exploration of aspects of justice. Hunt (2000) conducted a study in order to explore 
whether race, gender, social economic status, age and religious affiliation shape beliefs in a 
just world.  Two thousand eight hundred and fifty four interviews were conducted with 
residents of several counties in southern California. Of this sample 1 245 were whites, 737 
Hispanic, 646 black, 148 were Asians, and 62 were categorised other. The Asian category 
was very culturally heterogeneous (comprising Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, 
Filipinos and Indians, among others) and as such was eliminated from the study, as was the 
‘other’ group. As black respondents were over represented in the sample, a weighting 
correction was used to adjust the sample to reflect existing population proportions. The other 
independent demographic variables were measured as follows: socio-economic status was 
measured using a combination of personal income (comprising ten categories) and years of 
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education (also comprising ten categories). These were then combined into a 10-point scale 
with one index of socio-economic status. Age was measured in years, and religion in relation 
to three affiliations – catholic, protestant, and no affiliation. An additional measure of church 
attendance, comprising two categories (never or once a week or more) was included as a 
measure of religiosity. Gender was measured using a male or female category. The 
dependent variable, belief in a just world, was measured using four items extracted, through 
factor analysis, from a larger scale developed by Rubin and Peplau (1975). This sub scale 
had a reported alpha of .52. Descriptive and regression statistics were used to analyse the 
data. Results indicated significant differences between race groups regarding belief in a just 
world (Hispanics reporting the highest belief in a just world and black respondents the least), 
as well as between men and women (with men having a higher belief in a just world than 
women) and lower socio-economic groups reporting a stronger belief in a just world than the 
higher socio-economic group. Further there were no significant differences between religious 
affiliation and those attending church or not.  
 
While this study does indicate an attempt to incorporate more than just race or gender into an 
understanding of how justice beliefs are shaped, it raises a number of methodological and 
conceptual concerns. Firstly the way in which the demographic variables were measured 
could be considered extremely flawed in that they were reductionist and closed off legitimate 
options. Socio-economic status was measured using a personal index income as well as an 
index of the number of years of education. These were then combined into one index. Such a 
measure can in fact be very misleading. Income can only be looked at in relation to other 
variables. Someone earning $1000 a month who has no children or spouse might have a very 
different financial status from someone who earns $2000 a month but who has four children 
to support and educate as well as an unemployed spouse. Alternatively two people who earn 
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$1000 a month might differ in socio-economic status in that one has a spouse who earns 
$10000 a month and the other has no income-producing spouse. As such personal income is 
an insufficient measure of socio-economic status. Similar concerns are raised with using 
number of years of education as an indicator. Firstly the number of years that one has been 
receiving education is reflective of an input rather than an outcome – someone could have 
spent three years at university but fail to obtain a degree, or could have done a degree part 
time and thus taken twice as long to obtain a degree as a full-time student. Secondly there is 
no explanation given as to why education is such a fundamental indicator of socio-economic 
status. Neighbourhood, job title, house ownership or a range of other variables could 
arguably be as good, or even better, indicators of this variable. Finally the way in which 
these two variables were then combined is not explained e.g. were they weighted the same?  
 
Similar problems are evident with the measurement of religious affiliation and religiosity. 
Respondents were given the option of catholic, protestant, or no affiliation. This implies that 
if someone is not Catholic or Protestant then they have no religious affiliation (in fact this 
group is referred to as the ‘no religion’ group in the study), thereby excluding a range of 
other religions, some outside of Christianity such as Islam or Judaism, and other sub groups 
within Christianity. While the researcher does explain his choice of these two overarching 
Christian affiliations, he does not address the matter of respondents who may not be 
Christian but who do have other religious affiliations. Religiosity is also measured by one 
index – that of church attendance. Only two options are provided here, the first category 
being those who do not attend church at all, and the second for those who go once a week or 
more. This raises two concerns. Firstly religiosity cannot be measured by church attendance 
alone. There are a number of other activities such as community outreach, religious reading, 
and prayer and fellowship groups that are important measures of religiosity. Someone might 
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not attend church regularly, but might be very involved in a religious community and have 
very strong religious beliefs. Secondly a two point measure such as this one eliminates all the 
variance between never going to church and going one a week or more. Some people might 
go to church on all religious holidays but at no other time, while someone going to church 
everyday may not be comparable to a person who is forced by his/her spouse to go once a 
week. Some people might want to go to church more often than they do but are unable to for 
logistical or health reasons. As such this dichotomous measure of church attendance might 
not tell one very much about religiosity at all.  
 
Finally, with regards to race respondents were categorised as black, white, or Hispanic. The 
Asian category was omitted given the vast hetrogenities found in that grouping. While it is 
arguably preferable to exclude this group than present it as a homogenous grouping, this, 
along with the 60 respondents categorised as other point to an important consideration – 
three race groups are not sufficient to capture the actual complexity of this social world. 
While these people only account for 210 participants out of the entire sample of 2 854, if the 
main thrust of your research efforts are to explore race differences in justice perceptions, it is 
arguably not appropriate to simply eliminate minority groupings. These people could be a 
very important source of interesting information about race differences and justice, 
particularly because theirs is a voice that is seldom represented in studies of this nature. 
While whites, blacks and Hispanics undoubtedly represent the three major race groups in 
America as is argued by the researcher, this is not sufficient theoretical evidence to eliminate 
them from the study.  
 
With regards to the measurement of the dependent variable, belief in a just world, four items 
out of a longer 20-item scale. This was done on the basis of a factor analysis for which no 
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details were provided. The author states that this four-item sub scale represents the 
maximum possible reliability (it has an alpha of .52). This raises two concerns – firstly in 
relation to the reliability of the scale as a whole as well as the sub scale, and secondly in 
relation to the extent to which this measure can be said to represent beliefs in a just world. It 
is not clear why there was a need to reduce the number of items measuring belief in a just 
world. This could perhaps have been done because of a very low alpha for the total scale 
(evidenced on the low alpha reported for the sub scale, which was the most reliable 
configuration to emerge). It seems that it would not be desirable or necessary to diminish 
and over simplify the belief in a just world construct in this way.  The author has not 
provided sufficient information for the rationale behind this process, and it is therefore 
difficult to assess. However, it is clear that four items cannot be considered to be an 
extensive or comprehensive measure of the dependent variable. Further to this an alpha of 
.60 or higher is the conservative level considered acceptable for determining reliability of a 
measure in social science research  (McKennell, 1970). Other statisticians maintain that 0.70 
is a more acceptable cut off point (Kerlinger, 1986). As such it is clear that the sub scale 
cannot be considered a reliable measure. This is highly problematic given the centrality of 
the belief in a just world construct for this study.  
 
The final concern related to this study is the methods of analysis used. Essentially each 
demographic variable was looked at independently, with only race being looked at in 
relation to gender, socio-economic, age, and race sub groups. While this is an improvement 
on studies that do not account for any demographic differences within race or gender groups, 
as described earlier in this chapter, it is important to begin looking at the interactions 
between a range of demographic variables. This would arguably be more closely indicative 
of the real world complexities linked to identitysocial position and self-categorisation.  
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These concerns are not unique to this particular study. Other studies looking at belief in a 
just world and demographic variables have used similar measures, particularly of the 
demographic variables. For example Umberson (1993) conducted a study that looked at 
socio-economic status (defined in relation to education and income) and race (using two 
categories, that of black and white) in relation to beliefs in a just world. Results indicated 
that people with a lower socio-economic status and black respondents had a higher belief in 
a just world than the white and higher socio-economic subjects. Similarly Benson (1992) 
conducted a study using a sample of 283 people from Northern Ireland aimed at exploring 
the relationship between age, education, income and gender. Results indicated that age was 
the only variable that significantly predicted belief in a just world.  
 
In attempting to explore the relationship between religiosity and beliefs in a just world more 
closely, Crozier and Joseph (1997) conducted a study using a sample of 143 students 
between the ages of 16 and 18. Participants completed a questionnaire that comprised three 
scales. The first was a belief in a just world scale developed by Furnham and Proctor (1992). 
This scale divided up just world beliefs into three spheres namely personal just world 
beliefs, interpersonal just world beliefs, and socio political just world beliefs. The scale thus 
yields three sub scale scores, each based on the summing of scores across 10 items. The 
second scale was a global just world beliefs scale comprising 7 items, and the third scale 
was an Attitudes towards Christianity scale developed by Francis and comprising 24 items 
(1992). Results of a regression analysis showed no association between religiosity and 
global beliefs in a just world, socio political just world beliefs, or interpersonal just world  
beliefs. Religiosity was associated with personal just world beliefs.  
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While this study does share some of the limitations of other studies discussed in this chapter 
(such as using a student and using scales that are additive and ultimately use one index of a 
variable) the researchers did look more closely at the variables under investigation and 
defined them in ways that do account for more complexity. However, the sample was very 
homogenous being English students, all between the ages of 16 and 18, and presumably 
were all Christian (given the orientation of the religiosity measure). In addition of the 143 
participants, 112 were boys and only 31 were girls. As such the generalisability of these 
findings is limited. 
 
As can be seen from the above discussion race, gender and religious affiliation/religiosity 
have all been looked at in relation to perceptions and experiences of justice. A fourth 
demographic variable that has received considerable attention is that of nationality. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, researchers looking at culture and justice have often done so purely 
in relation to nationality. For example Lind, Tyler & Huo (1997) conducted two studies that 
aimed to test the generalisability of antecedents of procedural justice perceptions across 
culture. The sample for the first study comprised 309 students from an American university, 
216 from a German university, and 204 students from a Hong Kong university. In this study 
culture was equated with the nationality of the subject. Participants were asked to recall a 
dispute they had had with someone and then to answer eight questions about the dispute as 
well as rate a list of seven dispute resolution options. After doing this students completed six 
measures, all related to different aspects of procedural justice, as well as four questions 
related to beliefs about power distance and hierarchy. This last measure was included in 
order to test assumptions about the cultural differences between the three groups, and is 
based on one of Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions. Initial findings indicated that the three 
sites did differ significantly regarding beliefs about power-distance, proving, according to 
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the authors, the assumptions about cultural contrasts between the three nationality groups. 
Despite this, results of a regression analysis indicated no significant interactions between 
nationality and antecedants of procedural justice.   
 
The second study comprised a sample of 181 and 164 students from universities in America 
and Japan respectively. Students were given a vignette in which a hypothetical dispute was 
described. Eight different versions of this dispute were used, where three experimental 
variables were manipulated – the relationship between the participant and the other person in 
the dispute, similarity of background, and the nature of the disputed issue. Participants were 
then given a list of various dispute resolution methods and a scale asking them to rate each 
of the methods on the basis of a number of different dimensions, as well as the likelihood of 
their using that procedure. The analyses conducted only took into account four of the dispute 
resolution procedures, that of negotiation, persuasion, arbitration and mediation, as the 
authors argued that they were the most relevant to their hypotheses. Further to this they 
stated that the other options (social influence, ignoring, and giving in) were not rated as 
options that the participants were likely to use. As such they were dropped from the 
analyses. In addition to the three manipulated between subjects variables described above as 
well as the manipulated within-subject variables of the different resolution procedures, 
gender and culture were included in the model. Similar to the first study, participants 
completed a power-distance scale in order to determine whether American and Japanese 
students, as well as men and women, differed significantly on this measure of culture. The 
preliminary analyses of this scale indicated significant differences between nationality and 
the power distance items, but no such differences between male and female participants. 
Given these results the researchers felt that assumptions about cultural differences between 
the two groups had been supported, and further analyses were then done. An analysis of 
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variance (ANOVA), the statistical technique used to test for a significant difference between 
mean scores of the dependant variable of a number of groups by comparing the variability 
between the groups against the variability within the groups, was used. Results indicated a 
culture X gender effect, which was due to a difference in the American sample, where 
women tended to see all of the procedures as fairer than men. Results of a regression 
analysis showed one significant interaction involving culture – American participants placed 
greater emphasis on status recognition than their Japanese counterparts. The authors argue 
that despite this finding evidence indicates “ …that procedural justice is defined in much the 
same way across widely different cultural contexts” (Lind, Tyler, and Huo, 1997, p. 777).  
 
While the researchers were purporting to be exploring culture, it is clear that in fact they 
were looking at nationality - despite the fact that the different nationality groups scored 
significantly differently on Hofstede’s power distance scale. Aside from the concerns about  
this model of culture already discussed in Chapter 3, which criticises Hofstede’s model as 
being reductionist as well as insensitive to diversity of culture within groups, the use of this 
model in this study raises further concerns. The authors reduce Hofstede’s model even 
further by looking at only one of the culture dimensions, that of power-distance. They then 
use four items in order to measure this dimension. These items include the following 
statements:  “It is best for our society to let the elites decide what is good for us”, “If 
followers trust their leaders wholeheartedly, the group will be most successful”,  “Conflict 
among people is minimised if everyone has equal rights in society”, “An organisation is 
most successful if it is clear who is the leader and who is the follower”. Clearly these items 
are trying to assess some perception of power and hierarchy, but they are arguably very 
broad statements that tend towards ambiguity. For example a person may be unlikely to 
know what is meant by elites – is it the people voted into power or the people who hold 
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public office, the wealthy in society, or the educated? There is also an assumption that there 
is such a thing as an elite, when in fact the respondent might not think that there is. Further it 
does not specify which society. For example one of the groups came from the Chinese 
University in Hong Kong, before the hand over of Hong Kong to China. It is not clear which 
society they might then be referring to – is the Hong Kong society, with the elites in China, 
or the Chinese society with elites in China, or the Hong Kong society with elites in Hong 
Kong?  Given the political context of this sample, this question might have been quite a 
loaded one. Other groups might also have been responding to different ideas of society. The 
sample comprised university students, who might then have been thinking about their 
university community, or some American participants might have thought about their 
particular state while others thought about the United States in general. Similarly, in the 
second question subjects might have considered different leaders and responded accordingly 
– it might be thought best to follow a religious leader or your manager, but not necessarily 
your political leaders. The next statement -  “Conflict among people is minimised if 
everyone has equal rights in society” – also raises concerns in that, presumably, high 
agreement with this statement means a preference for hierarchical relations. This could 
possibly be misleading. There might in fact be more conflict in societies where there are 
equal rights as people are freer to disagree and express their disagreement, where in societies 
where there are not equal rights people might be more submissive and compliant out of fear. 
It is thus not clear that these statements are a valid measure of power-distance and 
preference for hierarchy, or that they are measuring aspects of culture. Finally, the last 
statement, “An organisation is most successful if it is clear who is the leader and who is the 
follower”, is also problematic. Firstly, it moves the context of the questions into the 
organisation, where culture arguably manifests differently. Notions of organisational culture 
are different to that of broader notions of culture, and things that are found to be acceptable 
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in organisations might not be in other contexts. Hierarchy is perhaps the most noticeable of 
such things – the distribution of decision making power and status along stratified levels is a 
very common organisational practice, and ‘flattened’ organisations that do not use such a 
arrangement are few and far between. There may, therefore, be a lot of people who might 
support hierarchical relationships within an organisation but who would not in many other 
contexts. Once again this item might be an indicator of organisational culture, but not of 
culture in other broader contexts. Given all of these concerns, even though differences 
between the different nationalities were found on this scale, it is not necessarily convincing 
that nationality can be taken to be a signifier of culture.   
 
There are a number of other studies that look at nationality, some as a signifier of culture, 
others as a variable in and of itself (Sun, 2001; Lam, Schaubroeck, Aryee, 2002;  Blader, 
Chang, & Tyler, 2001; Au, Hui, & Leung, 2002; Rahim, Magner, Antonioni & Rahman, 
2001; Pillai, Williams, & Tan, 2001). Many of these studies have found no differences 
between different nationality groups on a number of the relationships tested. For example 
Pillai, Williams, & Tan (2001) explored the relationship between procedural and distributive 
justice and supervisory trust, job-satisfaction , and organisational commitment, doing a 
comparison between samples of Indian, German and Chinese employees. Organisational 
justice perceptions were found to be an important predictor of trust in supervisors across all 
three samples. Similarly Rahim, Magner, Antonioni and Rahman (2001) conducted a study 
in order to explore differences in reactions to organisational justice between a sample of 302 
Americans and 299 Bangladeshis. Results indicated that all three dimensions of 
organisational justice perceptions were related to intention to turnover and organisational 
commitment. Other studies, however, have found significant differences between nationality 
groups. For example Blader, Chang, & Tyler (2001) compared the role of procedural justice 
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in motivating organisational retaliatory behaviours between a sample of 260 American and 
181 Taiwanese employees. Results indicated that procedural justice concerns were less 
predictive of retaliatory behaviours among the Taiwanese sample. Further, Taiwanese 
respondents considered relational and instrumental concerns equally when making a  
procedural justice judgement, while American participants considered relational concerns 
more predominantly.  
 
As with a range of other demographic variables explored, inconsistent results are perhaps 
unsurprising.  Often inadequate consideration and account is given for why differences 
between the selected nationality groups should be expected, and when it is, it is done in 
relation to Hofstede’s limited cultural model, usually in relation to one or two specific 
dimensions. As such the comparison groups appear slightly random, with no systematic 
rationale and trajectory underlying the studies. Further, nationality is also looked at in 
isolation from other variables that may be as important to consider, particularly in relation to 
nationality and culture. For example age and gender might impact on views of culture – 
women might experience a national culture differently from men, older people differently 
from younger ones. As discussed in this and the previous chapters, these concerns are not 
isolated, but rather form an underlying flaw in the justice literature.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, a range of different demographic variables have 
been explored in relation to perceptions of justice. Despite the importance of concerns about 
identitysocial position in relation to experiences and perceptions of justice, as well as the 
significance of demographic variables as indicators of social and group identity, these 
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matters have received sporadic and superficial attention from justice researchers. There are 
some clear indicators in the research of the importance of demographic variables for 
perceptions of justice. This is, however, as evidenced by the review of research, 
overshadowed by some conceptual and methodological limitations that constrain the 
usefulness of this research.  
 
The first limitation pertains to the way in which researchers define and measure both the 
demographic variables under investigation as well as perceptions of justice – these 
definitions are perhaps not always as considered as they should be, nor are they consistent 
across the body of research. For example, with regards to defining and operationalising 
demographic variables, it is arguably insufficient to measure socio-economic using income 
and education, erroneous to equate nationality with culture, and problematic to combine race 
groups with little intuitive or theoretical foundations. The way in which demographic 
variables are measured is often needlessly reductionist, perhaps in an attempt to limit the 
number of categories in order to make certain statistical procedures possible. There also 
seems to be very little agreement and consistency over how perceptions of justice are 
measured. Arguments about the dimensionality of justice (as discussed in Chapter 3) have 
led to some researchers defining procedural justice as comprising notions of interpersonal 
justice, while others do not. Some researchers define procedural justice in relation to process 
and decision control, others in relation to Leventhal’s (1980) six criteria. Further, 
distributive justice is sometimes defined in relation to questions about equity, while at other 
times questions about equality and need are incorporated. As such it is not possible to say 
that the range of studies discussed are actually talking about the same concepts, making it 
difficult to see how these studies articulate with one another.  It is clear that any attempt to 
explore the relationship between demographic variables and perceptions of justice needs to 
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consider more carefully how the variables under investigation are defined, as well as to  
measure these in a more heeded and in depth way.  
 
A second limitation of this research is that it has, for the most part, tended isolate one such 
characteristic, such as gender, race or nationality. As discussed before, these research results 
are, perhaps unsurprisingly, inconsistent. A poor black woman, for instance, may differ 
considerably from a rich white woman, a married man with four children from a single man 
with no children. No attention has been given to the differences that exist within these broad 
demographic categorisations, nor to the way in which demographic variables interact with 
one another. For example given the strong correlation between race and class, a study that 
looks at race on its own might, in fact, be picking up on socio-economic factors. Results are 
interpreted in the light of race, when this might actually be misleading.  If demographic 
variables are going to be the focus of a research question, meaningful results can only be 
obtained by looking at a myriad of characteristics with appropriate statistical procedures – 
procedures that can account for interactions between a host of different variables and that 
does not rely on the reduction of data to a limited number of categories. Further to this, it is 
clear that only a limited number of demographic variables have been looked at in relation to 
perceptions of justice. While race, gender, religion and nationality are all important and 
informative characteristics, there may be a host of other such variables that can provide 
important insight into the area. Organisational variables (such as tenure, union membership, 
job title, number of promotions in the organisation, length of tenure in one’s current 
position), domestic indicators (such as marital status, number of children, how many people 
one lives with, where one lives) and socio-economic variables (such as income, number of 
dependants, whether one owns one’s house) as well as a range of other characteristics could 
all provide valuable information about experiences of justice.  
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Finally, a third limitation of this research – one that has been echoed in research described in 
Chapters 2 and 3 - relates to the homogenous nature of the samples used. A considerable 
number of the studies described use university students as participants. This means that the 
majority of participants are from a very limited age range, are often predominantly white 
(unless it is race that is specifically under investigation), and reflect a particular socio-
economic group. These students have also often had no experience of full time employment, 
and many are not self-supporting. As such this restricts their experiences of justice to those 
encountered at home, socially, or at university. While this is something that has been noted 
about many studies conducted in the area of justice, it is perhaps particularly problematic in 
studies aimed at exploring demographic variables. Homogenous samples might produce 
results that are misleading in that there might be a host of other factors that are resulting in 
shared perceptions of justice. For example it might be unremarkable to find no differences 
between men and women on a sample of predominantly white, young adults attending a 
particular university – such participants are likely to have a tremendous amount in common, 
such as socio-economic status, level of education, age, perhaps even political views 
(particularly if the university is politically aligned). While researchers would interpret a no 
difference finding as meaning men and women experience justice similarly, the other 
demographic variables that this sample have in common might be more salient. More 
importantly, however, is that studies with this kind of sample have very little external 
validity – results cannot convincingly be generalised to other population groups.   
 
It is clear that demographic variables are important indicators of social and group identity, 
and that such variables locate people within the social and political context of their society. 
Being a woman, or black, young, or rich all have meanings that extend beyond simple 
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identifiers, and these meanings become particularly important when considering questions 
about justice. Theorists have argued that this social position, one that comprises a myriad of 
demographic variables, is crucial to understanding questions about justice.  Finding ways of 
exploring this relationship while attempting to account for the complexity of these variables 
is thus fundamental. This forms the basis for the current study, which aims to explore the 
extent to which a range of demographic variables predict perceptions of social and 
organisational justice.  
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Chapter 5: Rationale and Procedure 
 
Overview 
 
In the first half of this report the theoretical and conceptual background for this study was 
articulated and a number of key arguments that lay the foundation for the current study 
presented. In this chapter these arguments will be revisited as a prelude to a discussion of 
the aims and rationale of the current study. As pointed out in the introduction, while the 
summary of these arguments will undoubtedly be repetitive, it is intended for ease of 
reference to the reader who has already passed through approximately 150 pages of 
discussion.  
 
As will be outlined in this discussion, the literature and research review presented in the 
first half of this chapter present two sets of challenges – the first relates to theoretical 
questions that beg investigation and thus have bearing on the research questions, while the 
second concerns the methodological approach to be adopted, with particular reference to 
the definition and measurement of variables as well as the statistical analyses used. As 
such this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section provides an overview 
of the arguments made in the preceding chapters, and outlines the rationale for the current 
study. This section ends with the presentation of the research questions that have emerged 
from these arguments.  
 
The second section provides an overview of the methodological concerns that have 
influenced the current study, and begins a discussion about the approach to be adopted. 
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This section focuses more specifically on the research design and the nature of the sample, 
and provides information about procedures used, as well as biographical information on 
participating subjects. The third and fourth sections address two particular issues that have 
emerged as central methodological concerns, that is the definition and measurement of the 
variables under investigation, and the statistical analyses used.  
 
The third section thus addresses the matter of variable definition and measurement, and 
looks individually at each variable under investigation, starting with demographic variables 
and moving on to social and organisational justice perceptions. Information about the 
psychometric properties of scales being used is provided. In addition to this information is 
provided about the development and validation of a new organisational justice perceptions 
measure. Details about the pilot study, including information about the sample, procedures 
used, statistical analyses and results are presented.  
 
Finally, the fourth section details the statistical analyses to be conducted in light of the 
methodological concerns raised in the first half of the report. Information is provided about 
the tools used for all preliminary analyses including statistics used for the assessment of 
reliability and validity of the measuring instruments (Cronbachs Alpha and factor analysis) 
as well as the exploration and description of the data set (including distribution analyses, 
and descriptive statistics such as means, frequencies and percentages). Following this, an 
in depth discussion is presented on two statistical procedures to be used in answering the 
main research questions; namely cluster analysis and CHAID.   
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This chapter thus aims to refamiliarise the reader with the key arguments presented in the 
first half of the report and to describe ways in which the concerns raised will be addressed 
through the current study.  
 
 
 
Rationale for the Current Study 
 
In the first half of this report four key arguments were made which provide the point of 
departure for the current study. The first argument, discussed in Chapter two, pertained to 
the limited value of the tripartite framework used by social psychologists for understanding 
questions about justice. The second argument, discussed both in chapters two and three, 
related to limitations of the methodological underpinnings of research conducted in this 
area. The third argument, discussed in Chapter three, concerns itself with the distinction 
made by researchers between organisational and other types of justice. Finally, the last 
argument refers to a more specific question, that of the relationship between demographic 
variables and perceptions of justice. Each of these arguments forms a point of departure for 
the current study, and will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.  
 
Chapter two provided an overview of the area of social justice, looking at how justice has 
been theorised and researched over the last fifty years.  This chapter raised two primary 
concerns, that of the almost exclusive use of the tripartite model, as well as the 
methodological underpinnings of research conducted in the area. Through the review of 
justice literature, the tripartite or three-factor model most commonly used as a framework 
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for investigation by social psychologists was described – this model comprises distributive 
justice concerns which focus on the perceived fairness of outcomes, procedural justice 
concerns, which focus on the way in which outcome decisions are made, and interpersonal 
justice perceptions which are understood to refer to the quality of treatment received from 
decision-makers. Justice perceptions are thus accounted for by these three dimensions, and 
it is this model that is used as the foundation for the vast majority of research taking place 
in the area of justice. In the course of Chapter two it was argued that there seems to have 
been an over emphasis on this three-factor model, and that this framework presents some 
concerns that may serve to limit research in the area.  
 
The first concern that was presented refers to the extent to which this model represents 
actual thinking about and experiences of justice. While the model has been useful 
particularly when exploring decisions that have emerged from clear procedures  - where 
procedures and outcomes are distinct from one another, and where the procedure exists as 
a formal, observable means of reaching an outcome – it is argued that there are, however, 
many instances where people may not be able to, or wouldn’t naturally, make distinctions 
between these three dimensions of justice. Given the complexity of justice concerns, many 
outcome decisions that do not lend themselves to a neat dissection into procedural, 
interpersonal, and distributive concerns. Where the extraction of information about justice 
perceptions would be facilitated by an a priori categorisation of these perceptions, the use 
of these three dimensions might be valuable. However, imposing this when there is no 
need to do so might serve to force justice perceptions into the tripartite theoretical 
framework.  
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A second concern about this model discussed in Chapter two, refers to the extent to which 
the tripartite justice model relies on the notion of a centralised body of resources with a 
limited number of people having authority over how those resources get distributed. Once 
again there is a concern that such a conceptualisation may not always accurately reflect the 
real world complexities of resource ownership and allocation. As pointed out Chapter 
three, Nozick (1974) argues that there is no such thing as a central distribution where one 
individual or group has the right to control all resources, but rather the total result of 
distributions in a society is in fact the product of numerous individual decisions (Nozick, 
1974). Within the tripartite model it is assumed that there is a clear distinction between 
those who possess a set of resources and who thus are the decision-makers, and those who 
are subject to their authority.  While there may be instances where this distinction is clear 
(particularly in the organisational setting) this understanding of justice is arguably overly 
linear and reductionist, failing to account for the more complicated ways in which 
resources are held, allocations made, and the ways in which people think about them.  
 
Finally, the almost exclusive use of this a priori framework to explore questions about 
justice poses the danger that the research might become tautological – people are asked 
questions about justice with reference to these three dimensions, and their responses are 
then taken to be proof that these dimensions exist. There is, therefore, a danger that the 
responses being received are confirming a particular line of thought simply because of the 
way in which the questions are being asked. As such when research is conducted, it is on 
the basis of a framework that directs research and responses in a particular direction. This 
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arguably results in a body of research that becomes ossified and unable to move beyond 
this one paradigm. Again while this framework may be valuable in exploring particular 
questions about justice, it perhaps only offer a view of part of the picture, and as such 
present only a limited understanding of justice perceptions. It is thus arguably important to 
use alternate points of departure for the study of justice, ones that do not assume the 
structure of justice perceptions.  
 
Despite such concerns about the tripartite model, it forms the basis of almost all 
psychological research being conducted in the area of justice. All of the validated scales 
used to do quantitative studies in this area are based on this tripartite framework – 
questions are asked about distributions, procedures, and interpersonal treatment, and then 
are often summed in order to obtain an overall justice score, or individual sub scale scores. 
This leads to the second argument articulated in the theoretical section, that is the 
problematic methodological underpinnings of much of the research in this area. Such 
concerns relate to a reliance on an experimental research paradigm, the nature of research 
samples, as well as the reductionistic nature of many of the data collection and analysis 
tools used.  
 
As discussed in Chapter two, the psychological approach to research and knowledge 
generation is primarily empirical in nature, with much of the foundation of social 
psychological theories having their roots in an experimental research paradigm. While it is 
argued that a considerable amount of field research is conducted in the exploration of 
justice perceptions (Cropanzano, 2001), it is evident that a significant amount of research 
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is still conducted within the laboratory setting, posing some important limitations. The 
experimental paradigm observes people’s reactions to situations that are removed from 
actual events or experiences – it is argued that the greatest weakness of this paradigm is its 
artificiality and as such the external validity of results emanating from such research is 
weak (Babbie, 1998). In such studies it is the researcher that is defining the parameters of 
the ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ situation, rather than people’s actual experiences. As such it is not 
always clear that experimental research results reflect real life, or whether such studies are 
possibly confirming the a priori framework imposed by researchers.    
 
The second methodological concern relates to the nature of the samples upon which the 
research is being conducted. Many of the samples are, as mentioned previously, student 
samples, and are fairly homogenous with regards to demographic composition – they will 
be reflective of the university going population in America, most of whom are white, of a 
very limited age range, and who come from middle class backgrounds. This has serious 
implications for the validity of research findings, as such samples cannot be said to be 
representative of larger population groups. Instead they represent a very small component 
of the population, a group who is likely to have had very different experiences of access to 
resources from many other groups, and as such very different experiences of justice. This 
has implications for the body of research and knowledge that has derived from the many 
studies that use such samples – it is reflective of a very limited set of experiences and 
cannot be taken to be of equal significance for other population groups. While this is 
arguably a criticism that could be levelled at most research, as findings based on any 
specific sample is not easily generalised to different population groups, this is particularly 
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problematic within justice research for two reasons. Firstly, as can be seen American 
student samples are regularly used and as such a large part of the body of knowledge that 
comprises the area of justice has systematically been built on the basis of this restricted 
group. Secondly given that justice concerns itself with questions about resource 
distribution, it is arguably even more important that such research make use of diverse 
samples –it is clear that different groups are likely to have very different experiences and 
perceptions of justice. It is perhaps particularly problematic to confine research to a group 
of people who already have access to many of societies scarce resources. Despite the 
implications that the dependence on student samples has, little meaningful attention is paid 
to the limitations this presents to the research outcomes.  
 
The final methodological concern highlighted in chapters two and three relates to the 
tendency to reduce very complex issues into ‘variables’, which are then measured by a very 
limited set of questions and taken to accurately represent the whole of that experience.  As 
mentioned earlier a considerable amount of quantitative research is based on the use of 
justice scales that reduce measurement of justice perceptions into the three subscales. These 
measures then further reduce such perceptions by adding up the scores for each question in 
order to produce one index of justice perceptions. As such not only are perceptions of justice 
already being limited to the three types identified by researchers, but the complexities 
involved within each of these dimensions as well as the differences between people are 
being diminished. Further to this, the statistical tools used to analyse this data rely on the 
reduction of variables into limited categories and indices. ANOVAs, T-tests, multiple 
regressions, correlations, MANOVAs as well as many other uni and multivariate statistical 
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procedures cannot incorporate an indefinite number of categories and variations into their 
calculations. As such researchers are required to reduce data in accordance with the 
procedures used. If thinking about justice is to become more systemic and nuanced as is 
argued for in chapters two and three, research methodologies that extend beyond linear 
thinking will be needed. The recognition of complexity requires a move away from trying to 
simplify or reduce variables into measurable units, and a need to use methodologies that can 
account for and help explore this complexity. In this way the constraints of current 
methodologies need to be given far more meaningful attention, and problems with such 
methodologies that are in fact insurmountable need to be acknowledged.   
 
The limitations of the tripartite justice model as well as the methodologies employed by 
researchers were the first two arguments to emerge from the research and literature review 
presented in the first half of this thesis. The third argument, discussed in Chapter three, 
relates to the extent to which organisational justice concerns can be considered distinct from 
other types of justice. As stated earlier researchers have argued that organisational justice 
concerns are autonomous and independent from other justice concerns. This assertion has 
resulted in the emergence of a distinct ‘variable’, that of organisational justice, that is seen to 
be discrete from the rest of the justice literature. Despite this, there is no clear evidence that 
this claim to autonomy is true. Organisational justice research has not focused on providing 
empirical evidence for this contention, nor has a body of theory specifically aimed at 
addressing workplace concerns emerged. Currently, what delineates this variable as 
something distinct is the context in which it is investigated – the workplace.  It is, therefore, 
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clear that the notion that organisational justice is something separate from other types of 
justice requires some debate and empirical investigation.  
 
This type of investigation becomes increasingly important in the face of the criticisms of 
reductionism made in relation to research in the area. Much of the research conducted within 
the area of organisational justice isolates people’s broader experiences from those they have 
at work. In this way there is very little recognition that who a person is when they are 
outside of the organisation can have an important impact on how they experience justice in 
the organisation itself. As such even if organisational justice is understood to be a separate 
concern from that of social justice, account still needs to be given of the broader social 
context in which people operate.  
 
The final argument made in the theoretical review relates to one particular way in which 
justice research can account for some of the complexities of social context and personal 
circumstances – that is an exploration of the role demographic variables play in influencing 
perceptions of justice. As discussed in Chapter four, demographic variables are potentially a 
source of valuable insight into people’s experiences of justice. Firstly they are markers of 
social and group identityposition which was argued are inextricably linked to experiences of 
justice. They are also a rich source of information about the social context in which people 
operate.  Secondly, many societal allocation decisions are made on the basis of demography –
marital status, number of children, age, race, gender, level of education, and health status are 
just some of the variables that may determine access to resources and conditions within a 
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particular society and as such might influence one’s attitudes to and perceptions of a range of 
related constructs, including, if not primarily, perceptions of fairness of that society.  
 
Despite the importance of such variables, this is not an area that has been consistently or 
thoroughly researched. Similar to the reductionistic ways in which other questions about 
justice have been researched, social identityposition and demographic variables have been 
understood in quite isolated and reductionist ways. One or two demographic variables are 
taken to signify the whole – or certainly a large part - of one’s identityposition. In this way 
nationality or race become measures of culture, or gender becomes a signifier of identity. 
Research that has attempted to look at demographic variables has tended to isolate one such 
characteristic, such as gender, race or nationality. These research results are, perhaps 
unsurprisinglyas discussed in the previous chapter, inconsistent. A poor black woman, for 
instance, may differ considerably from a rich white woman, a married man with four 
children from a single man with no children. No attention has been given to the differences 
that exist within these broad demographic categorisations. In addition to this, very little 
attention or consideration has been given to the complex ways in which such variables 
interact, or the salience a range of other demographic variables have for people.  
 
Furthermore the way in which researchers define and measure the demographic variables 
that are studied is often needlessly reductionist, perhaps in an attempt to limit the number of 
categories in order to make certain statistical procedures possible. It is clear that any attempt 
to explore the relationship between demographic variables and perceptions of justice needs 
to consider more carefully how the variables under investigation are defined, as well as to  
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measure these in a more heeded and in depth way. Further to this, it is clear that only a 
limited number of demographic variables have been looked at in relation to perceptions of 
justice, particularly race, gender, religion and nationality. While these are all important and 
informative characteristics, there may be a host of other such variables that can provide 
important insight into the area. Organisational variables (such as tenure, union membership, 
job title, number of promotions in the organisation, length of tenure in one’s current 
position), domestic indicators (such as marital status, number of children, how many people 
one lives with, where one lives) and socio-economic variables (such as income, number of 
dependants, whether one owns one’s house) as well as a range of other characteristics could 
all provide valuable information about experiences of justice.  
 
It is clear that demographic variables are important indicators of social and group 
identityposition, and that such variables locate people within the social and political context 
of their society. Being a women, or black, young, or rich all have meanings that extend 
beyond simple identifiers, and these meanings become particularly important when 
considering questions about justice. Theorists have argued that this social position, one that 
comprises a myriad of demographic variables, is crucial to understanding questions about 
justice.  Finding ways of exploring this relationship while attempting to account for the 
complexity of these variables is thus fundamental.  
 
 
As can be seen four key challenges have emerged from the review of the literature. These 
challenges have shaped both the research questions being posed, as well as the 
methodological approach adopted. The first two concerns, that of the almost exclusive use of 
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the tripartite justice model as well as the methodological limitations of research in the area 
provide the rationale for the methodological approach to this study. The second two 
concerns, that of the relationship between organisational and social justice, as well as the 
relationship between demographic variables have directed the research questions. Each will 
be discussed in turn.  
 
As can be seen from the literature, two important sets of questions about justice perceptions 
require attention from researchers. The first pertains to the interface between different 
‘types’ of justice, in the case of this study, that of organisational and social justice, and asks: 
Are people’s experiences of organisational justice related to their experiences of social 
justice? The second question refers to similarities and differences in experiences of justice. 
At its broadest this question can be asked as follows: In what ways do people aggregate 
together in relation to their experiences of justice?  This is particularly important given 
that the structure of justice perceptions is not being assumed in the current study, and as 
such exploring alternate dimensions of justice concerns that might emerge is central.  
 
The next set of questions looks at the relationship between demographic variables and 
experiences of justice, and at its broadest asks: do demographic variables determine 
experiences of organisational and social justice?  To this end, this study will firstly 
investigate a wide range of biographic, work, financial, and religious demographic variables, 
and will explore which of these demographic variables emerge as being more significant in 
terms of predicting peoples’ experiences of justice. Furthermore it will attempt to explore 
how these demographic variables interact with one another in predicting experiences of 
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justice. As such the study will explore whether demographic variables predict cluster 
membership i.e. Can groups of people who hold similar social justice perceptions be 
characterised by similarities in demographic variables? 
 
Tools like cluster analysis and CHAID that are being used in this study and will be 
discussed in more detail further on in this chapter, work without a priori assumptions. They 
may be used for hypothesis testing, but can also be used to develop hypotheses through the 
exploration of data patterns. It is in this latter way that the present research uses these 
techniques – in order to explore justice perceptions and demographic variables for patterns, 
not for hypothesis testing.  
 
Methodological Approach of the Study 
 
As mentioned previously, two concerns articulated in the preceding chapters, that of the 
almost exclusive use of the tripartite justice model as well as the methodological limitations 
of research in the area, provide the rationale for the methodological approach to this study. 
As discussed, previous psychological research has tended to rely rather heavily on 
experimental research designs, often using samples of university students. Where research is 
conducted in the field it rarely involves semi or unskilled workers – samples tend to 
comprise more educated, literate employees. While such research is important for the 
development of theory and the exploration of its applicability within certain settings, it has 
been argued in the preceding chapters that alternate approaches to justice research that 
attempt to explain the real world complexity of people’s experiences are also needed. The 
current study thus calls for a research design and methodology – with particular emphasis on 
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the sample, measuring instruments as well as the statistical analyses – that addresses some of 
the concerns articulated by the author.  
 
The current study is quantitative in nature, and makes use of a non-experimental, partially 
exploratory, cross-sectional design. The design is non-experimental as there is no control or 
manipulation of the independent variable. In addition to this, there is no control group 
(Leedy, 1993).  According to Kerlinger (1986), non-experimental research is the most 
systematic, empirical enquiry from which inferences about the relationships between 
variables (rather than cause and effect relationships) can be made. The current research is 
exploratory in nature because while the relationship between demographic variables and 
justice perceptions have been given some attention as by-products of other research efforts, 
no attempts have been made to intentionally explore specific and focussed demographics, 
within a theoretical framework. In addition to this, the interaction between demographic 
variables in relation to perceptions of justice has not been explored. As such, the relationship 
between this independent and dependent variable has not previously been explored. As this 
research involves the observation of the variables at the same point in time, it is cross 
sectional in nature (Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991; Kerlinger, 1986).  
 
Such a research design requires the participation of a large, diverse sample of people with a 
wide range of life circumstances, who, to some extent, can be seen to be representative of 
the kind of population that organisational justice research is most often applied to. In this 
way participants can be asked about their actual experiences and perceptions of justice, 
rather than be asked to imagine a scenario or draw on experiences they have not had. As 
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such the present study was conducted in a large South African organisation.  This 
organisation manufactures and distributes paint, and as such have a number of different 
factories, depots, as well as administrative centers around the country. The company 
employs approximately 1500 people, with sites in every province in South Africa and a head 
office in Johannesburg. A wide range and level of skill and expertise is utilised within this 
company. With regards to the production of the goods they manufacture, employee skills 
range from the more highly skilled engineers, chemists, laboratory technicians, and 
researchers, to semi-skilled mixers and machine operators and unskilled packers and fillers. 
In terms of the ongoing functioning of the factories and sites, the organisation employs 
engineers, electricians, and fitters and turners, as well as general maintenance staff, and 
security personnel. There are also centralised as well as regional administrative, human 
resource, strategic, and financial functions, for which the company employs appropriate 
staff.  
 
As the present study is focussing on demographic variables, an organisation that could 
afford access to a very diverse potential sample was essential, and this organisation proved 
to be appropriate in this regard. In order to obtain permission to conduct this research in the 
organisation, the researcher was required to meet with the Human Resources Director, the 
regional Human Resources Managers, as well as representatives of the unions operating in 
the organisation. A presentation was made at the organisation’s national forum, and then 
again at the regional forums.  Once permission to conduct the research was obtained from all 
the relevant parties, all scales, instructions, and preambles were translated into Zulu and 
Afrikaans. These languages were selected on the advice of the union representatives and 
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Human Resources Managers and are based on the language profile of the employees. Back 
translations were conducted in order to check the accuracy of the translations, and 
corrections made where necessary.  
 
Meetings with the employees were set up at the three larger sites, namely Johannesburg, 
Cape Town and Durban. Employees were divided into groups ranging from 10 to 30, 
depending on the size of the department, where they were addressed by the researcher or a 
research assistant (where several meetings were taking place simultaneously). Employees 
were informed about the nature of the research, what was required of those who wished to 
participate, issues pertaining to the confidentiality and anonymity of their responses, as well 
as the voluntary nature of the research. Employees were then given an opportunity to ask 
any questions. Those employees who wished to participate completed a questionnaire, while 
those who didn’t returned to their departments. Participants were handed a questionnaire in a 
language of their choice, along with an envelope in which to seal their completed responses. 
Every questionnaire had a covering letter that repeated the details provided to the employees 
verbally (See Appendix A). A sealed box was placed at the front of the room, and employees 
placed their sealed envelopes into the box. The researcher or the research assistant then 
immediately removed the boxes. 
 
For the smaller sites that were not easily geographically accessible,  questionnaires with 
envelopes were sent to the site managers. All the managers were informed telephonically 
about the research and were given instructions for the distribution and collection of 
questionnaires. Similar to the larger sites, the employees were informed about the research. 
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Those who wished to participate were given a questionnaire in the language of their choice, 
along with an envelope in which to seal their completed form. A box was placed in a central 
but secure place, and all completed and sealed questionnaires were placed by the employees 
in the box. The completed questionnaires were then sent by courier to Johannesburg, where 
the researcher collected them.  
 
This procedure generated a response of usable questionnaires from 467 of the employees. 
With regards to the personal characteristics of the sample (See Table 5.1.) 323 (69.16%) of 
the questionnaires were completed in English, 81(17.34%) in Zulu, and 63 (13.49%) in 
Afrikaans. 71 (15.20%) of the respondents work in two sites in the Cape region, 47 
(10.06%) are from the Head Office in Johannesburg, 200 (42.83%) work in the factory in 
Krugersdorp, 93 (19.91%) work in the Durban site, and 56 (11.99%) work in the smaller 
depots in the Durban coastal region.  359 (77.04) of respondents are male, and 107 (22.96%) 
are female. With regards to level of education 20 (4.83%) of respondents have a Std 5 or 
below, 103 (24.88%) have some high school education but not a matric, 180 (43.48%) 
respondents have a matric, 66 (15.94%) have a diploma, 35 (8.45%) a degree, and 10 
(2.42%) have a post graduate degree.  
 
In relation to employment demographics (See Table 5.2.) , 80 (17.94%) of respondents are 
administrative staff (i.e. work as clerks, secretaries, or administrative assistants), 37 (8.30%) 
are laboratory staff (i.e. lab or colour technicians, chemists, lab assistants or research 
chemists), 162 (36.32%) are general factory staff (i.e. pickers, packers, or fillers), 35 
(7.85%) are managerial and executive staff, 35 (7.85%) are supervisory staff , 26 (5.83%) 
are security staff, 9 (2.02%) are human resources staff, 17 (3.81%) are technical staff (i.e. 
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engineers, fitters, information technology specialists, or maintenance staff), while 20 
(4.48%) are financial staff (i.e. all accounting functions and credit control).  
 
In terms of age and tenure (See table 5.3), the minimum age is20, while the oldest employee 
is 69. The mean age for the sample is 39.55. The minimum tenure is 3 months (one quarter 
of a year), while the maximum tenure is 42 years. The mean tenure is 11.37. The minimum 
amount of tenure in the respondent’s current job is 0 (the employee was starting that job on 
the day they completed the questionnaire), while the maximum is 33 years. The mean tenure 
for current position for the sample is 6.54 years. 
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Table 5.1. Demographic Frequencies of Sample – Personal Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
 
Cumulative  
Percent 
Language     
1 English                      323 69.16 323 69.16 
2 Zulu                           81 17.34 404 86.51 
3 Afrikaans                    63 13.49 467 100.00 
Area     
1 Cape Region              71 15.20 71 15.20 
2 Head office (JHB)      47 10.06 118 25.27 
3 Krugersdorp               200 42.83 318 68.09 
4 Durban                       93 19.91 411 88.01 
5 Durban Coastal          56 11.99 467 100.00 
Gender (n Missing =1)     
1 Male                           359 77.04 359 77.04 
2 Female                        107 22.96 466 100.00 
Education (n Missing =53)     
1 Up to Std 5                   20 4.83 20 4.83 
2 Std 6-Std 9                    103 24.88 123 29.71 
3 Matric                           180 43.48 303 73.19 
5 Diploma                        66 15.94 369 89.13 
6 Degree                          35 8.45 404 97.58 
7 Post Graduate Degree   10 2.42 414 100.00 
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Table 5.2: Demographic Frequencies of Sample – Employment Characteristics 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Job Title (n Missing =21)     
1 Administrative Staff         80 17.94 80 17.94 
2 Laboratory Staff               37 8.30 117 26.23 
3 General Factory Staff       162 36.32 279 62.56 
4 Managerial Staff               35 7.85 314 70.40 
5 Supervisory Staff           35 7.85 349 78.25 
6 Sales Staff                         25 5.61 374 83.86 
7 Security staff                    26 5.83 400 89.69 
10 Human Resources           9 2.02 409 91.70 
11 Technical Staff                17 3.81 426 95.52 
14 Financial Staff                 20 4.48 446 100.00 
Contract Type (n Missing =3)     
1 Full-Time                          432 93.10 432 93.10 
2 Part-time                           14 3.02 446 96.12 
4 Contract                            18 3.88 464 100.00 
Union  (n Missing =8)     
1 No Union                        225 49.02 225 49.02 
2 SACWU                          105 22.88 330 71.90 
3 SEPPAWU                      122 26.58 452 98.47 
4 Other                               7 1.53 459 100.00 
Salary (n Missing =9)     
1 R500-R1000                   8 1.75 8 1.75 
2 R1001-R1500                 13 2.84 21 4.59 
3 R1501-R2000                 54 11.79 75 16.38 
4 R2001-R3500                 133 29.04 208 45.41 
5 R3501-R4000                 65 14.19 273 59.61 
6 R4001-R4500                 28 6.11 301 65.72 
7 R4501-R5000                 29 6.33 330 72.05 
8 R5001 or above              128 27.95 458 100.00 
 
   
 173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Sample Descriptors – Age and Tenure 
 
 
Variable Maximum Mean Minimum N N Missing Std Dev 
Age  
Tenure Org 
Tenure Job 
63.00 
42.00 
33.00 
39.55 
11.37 
6.54 
20.00 
0.25 
0.00 
455 
461 
455 
12 
6 
12 
10.40 
9.76 
6.80 
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By conducting a field study, using a non-experimental research design, and recruiting a 
large, diverse sample of employees, the current study has addressed some of the concerns 
raised in the preceding chapters. These factors form a suitable point of departure for the 
current study, however the method of data collection (particularly in relation to how the 
variables under investigation are defined and measured) and analysis are arguably central 
to dealing with the limitations of research in this area articulated in the preceding 
chapters and answering the research questions in a way that accounts for the complexities 
of real life experiences. As was pointed out and illustrated in the first half of this report, 
data collection has relied on traditional measuring instruments, where variables are 
defined on the basis of certain unchallenged assumptions and where statistical analysis is 
conducted using score totals (derived from adding up responses to a range of questions). 
Such an approach, while useful for certain types of investigations, are of limited value for 
the current study, which is attempting to avoid both the theoretical assumptions 
underpinning more traditional measuring instruments as well as reductionist 
methodologies. The following two sections report on measures adopted in the current 
study to address each of these two concerns – that of the measuring instruments used and 
developed for the study, as well as the statistical procedures used for data analysis.  
 
Defining and Measuring the Research Variables 
 
 
 
Three sets of variables are under investigation in the current study, that of social justice 
perceptions, organisational justice perceptions, and demographic variables. As discussed 
in the previous chapters researchers have been restrictive in the way in which they have 
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defined and measured such variables. With regards to justice perceptions, they have 
made use of a tripartite model to understand and explain perceptions of social and 
organisational justice. It was argued that this model has been over emphasised and that 
thinking about justice has become ossified in relation to the three dimensions that 
comprise this framework. With regards to demographic variables, it was argued that the 
way in which researchers define and measure the demographic variables that are studied 
is often needlessly reductionist, More careful attention needs to be given to which 
demographic variables are included, how the variables under investigation are defined, 
as well as how they are measured.  An important challenge for the current study was 
thus finding ways of defining and measuring the variables under investigation in such a 
way that these concerns were addressed. It is important to note at this point that the 
statistical tools used to analyse the data yielded by the questionnaires do not work on the 
basis of a scale. Analyses will be done at an individual item level, and scale totals will 
not be obtained. In this way constructs that require psychometric analysis are not being 
used. This will be discussed in more detail further on in this chapter where cluster 
analysis is presented. However it is significant at this point to say that given this level of 
analysis the psychometric properties of scales are not relevant for the central questions 
of the current study.  
 
In relation to the demographic variables, two concerns emerged from the literature and 
previous research. The first pertains to which demographic variables to include in the 
study, with a particular emphasis on the identified need to explore the real world 
complexities of social identity position (as discussed in Chapter 4). The second concern 
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relates to how these variables, once identified, should be measured, bearing in mind the 
need to obtain several indices of each characteristic. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a 
number of variables that may constitute demographic descriptors of an individual, ranging 
from simple descriptors, or as Young (1990) terms them aggregators, such as hair or eye 
colour to more meaningful social groupings such as race or gender. It would not be 
possible, or necessary, to include all such descriptors in the current research. Given the 
discussion of justice and identity demography in the previous chapters, and in light of the 
research questions, the most suitable variables to look at would be those that are indicators 
of social position i.e. those variables that may effect or help determine a person’s 
experience of resource acquisition and distribution. In order to gain a holistic picture of an 
individual’s social position, it is important to look at all the areas from which such 
positioning is derived. It would not be sufficient to look only at information about a 
respondent’s job, for example, as characteristics of home, community life, and the 
individual him/herself, may be as important in determining social status.   
 
Several key areas, central to the notion of social position, can be identified. These include 
personal descriptors (e.g. age, race, gender), employment descriptors (e.g. job title, 
position in organisation, length of employment, union membership), domestic descriptors 
(e.g. marital status, number of children, living arrangements), financial descriptors (e.g. 
monthly income, investments, property), and religious descriptors (e.g. membership of 
religious community, religious affiliation, religious activities). Demographic information 
in these areas can be seen to be central to an individual’s social position in that they will 
directly affect the resources one has access too.  
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Even within these parameters there are many demographic variables one could look to, and 
no research can hope to be exhaustive in this regard. Rather, it is important to include 
questions that will provide an adequate amount of information about the area of interest. If, 
for example, it was decided that financial variables would provide valuable information in 
relation to the research question, there are a number of questions that could be asked in 
order to determine a person’s financial status. It would not be sufficient to simply ask 
respondents what their monthly income is. At the same time, it would not be plausible or 
desirable to ask for detailed banking and budget information. Some sample questions that 
would give an indication of the respondent’s income, their financial obligations, and their 
accumulated assets would provide sufficient information. As such, for each of the 
descriptors, a number of questions (gathered from market research and financial 
assessment instruments) were asked. While these were understood to be indexical in nature 
rather than exhaustive, they were sufficiently in depth to provide a more holistic picture of 
the variable than the use of one or two indices.  
 
For example, economic or financial status was assessed using the following questions: what is 
your monthly salary?; do you have a spouse or partner that earns an income?; apart from any 
other household salaries (as discussed above), do  you have any other additional monthly 
income?; how many people are financially dependant on you (e.g. children) ?; of these 
dependants, how many are being educated, are unemployed by choice (e.g. housewife, 
mother), are unable to find work, or are unable to work due to old age or ill health?; are you 
on a pension plan ?; do you belong to a medical aid?; do you own the home in which you 
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live?;  do you or your spouse/partner have any investments?. In addition to this, a list of basic 
and luxury household items were presented, and respondents were asked which of the items 
they owned. As can be seen such questions, while not exhaustive, do provide a more in depth 
and holistic profile of the person than simply asking a single question about income.  
 
The demographic blank was presented to researchers in a number of other disciplines 
(including Sociology, Politics, Economics, and Law) as well as to a demographer for 
comment, and it was agreed that both the terminology used (i.e. demographic variables 
and social position) as well as the variables chosen , form standard features in other 
research and were appropriate choices in relation to the current study. 
 
The second set of measures to be sourced or developed related to the two aspects of 
justice under investigation, that of social and organisational justice perceptions. As 
stated earlier, new or alternate ways of defining and measuring justice perceptions – 
ones that do not necessarily assume the structure of justice perceptions in this way – are 
a fundamental part of the methodological concerns of the current study. In order to 
address this concern a more generalised measure of justice perceptions needed to be 
sourced or developed. A global measure of justice would not be based on the tripartite 
framework, and unlike more traditional measures of justice would therefore not divide 
questions up into distributive, procedural and interpersonal concerns. Instead it would 
need to extract from respondents a more general sense of their perceptions in relation to 
the different experiences and events they encounter in their day to day life. Such a 
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measure, by not imposing an a priori framework, might allow different configurations or 
dimensions of justice to emerge.  
 
With regards to social justice perceptions the belief in a just world scale (Rubin  & Peplau, 
1973) was used. Just World Theory (Lerner, 1970) hypothesises that people have a need to 
believe that, in general, people get what they deserve i.e. that the world is, for the most 
part, a just place – a place where one’s merit and fate are closely aligned (Rubin  & Peplau, 
1973). While this hypothesis and its resultant controversy are not central to the current 
research, scales developed to measure belief in a just world are suitable measures of social 
justice perceptions.  
 
A belief in a just world scale was developed by Rubin and Peplau (1973) in order to 
measure “ An attitudinal continuum extending between two poles of total acceptance and 
total rejection of the notion that the world is a just place.” (Rubin and Peplau , 1973, p. 66). 
The scale has 20 items and respondents are asked to reflect their degree of agreement or 
disagreement with these items on a six point Likert scale. The items are drawn from a 
range of domains including health, family, school, politics, and criminal justice, and the 
questions are divided into those that assess ‘just world beliefs’ and those that assess ‘unjust 
world beliefs’. The scale has been criticised particularly in relation to the implications it 
has for the belief in a just world hypothesis. Theorists argue that this belief is a personality 
trait that emerges out of critical developmental stages we go through as children. The key 
concern about the scale is that it is over simplistic and measures an attributional style 
rather than a personality dimensions (Lerner, 1980). In fact when looking at the items in 
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the scale, at face value they are arguably asking simply about the perceived fairness of 
one’s social world, particularly when considering the South African context. Some of the 
questions in this scale include: It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail, 
Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own , It is a common occurrence 
for guilty people to get off free in South Africa, and It is often impossible for people in 
South Africa to receive a fair trial. Such questions cannot be seen to be measuring a deep 
set personality trait, particularly given the past and current realities of South Africa. If , for 
example, someone states that they believe it is impossible for someone to get a fair trial in 
South Africa, this could arguably be a valid concern given problems related to access to 
lawyers, the failings of policing in the country, the pressures and problems facing the 
courts, and even the racial tensions splitting the South African bar.  Similarly, if one feels 
that people are suffering through no fault of their own, it is more likely to be because one 
is faced with beggars, homeless people, street children and hawkers at almost every single 
traffic light in cities like Johannesburg.  
 
While this has important implications for Just World research, it arguably makes the 
measure particularly suitable for the current study in that it asks direct questions about the 
perceived fairness of one’s social world. This is particularly true given that the statistical 
analyses used to explore the data do not make use of an additive total i.e scale totals 
comprised of adding up scores across each item . Instead each item is looked at 
individually, and response profiles of respondents are analysed. In this way the Belief in a 
Just World Scale can be used simply as a list of questions asking people about their 
opinions of the social world in which they live. The scale thus provides a vehicle with 
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which to explore people’s perceptions of justice in relation to different aspects of their 
social world, and can serve as a suitable proxy for a ssocial justice perceptions measure..  
 
The scale has been extensively used in social justice research (Furnham & Procter, 1989) 
and extensive information (mainly inconsistent) is available about the psychometric 
properties of the measure. With regards to the reliability of the scale, Cronbach alphas 
ranging from .63 to .81 have been reported (Bruhn, 1998; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Rubin 
& Peplau, 1973). Rubin and Peplau (1973) reported an alpha of .79, Ma and Smith (1985) 
one of 0.78.  Smith and Green (1984) reported an alpha of 0.67. Furnham (1997) 
administered the scale to 1700 students in twelve different countries. Of the twelve groups, 
alphas of above 0.60 were reported for seven. The alphas ranged from 0.46 to 0.71. 
Similarly, in a study with over 2000 subjects, Furnham (1988) reported alphas of between 
0.53 and 0.81.  
 
In terms of construct validity, factor analysis has not produced consistent results in relation 
to the multi-dimensionality of the scale (Whatley, 1993), with some research indicating a 
one-factor scale (Ahmend & Stewart, 1985), and other research a two or four factor one 
(Couch, 1998; Ambrosia & Sheehan, 1990; Hyland & Dann, 1987). Given this 
inconsistency, it is most often used as a one-dimensional scale (Tanaka, 1999).  Furnham 
and Procter (1989) argue that the scale has satisfactory face, concurrent, and predictive 
validity in that it has been shown to correlate with several other self-report measures and 
has been found, in experimental studies, to be predictably related to specific behaviours.  
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Given the concerns and focus of the current study, this scale seemed to be an appropriate 
measure of social justice perceptions in that it asks twenty questions about the perceived 
fairness of different aspects of the social world.  
 
Sourcing an appropriate measure for organisational justice perceptions was more 
problematic in that existing scales are almost entirely defined in relation to the tripartite 
model. Only measures that looked at justice perceptions in relation to procedural, 
distributive, and interpersonal concerns were available. As such a new, global 
organisational justice scale that does not assume the structure of such perceptions 
needed to be developed for the current study. The following paragraphs will describe the 
methodology used to develop and validate such a scale.   
 
The first step involved generating a number of items that could be piloted on a sample of 
employed individuals. As the scale is attempting to measure perceptions about the 
general functioning of the organisation, and could not assume the structure of justice 
perceptions themselves, it was decided to first identify the key areas of organisational 
functioning and then to direct the questions to the perceived fairness of those areas. This 
marks a deviation from more traditional measures of organisational justice which have 
first identified the structure of justice in relation to distributive, procedural and 
interpersonal concerns, and have then asked quite general organisationally orientated 
questions about the dimensions. For example participants might be asked questions 
about interpersonal justice such as “To what extent do the managers at your company 
treat you with respect and courtesy?, or procedural justice questions such as “To what 
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extent do the managers in your company adequately consider your viewpoint? “ or  
“When procedures are applied management bases its decisions on accurate information”. 
Distributive questions might be phrased as “To what extent are you fairly rewarded 
considering the responsibilities that you have?”. As can be seen these questions have the 
different dimensions as their basis, and the contextual elements are very general, 
referring to all procedures, rewards and interactions in the organisation.   
Six key areas that cover a representative portion of organisational activities were 
identified through the literature. These included selection and recruitment, training and 
development, industrial relations (including management-worker relations, disciplinary 
policies and practices, union-organisational relations, as well as grievance policies and 
practices), organisational structure (including communication and decision-making), 
work allocation, and remuneration and reward. Twenty-four items were generated in 
order to assess justice perceptions of each of these areas of organisational functioning 
(See Table 5.4 ) . Certain items asked directly if certain practices were fair, while other 
items assessed the underlying principles of fairness proposed by theorists e.g. 
consistency, inclusiveness, transparency. Once these items were generated they were 
presented to several experts in the area of organisational behaviour as well as social 
justice. This included a sociologist, a political scientist, an industrial psychologist, as 
well as a lawyer. All these people assessed the proposed scale as having adequate face 
validity and no additions or alterations were suggested. 
  
Next a pilot study was conducted in order to validate the scale. Two versions of the scale 
were presented, where the items were ordered differently. These have been termed Form 
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1 and Form 2 respectively. As this scale is attempting to measure perceptions of 
organisational justice, the optimum pilot sample would comprise employees of a South 
African organisation. As such an administrative branch of a large bank was approached, 
and they gave permission for the research to be conducted in their organisation. 
Questionnaires with a brief demographic blank, an envelope, and a covering letter 
explaining the purpose of the research as well as the employees rights regarding 
participation were handed to all employees as they came to work in the morning. A 
sealed box was placed in the reception area, and employees were asked to place 
completed questionnaires in the envelopes and then into this box. The box was collected 
by the researcher at the end of three days. All responses were then analysed.  
 
A total of 184 employees responded. As can be seen in Table 5.5 the sample consisted of 
140 (76.1%) female respondents and 36 (19.6%) male respondents. Regarding position 
in the organisation, 131 (71.2%) respondents were members of team groups, while 26 
(14.1%) were team leaders. The racial composition of the sample was 69 (37.5%) black 
respondents, 26 (14.1%) white, 66 (35.9%) Coloured, and 9 (4.9%) Indian respondents. 
79 respondents belonged to a union, while 95 were not union members. The ages of the 
respondents (See Table 5.6.) ranged from 19 to 54, with the mean age being 29.63.  
 
As can be seen from Table 5.7, 90 (48.9%) respondents completed Form 1, and 94 
(51.1%) completed Form 2. Of those respondents that completed Form 1, 69 (76.7%) 
were female, and 16 (17.8%) were male, while the respondents of Form 2 comprised 71 
(75.5%) females and 20 (21.3%) males. With regards to position in the organisation, 
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Form 1 was completed by 70 (77.8%) team group members and 7 97.8%) team leaders , 
while Form 2 was completed by 61 (64.9%) team group members and 19 (20.2%) team 
leaders. 37 (41.1%) of the respondents who completed Form 1 were members of a union, 
while 46 (51.1%) were not. With regards to Form 2, 42 (44.7%) respondents were union 
members, while 49 (52.1%) were not. In terms of racial composition, Form 1 was 
completed by 31 (34.4%) black respondents, 9 (10%) white respondents, 36 (40%) 
coloured respondents, and 6 (6.7%) Indian respondents. Form 2 was completed by 38 
(40.4%) black respondents, 17 (18.1%) white respondents, 30 (31.9%) coloured 
respondents, and 3 (3.2%) Indian respondents. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5. 9, the minimum score for Form 1 was 24, and the 
maximum was 115. The mean score for Form 1 was 70.17, and the standard deviation 
was 19.09. The minimum score for Form 2 was 29, and the maximum score was 110. 
The mean score for Form 2 was 69.32 and the standard deviation17.77. Both Forms have 
mean scores that indicate moderately fair perceptions of organisational justice.  
 
With regards to the reliability of the scale, both Forms produced Cronbach Alpha Co-
efficients of above .90 (See table 5. 10) (Form 1 has an alpha of .96, and Form 2 has one 
of .94), indicating high levels of internal consistency.  From the item-total statistics for 
both Form 1 and Form 2 (Table 5.11 and 5.12 respectively) it can be seen that all of the 
items correlate significantly with the total, and the alpha would not be improved by 
removing any of the items.  In addition to this the mean score of the scale would not be 
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significantly effected by the removal of any of the items (it remains between 69 and 70 
for Form 1 and 67 and 68 for Form 2).  
 
In order to assess the validity of the scale, a principle component factor analysis was 
conducted for each version of the scale. With regards Form 1, four factors with 
eigenvalues larger than 1 were initially extracted on the basis of Kaiser’s criterion (See 
Table 5.13). The first factor accounted for 54.15% of the variance, the second factor for 
5.13% (60.28% cumulative), the third for 4.98% (65.27% cumulative), and the fourth for 
4.74% (70.01% cumulative). The scree plot (Table 5.14 ) has one sharp direction 
change, indicating a possible two factor solution.  
 
The unrotated component matrix (Table 5.15 ) indicates that all the items are loading most 
heavily onto Factor 1, except for item 11, which is loading onto Factor 2, and item 18, 
which is loading onto Factor 4. Despite this, these items are still loading very significantly 
onto Factor 1. The rotated component matrix (varimax rotation) (Table 5.16 ) indicates that 
once again all the items are loading onto Factor 1. However the majority of the items are 
loading in on all four factors, with the rest loading in on at least three of the factors.  
 
 
There is a clear indication that a 1-factor solution may be the most appropriate for this 
instrument. The first factor is accounting for a considerable amount of the variance 
(54.14%), and while there are three other factors with eigenvalues larger than one, all three 
of these components are accounting for only an additional 15% of variance. The scree-plot 
(Table 5.14 ) supports a solution with fewer factors, as there is only one significant direction 
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change. With regards to the factor loadings, the unrotated solution indicates that all the 
items are loading onto Factor 1. The rotated solution is also indicating that all the items load 
into Factor 1, and that given that all the items are loading in across most of the factors, the 
other three factors are not easily distinguishable from one another or from factor one. This 
is in line with the scale development in that it supports a one factor, global organisational 
justice perception.  
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Table 5.4 : Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Items 
 
All employees are treated fairly. General 
Employees are paid a fair salary. Remuneration and Reward 
Employees are rewarded for their efforts. Remuneration and Reward 
You will be promoted if you deserve it. Remuneration and Reward 
Every employee will have a fair hearing when problems arise. Industrial Relations 
Managers are, for the most part, fair in their dealings with employees Industrial Relations 
Management gives representative unions their due respect and consideration. Industrial Relations 
Punitive action taken against employees is, for the most part, fair. Industrial Relations 
The disciplinary procedures used are fair. Industrial Relations 
Grievances against managers are dealt with appropriately Industrial Relations 
Managers and supervisors communicate effectively with their subordinates Organisational structure 
For the most part, relevant information is shared with all employees. Organisational structure 
Employees’ input is important when decisions are made. Organisational structure 
Employees are part of the decision making process. Organisational structure 
Decisions that are made are in the best interests of all employees. Organisational structure 
Employees’ input is used appropriately when decisions are made. Organisational structure 
When applying for a job, all qualified applicants have a fair chance of being selected. Selection and recruitment 
Selection procedures used to fill vacancies are fair. Selection and recruitment 
The best person for a job usually gets the job. Selection and recruitment 
When a position becomes available, the post is advertised so as many people as 
possible will hear of the vacancy. 
Selection and recruitment 
All employees have a fair chance of getting access to training. Training and Development 
Everyone has the opportunity to develop themselves professionally. Training and Development 
Everyone does their fair share of work. Work Allocation 
Work is allocated fairly. Work Allocation 
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Table 5.5: Demographic frequencies for Total Sample (Pilot Study) 
 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 36 19.6 
Female 140 76.1 
Missing 8 4.3 
Position   
Member 131 71.2 
Leader 26 14.1 
Missing 27 14.7 
Race   
Black 69 37.5 
White 26 14.1 
Coloured 66 35.9 
Indian 9 4.9 
Missing 14 7.6 
Union Membership   
Yes 79 42.9 
No 95 51.6 
Missing 10 5.4 
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Table 5.6 : Age for Total Sample (Pilot Study) 
 
Age     
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
173 19.00 54.00 29.63 6.55 
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Table: 5.7: Demographic Frequencies for Sample: Form 1 and Form 2 (Pilot Study) 
 
Form  Frequency Percent 
1 
2 
 90 48.9 
 94 51.1 
Gender   
Form Frequency Percent 
1 Male 16 17.8 
 Female 69 76.7 
 Missing 5 5.6 
Form Frequency Percent 
2 Male 20 21.3 
 Female 71 75.5 
 Missing 3 3.2 
Position   
Form Frequency Percent 
1 Member 70 77.8 
 Leader 7 7.8 
 Missing 13 14.4 
Form Frequency Percent 
2 Member 61 64.9 
 leader 19 20.2 
 Missing 14 14.9 
Union Membership   
Form Frequency Percent 
1 Yes 37 41.1 
 No 46 51.1 
 Missing 7 7.8 
Form Frequency Percent 
2 Yes 42 44.7 
 No 49 52.1 
 Missing 3 3.2 
Race   
Form Frequency Percent 
1 Black 31 34.4 
 White 9 10.0 
 Coloured 36 40.0 
 Indian 6 6.7 
 Missing 8 8.9 
Form Frequency Percent 
2 Black 38 40.4 
 White 17 18.1 
 Coloured 30 31.9 
 Indian 3 3.2 
 Missing 6 6.4 
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Table 5.8 : Age for Sample Form 1 and Form 2 (Pilot Study) 
 
Form N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
1 83 19.00 54.00 28.80 6.63 
2 90 20.00 49.00 30.38 6.42 
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Table 5.9 : Descriptives for Form 1 and Form 2 (Pilot Study) 
 
Form N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
1 90 24.00 115.00 70.17 19.09 
2 94 29.00 110.00 69.32 17.77 
 
Low  Moderate  High 
24 72 120 
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Table 5.10 : Cronbach Alphas for Form 1 and Form 2 (Pilot Study) 
 
 Cronbach Alpha 
Form 1 .96 
Form 2 .94 
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Table 5.11 : Item-total Statistics for Form 1 (Pilot Study) 
 
 
                 Scale          Scale         Corrected 
                 Mean         Variance       Item-            Squared          Alpha 
                 if Item        if Item         Total              Multiple        if Item 
                Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation     Deleted 
 
  J1           69.8095       304.1889        .7207         .8148           .9593 
  J2           69.9206       304.9452        .7227         .7856           .9593 
  J3           69.9365       302.3507        .7546         .7817           .9590 
  J4           69.8889       305.6810        .7540         .7928           .9590 
  J5           69.9048       305.5069        .6451         .6732           .9601 
  J6           70.5079       304.3830        .7174         .7661           .9593 
  J7           70.1429       301.1244        .7485         .7349           .9590 
  J8           69.7619       305.1843        .7814         .7871           .9588 
  J9           69.8413       316.4905        .5428         .6204           .9609 
  J10         70.0000       304.4839        .7854         .8474           .9587 
  J11         70.6825       311.1879        .4980         .6764           .9617 
  J12         69.8730       307.0804        .8126         .8375           .9587 
  J13         70.1587       301.7486        .7105         .7998           .9595 
  J14         70.0635       306.0927        .6317         .8123           .9603 
  J15         70.0317       308.9990        .7632         .6966           .9591 
  J16         70.2381       305.0553        .6912         .6107           .9596 
  J17         70.0635       304.5765        .7948         .8338           .9586 
  J18         69.5556       315.5412        .4867         .5666           .9614 
  J19         70.0317       305.9022        .6738         .7428           .9598 
  J20         69.7778       306.6272        .7541         .7478           .9591 
  J21         70.2063       310.0696        .6550         .6732           .9599 
  J22         69.9683       304.2893        .7001         .7381           .9595 
  J23         69.9683       305.1925        .7945         .8993           .9587 
  J24         70.1270       301.9191        .7320         .8372           .9592 
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Table 5.12 : Item-total Statistics for Form 2 (Pilot Study) 
 
 
 
                 Scale          Scale        Corrected 
                Mean         Variance        Item-           Squared        Alpha 
               if Item          if Item          Total            Multiple       if Item 
               Deleted        Deleted    Correlation    Correlation      Deleted 
 
J1            68.1389       301.4452        .5728         .5927            .9486 
J2            67.4167       295.6831        .6892         .6531            .9471 
J3            67.4722       302.3936        .5663         .6919            .9486 
J4            67.6667       294.9014        .7147         .7271            .9468 
J5            67.3750       296.2377        .7279         .7553            .9466 
J6            67.5556       300.7856        .6535         .6997            .9476 
J7            67.8194       301.6712        .5893         .6289            .9483 
J8            67.4167       303.9930        .5241         .5160            .9491 
J9            67.5000       295.4366        .7358         .7626            .9465 
J10          67.5556       293.4898        .7643         .7825            .9461 
J11          67.6667       298.3380        .6145         .5825            .9481 
J12          67.4444       308.3349        .4212         .6068            .9503 
J13          67.6528       296.3707        .7367         .7242            .9465 
J14          67.3472       297.9763        .6744         .7053            .9473 
J15          67.1806       303.9529        .5942         .6549            .9482 
J16          67.4028       302.6383        .6932         .6970            .9473 
J17          67.3472       306.2580        .6023         .6389            .9482 
J18          67.3333       306.8169        .5795         .7691            .9484 
J19          67.1944       305.7363        .5707         .6202            .9485 
J20          67.1806       299.0796        .6174         .5626            .9480 
J21          67.6667       295.8028        .6704         .6422            .9474 
J22          67.5278       298.5908        .7680         .8004            .9464 
J23          67.6250       300.9982        .7106         .7464            .9470 
J24          67.7361       290.5632        .7686         .7886            .9460 
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Table 5.13 : Factor Extraction with Kaiser’s Criterion for Form 1 (Pilot study) 
 
 
T o ta l  V a r ia n c e  E x p l a in e da
1 2 .9 9 7 5 4 .1 5 2 5 4 .1 5 2 1 2 .9 9 7 5 4 .1 5 2 5 4 .1 5 2
1 . 4 7 3 6 . 1 3 6 6 0 .2 8 8 1 . 4 7 3 6 . 1 3 6 6 0 .2 8 8
1 . 1 9 6 4 . 9 8 2 6 5 .2 7 0 1 . 1 9 6 4 . 9 8 2 6 5 .2 7 0
1 . 1 3 8 4 . 7 4 2 7 0 .0 1 2 1 . 1 3 8 4 . 7 4 2 7 0 .0 1 2
.9 6 3 4 . 0 1 3 7 4 .0 2 5
.7 9 1 3 . 2 9 7 7 7 .3 2 3
.6 3 2 2 . 6 3 3 7 9 .9 5 5
.6 0 5 2 . 5 2 0 8 2 .4 7 5
.5 4 8 2 . 2 8 1 8 4 .7 5 7
.4 7 0 1 . 9 5 7 8 6 .7 1 4
.4 4 4 1 . 8 4 8 8 8 .5 6 2
.4 0 6 1 . 6 9 1 9 0 .2 5 3
.3 8 3 1 . 5 9 6 9 1 .8 5 0
.3 3 5 1 . 3 9 7 9 3 .2 4 7
.2 7 7 1 . 1 5 6 9 4 .4 0 2
.2 6 2 1 . 0 9 1 9 5 .4 9 3
.2 4 3 1 . 0 1 3 9 6 .5 0 6
.2 0 6 .8 5 9 9 7 .3 6 6
.1 7 1 .7 1 4 9 8 .0 7 9
.1 4 5 .6 0 4 9 8 .6 8 3
.1 2 7 .5 2 9 9 9 .2 1 2
8 . 2 0 6 E -0 .3 4 2 9 9 .5 5 4
5 . 7 6 0 E -0 .2 4 0 9 9 .7 9 4
4 . 9 5 4 E -0 .2 0 6 1 0 0 .0 0 0
C o m p o n e
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
2 0
2 1
2 2
2 3
2 4
T o ta l %  o f  V a r ia n C u m u la t iv e  T o ta l %  o f  V a r ia n C u m u la t iv e     
In it ia l E ig e n v a lu e s E x tra c t io n  S u m s  o f  S q u a re d  L     
E x tra c t io n  M e th o d :  P r in c i p a l C o m p o n e n t  A n a ly s is .
F O R M  =  1 .0 0a .  
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Table 5.14 : Scree Plot Form 1 
 
Scree Plot
FORM:         1.00
Component Number
2321191715131197531
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
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Table 5.15 : Component Matrix Unrotated Form 1 
 
Component Matrixa,b
.758 -.365 -4.65E-02 -2.93E-02
.752 -5.58E-02 .269 -.168
.783 -.125 8.822E-02 -7.28E-02
.783 -.187 .233 -.104
.680 -.258 .229 -6.17E-02
.738 .267 .262 -.114
.773 3.179E-02 .245 -.228
.810 -.161 9.815E-02 -.151
.575 -.381 3.759E-03 .513
.811 -7.12E-02 -.248 -7.75E-02
.522 .532 .366 .102
.836 -1.81E-02 4.746E-02 -.118
.738 .110 -.283 .270
.656 .529 -.136 .118
.792 -.175 -.131 -2.28E-02
.724 -2.80E-02 -.149 5.763E-02
.816 -6.78E-02 .225 5.992E-02
.515 -.251 .266 .570
.699 .361 6.413E-02 .111
.787 -2.11E-02 -.270 -.109
.676 .291 -.223 .421
.737 -.107 -.346 -.156
.822 3.013E-02 -.404 -.193
.756 .261 3.426E-02 -.159
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
J10
J11
J12
J13
J14
J15
J16
J17
J18
J19
J20
J21
J22
J23
J24
1 2 3 4
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
4 components extracted.a. 
FORM = 1.00b. 
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Table 5.16 : Component Matrix Varimax Rotation Form 1 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa,b
.570 .510 -3.01E-03 .354
.711 .248 .285 .146
.606 .403 .228 .243
.721 .297 .194 .259
.657 .240 9.801E-02 .291
.573 .211 .567 5.658E-02
.710 .280 .352 6.376E-02
.676 .425 .192 .201
.243 .290 3.640E-02 .770
.421 .684 .224 .186
.317 -4.87E-02 .768 7.768E-02
.604 .464 .324 .173
.143 .607 .419 .381
.113 .428 .735 7.380E-02
.482 .581 .161 .282
.348 .533 .272 .268
.626 .290 .346 .360
.288 2.732E-02 .183 .779
.307 .308 .645 .174
.393 .688 .245 .129
1.308E-02 .487 .593 .424
.367 .733 .125 9.837E-02
.362 .823 .261 3.146E-02
.479 .411 .518 -1.75E-03
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
J10
J11
J12
J13
J14
J15
J16
J17
J18
J19
J20
J21
J22
J23
J24
1 2 3 4
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 7 iterations.a. 
FORM = 1.00b. 
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Similar results were found for Form 2. As can be seen from Table 5.17, five factors with 
eigenvalues larger than 1 were initially extracted on the basis of Kaiser’s criterion. The 
first factor accounted for 47.28% of the variance, the second factor for 5.54% (53.8% 
cumulative), the third for 5.33% (59.16% cumulative), the fourth for 4.74% (63.90% 
cumulative), and the fifth for 4.38% (68.28 cumulative). The scree plot (Table 5.18 ) has 
one sharp direction change, indicating a possible two factor solution.  
 
The unrotated component matrix (Table 5.19) indicates that all the items are loading most 
heavily onto Factor 1, except for item 12, which is loading onto Factor 2. Despite this, 
these items are still loading very significantly onto Factor 1. The rotated component 
matrix (varimax rotation) (Table 5.20) indicates that once again all the items are loading 
onto Factor 1. However the majority of the items are loading in on all five factors, with 
the rest loading in on at least three of the factors.  
 
As with Form 1, there is a clear indication that a 1-factor solution may be the most 
appropriate for this instrument. The first factor is accounting for a satisfactory amount of 
the variance (47.28). The scree-plot supports a solution with fewer factors, as there is only 
one significant direction change. With regards to the factor loadings, the unrotated 
solution indicates that all the items are loading onto Factor 1. The rotated solution is also 
indicating that all the items load into Factor 1, and that given that all the items are loading 
in across most of the factors, the other four factors are not easily distinguishable from one 
another or from factor one. This is in line with the scale development in that it supports a 
one factor, global organisational justice perception.  
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Table 5.17 : Factor Extraction with Kaiser’s Criterion for Form 2 (Pilot study) 
 
T o ta l  V a r i a n c e  E x p la in e da
1 1 .3 4 8 4 7 .2 8 2 4 7 .2 8 2 1 1 .3 4 8 4 7 .2 8 2 4 7 .2 8 2
1 . 5 7 0 6 . 5 4 3 5 3 .8 2 5 1 . 5 7 0 6 . 5 4 3 5 3 .8 2 5
1 . 2 8 1 5 . 3 3 7 5 9 .1 6 2 1 . 2 8 1 5 . 3 3 7 5 9 .1 6 2
1 . 1 3 8 4 . 7 4 0 6 3 .9 0 2 1 . 1 3 8 4 . 7 4 0 6 3 .9 0 2
1 . 0 5 1 4 . 3 8 0 6 8 .2 8 2 1 . 0 5 1 4 . 3 8 0 6 8 .2 8 2
.8 8 3 3 . 6 8 0 7 1 .9 6 2
.8 1 0 3 . 3 7 5 7 5 .3 3 7
.7 5 1 3 . 1 2 8 7 8 .4 6 5
.6 6 9 2 . 7 8 9 8 1 .2 5 4
.6 0 1 2 . 5 0 6 8 3 .7 6 0
.5 5 8 2 . 3 2 6 8 6 .0 8 6
.4 9 0 2 . 0 4 3 8 8 .1 2 9
.4 4 1 1 . 8 3 8 8 9 .9 6 7
.4 0 7 1 . 6 9 6 9 1 .6 6 3
.3 5 5 1 . 4 7 9 9 3 .1 4 2
.2 8 2 1 . 1 7 4 9 4 .3 1 6
.2 5 2 1 . 0 5 2 9 5 .3 6 7
.2 2 5 .9 3 8 9 6 .3 0 5
.2 1 6 .8 9 9 9 7 .2 0 4
.1 8 7 .7 7 8 9 7 .9 8 2
.1 7 7 .7 3 8 9 8 .7 2 0
.1 3 2 .5 4 9 9 9 .2 6 9
9 . 8 4 2 E -0 .4 1 0 9 9 .6 7 9
7 . 7 0 7 E -0 .3 2 1 1 0 0 .0 0 0
C o m p o n e
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
2 0
2 1
2 2
2 3
2 4
T o ta l %  o f  V a r ia n C u m u l a t iv e  T o ta l %  o f  V a r ia n C u m u l a t iv e     
In it ia l E ig e n v a lu e s E x tra c t io n  S u m s  o f  S q u a re d  L     
E x tra c t io n  M e t h o d :  P r i n c ip a l C o m p o n e n t  A n a l y s is .
F O R M  =  2 .0 0a .  
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Table 5.18 : Scree Plot for Form 2 
 
Scree Plot
FORM:         2.00
Component Number
2321191715131197531
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
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Table 5.19 : Component Matrix Unrotated Form 2 
 
 
Component Matrixa,b
.605 3.289E-02 -.133 .190 -3.38E-02
.725 -.181 -.251 8.054E-02 .117
.608 -.402 -.249 .257 .337
.744 6.613E-02 .251 .147 -7.20E-02
.762 -9.23E-02 -.173 -4.61E-02 5.022E-02
.691 -8.37E-02 -.351 .198 6.418E-02
.619 .181 .503 .245 .283
.554 .105 6.556E-02 .430 -.508
.766 5.678E-02 -.179 -1.72E-02 -.268
.798 4.182E-02 -3.78E-02 -7.87E-02 -.325
.643 .314 .217 .211 -5.82E-02
.448 .658 -.216 -7.19E-02 .258
.767 .151 -.252 -.163 -.101
.702 .269 .233 -8.12E-02 .193
.625 .413 -.192 -.403 .172
.731 -9.60E-02 .128 -.232 2.497E-02
.645 -.415 .189 8.720E-02 .152
.626 -.371 .423 -.311 5.487E-02
.615 -.326 1.267E-03 -.422 -.140
.654 6.098E-02 8.384E-02 -.203 -.383
.701 .161 .231 -4.18E-02 .182
.801 -.130 7.949E-02 -4.31E-02 -4.65E-02
.748 -.192 -.289 6.827E-03 .143
.795 -5.10E-03 -2.28E-02 .296 2.196E-02
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
J10
J11
J12
J13
J14
J15
J16
J17
J18
J19
J20
J21
J22
J23
J24
1 2 3 4 5
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
5 components extracted.a. 
FORM = 2.00b. 
 
 
   
 205 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.20 : Component Matrix Varimax Rotation Form 2 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa,b
.438 .102 .213 .368 .198
.674 .268 .154 .220 .208
.844 .147 .197 5.140E-03 -1.74E-02
.272 .292 .529 .435 .141
.548 .368 .180 .261 .294
.686 .111 .106 .313 .242
.181 .117 .852 .144 .126
.192 1.829E-02 .244 .816 -4.53E-02
.387 .342 9.673E-02 .561 .323
.296 .454 .168 .590 .284
.153 8.055E-02 .542 .457 .273
.133 -.134 .255 .112 .799
.392 .354 8.384E-02 .400 .515
.184 .291 .574 .170 .433
.182 .308 .155 8.991E-02 .793
.304 .572 .317 .191 .243
.520 .440 .403 9.103E-02 -.145
.198 .772 .412 2.287E-02 -6.14E-02
.285 .748 1.126E-03 .163 .124
8.308E-02 .510 .138 .530 .242
.242 .311 .556 .169 .336
.423 .486 .335 .339 .166
.695 .320 .120 .182 .258
.557 .151 .419 .429 .166
J1
J2
J3
J4
J5
J6
J7
J8
J9
J10
J11
J12
J13
J14
J15
J16
J17
J18
J19
J20
J21
J22
J23
J24
1 2 3 4 5
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 10 iterations.a. 
FORM = 2.00b. 
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A t-test was conducted in order to establish whether there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores of those who answered form 1 and those who answered form 2. As 
can be seen from Table 5.21 , results indicated that there was no significant difference 
between the means of group 1 (those who filled in Form 1) and group two (those who filled 
in Form 2).  
 
The results of the pilot study indicate a scale that is both reliable and valid. From the 
reliability analysis it can be seen that both versions of the scale have sufficiently high 
Cronbach Alphas. As such there is a high internal consistency across the items in the scale. It 
can also be seen that there are no items that correlate negatively and no significantly low 
item-total correlations. As such it is clear that the scale has sufficient reliability for use in the 
study. With regards to the factor analysis, in both form 1 and form 2, a one-factor solution is 
indicated. This is in line with the development of the scale, where an attempt was made to 
measure global justice perceptions, rather than any number of justice dimensions. As such a 
one-factor solution indicates that the scale is in fact measuring one this one underlying 
justice construct. The t-test results indicated that there was no significant difference between 
the mean score of group 1 and the mean score of group 2.  In addition to this the reliability 
and validity results seem to be replicating themselves across the two versions of the 
questionnaire. This means that there appears to be no order effect with regards to the 
completion of the scale.  
 
Given the satisfactory reliability and validity results, as well as the stability of results 
across the two forms, this scale proved to be suitable for the purposes of the current  
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T-Test
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study, and was used in the main study. This marks an important deviation from research 
trends in this area, which have relied on the tripartite justice model to explore 
perceptions of justice.  
 
As can be seen from the above discussion the current research has attempted to address 
some of the methodological concerns articulated in the preceding chapters through the 
definition and measurement of the variables under discussion. An extensive 
demographic blank that looks at a wide range of variables and measures them in a 
holistic and in-depth way was developed, and an appropriate social justice perceptions 
measure source. Further to that a global organisational justice perceptions scale was 
developed and validated, allowing for a more open and undetermined exploration of 
justice perceptions. As mentioned previously, the arguments laid out in the first half of 
this report proposed two sets of methodological challenges for the current study, the 
measuring instruments being only the first. A second set of considerations was how the 
data, once collected, is to be analysed.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter and in the preceding chapters most studies of justice 
make use of statistical tools that rely on the reduction of variables into limited 
categories and indices to analyse data. It was argued that if thinking about justice is to 
become more systemic and nuanced as is argued for in chapters two and three, research 
methodologies that extend beyond linear thinking are needed. Methods of analysis that 
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attempt to work with the complexity of the variables rather than relying on the reduction 
of variables is required. In addition to this statistical procedures that account for the 
interaction of variables need to be used, rather than simply looking at more directly 
linear relationships.  It is these considerations that informed the choice of statistical 
tools in the current study.  The following paragraphs will describe the ways in which the 
data was analysed, starting off with the preliminary analyses that were done in order to 
explore the structure and properties of the data set.  
 
Firstly, in order to establish the psychometric properties of the measuring instruments 
Cronbach Alphas and factor analyses were conducted on the scales. The distributions of 
the different variables were then explored in order to test for normality as well as to 
identify the possibility of outliers. Following this, descriptive statistics were used in 
order to explore and describe the data set. Correlations were then used to explore the 
relationship between the variables.  
 
Once the data set had been fully described and explored, the following steps were taken 
in order to attempt to answer the research questions:  
1. Cluster analyses were conducted on each of the justice variables 
2. The clusters were described in terms of profiles of justice responses  (i.e. mean 
scores for each item of the scale for each variable) 
3. A CHAID analysis was conducted in order to explore whether demographic 
variables were predicting cluster membership for each of the justice variables 
(i.e. the demographic variables were the predictors, and organisational justice 
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perceptions and social justice perceptions were the dependent variables 
respectively). 
 
These statistical procedures are different from more conventional data analysis methods 
described in the preceding chapters in that they do not make use of total scores or single 
score indices, but rather analyse scoring profiles (i.e. peoples responses for each item), 
taking into account responses to each question answered. Furthermore they account for 
the interactions between a wide range of variables, rather than focusing on single or a 
limited number of interactions. All of the above procedures will be discussed in more 
detail.  
 
An evaluation of the scale and the sub scales used in the present study was necessary 
before any results could be established.  As such the reliability and validity of the 
measuring instrument had to be considered. Reliability refers to the extent to which the 
scale is consistently measuring the instrument at hand, whereas validity refers to the 
extent to which the instrument is measuring what it is supposed to measure (Anastasi, 
1976). Internal reliability measures assess the homogeneity of test items (Anastasi, 
1976), or the extent to which items on a given scale correlate with each other (Rosenthal 
& Rosnow, 1991).  The higher the inter item correlation, the more consistently the scale 
is measuring the same construct. The internal reliabilities of the scale and sub scales 
used in the current research were calculated using Cronbach’s alpha. A Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of 0.60 and above is regarded by some authors as acceptable for the 
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Social Sciences (McKennell, 1970), while others maintain that 0.70 is a more acceptable 
cut off point (Kerlinger, 1986).  
 
Validity refers to the extent to which a scale measures what it is supposed to measure. 
Construct validity is the extent to which the scale actually captures the theoretical 
construct or trait that it is supposed to measure (Anastasi, 1976, Rosenthal & Rosnow, 
1991). Factor analysis is one of the most common statistical measures of construct 
validity. The purpose of factor analysis is to describe relationships among many 
variables in terms of a few underlying quantities termed factors (Johnson & Wichern, 
1998). It is defined as a method for the simplification of more complex sets of data 
(Kline, 1994). A factor is a grouping of variables that have a high correlation with one 
another but a low correlation with variables in another group - it is a construct which is 
the ‘condensed statement’ of the relationships between a group of variables (Royce, 
1963). As such factor analysis can account for the relationships between variables, and 
can be useful in discovering the main dimensions or constructs that underpin a set of 
variables (Kline, 1994). As such it is a useful tool for exploring the construct validity of 
a measuring instrument – to ascertain the underlying relationship between a set of items 
attempting to represent a particular construct.  
 
A factor is defined by its factor loadings – the correlation of a variable with that factor. 
A factor analysis will derive a number of factors, but the meaning of that factor can only 
be deduced from an exploration of the factor loadings i.e. which variables are correlating 
most strongly with the different factors. The meaning of these factors must then be 
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validated against external criteria, for example the theoretical underpinnings of a 
particular construct, or previous research in the area (Kline, 1994). In this way the 
results of a factor analysis must be interpreted within the context of the study and the 
theoretical field. A factor loading is considered high if it is 0.6 or above, and is 
moderately high if it is 0.3 or above (Kline, 1994). Kline (1994) argues that a factor 
loading below 0.3 should be ignored, however many statisticians find such a cut-off to 
be too rigorous (Cattell, 1978). Cattell  (1978) regards loadings from 0.15 and above 
significant.  
 
A distinction is made between exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, with the 
former being a method of investigating the underlying structure of a set of variables, and 
the latter being a method of testing hypotheses (Kline, 1994). In the current study factor 
analysis is used in its exploratory sense, in order to investigate the structure and 
construct validity of the measurement instruments. Principal component analysis is one 
method of condensing a correlation matrix and a set of variables, and is the method used 
in the current study. The aim of this method of factor analysis is to be able to estimate 
the correlation matrix by finding the characteristic equation of the matrix (Kline, 1994). 
This is done by deriving two sets of values, that of the eigenvectors (a column of 
weights each applicable to a variable in the matrix and from which the factor loadings 
are derived) and the eigenvalues (a value reflecting the proportion of variance explained 
by each factor). The eigenvalue of a component, a value that is always positive or zero, 
is an indication of the proportion of total variance that component accounts for (Kline, 
1994). As such the larger the eigenvalue of the factor, the more variance it accounts for.  
   
 213 
 
In a Principal Component Analysis, principal components emerge in the order of the 
highest proportion of variance explained by each component. Principal components 
maximise the amount of variance explained by the factors – no other method of 
extraction could produce factors that will account for more variance than the principal 
components. The number of eigenvalues represents the number of components needed to 
explain the relationships between the variables. In Principal Component analysis there 
are as many eigenvalues as there are variables, with the eigenvalues becoming smaller 
lower down the list, but eventually accounting for all of the variance. Much of what is 
initially produced in a factor analysis is an artifact of the statistical methods used – for 
example Principal Component Analysis will generally produce one general factor, 
followed by bipolar factors (Kline, 1994). Because the factors may be algebraic artifacts, 
they must be simplified by a process of rotation in order to be meaningfully interpreted.  
 
The process of rotation is best understood if one imagines factors in relation to the 
notion of Euclidean space, where a set of axis (representing different factors and along 
which factor loadings are indicated) form four quadrants. Variables can fall into any of 
the four quadrants. By rotating the axes (which can hold any point in this space) 
variables will load differently onto the factors i.e. factor loadings, and thus the meaning 
of the factors, will change. In this way it becomes clear that there is no one perfect or 
correct factor analysis solution. There are two types of rotation, orthogonal and oblique. 
Orthogonal rotation keeps the axes at a 90-degree angle to one another, meaning that the 
rotated factors are not correlated to one another. Oblique rotation, on the other hand, 
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allows the axes to take up any position in space relative to one another, where the angle 
between the axes indicates the correlation between the factors. There is almost an 
infinity of mathematically equivalent sets of factors as the axes, or factors, can be 
rotated into any position relative to one another, and each rotation or new position would 
present new factor loadings. (Kline, 1994). However, each of these solutions is 
mathematically equivalent, as they will explain the same amount of variance in each 
variable. As such there is no mathematical argument for choosing one solution (even the 
initial unrotated solution) over another. However it is argued that there is a rational basis 
for choosing a solution, and that this is based on the law of parsimony ( Kline,1994).  
This law states that one should select the simplest explanation of those that fit the facts 
i.e. it makes sense to pick the most simple solution from the infinite number of rotations. 
This provides the rationale for the criteria of simple structure for the rotation of factors, 
where the optimum solution is where the factors in a given matrix each have a few high 
loadings. As such a simple structure method of rotating factors will attempt to maximise 
the number of zero (or near zero) factor loadings (Cattell, 1978). Varimax rotation, an 
orthogonal rotation method, aims at obtaining a simple structure by maximising the sum 
of variances of squared loadings, producing loadings which are either high or near to 
zero. Kline (1994) states that it is generally agreed that the Varimax procedure is the 
most efficient procedure for obtaining simple structure with orthogonal rotation.  As 
such, this is the method of rotation used in the current study.  
 
Catell (1978) suggested a number of technical rules for simple structure factor analysis. 
These include a good rationale for the inclusion of the variables or items (and not 
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omitting any important aspects of the construct), a heterogeneous, representative sample, 
a sample size of at least 100 subjects , a variable to subject ratio of at least 2:1 (although 
the bigger the ratio of subjects to items the better), an appropriate method of factor 
analysis (such as principal component analysis), and finally the appropriate choice of the 
number of factors to be rotated. With regards to the first four rules, this study meets the 
established criteria. The scale items all have a clear, theoretical rationale, the sample size 
is 467, the subject to variable ratio is approximately 20:1 for the organisational justice 
scale, and approximately 23:1 for the belief in a just world scale. The sample is 
heterogeneous, representing a wide range of people, and as discussed above, principal 
component analysis is a suitable method of factor analysis for this study.  
 
With regards to the last rule, that of deciding how many factors to retain for rotation, this 
decision can only be made after conducting the principal component analysis. Once this 
is done, two criteria need to be considered. The first is the eigenvalue of each factor. 
Kline 91994) states that it is standard practice for factors with an eigenvalue of larger 
than 1 to be retained. He argues, however, that this often greatly over estimates the 
number of factors, particularly in large matrices.  The second criteria is that of a Scree 
test, which Kline (1994) argues is possibly the best indicator of the appropriate number 
of factors to retain. In the Scree test a plot is made with the eigenvalues and the principal 
components. The cutoff point each factor is where the line changes slope. As such, by 
looking at the number of slope changes in the Scree plot, one can deduce the number of 
factors to be retained. One criticism of the Scree test is that it is subjective. As such 
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Kline recommends that the Scree test is looked at in conjunction with the eigenvalues of 
the factors.  
 
Once the validity and reliability of the measuring instruments was established, a number 
of analyses were carried out in order to explore and describe the data set. The means 
(averages), frequencies (number of occurrences) and percentages of all biographical data 
were calculated in order to enable the researcher to classify and describe the current 
sample. The means to the scales and sub scales were also calculated, allowing the 
researcher to establish the average overall response to the measures. 
 
Once these preliminary analyses were done, the data was analysed in order to answer the 
research questions.  The first question that was explored pertained to the relationship 
between organisational and social justice perceptions i.e. Are people’s experiences of 
organisational justice related to their experiences of social justice? In order to answer 
this question Pearsons-Product Moment  Correlations were used. Correlations indicate 
the degree to which two variables are related (Runyon and Haber, 1976; Howell, 1992). 
Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991) describe a linear relationship as one where a fixed change 
in one variable is always associated with a fixed change in another variable. A 
correlational analysis is a technique that allows for the directionality and degree of linear 
relationships between two variables to be established.  (McCall, 1990). A correlation co-
efficient (a unitless measure) is a number from –1.00 through to +1.00, which reflects 
the nature of the linear relationship. 0.00 indicates no relationship, with –1.00 reflecting 
a perfect negative relationship and +1.00 a perfect positive one (Kerlinger, 1986). As 
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such by performing a correlation analysis on organisational and social justice,  
information about the relationship between these two dimensions could be gleaned. This 
will provide the point of departure for further discussion on the basis of the other 
statistical analyses being performed. While these are being conducted most primarily in 
order to answer the other two research questions, they will also be able to add some 
more information about the relationship between these two dimensions of justice. This 
will be discussed in more detail further on in this chapter. 
 
The second question to be explored was the one that asked : In what ways do people 
cluster together in relation to their experiences of justice? As mentioned previously, 
techniques needed to be employed that could work with the complexity of the data set, 
with as little unnecessary reduction of the data as possible. In order to do this a cluster 
analysis will be used. Typically, cluster analysis is used to develop classification 
systems, investigate conceptual frameworks for grouping variables, generate hypotheses 
through the exploration of data, or to test hypotheses by determining the presence of 
clusters or types defined through other procedures.  (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). 
Cluster analysis is a broad term used to refer to a range of clustering methods 
(multivariate statistical procedures) that are used to organise sets of data into highly 
similar, relatively homogenous groups. Such homogenous groups of cases are referred to 
as clusters (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). For the purposes of this research, social 
and organisational justice perceptions will be subject to a clustering procedure and 
analysis, in order to determine whether groups of people with similar perceptions 
emerge.  
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It is important to note that cluster analysis works at an individual item level, and can be 
used to cluster any type of variable. For example variables such as cities could be 
clustered on the basis of a number of descriptive features. As such the ‘scales’ used in 
the current study need to be understood simply as a series of statements. They will not 
be used in an additive manner, and each item stands on its own. As such the 
psychometric properties of such ‘scales’ are not relevant to this analysis.  
 
There are five basic steps involved in a cluster analysis, all of which involve choosing 
from an array of possible techniques and measurements. Different clustering methods 
will generate different solutions for the same data set. Therefore in order to make the 
cluster analysis meaningful, it is essential that one chooses the most appropriate methods 
for the purposes of the given study (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984).  The first two 
steps involve selecting the sample for the analysis and defining the variables on which 
the cases in the sample will be measured. In the present study both these matters have 
been guided by the literature and the research questions, and have been discussed earlier 
on in this chapter.  An additional note in relation to these first two steps, regarding the 
transformation of data, is important at this juncture. Where the normality of the 
distribution is in question, or where the data does not have the same scale value, it is 
common to perform a transformation of the data or standardise it to a mean of 0 and a 
unit variance (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984).  When performing a cluster method, 
however, such a procedure is considered inappropriate. Standardisation may reduce the 
very differences that the clustering method is attempting to determine (Everitt, 1980 in 
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Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). As such, no standardisation procedures will be 
performed on the data for the present study.  
 
The third step in a cluster analysis entails computing the similarities among the cases. 
Similarity between profiles can be assessed on the basis of the shape of the profile, the 
way in which scores are dispersed around the average (known as scatter), or the mean 
score of the case across all the variables (elevation) (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). 
There are a number of different similarity measures that can be used, each of which is 
sensitive to different properties of the profile. The choice of similarity measure is based 
on the strengths and limitations of each measure in relation to the study being done, as 
well as the properties of the data. In the present study, the initial clustering will be done 
on the basis of justice perceptions. The scale being used to measure this variable will 
yield data that is, arguably, ratio data (while a Likert type scale does generate categorical 
data for each item, a total of the scores for all the items – a scale total – can arguably 
constitute ratio data). Of the similarity measures that are considered appropriate for this 
type of data, distance measures have enjoyed a great deal of popularity (Aldenderfer & 
Blashfield, 1984). Unlike correlation co-efficients which are sensitive to the shape of 
profiles but not to the magnitude of such profiles – a drawback that is considerable given 
the nature of this study – distance measures use the magnitude of variables to determine 
their distance from one another. Cases that are described by variables with the same 
magnitude will be considered identical (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). One of the 
biggest problems effecting the popularity of this type of similarity measure is that it is 
affected by the standardisation of variables. As no standardisation procedure will be 
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used in this study, this need not present a concern. Another problem with this type of 
measure is that it is effected by elevation differences, such that variables with big size 
differences and standard deviations may overshadow the effects of other variables with 
smaller differences (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Despite this, distance measures 
appear to be the most appropriate similarity measure for the purposes of this study.  
 
The fourth step in a cluster analysis is to use a cluster method to form groups of similar 
cases. Of the number of families of methods to choose from, hierarchical agglomerative 
methods are the most frequently used (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Such methods 
start off by finding the two most similar cases, and sequentially add the most similar 
cases, forming different clusters at various levels of similarity, until one large cluster is 
formed at the end of the process. This sequence is depicted in a graph called a 
dendrogram, which graphically displays the hierarchical structure of the clustering. The 
clusters do not overlap (i.e. each case will appear in only one cluster), but the clusters 
are nested (i.e. are part of more inclusive clusters at higher levels of similarity). 
Hierarchical agglomeration is based on a set of merger rules or linkage forms, which 
determine when cases should be combined. There are a number of different sets of 
merger rules that can be applied depending on the nature of the study and the research 
questions. These merger strategies can be compared by observing how they effect the 
‘space’ between groups in the data i.e. do they reduce the space between groups (space-
contracting methods) or increase such a space (space-dilating methods). While some 
authors prefer space-contracting methods because they possess desirable mathematical 
properties (Jardine & Sibson, 1968 in Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984) others consider 
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them to limit the application of the analysis, and therefore prefer space-dilating methods 
(Williams, 1971 in Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). As the application of the analysis is 
of primary importance in this study, space-dilating methods would be most appropriate. 
Ward’s Method is a space-dilating technique that is widely used in the social sciences. 
This method optimises the minimum variance within the clusters, a function known as 
the error sum of squares. At the beginning of the sequence, each case is in its own 
cluster and therefore the error sum of squares is zero. Cases are joined on the basis that 
they result in the minimum increase in the error sum of squares. A concern with such a 
method is that it is effected by elevation profiles.  
 
A number of comparisons between similarity measures and clustering methods have 
been conducted in order to determine what factors effect the performance of such 
methods. Given the exploratory nature of the research questions, the properties of the 
scales being used in this study, the applied nature of the research, as well as the non-
linear nature of the relationships between variables, Ward’s method of clustering with a 
distance measure of similarity is the most appropriate clustering method to use. It is 
impossible to say which clustering method would be the correct one to use, as there can 
be no correct clustering solution. Instead one needs to determine the appropriateness of 
the method being used in relation to the nature of the data and the study.  
 
As can be seen a cluster analysis makes use of all of a respondents answers, working on 
the basis of profiles of responses, rather than the reduction of a set of questions into one 
index. This will allow for a more in depth and nuanced exploration of justice perceptions 
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than the methods more conventionally used by justice researchers (as described in 
chapters two, three and four). The reasons for this are best illustrated through an 
example. On a five item scale scored on a 5-point Likert scale, respondent A answers 
strongly disagree (i.e. ticks 1) in response to question one and two, neither agree nor 
disagree (i.e. ticks a 3) for question three, agree (i.e. ticks a 4) for question four, and 
strongly agree (i.e. ticks a 5) for the fifth question. Respondent A would thus score a 
total of 14 out of possible 25, and would fall into the category of having moderate justice 
perceptions. Respondent B, on the other hand might score exactly the opposite, 
answering a 5 for question one, a 4 for question two, a 3 for question three, and a 1 for 
questions four and five.  Respondent B, despite having very disparate views from 
respondent A, would also score a 14 and be classified as having moderate perceptions.  
In many analyses (such as regression analyses, correlations, ANOVAs and MANOVAs) 
these two people would be recognised as being identical. A cluster analysis, however, 
because it works with profiles of responses, would recognise these two people as 
holding very different perceptions.  
 
While this has clear advantages, a cluster analysis is, to some extent, descriptive in 
nature – it will explore the ways in which people are similar or different from eachother 
in relation to their justice perceptions, but it will not identify relationships between 
variables. As discussed above, this is interesting in itself in that it might allow alternate 
conceptions of justice concerns to emerge. However in order to use this procedure to 
understand or predict the relationship between variables (in this case between justice 
perceptions and demographic variables), further analyses using the clustering solution 
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need to be conducted. In the current study this takes the form of a data mining technique. 
Data Mining is an analytic process designed to explore large amounts of data (most 
typically business or market related data). The aim of such an exploration is to search for 
consistent patterns and systematic relationships between variables, and then to validate 
the findings by applying the detected patterns to new subsets of data. The ultimate goal 
of data mining is prediction – in the current study this would apply to the final research 
question: do demographic variables predict experiences of organisational and social 
justice? As predictive data mining is the most common type of data mining and one that 
has the most direct business applications, there has been recent increased interest in 
developing new analytic techniques specifically designed to address the issues relevant 
to business Data Mining. One such development is that of Classification Trees.  
 
A classification tree is a method of hierarchically sorting data and is used in the current 
study in order to predict membership of the cluster groups on the basis of the 
demographic variables. Classification trees are different from traditional statistical 
methods for predicting group or cluster membership on a categorical dependent variable 
as they employ a hierarchy of predictions, with many predictions sometimes being 
applied to particular cases. Traditional methods use simultaneous techniques to make 
one and only one class membership prediction for each and every case. Classification 
trees are hierarchical in nature i.e. a hierarchy of questions are asked, and the final 
decision depends on the answers to all the questions that preceded it (STATISTICA 
manual, 2003). There are a number of different classification tree tools. The one used in 
the current study is called Chi-square Automatic Interaction Detection, or CHAID. 
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CHAID is a classification trees program developed by Kass (1980) that performs multi-
level splits when computing classification trees (STATISTICA manual, 2003). It is a 
technique used for the classification of data. CHAID evaluates complex interactions 
among predictors, and displays the results in the form of a ‘tree’ diagram. This technique 
is appropriate for a data set where there is one dependent variable, and many categorical 
predictors that may or may not be ordinal (Kass, 1980), such as the data set in the 
current study. It partitions the data into mutually exclusive, exhaustive groupings that 
best describe the dependent variable (Kass, 1980). In the case of the current study the 
independent variables are the host of demographic variables, while the dependent 
variable is justice perceptions (both organisational and social). However instead of 
justice perceptions being analysed in the form of scale totals, they are looked at in 
relation to the cluster memberships that emerge from the cluster analysis. In other words 
the CHAID will be used in order to explore how the demographic variables describe 
justice perceptions cluster membership.    
 
CHAID has its origins in the automatic interaction detection (AID) technique, where 
data is bisected using the predictors. AID is used when the dependent variable is interval 
in nature, and it maximises the between-group sum of squares at each bisection (Kass, 
1980). CHAID, on the other hand, operates where the dependent variable is nominal, 
and it maximises the significance of the chi-squared statistic at each partition. With 
CHAID, the division does not have to be a bisection (Kass, 1980), rather CHAID 
performs multi-level splits rather than binary splits when computing classification trees. 
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With multi-level splits, predictor variables can be used for splitting only once 
(STATISTICA Manual, 2003). There are a number of steps in a CHAID analysis. Firstly 
the best partition for each predictor is found. For example in the current study, age may 
be partitioned on the basis of those older than 30 and those younger than 30, or salary 
between those who earn more than R3000 a month and those who earn less. The second 
step is to compare the predictors to each other and then select the one that best predicts 
the dependent variable. The data is then divided according to the predictor. Each sub-
group is then reanalysed independently, and further divisions are produced (Kass, 1980).  
 
For example, CHAID might identify age as the first predictor of justice perceptions, with 
people above thirty falling into one group and people below thirty falling into the other. 
Within each of these groups cluster memberships will be identified e.g. of all of the 
people under the age of  thirty, 50% were in cluster one, 25% in cluster two, 10% in 
clusters three and four, and only 5% in cluster 6. In the over thirties however, only 2% 
are in cluster 1, 10% in clusters two, three, and four, and the remaining 68% are in 
cluster six. There is a clear indication that cluster one (which may be defined, for 
example, as a group of people who have low justice perceptions in relation to industrial 
relations and organisational communication, but high perceptions about selection and 
training and development) has an overwhelmingly high number of the under thirties, 
while cluster six has a high number of the over thirties (people who have moderate 
justice perceptions about selection and training and development, but very high 
perceptions about industrial relations and organisational structure). These two groups are 
then reanalysed. For the first group union membership might then be the next best 
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predictor of justice, with those belonging to a union falling into one group and those 
who do not into another. This means that group one now comprises group 1A - all the 
people under the age of thirty who do belong to a union,  and group 1B – all the people 
under the age of thirty who do not belong to a union. Similarly group two would be split 
on the basis of its next predictor, say gender, into all of those who are over the age of 
thirty and who are female, and those who are over the age of thirty and male. And so the 
analysis proceeds.  
 
The CHAID modeling results are displayed in a tree diagram. The "trunk" of the tree 
represents the total modeling database. CHAID then creates a first layer of "branches" 
by displaying values of the strongest predictor of the dependent variable. CHAID 
automatically determines how to group the values of this predictor into a manageable 
number of categories. (E.g., we may start with ten categories of age, and CHAID might 
collapse these ten categories down to only four or five statistically significantly different 
age groups.) CHAID then creates additional layers of branches off of each age grouping, 
using the strongest of the remaining predictors. It continues this branching procedure 
until the final branches or "twigs" of the tree have been generated. 
 
CHAID thus is a useful tool for dividing data into more homogenous groups (Kass, 
1980) while still retaining the richness of information. It is particularly appropriate for 
use in this study in that it looks at the interactions between the demographic variables 
rather than seeing each one in isolation from the others, and it can analyse an unlimited 
number of such variables. As such there is no need to reduce the number of demographic 
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variables under investigation – which is particularly useful given the exploratory nature 
of the study – or to use limited indices of demographic variables. This addresses a 
number of the concerns articulated in the preceding chapters and in the beginning of this 
chapter.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the approach to the current study is inflected 
with concerns and arguments raised in the first half of this report. Theoretical concerns 
related to the relationship between different types of justice as well as the relationship 
between demographic variables (as indicators of identity and social position) and 
perceptions of justice have informed the research questions being investigated. Further, 
concerns about the way in which social psychologists investigate questions about justice 
and demographic variables have directed the methodological approach of the current study. 
This is particularly in relation to the way in which the variables under consideration are 
being defined and measured, as well as the types of statistical tools employed to analyse 
the data.   
 
This chapter outlined the ways in which the current study aims to address the concerns 
raised by detailing both the research questions as well as the methodological approach to 
be adopted. By empirically exploring the relationship between organisational and social 
justice as well as the relationship between demographic variables and perceptions of 
justice, this study is addressing important theoretical considerations. With regards to 
methodological issues, by conducting a field study with a large and diverse sample of 
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employed people with varied work, domestic, financial and religious backgrounds, this 
study avoids the limitations of experimental laboratory-based research using largely 
homogenous samples of university students that is so prolific within the area of justice 
research. Further, by including a wide range of demographic variables that are measured 
using a number of different indices, this study avoids the kind of reductionism that has 
been evident in other studies exploring aspects of demography and justice perceptions.  In 
this way the relationship between demographic variables and justice perceptions can be 
more fully explored in such a way that the complexities of identity and social position can 
be accounted for. Similarly, the way in which justice perceptions are measured in this 
study – that is globally rather than in relation to the tripartite structure - avoids the 
limitations of working within one framework that has, arguably, become restrictive rather 
than informative.   
 
Finally, statistical procedures that can assist a better understanding of the complexities of 
the variables under study were identified and described, namely cluster and CHAID 
analyses. By using tools that firstly, do not rely on the reduction of variables into a small 
number of categories or single indices, and secondly are aimed at exploring the interactions 
between a large number of variables, this study is arguably moving beyond a linear 
understanding of the relationship between the variables. Further, such an approach 
accounts for more of the complexities involved in such relationships than other more 
conventional approaches.  
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The results of the statistical analyses described above are presented in the following 
chapter. 
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Table 5.21: T-Test Form 1 and 2 
 
Group Statistics
90 70.1778 19.09031 2.01230
94 69.3298 17.77602 1.83346
FORM
1.00
2.00
JUSTTOT
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Independent Samples Test
.182 .670 .312 182 .755 .8480 2.71806 -4.51497 6.21095
.311 179.632 .756 .8480 2.72230 -4.52380 6.21978
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
JUSTTOT
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
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Chapter 6: Results 
 
Overview 
 
 
The results of the statistical analysis carried out for the current research are presented in the 
following chapter. As discussed in Chapter 5, the analyses are conducted in a number of steps. 
First the psychometric properties of the scales are explored, and Cronbach Alphas and factor 
analyses are presented for each measure. As will become evident, the belief in a just world 
scale presented a problem with regards to reliability, and as such needed to be explored in 
more depth. Following a factor analysis it was decided to divide this scale up into two 
separate measures, that of a social justice perceptions scale and a social injustice perceptions 
scale. As such three justice variables were carried forward for all the other analyses. 
Following the exploration of the measuring instruments, the data set is explored, with 
descriptive summary statistics being presented, followed by distribution analyses for each set 
of measures. As will be seen, two of the distributions, that of social justice perceptions and 
social injustice perceptions, do not meet the assumption of normality required for parametric 
analyses in that they were both slightly skewed. As such, where necessary, non-parametric 
equivalent procedures are used.  
 
Once the preliminary analyses are complete, focus turns to answering the main research 
questions. Firstly a correlation analysis is conducted in order to explore the relationship 
between organisational and social justice perceptions (with social justice perceptions now 
comprising two independent measures). The next stage in the analysis is a cluster analysis, 
which is conducted on each of the dependent variables. The first step is to determine how 
many clusters should be retained from the analysis. To this end a cluster history diagram and a 
dendrogram are presented. These represent (the first in table form, the second 
   
   229 
diagrammatically) where the cluster breaks are occurring and how many people are in each 
cluster, starting with one large cluster and ending ultimately in each individual respondent. An 
appropriate cluster solution, with clusters that are suitably large enough and appear 
meaningful in relation to the entire data set, is then determined. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
this is largely an interpretative process, with there being any number of appropriate solutions. 
For organisational justice perceptions a six-cluster solution is retained. For the two social 
justice variables both a three-cluster and six-cluster solution is explored. For both of these 
variables, however, a six-cluster solution is retained. Following this initial step, each cluster 
solution is discussed, looking at the composition of the clusters as well as the mean item score 
profiles. Through this process each cluster is defined in relation to the justice perceptions 
emerging for that group of people. While this analysis is important in itself in that it directly 
explores one of the research questions (about the ways in which people cluster together in 
relation to their justice perceptions) it can also be considered the first step in the next set of 
analyses, that of the CHAID analyses.  
 
Using the clusters as dependent variables, the CHAID explores the relationship between the 
demographic variables and justice perceptions. A separate analysis is conducted for each of 
the justice dimensions, with two figures being presented for each. First a decision tree is 
presented, which displays the modeling results generated by the CHAID analysis. In this 
diagram the total database is divided into a first layer of "branches" based on the strongest 
predictor of the dependent variable, which is divided into a manageable number of categories. 
Additional branches are then generated using the strongest of the remaining predictors. It 
continues this branching procedure until the final branches or "twigs" of the tree have been 
generated. The second table to be presented is that of a competing splits tree, which indicates 
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which of the demographic variables are also strong predictors of justice perceptions, but were 
not as strong as the one selected by the CHAID.  
Finally the chapter is concluded with a review of the main results found through the 
analyses conducted.  
Scale Validation 
 
 
The psychometric properties of the two measures of social and organisational justice used in 
the study were assessed, with particular attention to the reliability and validity of the 
measures. With regards to the organisational justice measure, the development and 
validation of this scale was discussed in Chapter 5.  The psychometric properties of this 
scale, as they pertain to its use in the current study, are now reported.   
 
As can be seen from Table 6.1 the Cronbach Alpha for the global justice perceptions scale 
for the main study was 0.95, indicative of high internal consistency, and in line with findings 
in the pilot study. The item-total statistics (Table 6.2) indicate that all the items are 
correlating sufficiently with the total score (the correlation co-efficients range between 0.37 
and 0.75), and that the alpha would not be improved by deleting any of the items.  
 
 
A Principle Component Factor Analysis was conducted in order to confirm the construct 
validity of the global justice perceptions scale. On the basis of Kaiser’s criterion 3 factors 
with eigenvalues larger than 1 were initially extracted (See Table 6. 3). The cumulative 
proportion of variance explained by the three factors is 0.59. However the first factor 
accounts for 0.49 of that variance, with the other two factors only accounting for 0. 95 (0.05 
and 0.04 respectively). The scree plot (See Table 6.4) indicates a possible three factor 
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solution. As such three factors were retained. When rotated using the varimax rotation 
method, all the items are still loading very strongly onto the first factor (See Table 6.5), 
although many of them are loading more strongly onto other factors. Given the extent to 
which the items are loading in across all the factors, it is clear that the factors are not 
emerging as distinct from one another. There are thus strong indications that a one-factor 
solution is appropriate. As such a principal component factor analysis retaining one-factor 
was conducted. The component matrix indicates that all the items are in fact loading onto the 
first factor (See Table 6.6), confirming a one-factor solution, and supporting the construct 
validity of the measuring instrument.  
 
From the above discussion it can be seen that the global organisational justice scale has 
suitable reliability and validity for use in this study. In addition to this, these results are 
similar to those found in the pilot study (as described in Chapter 5). The fact that the 
findings replicate themselves across samples further confirms both the validity and 
reliability of the measure, confirming its suitability for use in this study.  
 
 
With regards to the belief in a just world scale, a Cronbach Alpha of 0.42 was found for the 
current study (See Table 6.7). This indicates very poor internal consistency, and raises 
concerns about the reliability of the measuring instrument. The item-total statistics (See 
Table 6.8) verify that none of the items were correlating sufficiently from the total, with 
item 8 and 16 correlating negatively with the total. None of the items would improve the 
alpha significantly if deleted. As such further exploration of the instrument was required, 
in order to determine whether a reliable sub-scale could be salvaged.   
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Table 6.1: Cronbach Alpha for Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Scale  
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha 
Variables Alpha 
Raw 0.95 
Standardized 0.95 
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Table 6.2: Item-Total Statistics for Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Scale  
 
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha with Deleted Variable 
Deleted 
Variable 
Raw Variables Standardized Variables 
Label 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
OJ1 0.64 0.95 0.64 0.95 OJ1 
OJ2 0.73 0.95 0.73 0.95 OJ2 
OJ3 0.64 0.95 0.64 0.95 OJ3 
OJ4 0.65 0.95 0.65 0.95 OJ4 
OJ5 0.60 0.95 0.60 0.95 OJ5 
OJ6 0.68 0.95 0.68 0.95 OJ6 
OJ7 0.76 0.95 0.76 0.95 OJ7 
OJ8 0.70 0.95 0.79 0.95 OJ8 
OJ9 0.53 0.95 0.53 0.95 OJ9 
OJ10 0.66 0.95 0.66 0.95 OJ10 
OJ11 0.64 0.95 0.64 0.95 OJ11 
OJ12 0.65 0.95 0.65 0.95 OJ12 
OJ13 0.65 0.95 0.65 0.95 OJ13 
OJ14 0.69 0.95 0.69 0.95 OJ14 
OJ15 0.72 0.95 0.72 0.95 OJ15 
OJ16 0.67 0.95 0.67 0.95 OJ16 
OJ17 0.77 0.95 0.77 0.95 OJ17 
OJ18 0.38 0.95 0.38 0.95 OJ18 
OJ19 0.71 0.95 0.71 0.95 OJ19 
OJ20 0.64 0.95 0.64 0.95 0J20 
OJ21 0.74 0.95 0.74 0.95 OJ21 
OJ22 0.40 0.95 0.40 0.95 OJ22 
OJ23 0.72 0.95 0.72 0.95 OJ23 
OJ24 0.66 0.95 0.66 0.95 OJ24 
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Table 6.3: Factor Extraction with Kaiser’s Criterion for Global Organisational Justice 
Perceptions Scale  
 
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 24  Average = 1 
 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 11.97 10.75 0.50 0.50 
2 1.231 0.17 0.05 0.55 
3 1.06 0.20 0.04 0.60 
4 0.86 0.02 0.04 0.63 
5 0.84 0.08 0.04 0.66 
6 0.76 0.08 0.03 0.70 
7 0.68 0.06 0.03 0.72 
8 0.63 0.03 0.03 0.75 
9 0.60 0.03 0.03 0.78 
10 0.57 0.05 0.02 0.80 
11 0.52 0.04 0.02 0.82 
12 0.48 0.04 0.02 0.84 
13 0.45 0.02 0.02 0.86 
14 0.43 0.06 0.02 0.88 
15 0.37 0.00 0.02 0.89 
16 0.37 0.04 0.02 0.91 
17 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.92 
18 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.94 
19 0.30 0.01 0.01 0.95 
20 0.30 0.03 0.01 0.96 
21 0.27 0.04 0.01 0.97 
22 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.98 
23 0.22 0.04 0.00 0.99 
24 0.19  0.00 1.00 
 
 
Variance Explained by Each Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
11.97 1.23 1.06 
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Table 6.4 Scree Plot for Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Scale  
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Table 6.5: Component Matrix for Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Scale – 
Varimax Rotation  
Rotated Factor Pattern 
 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
OJ1 0.72 0.27 0.06 
OJ2 0.73 0.36 0.11 
OJ3 0.39 0.6 0.15 
OJ4 0.75 0.23 0.11 
OJ5 0.45 0.49 0.13 
OJ6 0.6 0.37 0.24 
OJ7 0.69 0.39 0.2 
OJ8 0.49 0.49 0.36 
OJ9 0.36 0.35 0.26 
OJ10 0.34 0.73 0.03 
OJ11 0.57 0.4 0.11 
OJ12 0.74 0.2 0.13 
OJ13 0.56 0.33 0.23 
OJ14 0.55 0.37 0.36 
OJ15 0.64 0.43 0.11 
OJ16 0.35 0.75 0.02 
OJ17 0.58 0.55 0.13 
OJ18 -0.08 0.47 0.64 
OJ19 0.56 0.36 0.39 
0J20 0.31 0.58 0.33 
OJ21 0.46 0.63 0.22 
OJ22 0.24 -0.04 0.81 
OJ23 0.3 0.72 0.32 
OJ24 0.56 0.28 0.45 
 
 
Variance Explained by Each Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
6.75 5.22 2.28 
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Table 6.6: Component Matrix for Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Scale – One 
Factor Analysis  
 
Factor Pattern 
 Factor1 
OJ1 0.70 
OJ2 0.78 
OJ3 0.70 
OJ4 0.72 
OJ5 0.67 
OJ6 0.73 
OJ7 0.80 
OJ8 0.77 
OJ9 0.56 
OJ10 0.71 
OJ11 0.69 
OJ12 0.70 
OJ13 0.68 
OJ14 0.74 
OJ15 0.76 
OJ16 0.72 
OJ17 0.80 
OJ18 0.44 
OJ19 0.75 
0J20 0.69 
OJ21 0.79 
OJ22 0.41 
OJ23 0.77 
OJ24 0.72 
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Table 6.7: Cronbach Alpha for Belief in a Just World Scale 
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha 
Variables Alpha 
Raw 0.43 
Standardized 0.42 
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Table 6.8: Item-Total Statistics for Belief in a Just World Scale 
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha with Deleted Variable  
Deleted 
Variable 
Raw Variables Standardized Variables 
 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
JW1 0.03 0.44 0.03 0.42  
JW2 0.12 0.42 0.12 0.40  
JW3 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39  
JW4 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.38  
JW5 0.11 0.42 0.11 0.41  
JW6 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.38  
JW7 0.27 0.38 0.26 0.37  
JW8 -0.12 0.46 -0.12 0.45  
JW9 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.38  
JW10 0.13 0.41 0.13 0.40  
JW11 0.29 0.38 0.28 0.37  
JW12 0.16 0.41 0.16 0.39  
JW13 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.43  
JW14 0.10 0.42 0.09 0.41  
JW15 0.29 0.38 0.28 0.37  
JW16 -0.08 0.46 -0.07 0.44  
JW17 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.42  
JW18 0.09 0.42 0.09 0.41  
JW19 0.10 0.42 0.09 0.41  
JW20 0.06 0.43 0.06 0.42  
 
   
   240 
A principal components factor analysis was conducted in order to explore the structure of 
the scale. As Table 6.9 reveals, on the basis of Kaiser’s criterion 7 factors with eigenvalues 
larger than one were retained. The total variance explained by this solution was 57.04% , 
with the first factor only accounted for 17.81% of the variance. The second factor 
accounted for 9.27% of the variance, the third 7.11%, the fourth 6.76%, and the fifth, sixth, 
and seventh each accounting for approximately 5%. The scree-plot (See Table 6.10) 
indicates a possible two or three factor solution. Given that the scale was initially 
structured along the lines of two dimensions (that of a just and unjust belief) (Rubin & 
Peplau, 1973), and that previous studies have indicated a clear two-factor solution (Couch, 
1998), it was decided to retain two factors.  
 
The unrotated factor matrix for a two-factor solution (See Table 6.11) indicates that ‘just’ 
and ‘unjust’ items are loading positively in relation to the two different factors. There are 
two exceptions, namely item 7 and item 8. Item 7 is loading in almost equally across the two 
factors, and item 8 is not loading in on either of the factors. The rotated solution (See Table 
6.12) replicates this pattern, only the loadings are clearer and more definitive. Item 7 now 
loads more clearly onto Factor 1, and no longer loads onto Factor 2. Item 8 now makes the 
0.15 cut-off suggested by Cattell (1978) and now positively, albeit weakly, loads onto Factor 
2.    
 
It is clear that two factors related to ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ items are emerging.  Conceptually 
this seems appropriate. In the original scale, Rubin and Peplau (1973) included just and 
unjust items, instructing that the unjust items be negatively scored in order to obtain a total 
belief in a just world score. However it could be argued that belief in a just world and belief 
in an unjust world are conceptually different constructs, rather than being at opposite ends 
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on a continuum. Not believing in a just world, i.e. that each will get his/her due, does not 
necessarily mean that a person believes in an unjust world, i.e. that bad things will happen to 
good people. As such, revere scoring unjust items in order to get a total score may be 
misleading – it is treating two separate constructs as if they were opposite ends of a 
continuum. Such an understanding can account for the low internal consistency of the scale, 
as the just and unjust beliefs may not be correlating with one another. It is possible that the 
two factors emerging from the factor analysis are indicating two separate scales measuring 
independent constructs. As such these two factors were explored further in relation to 
internal consistency.   
 
The Cronbach Alpha for belief in an unjust world scale (See Table 6.13) is 0.64, indicating a 
satisfactory level of internal consistency. The item-total statistics for this scale (See Table  
6.14) show that while all the items are correlating with the total, they are doing so rather 
moderately. However the alpha would not be improved by the deletion of any of the items. 
The Cronbach Alpha for the new belief in just world scale (See Table 6.15) is 0.71, also 
indicating a satisfactory level of internal consistency. The item-total statistics for this scale 
(See Table 6.16) show that all the items are correlating with the total, some more moderately 
than others- the item-total correlations range from 0.22 to 0.44. However the alpha would 
not be improved by the deletion of any of the items. 
 
Further analysis was conducted in order to establish the extent to which these two factors are 
related to one another. Due to the fact that the distribution for these two scales is not normal 
(See Tables 6.20 and Table 6.21), a Spearmans correlation co-efficient was obtained (See 
Table 6. 17). A weak significant negative relationship of -0.252 exists between the two 
factors. 
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Table 6.9: Factor Extraction with Kaiser’s Criterion for Belief in a Just World Scale 
 
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 20  Average = 1 
 Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 3.56 1.71 0.18 0.18 
2 1.85 0.43 0.09 0.27 
3 1.42 0.07 0.07 0.34 
4 1.35 0.20 0.07 0.41 
5 1.15 0.12 0.06 0.47 
6 1.04 0.01 0.05 0.52 
7 1.03 0.05 0.05 0.57 
8 0.98 0.08 0.05 0.62 
9 0.90 0.08 0.05 0.66 
10 0.81 0.05 0.04 0.70 
11 0.77 0.07 0.04 0.74 
12 0.70 0.04 0.04 0.78 
13 0.66 0.01 0.03 0.81 
14 0.65 0.02 0.03 0.84 
15 0.63 0.07 0.03 0.88 
16 0.56 0.04 0.03 0.90 
17 0.52 0.03 0.03 0.93 
18 0.49 0.02 0.02 0.95 
19 0.47 0.03 0.02 0.98 
20 0.44  0.02 1.00 
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Table 6.10: Scree Plot for Belief in a Just World Scale 
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Table 6.11: Component Matrix for Belief in a just World Scale – Two-Factor Analysis 
(Unrotated) 
 
Factor Pattern 
 Factor1 Factor2 
JW1 
JW2 
JW3 
JW4 
JW5 
JW6 
JW7 
JW8 
JW9 
JW10 
JW11 
JW12 
JW13 
JW14 
JW15 
JW16 
JW17 
JW18 
JW19 
JW20 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
( J ) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
-0.258 0.31* 
0.28* 0.13 
0.43* 0.12 
-0.18 0.63* 
-0.33 0.54* 
0.51* 0.22 
0.46* 0.40 
-0.42 -0.04 
0.44* 0.24 
-0.31 0.45* 
0.52* 0.20 
0.51* 0.05 
-0.41 0.33* 
0.48* -0.06 
0.58* 0.40 
-0.55 0.12* 
-0.40 0.36* 
0.42* 0.10 
0.43* 0.12 
-0.28 0.28* 
*Indicates highest positive loading 
 
Variance Explained by Each Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 
3.56 1.85 
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Table 6.12: Component Matrix for Belief in a Just World Scale – Two-Factor Analysis 
(Varimax Rotation) 
 
Rotated Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 Factor2 
JW1 
JW2 
JW3 
JW4 
JW5 
JW6 
JW7 
JW8 
JW9 
JW10 
JW11 
JW12 
JW13 
JW14 
JW15 
JW16 
JW17 
JW18 
JW19 
JW20 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
( J ) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
(U) 
( J ) 
( J ) 
(U) 
-0.07 0.34* 
0.30* -0.02 
0.43* -0.11 
0.16 0.63* 
-0.02 0.64* 
0.55* -0.06 
0.60* 0.12 
-0.38 0.18* 
0.50* -0.02 
-0.04 0.54* 
0.55* -0.08 
0.46* -0.21 
-0.19 0.50* 
0.38* -0.29 
0.70* 0.06 
-0.42 0.38* 
-0.16 0.51* 
0.42* -0.12 
0.43* -0.11 
-0.10 0.38* 
*Indicates highest positive loading 
 
Variance Explained by Each Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 
3.14 2.28 
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 Table 6.13: Cronbach Alpha for Belief in an Unjust World Scale 
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha 
Variables Alpha 
Raw 0.64 
Standardized 0.64 
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 Table 6.14: Item-Total Statistics for Belief in an Unjust World Scale 
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha with Deleted Variable 
Deleted 
Variable 
    Raw Variables Standardized Variables 
Label 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
JW1 0.23 0.63 0.23 0.63 JW1 
JW4 0.31 0.62 0.31 0.62 JW4 
JW5 0.39 0.60 0.38 0.60 JW5 
JW8 0.24 0.63 0.25 0.63 JW8 
JW10 0.33 0.61 0.33 0.61 JW10 
JW13 0.34 0.61 0.34 0.61 JW13 
JW16 0.37 0.60 0.38 0.60 JW16 
JW17 0.37 0.60 0.37 0.60 JW17 
JW20 0.29 0.62 0.29 0.62 JW20 
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  Table 6.15: Cronbach Alpha for New Belief in a Just World Scale 
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha 
Variables Alpha 
Raw 0.71 
Standardized 0.71 
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         Table 6.16: Item-Total Statistics for New Belief in a Just World Scale 
 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha with Deleted Variable 
Deleted 
Variable 
    Raw Variables Standardized Variables 
Label 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
JW2 0.22 0.72 0.22 0.71 JW2 
JW3 0.38 0.69 0.38 0.69 JW3 
JW6 0.39 0.69 0.39 0.69 JW6 
JW7 0.41 0.69 0.41 0.69 JW7 
JW9 0.37 0.69 0.37 0.69 JW9 
JW11 0.45 0.68 0.45 0.68 JW11 
JW12 0.38 0.69 0.38 0.69 JW12 
JW14 0.32 0.70 0.32 0.70 JW14 
JW15 0.46 0.68 0.46 0.68 JW15 
JW18 0.26 0.71 0.26 0.71 JW18 
JW19 0.31 0.70 0.31 0.70 JW19 
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Table 6.17: Spearman’s Correlation Co-efficients for the New Belief in a Just World Scale  
and the Belief in an Unjust World Scale 
 
 
 UJWTot JWTot 
UJWTot 1.00 
 
453 
-0.25 
<.00 
448 
JWTot -0.25 
<.00 
448 
1.00 
 
453 
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It is unsurprising that the two constructs are somewhat negatively related, yet the weak 
relationship between the two indicates that there is not a multi-collinearity problem, and that 
the two constructs are in fact measuring different things. The relationship between these two 
variables is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 (under the heading Relationship between 
Variables) 
 
Given the satisfactory reliability as well as validity of the two scales, it was decided to 
proceed using these two measures independently of one another. 
 
Description of the Data Set 
 
A number of statistics were run in order to explore and describe the data set. Firstly basic 
descriptive statistics for each of the dependent variables were obtained. As indicated in Table 
6.18 the maximum score for the global organisational justice perceptions scale is 118.96, and 
the minimum score is 24.00. The mean score for this scale is 68.86, representative of 
moderate to slightly low mean organisational justice perceptions. The standard deviation is 
19.95. With regards to the belief in an unjust world scale, the maximum score is 45.00, the 
minimum score is 9.00, and the mean score is 23.32. This is indicative of a moderate to 
slightly low mean belief in an unjust world. The standard deviation is 5.11. The maximum 
score for the belief in a just world scale is 55.00, while the minimum score is 11. The mean 
score is a moderate to high 36.67. The standard deviation is 6.33. 
 
Analyses were then conducted in order to explore the nature of the distribution for each of 
the dependent variables. All three tests of normality for the global organisational justice 
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Perceptions distribution (See Table 6.19) have p- values above the 0.05 significance level 
(p>0.150, p>0.250, p>0.250), indicating that the distribution is normal. The histogram (See 
Figure 6.1) clearly fits a normal distribution. All three tests of normality for the belief in an 
unjust world scale distribution (See Table 6.20) have p- values below the 0.05 significance 
level (p>0.010, p>0.005, p>0.005), indicating that the distribution is not normal. The 
histogram (See Figure 6. 2) indicates that the distribution is slightly skewed to the left. All 
three tests of normality for the new belief in a just world distribution (See Table 6.21) have 
p- values below the 0.05 significance level (p>0.010, p>0.008, p>0.005), indicating that the 
distribution is not normal. The histogram (See Figure 6.3) indicates that the distribution is 
slightly skewed to the right.  
 
Only one of the distributions, that of organisational justice perceptions meets the assumption 
of normality required for the use of parametric statistics. As such, where required, non-
parametric equivalent statistical procedures were used.  
 
 
Relationships between the Dependent Variables 
 
 
The first research question relates to the nature of the relationship between different ‘types’ 
of justice, particularly that of social and organisational justice. As such correlation analyses 
were used in order to explore the relationship between perceptions of organisational justice, 
belief in a just world, and belief in an unjust world. As can be seen from Table 6.22 global 
organisational justice perceptions are not significantly correlated with belief in an unjust 
world, but are very weakly correlated with belief in a just world (0.107, p>0.02). Belief in an 
unjust world and belief in a just world are negatively correlated (-0.252, p>0001), but once 
again this correlation is very weak. This indicates that the organisational and 
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Table 6.18: Summary Statistics for All Scales 
 
 
 
Variable Maximum Mean Minimum N N Miss Std Dev 
Organisational Justice 
Belief in an Unjust World 
Belief in a  Just World 
118.96 
45.00 
55.00 
68.86 
23.32 
36.67 
24.00 
9.00 
11.00 
464 
453 
453 
3 
14 
14 
19.95 
5.12 
6.33 
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Table 6.19: Distribution Analysis for Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Scale – 
Goodness of Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.03 Pr > D >0.150 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.04 Pr > W-Sq >0.250 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 0.45 Pr > A-Sq >0.250 
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Figure 6.1: Distribution Analysis for Global Organisational Justice Perceptions Scale – 
Histogram with Fitted Normal Distribution 
 
 
 
 
   
   256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.20: Distribution Analysis for New Belief in an Unjust World – Goodness of Fit 
Tests for Normal Distribution 
 
 
 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.08 Pr > D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.33 Pr > W-Sq <0.005 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.90 Pr > A-Sq <0.005 
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Figure 6.2: Distribution Analysis for New Belief in an Unjust World – Histogram with 
Fitted Normal Distribution 
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Table 6.21: Distribution Analysis for New Belief in a Just World – Goodness of Fit Tests 
for Normal Distribution 
 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.05 Pr > D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.19 Pr > W-Sq 0.008 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.25 Pr > A-Sq <0.005 
 
   
   259 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Distribution Analysis for New Belief in a Just World – Histogram with Fitted 
Normal Distribution 
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Table 6.22: Spearman Correlation Co-Efficients for All Scales 
 
 
 UJWTot JWTot OJTot 
UJWTot 1.00 
 
453 
-0.25 
<.00 
448 
-0.01 
0.85 
453 
JWTot -0.25 
<.00 
448 
1.00 
 
453 
0.11 
0.02 
453 
OJTot -0.01 
0.85 
453 
0.11 
0.02 
453 
1.00 
 
464 
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social justice perceptions should be seen as independent of one another.  
 
Cluster Analysis 
 
 
The second research question relates to the way in which people cluster together in relation 
to their perceptions of justice. In order to answer this question a cluster analysis was 
conducted on each of the dependent variables. This analysis also provides the first step of 
the CHAID analysis, which was conducted next. Each of the cluster analyses are now 
reported on, starting with organisational justice perceptions, then belief in a just world, and 
finally belief in an unjust world.  For each analysis, first a cluster history report is presented 
along with a dendrogram, both of which form the basis for deciding how many clusters 
should be retained. On the basis of this decision a cluster composition table is then 
presented, indicating how each cluster is composed. Finally, a graph indicating the mean 
score for each item per cluster is presented. 
 
With regards to organisational justice perceptions, as can be seen from the Cluster History 
Table (See Table 6.23) and the Dendrogram (See Figure 6.4), the first cluster, comprising 
451 people splits at a height of 0.296 into Clusters 3 and 2. Cluster 3, comprising 169 people 
splits into Clusters 8 and 13 at a height of 0.037. Cluster 8, comprising 108 people, then 
splits into Clusters 22 (n=63) and 25 (n=45) at a height of 0.008. On the other hand, Cluster 
13 (n=61) splits into Clusters 18 and 438 much lower down at 0.006. Cluster 2 (n=282), on 
the other hand, splits into Clusters 5 and 4 at a height of 0.093. Cluster 5, comprising 166 
people, splits into Clusters 6 and 11 at a height of 0.016. Cluster 6 (n-125) in turn splits into 
Clusters 7 and 19 at 0.0108, Cluster 7 (n=100) into Clusters 17 (n=53) and 12 (n=47) at 
0.010, and Cluster 19 (n=25) splits into Clusters 28 and 54 much lower down at 0.005.  
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Cluster 11, comprising 41 people, also splits lower down, at 0.07.   Cluster 4 (n=116) splits 
into Clusters 9 and 10 at 0.023. Cluster 9 (n=62) then splits into Clusters 20 and 16 at 0.083, 
while Cluster 10 (n=54) splits into Clusters 14 and 68 at 0.0077.  
 
Working on the basis of a six cluster solution, it can be seen from Table 6.24 that Cluster 1 
has 54 members, Cluster 2 has 108, Cluster 3 has 61, Cluster 4 has 62, Cluster 5 has 41, and 
Cluster 6 has 125 members.  Looking at the mean score for each item in each cluster, it can 
be observed that in Cluster 1 the mean scores range from 1.13 to 2.24, with the majority of 
items having a mean score between 1.12 to 1.81. For items 6,7,13,14,15, and 19, no-one in 
the cluster scored higher than 3, while for items 2,8,11,12,17,20,21, and 23, the maximum 
score is 4. As such it is only for items 1,3,4,5,9,10,16,18,22, and 24 that the maximum of 5 
has been scored. For Cluster 2 the mean scores for the items are generally higher, all falling 
above 3. The maximum score for all the items is 5, except item for 20 where the maximum 
score is 4.  For items 4,8,13,14,15,17,20, and 22, no-one scored lower than 2. The mean 
scores in Cluster 3 are the highest out of all the clusters, with the scores ranging between 
3.88 and 4.57. The maximum scores for all the items are 5, while only items 
4,5,7,11,14,15,16,17, and 18 have a minimum score of 1. All the other items have minimum 
scores ranging between 2 and 3. Cluster 4 has a greater mixture of mean scores, with an 
almost equal combination of scores around 1 and 2. The minimum score of all the items is 1, 
while there is a range of maximum scores, mainly 4 and 5. Cluster 5 also has a greater 
mixture of mean scores than Clusters 1,2, and 3, but for this cluster the combination is of 
scores around 2 and 3. The minimum scores are predominantly 1, except for items 1,2,3,4,6, 
and 12 where the minimum score is 2. The maximum scores vary between 4 and 5. The 
mean scores in Cluster 6 range between 2.13 and 2.90, with only items 9,13,14, and 22 
having mean scores around 2. Item 11 has a mean score of 1.94. The minimum score for all 
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the items is 1, and the maximum scores are predominantly 5, except for items 15, and 23 
that have maximum scores of 4.  
 
Looking at the mean score profiles for the clusters (See Figure 6.5), from the starting point 
of item 1, all the clusters move down to item 2. The magnitude of this drop is higher for 
Clusters 1,4, and 6, while it is marginal for Clusters 2,5, and 3. Clusters 1,4,6, and 3 move 
up for item 3, while Cluster 2 moves down quite sharply for this item. Cluster 5 also drops, 
but more moderately. For item 4, Clusters 1, 3 and 5 slope down slightly, while all the other 
clusters move up, Clusters 4 and 2 relatively sharply. Clusters 4,2,5, and 3 all drop for item 
5 (Clusters 5 and 4 rather sharply), while Clusters 1 and 6 move up for that item. Clusters 1 
and 4 have virtually the same mean score for this item. All the clusters except for Cluster 1 
move up to a peak for item 6, with Clusters 4 and 5 doing so more sharply than the others. 
Cluster 1 drops for this item. All the clusters move down for item 7, Clusters 2 and 4 
relatively sharply. Clusters 6 and 5 have the same mean score for this item. Clusters 1,4,6, 
and 5 move slightly up for item 8, while Cluster 4 remains almost level and Cluster 3 drops 
slightly. Again Clusters 6 and 5 have the same mean score for this item. All the clusters 
move up for item 9, with Clusters 1,4, and 5 doing so quite sharply, and Cluster 8 doing so 
very slightly. Clusters 4 and 6 have the same item mean score for this item. The item means 
in all the clusters drop for item 10, most sharply in Clusters 1 and 4. Clusters 6 and 5 have 
the same item mean score for this item. The item mean score for all the clusters drop 
considerably sharply for item 11, except in Cluster 1where the mean score has remained the 
same as item 10. Cluster 1 and 4 share the same mean score for this item. Once again the 
clusters all follow a similar pattern in relation to the mean score for item 12. All the clusters 
move up, and Clusters 5 and 2 share the same mean score for this item. Between items 13 
and 17 the clusters diverge in terms of their patterns. Cluster 1 remains fairly consistent 
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peaking slightly at item 16, and then dropping back down for item 17. Cluster 4 drops 
steadily down across these items, having the lowest score for item 16. This cluster overlaps 
with Cluster 1 with regards to the mean score for item 16. Cluster 6 drops sharply for items 
14 and 15, but increases slightly for item 15 and more so for item 16. Cluster 5 remains level 
across these items, overlapping with Cluster 6 on item 14. Cluster 2 drops slightly down to 
item 16, but increases again for item 17. This pattern is echoed in Cluster 3, only the 
magnitude of the variance in Cluster 3 being much smaller. For item 18, two sets of clusters 
overlap. Cluster 1 increases sharply and Cluster 5 drops rather sharply, resulting in a shared 
mean score for this item for these two clusters. Similarly Cluster 6 increases and Cluster 2 
decreases for this item, also resulting in a common mean score.  The mean score for item 18 
increases sharply in Cluster 4, following a similar pattern to Clusters 1 and 6. Cluster 3, on 
the other hand, drops slightly for this item. For item 19, the mean score drops rather sharply 
in Clusters 1 and 4, and more moderately in Cluster 6. Moving in the opposite direction, the 
mean score for Cluster 5 moves up, and is almost identical to the mean item score in Cluster 
6. The item mean score also increases slightly in the last two clusters, 3 and 2. The item 
mean score for item 20 increases in Clusters 1,4,6 and 5, but remains similar to item 19 for 
Clusters 2 and 3. Similarly for item 21 the item mean score drops increases in Clusters 1,4,6 
and 5, but remains similar to item 20 for Clusters 2 and 3. There is a relatively sharp 
increase in the item mean score for item 22 across all the clusters, particularly so in Cluster 
2. Clusters 6,4, and 2 share a common mean score for this item. All the clusters drop back 
down for item 23, where once again Clusters 6,4, and 2 share a common mean score for this 
item. Finally all the clusters except Cluster 5 increase marginally for item 24. Cluster 5 
continues to drop. 
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As such, when looking at the organisational justice perceptions clusters, it can be seen that 
generally, the clusters lie relatively parallel to one another. At a most basic interpretation, 
the clusters move from those with low justice perceptions to those with high justice 
perceptions. Cluster 3 comprises those with the highest justice perceptions, and Cluster 1 
those with predominantly the lowest. Clusters 5 and 6 appear to represent those with 
generally moderate perceptions of justice, with there being some significant overlap between 
those two clusters. People in Cluster 2 seem to have fairly high perceptions of organisational 
justice, with those in Cluster 4 having fairly low to moderate perceptions. While the cluster 
profiles do seem to follow similar patterns, varying most obviously in relation to mean 
scores for each item, there are areas of divergence and similarity that help to define the 
clusters more meaningfully.  
 
Starting with Cluster 3, it can be seen that the people in this cluster have the highest 
organisational justice perceptions, with there being no areas of overlap between this cluster 
and any of the other clusters. This cluster has the highest mean scores across all the items, 
with most of the item mean scores falling between 4 and 4.5. This cluster also has the 
smallest range of scores, with all mean scores falling between 3.89 and 4.57. The people in 
this cluster appear to have fairly consistent perceptions across all the items, with there being 
no significant peaks or valleys. This, along with the high scores is an indication that perhaps 
people in this cluster have a generalised positive attitude to the organisation, not really 
differentiating between different issues or areas of organisational functioning. Instead they 
almost indiscriminately perceive everything to be just and fair. This cluster can, therefore, be 
defined as comprising “generalised high justice perception scorers”.  
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Cluster 2 can be defined as the next cluster down – despite having the same starting point as 
Cluster 5, the mean scores for all other items are higher (except for item 12 where they are 
virtually identical). The mean item scores for this cluster fall between 3 and 4, with the 
lowest mean (2.97) being for item 11- “Employees are paid a fair salary”. Generally, 
however, there are moderately high perceptions for all the items. Like those in Cluster 3, the 
people in this cluster also appear to be fairly consistent in their perceptions across items, 
with there being no particularly significant peaks or valleys. Cluster 2 is very similar in 
profile to Cluster 3, with the main differences being that the mean item scores are slightly 
lower, and the peaks and valleys (despite being very moderate) are slightly sharper.  This 
perhaps indicates that people in this cluster, while having generally positive perceptions of 
justice in the organisation, are slightly more critical than those people in Cluster 3.  
 
This is particularly true with regards to the extent to which information is shared with all 
employees (item 3), issues about salary (item 11), the fairness of treatment that all 
employees receive (item 16), and the extent to which everyone does their fair share of work 
(item 18). While these perceptions are still moderate to high, they do deviate slightly from a 
generally higher perception of fairness. These items seem to indicate a concern for the 
general employee body in relation to general areas of organisational functioning– i.e. they 
ask about the general treatment all employees receive with regards to broader areas of 
practice ( for example work allocation, information sharing ) rather than more specific 
domains such as disciplinary enquiries and job selection. Most of the highest mean item 
scores refer to such specific domains. For example three of the highest scoring items, item 
22 (vacant posts are advertised to as many people as possible will hear of the vacancy), item 
9 (management gives representative unions their due respect), and item 4 (Employees will 
have a fair hearing when problems arise), refer to very particular organisational practices.  
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This may indicate that while people in this cluster may be satisfied with the treatment that 
they are receiving, particularly in relation to specific organisational policies and procedures, 
the source of some of their criticisms may be in relation to the general treatment the entire 
employee body is receiving.  
 
These concerns become more evident when looking at the points at which Cluster 2 deviates 
from Cluster 3. The first divergence occurs with items 1 to 3, where the mean item scores in 
Cluster 2 drop relatively sharply, but remains consistently high in Cluster 3. These items 
refer to the fairness of disciplinary hearings, the extent to which managers are fair in their 
dealings with employees, and the extent to which relevant information is shared with all 
employees.  Further along, Cluster 2 once again diverges from Cluster 3 at item 10, where 
the mean item score for Cluster 2 once again drops in contrast to a consistently high score in 
Cluster 3. This item refers to the extent to which employees input is important when 
decisions are made. As such while Cluster 2, like Cluster 3, has relatively high justice 
perceptions, Cluster 2 differs from Cluster 3 in that there seems to be more reservation about 
the relationship between management and employees. This appears to be more particularly 
in relation to the inclusiveness of this relationship. As such Cluster 2 can be defined as 
comprising people who personally experience the organisation as fair, but have concerns 
about more general practices that may or may not affect them directly.  
 
Cluster 5 is the next cluster down. While this cluster starts off at the same place as Cluster 2 
(i.e. it has the same mean item score for item 1 – “The disciplinary procedures used are 
fair”), this item marks a high point for Cluster 5 and a low point for Cluster 2. Cluster 5 has 
a fairly wide range of scores overall, with the mean item score falling between 2.10 and 
3.78. This is a range of almost two numbers, indicating perceptions that range between 
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moderately low to moderately high. This cluster is also less consistent than the previous two, 
in that there are far more peaks and valleys, with significantly more variance between the 
mean item scores across all the items. As such people in this cluster seem to be less 
consistent with regards to their perceptions of justice in relation to different areas of 
organisational functioning.   
 
The high points for Cluster 5 include items 1 and 4 (the extent to which disciplinary 
procedures are fair), 6 (the extent to which people have a fair chance of accessing training), 
9 (the extent to which management gives unions their due respect and consideration) and 12 
(the extent to which punitive action taken against employees is fair). All of these mean item 
scores fall between 3.50 and 3.78, indicating above average justice perceptions in these 
areas. For the most part these items seem to refer to collective industrial relations issues, in 
that they focus on aspects of the governance of employee-employer relations. This seems to 
be particularly true around questions of discipline. As such while people in this cluster have 
perceptions that are more moderate than the other two clusters already discussed, their 
concerns do not seem to be about relations between employees and management. Instead 
there are clearly other areas that mark particular concerns for this cluster, as there are a 
number of items where justice perceptions fall well below the average mark. These include 
items 5 (the extent to which employees are rewarded for their efforts), 7 (the extent to which 
selection procedures used to fill vacancies are fair), 11 (the extent to which employees are 
paid a fair salary), 18 (the extent to which everyone does their fair share of work), 21 (the 
extent to which decisions made are in the best interests of all employees), and 24 (the belief 
that the best person for the job usually gets the job). All of these items fall between 2.10 and 
2.40, indicating moderately low perceptions of justice in these areas. These items seem to 
focus on the material benefits and rewards individuals have access to within the 
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organisation, such as salary, workload, and promotion and job opportunities. As such people 
in Cluster 5 may be characterised as being relatively satisfied with collective industrial 
relationship issues, but less so with the individual material benefits.  
 
Moving onto Cluster 6, it can be seen that scores in this cluster share a similar mark range as 
Cluster 5, falling between 1.94 and 3.62. While this indicates a marginally ‘lower’ profile 
(i.e. the bottom and high scores in Cluster 6 are both lower than in Cluster 5), for many 
items there are also very similar mean scores. The mean scores for items 7 (Selection 
procedures used to fill vacancies are fair) ,8 (“Work is allocated fairly”) ,10 (“Employees 
input is important when decisions are made”) , 13 ( “ Everyone has the opportunity to 
develop themselves professionally”) , 14 (“You will be promoted if you deserve it”), and 19 
(“ When applying for a job, all qualified applicants have a fair chance of being selected”) are 
virtually identical. These items seem to point to human resource practices from which 
individuals may benefit. The mean scores for these items fall around a score of 3.00 (ranging 
between 2.36 and 3.20), indicating that people in both Clusters 6 and 5 have moderate to 
slightly low justice perceptions about these practices.  
 
Despite these similarities, there are some significant differences between these two clusters. 
People in Cluster 5 have significantly lower mean item scores for items 1 (“The disciplinary 
procedures used are fair”), 2 (“Managers are, for the most part, fair in their dealings with 
employees”), 3 (“For the most part, relevant information is shared with all employees”), 4 
(“Every employee will have a fair hearing when problems arise”), 11 (“Employees are paid 
a fair salary), 12 (“Punitive action taken against employees is, for the most part, fair”), 15 
(“Grievances against managers are dealt with appropriately”), 16 (“Employees are part of 
the decision making process”), and 17 (“All employees are treated fairly”).  These items 
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seem to point towards the collective relationship between management and employees, with 
particular emphasis on discipline and punishment in the organisation. While Cluster 5 has 
been characterised by people who are relatively satisfied with the collective relationship in 
the organisation, but less so with human resource practices that effect individual 
accomplishment, Cluster 6 seems to be following the opposite trend. People in this group 
appear to be more satisfied with human resources practices, but less so with the industrial 
relationship in the organisation. It is important to remember though, that while they are more 
satisfied with individual human resources practices, the scores for these items are similar to 
those at the bottom of the range for Cluster 5. As such people in Cluster 6 seem to have 
generally lower justice perceptions than those in Cluster 5 (and are significantly lower than 
people in Clusters 2 and 3). There are, however, a number of items where people in Cluster 
6 scored higher than those in Cluster 5.  
 
The most notable of such items is number 18 (“Everyone does there fair share of work”) 
where there is a clear divergence between the 2 clusters.  Cluster 6 moves relatively sharply 
up, and Cluster 5 equally as sharply down, bringing Cluster 6 clearly above Cluster 5. The 
mean score for this item for Cluster 5 is 2.12, marking it as one of the lowest scoring items 
for this cluster. The mean score for item 18 for Cluster 6 is 2.99, marking it as one of the 
highest scoring items for this cluster.  At face value item 18 seems to be very similar to item 
8 (“Work is allocated fairly”), where the 2 clusters scored almost identically (2.61 for 
Cluster 5 and 2.70 for Cluster 6). However these two items can be seen to be tapping in to 2 
very different aspects of working relationships. By asking if work is allocated fairly, item 8 
is asking respondents to comment on the actions of managers or supervisors – the people 
who allocate the work. Item 18, on the other hand, by asking whether everyone does their 
fair share of work, is asking respondents to comment on the actions of people who do the 
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work – employees, colleagues, and peers. As such item 8 can be seen to be a reflection on 
the relationship between management and employees, while item 18 is a reflection on the 
relationship between workers in the organisation. There are many items looking at a similar 
relationship to that in item 8, but it appears that only item 18 asks for comment on the 
behaviour of colleagues. Clearly people in Cluster 6 have a higher perception of justice 
regarding such behaviour than those in Cluster 5.  
 
A second item where Cluster 6 scores noticeably higher than Cluster 5, is number 22 
(“When a position becomes available, the post is advertised so as many people as possible 
will hear of the vacancy”). This item is the highest scoring item for Cluster 6 (3.62). It refers 
to a very specific aspect of job recruitment and selection practices, and as such might seem 
unusual for people to feel particularly strongly about. However this item also forms a high 
point for Clusters 3, 1 and 4, and falls above the mean point in every cluster. As such it can 
be deduced that this is a practice that the organisation clearly and follows.  Variations on the 
mean score for this item may be related to the extent to which people have had direct 
experience with looking for, or advertising, other jobs in the organisation. As such the 
difference in scores for this item between Clusters 5 and 6 may be related to peoples 
personal experience with recruitment in the organisation – people in Cluster 6 may be more 
actively looking for other jobs. This is supported by looking at the next highest scoring item 
for Cluster 6, which is item 13 (“Everyone has the opportunity to develop themselves 
professionally”). Both items refer to alternate job opportunities for employees.  
 
People in Cluster 6 can, as such, be characterised as having moderate/moderately low 
organisational justice perceptions, being more dissatisfied with the collective relationship 
between management and employees than with practices that impact on individual well 
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being in the organisation. People in this cluster also seem to have more trust in their 
colleagues capacity to act fairly.    
 
Cluster 4, the next cluster down, marks a much clearer move into lower justice perceptions, 
with the range of mean item scores falling between 1.32 and 3.79. The highest scoring item, 
item 22 (“When a position becomes available, the post is advertised so as many people as 
possible will hear of the vacancy”), is somewhat of an anomaly, however, as the next nearest 
item is 3.10 (item 9 – “Management gives representative unions their due respect and 
consideration”). Other than those 2 items, all the other items have a mean score between 1 
and 2 – an indication of relatively low perceptions of organisational justice in that cluster. 
Looking at the higher scoring items, it can be seen that there are certain specific practices 
that the organisation seems to be engaging in quite effectively. As discussed with item 22 
for Cluster 6 above, the practice of widely advertising vacancies in the organisation is 
something that appears to be a relative strength of human resources functioning. Similarly 
the relationship between the representative union and management appears to be identified 
as one of the least problematic areas of industrial relations functioning, as, like item 22, it is 
one of the highest scoring items for all clusters. For all clusters except Cluster 1 (to be 
discussed next), the mean item scores for these 2 items fall at 3.00 or above – an indication 
of neutrality or positive justice perceptions about these practices. Clearly there are standard, 
observable practices for these two areas of organisational functioning that would be difficult 
to contest.  
 
Looking at the organisational policy on selection and recruitment, it is made clear that all 
posts have to be advertised on notice boards in every branch and factory (notice boards are 
situated in common room areas frequented by employees, such as canteens and change 
   
   273 
rooms). In addition vacancies have to be advertised on the company intranet. Employees 
can, therefore, easily find out what current vacancies there are in the organisation, and be 
alerted to possible job opportunities. With regards to management-union relations, there are 
2 unions recognised by the organisation, namely SACWU and SEPPAWU. These 2 unions 
are representative of the vast majority of employees. Monthly meetings are held with union 
representatives and management within each branch or factory, and regional meetings held 
every three months. All organisational initiatives, new practices, changes to practices, 
problems, queries and concerns are raised at these meetings. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
current research had to be approved at both local and regional meetings by union 
representatives. It is clear that consultation with unions is built into the procedures for 
almost all organisational activities.  
 
As such even people with low organisational justice perceptions, such as in this cluster, do 
not extend these negative justice perceptions to these organisational practices. Another high 
point for this cluster is item 18 (“Everyone does there fair share of work”). The mean score 
for this item is 2.73. While this is still indicative of moderately low justice perceptions, it is 
markedly higher than many other items in this cluster, as well as being higher for this item 
than Cluster 5 (comprising people with generally higher justice perceptions than Cluster 4). 
As discussed above for Cluster 6, this could be an indication that people in this cluster 
perceive aspects of the relations between employees as being more fair than between 
employees and managers.  
 
The 3 lowest mean item scores for this cluster are item 7 (“Selection procedures used to fill 
vacancies are fair”), item 11 (“Employees are paid a fair salary”) and item 16 (“Employees 
are part of the decision making process”). Item 7 presents an interesting contrast to the very 
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high score of item 22, also part of the selection and recruitment practices of the organisation. 
As discussed above, while employees in this cluster score relatively highly for the item 
referring to the advertisement of vacancies, they score particularly low (1.48) on the item 
related to selection procedures. As such while they feel they may hear about vacancies, 
clearly they feel that the way in which someone is selected to fill the vacancy is not fair. 
This contrast between items 22 and 7 seems to hold true for Clusters 5, 2, and 6 as well. 
With regards to item 11 concerning the fairness of salaries, this cluster has the lowest mean 
score (1.32) of all the clusters. This cluster clearly comprises people who have low 
distributive justice perceptions. Looking at item 16, concerning employees involvement in 
decision making, people in this cluster are also clearly feeling particularly alienated from 
such processes. As such this cluster comprises people who, while they are expressing 
neutrality regarding certain human resource practices, are generally feeling that the 
organisation treats employees unfairly. What defines this group more clearly has to be 
understood in relation to the last cluster, Cluster 1, also a very low scoring group of people.   
 
Cluster 1 has a relatively low spread of mean item scores, with such scores ranging between 
1.13 and 2.39.  As such the perceptions of organisational justice are generally very low, and 
this cluster comprises the lowest scorers for almost every item. This cluster occupies a 
similar score range as Cluster 4, and there are certain similarities between these 2 clusters 
with regards to their score profiles. For example from item 17 to 24 they follow virtually the 
same score profile, with identical peaks and valleys, just with people in Cluster 1 scoring 
lower on those items than people in Cluster 4. This is also true for items 7-10. However 
there are also points of divergence for these 2 clusters, which can assist in differentiating 
these 2 groups of low scorers from one another.  
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The most noticeable area of divergence between the 2 clusters incorporates items 13 
(“Everyone has the opportunity to develop themselves professionally”), 14 (“You will be 
promoted if you deserve it”), and 15 (“Grievances against managers are dealt with 
appropriately”), where the mean item scores in Cluster 1 drop very closely towards 1, yet 
move up towards (an above) 2 in Cluster 4.  There is a similar divergence with regards to 
item 6 (“All employees have a fair chance of getting access to training”). While the scores 
for all of these items for both clusters are indications of low justice perceptions, it is clear 
that these items mark different areas of concern for people in the two groups. All the items 
in this group are arguably indicators of employees’ sense of control over their capacity to 
progress in the organisation. The first two items refer directly to employees’ scope for 
advancement in the organisations, while item 6 points to the means of accessing better 
opportunities in the organisation.   The other item referring to grievances against managers 
can, in the context of the other items, be seen to be related to employees’ sense of their 
capacity to act against decision-makers in relation to unfair immobility in the organisation. It 
is interesting to note that the lowest scoring item for this cluster, item 19, refers to the extent 
to which all qualified applicants for a job have a fair chance of being selected. Clearly 
people in Cluster 1 have very little sense of hope with regards to moving out of their current 
positions, and have particularly low justice perceptions about direct and related practices 
that would potentially enable them to do so. People in Cluster 4, on the other hand, while 
still having moderately low organisational justice perceptions seem to be less concerned 
with these types of visible, measurable organisational practices, and more concerned with 
practices that have less observable procedural mechanisms, such as employees being part of 
the decision making process (item 16).  
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There are a number of other items that mark important differences between the two clusters. 
The first of these areas of difference include items 1 (“The disciplinary procedures used are 
fair”), 2 (“Managers are, for the most part, fair in their dealings with employees”), 3 (“For 
the most part, relevant information is shared with all employees”), and 4 (“Every employee 
will have a fair hearing when problems arise”), where people in Cluster 1 have markedly 
lower perceptions than those in Cluster 4. A second set of items which follow a similar 
pattern include items 12 (“Punitive action taken against employees is, for the most part, 
fair”), 19 (“ When applying for a job, all qualified applicants have a fair chance of being 
selected”) and 20 (Managers and supervisors communicate effectively with their 
subordinates”). While these are clearly not areas of satisfaction for those in Cluster 4, people 
in Cluster 1 appear to be markedly more concerned about them.   These items are all related 
to the relationship between management and employees, with there being a particular 
emphasis on discipline and punishment in the organisation. People in Cluster 1 clearly have 
less confidence with regards to these practices, as well as in the employment relationship 
than people in Cluster 2. This marks a clear area of concern for people in Cluster 1.  For 
people in Cluster 4, however, there is a very strong sense of dissatisfaction with regard to 
reward and salary, with items 11 (Employees are paid a fair salary”) and 5 (“Employees are 
rewarded for their efforts”) being two of the lowest scoring items for this cluster.  
 
As such these two clusters, while both having low organisational justice perceptions, are 
quite clearly differentiated by their areas of concern. People in Cluster 4 may be 
characterised by a strong distributive concern, as well as dissatisfaction with the less 
observable aspects of organisational practices. They tend to be more neutral towards 
established organisational human resources practices.  People in Cluster 1, on the other 
hand, may be characterised as having a general sense of injustice regarding most 
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organisational practices. There is a particular emphasis on those practices that allow people 
to progress and develop within the organisation, as well as the quality of the relationship 
between managers and employees, particularly with regards to the use of authority.  
 
The second cluster analysis was conducted with responses to the belief in a just world scale. 
From the Cluster History Profile (See Table 6.25) and the Dendrogram (See Figure 6.6), it 
can be seen that the first cluster (n=465) splits into Clusters 2 (n=338) and 8 (n=127) at a 
height of 0.1117. Cluster 2 then splits into Clusters 3 and 20 at a height of 0.0511. Following 
the branch emanating from Cluster 3, Clusters 4 and 5 emerge at a height of 0.0380. Cluster 
4 (217) then splits into Clusters 7 and 6 at a height of 0.0336. Cluster 7 (n= 92) then splits 
into Clusters 10 and 26 at 0.0217, and Cluster 10 then splits into Clusters 14 (n=23) and 13 
(n=42) at a height of 0.0183. Cluster 26 (n=27) splits much lower down at a height of 
0.0077. Cluster 6 (n-125)  splits into Clusters 18 and 9 at a height of 0.0230. Cluster 18 (n= 
44) splits much lower down, at a height of 0.0108. Cluster 9 (n=81) splits into Clusters 16 
(n=52) and 21 (n=29) at a height of 0.0187. Returning to Cluster 5 (n=95), there is a split 
into Clusters 11 (n=75) and 19 (n=21) at a height of 0.0249. The branch emanating from 
Cluster 20 (n= 26) splits much lower down, starting with Clusters 30 and 63 at a height of 
0.0090. The second main branch starts with Cluster 8 (n=127) splitting into Clusters 15 and 
12 at a height of 0.212. Cluster 15 (n=47) splits into Clusters 22 and 34 at a height of 
0.0112. These two clusters then split much lower down. Cluster 12 (n=80) on the other hand, 
splits into clusters 28 and 32, which also, in turn, only split at a much lower height.  
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Table 6.23: Cluster History (Organisational Justice Perceptions) 
 
NCL Clusters Joined FREQ SPRSQ RSQ ERSQ CCC PSF PST2 Tie 
30 CL40 CL43 34 0.0042 .616 .343 142 23.2 4.6  
29 CL78 CL82 8 0.0042 .611 .338 144 23.7 4.3  
28 CL66 CL45 19 0.0045 .607 .333 145 24.2 4.1  
27 CL69 CL38 18 0.0045 .602 .328 147 24.7 3.8  
26 CL67 CL50 17 0.0045 .598 .322 149 25.3 4.2  
25 CL52 CL35 45 0.0047 .593 .317 151 25.9 5.7  
24 CL37 CL36 30 0.0047 .588 .311 150 26.5 4.3  
23 CL42 CL48 16 0.0048 .584 .306 149 27.3 3.7  
22 CL31 CL70 63 0.0050 .579 .299 148 28.1 6.1  
21 CL109 CL26 24 0.0052 .573 .293 148 28.9 4.4  
20 CL21 CL34 38 0.0054 .568 .286 147 29.8 4.5  
19 CL28 CL54 25 0.0055 .563 .279 146 30.9 4.2  
18 CL49 CL44 59 0.0055 .557 .272 146 32.0 8.2  
17 CL24 CL39 53 0.0055 .552 .264 146 33.4 5.3  
16 CL32 CL158 24 0.0057 .546 .256 146 34.9 5.7  
15 CL33 CL29 29 0.0058 .540 .248 147 36.6 4.9  
14 CL53 CL23 36 0.0062 .534 .239 147 38.5 5.8  
13 CL18 CL438 61 0.0065 .527 .230 147 40.7 8.8  
12 CL15 CL27 47 0.0068 .521 .220 148 43.3 5.0  
11 CL30 CL46 41 0.0072 .513 .210 149 46.4 7.0  
10 CL14 CL68 54 0.0077 .506 .198 151 50.1 7.2  
9 CL20 CL16 62 0.0083 .497 .185 154 54.7 6.5  
8 CL22 CL25 108 0.0089 .488 .171 158 60.4 10.0  
7 CL17 CL12 100 0.0100 .478 .156 163 67.9 7.7  
6 CL7 CL19 125 0.0108 .468 .139 171 78.2 7.7  
5 CL6 CL11 166 0.0165 .451 .120 179 91.6 11.8  
4 CL9 CL10 116 0.0237 .427 .098 190 111 18.2  
3 CL8 CL13 169 0.0371 .390 .072 205 143 40.3  
2 CL5 CL4 282 0.0936 .297 .041 206 189 62.6  
1 CL3 CL2 451 0.2966 .000 .000 0.00 . 189  
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Figure 6.4: Dendrogram for Organisational Justice Perceptions 
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Table 6.24: Cluster Composition- Organisational Justice Perceptions 
CLUSTER N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1 54 OJ1 1.74 1.17 1 5 
  OJ2 1.31 0.64 1 4 
  OJ3 1.56 1.08 1 5 
  OJ4 1.59 0.96 1 5 
  OJ5 1.81 1.29 1 5 
  OJ6 1.30 0.57 1 3 
  OJ7 1.17 0.42 1 3 
  OJ8 1.37 0.76 1 4 
  OJ9 2.24 1.13 1 5 
  OJ10 1.43 0.98 1 5 
  OJ11 1.39 0.86 1 4 
  OJ12 1.71 0.91 1 4 
  OJ13 1.19 0.44 1 3 
  OJ14 1.15 0.41 1 3 
  OJ15 1.28 0.56 1 3 
  OJ16 1.43 0.88 1 5 
  OJ17 1.22 0.54 1 4 
  OJ18 2.15 1.38 1 5 
  OJ19 1.13 0.39 1 3 
  OJ20 1.54 0.84 1 4 
  OJ21 1.41 0.81 1 4 
  OJ22 2.39 1.53 1 5 
  OJ23 1.31 0.64 1 4 
  OJ24 1.30 0.79 1 5 
2 108 OJ1 3.76 0.72 1 5 
  OJ2 3.60 0.75 1 5 
  OJ3 3.29 0.90 1 5 
  OJ4 3.81 0.71 2 5 
  OJ5 3.49 0.89 1 5 
  OJ6 3.75 0.87 1 5 
  OJ7 3.38 0.82 1 5 
  OJ8 3.35 0.78 2 5 
  OJ9 3.68 0.66 1 5 
  OJ10 3.35 0.93 1 5 
  OJ11 2.97 0.94 1 5 
  OJ12 3.53 0.70 1 5 
  OJ13 3.79 0.72 2 5 
  OJ14 3.55 0.78 2 5 
  OJ15 3.47 0.71 2 5 
  OJ16 3.13 0.83 1 5 
  OJ17 3.49 0.69 2 5 
  OJ18 3.05 0.94 1 5 
  OJ19 3.36 0.88 1 5 
  OJ20 3.29 0.75 2 4 
  OJ21 3.27 0.69 1 5 
  OJ22 3.71 0.76 2 5 
 
Table 6.24: Cluster Composition- Organisational Justice Perceptions  Contd…
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CLUSTER N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
  OJ23 3.17 0.83 1 5 
  OJ24 3.23 0.82 1 5 
3 61 OJ1 4.36 0.61 2 5 
  OJ2 4.31 0.62 2 5 
  OJ3 4.35 0.65 2 5 
  OJ4 4.10 0.85 1 5 
  OJ5 4.08 1.00 1 5 
  OJ6 4.39 0.71 2 5 
  OJ7 4.33 0.72 1 5 
  OJ8 4.18 0.56 3 5 
  OJ9 4.28 0.71 3 5 
  OJ10 4.28 0.69 2 5 
  OJ11 3.89 0.88 1 5 
  OJ12 4.15 0.77 2 5 
  OJ13 4.23 0.56 3 5 
  OJ14 4.21 0.88 1 5 
  OJ15 4.02 0.74 1 5 
  OJ16 3.89 0.91 1 5 
  OJ17 3.93 0.93 1 5 
  OJ18 3.90 0.98 1 5 
  OJ19 4.28 0.61 3 5 
  OJ20 4.18 0.62 2 5 
  OJ21 4.26 0.68 2 5 
  OJ22 4.57 0.53 3 5 
  OJ23 4.28 0.61 3 5 
  OJ24 4.31 0.70 2 5 
4 62 OJ1 2.19 0.99 1 4 
  OJ2 1.97 0.96 1 4 
  OJ3 2.18 0.91 1 4 
  OJ4 2.44 0.99 1 4 
  OJ5 1.68 0.84 1 4 
  OJ6 2.37 1.27 1 5 
  OJ7 1.48 0.62 1 3 
  OJ8 2.01 0.88 1 4 
  OJ9 3.10 1.13 1 5 
  OJ10 1.94 0.90 1 4 
  OJ11 1.32 0.51 1 3 
  OJ12 2.40 0.91 1 4 
  OJ13 2.47 1.35 1 5 
  OJ14 1.94 1.04 1 4 
  OJ15 1.93 0.97 1 4 
  OJ16 1.35 0.52 1 3 
  OJ17 1.69 0.78 1 4 
  OJ18 2.73 1.19 1 5 
  OJ19 1.76 0.92 1 4 
  OJ20 2.44 1.11 1 5 
  OJ21 1.73 0.77 1 4 
  OJ22 3.79 0.98 1 5 
  OJ23 2.13 1.05 1 5 
  OJ24 2.24 0.88 1 4 
 
Table 6.24: Cluster Composition- Organisational Justice Perceptions  Contd…
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CLUSTER N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
5 41 OJ1 3.78 0.72 2 5 
  OJ2 3.73 0.74 2 5 
  OJ3 3.63 0.83 2 5 
  OJ4 3.54 0.92 2 5 
  OJ5 2.37 0.80 1 4 
  OJ6 3.51 1.05 2 5 
  OJ7 2.44 0.87 1 4 
  OJ8 2.61 0.77 1 4 
  OJ9 3.48 0.81 1 5 
  OJ10 2.85 0.88 1 4 
  OJ11 2.40 0.83 1 4 
  OJ12 3.56 0.78 2 5 
  OJ13 3.29 1.10 1 5 
  OJ14 2.68 0.96 1 5 
  OJ15 2.80 0.90 1 4 
  OJ16 2.80 0.95 1 4 
  OJ17 2.76 0.83 1 4 
  OJ18 2.12 0.78 1 4 
  OJ19 2.54 1.10 1 5 
  OJ20 2.56 1.00 1 5 
  OJ21 2.10 0.62 1 3 
  OJ22 3.05 1.16 1 5 
  OJ23 2.46 0.74 1 4 
  OJ24 2.12 0.71 1 4 
6 125 OJ1 2.69 1.09 1 5 
  OJ2 2.38 1.01 1 5 
  OJ3 2.74 1.00 1 5 
  OJ4 2.91 0.98 1 5 
  OJ5 2.91 1.05 1 5 
  OJ6 2.97 1.11 1 5 
  OJ7 2.36 0.93 1 5 
  OJ8 2.70 1.02 1 5 
  OJ9 3.06 0.98 1 5 
  OJ10 2.90 1.02 1 5 
  OJ11 1.94 0.88 1 5 
  OJ12 2.72 0.83 1 5 
  OJ13 3.21 1.10 1 5 
  OJ14 3.00 1.02 1 5 
  OJ15 2.13 0.82 1 4 
  OJ16 2.38 1.03 1 5 
  OJ17 2.28 0.90 1 5 
  OJ18 2.99 1.13 1 5 
  OJ19 2.62 0.95 1 5 
  OJ20 2.74 0.98 1 5 
  OJ21 2.50 0.83 1 5 
  OJ22 3.62 1.04 1 5 
  OJ23 2.60 0.85 1 4 
  OJ24 2.66 0.99 1 5 
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Figure 6.5: Organisational Justice Items Mean Score Cluster Profile 
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Table 6:25: Cluster History (Belief in a Just World) 
 
NCL Clusters Joined FREQ SPRSQ RSQ ERSQ CCC PSF PST2 Tie 
30 CL46 CL231 19 0.0070 .554 .528 6.21 18.6 7.5  
29 CL40 CL56 29 0.0071 .547 .523 5.73 18.8 7.1  
28 CL49 CL71 27 0.0072 .540 .518 5.26 19.0 8.5  
27 CL50 CL410 18 0.0073 .533 .512 4.82 19.2 8.4  
26 CL35 CL58 27 0.0077 .525 .507 4.31 19.4 6.9  
25 CL60 CL65 22 0.0080 .517 .501 3.80 19.6 8.1  
24 CL52 CL51 18 0.0080 .509 .495 3.34 19.9 6.9  
23 CL53 CL37 35 0.0082 .501 .488 2.89 20.1 8.3  
22 CL57 CL64 37 0.0086 .492 .482 2.40 20.4 11.5  
21 CL39 CL83 29 0.0089 .483 .475 1.90 20.8 7.7  
20 CL30 CL63 26 0.0090 .474 .468 1.46 21.1 7.1  
19 CL36 CL47 20 0.0095 .465 .461 0.98 21.5 5.9  
18 CL48 CL29 44 0.0108 .454 .453 0.27 21.9 9.1  
17 CL23 CL25 57 0.0109 .443 .445 -.37 22.3 8.7  
16 CL27 CL43 52 0.0109 .432 .436 -.90 22.8 11.5  
15 CL22 CL34 47 0.0112 .421 .427 -1.4 23.4 11.2  
14 CL42 CL31 23 0.0113 .410 .417 -1.8 24.1 10.1  
13 CL33 CL38 42 0.0147 .395 .406 -2.8 24.6 11.0  
12 CL28 CL32 80 0.0160 .379 .395 -4.0 25.1 18.3  
11 CL24 CL17 75 0.0168 .362 .381 -4.6 25.8 11.6  
10 CL14 CL13 65 0.0183 .344 .363 -4.6 26.5 11.2  
9 CL16 CL21 81 0.0187 .325 .343 -4.1 27.5 15.0  
8 CL15 CL12 127 0.0212 .304 .321 -3.8 28.5 18.9  
7 CL10 CL26 92 0.0217 .282 .296 -3.1 30.0 12.4  
6 CL18 CL9 125 0.0230 .259 .267 -1.7 32.1 16.0  
5 CL11 CL19 95 0.0249 .234 .233 0.42 35.2 14.4  
4 CL7 CL6 217 0.0336 .201 .192 2.04 38.6 19.1  
3 CL4 CL5 312 0.0380 .163 .142 5.35 44.9 19.7  
2 CL3 CL20 338 0.0511 .112 .081 10.3 58.2 25.4  
1 CL2 CL8 465 0.1117 .000 .000 0.00 . 58.2  
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Figure 6.6: Dendrogram - Belief in a Just World 
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Two cluster solutions emerge as being potentially useful from observing the dendrogram. 
The first is a three cluster solution, eliminating all clusters after Clusters 8, 3, and 20, where 
the splits start happening much closer together. However another potential solution is to 
retain six clusters, namely Clusters 7,6,11,19,20 and 8. The cluster sizes at that level are still 
suitably large, and the splits are not yet too close together. A six-cluster solution may also be 
more appropriate for this study, in that it could offer more insight into the complexity of 
perceptions of justice.   
 
Given that in deciding how many clusters to retain, a possible three-cluster or six-cluster 
solution has been identified, both these solutions have been explored further.  
 
Beginning with a three-cluster solution, it can be seen from the Cluster Composition Table (See 
Table 6.26) that Cluster 1 comprises 185 people, cluster 2 170 people, and Cluster 3 110 people. 
With regards to the item mean scores, these range between 2.49 and 3.58 in Cluster 1, 2.97 and 
4.52 in Cluster 2, and 3.25 and 4.60 in Cluster 3. Cluster 1 comprises mainly mean item scores 
of around 2, Cluster 2 mean item scores of around 3, and Cluster 3 of a mixture between mean 
item scores of around 3 and 4. With regards to the minimum and maximum scores, in Cluster 1 
the minimum score for all the items is 1 and the maximum score is 5. The same is true for 
Cluster 2, except for item 12, where the maximum score is 4. For Cluster 3, most items have a 
minimum score of 1, except for items 6,7, and 11 where the minimum score is 2, and item 15 
where the minimum score is 3. The maximum score for all the items in this cluster is 5.  
 
From the line plot of the mean item scores per cluster (See Figure 6.7) an initial analysis reveals 
that Cluster 1, for the most part, comprises lower scoring people, Cluster 2 moderate scoring 
people, and Cluster 3 people who are scoring slightly higher than moderate.  It can be seen that 
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up to item 7 (just world item 12), for the most part each cluster is relatively consistent across all 
the items. At item 7 Cluster 1 dips sharply to a mean score below 3, where it intersects with 
Cluster 2 which has been dipping gradually from item 4. Cluster 1, however, starts increasing at 
item 7, with that item representing the third highest mean for that cluster. All the clusters move 
back up again for item 8 (just world item 14). For item 9 (just world item 15), Cluster 3 keeps on 
rising reaching the highest mean score for that cluster, Cluster 2 remains consistent with item 8, 
and Cluster 1 drops. At item 10 (just world item 18), Cluster 3 dips sharply as does Cluster 2, 
while Cluster 1 also reaches a valley at that point. All three clusters rise sharply for item 11 (just 
world item 19).  
 
With regards to the six-cluster solution, from the Cluster Composition Table (See Table 6.27) it 
can be seen that Cluster 1 comprises 29 people, Cluster 2 comprises 97 people, Cluster 3 110 
people, Cluster 4 140 people, Cluster 5 73 people, and Cluster 6 16 people. The mean item 
scores in Cluster 1 range between 1.59 and 3.17, between 2.84 and 4.49 in Cluster 2, between 
2.74 and 4.61 in Cluster 3, between 2.78 and 3.94 in Cluster 4, between 2.44 and 4.56 in Cluster 
5, and between 1.19 and 3.68 in Cluster 6. With regards to the minimum and maximum scores, 
in Cluster 1 the minimum score for all the items is 1, but the maximum score is 5 for only 5 of 
the items. For items 3 and 9 the maximum score is 4, and for items 11, 15, 18, and 19 the 
maximum score is 4. For Cluster 2 the minimum score for the majority of items is 1, but for 
items 3 and 15 this score is 2, and for item 19 it is 3. The maximum score for the majority of 
items in this cluster is 5, except for items 12 and 14, where the maximum score is 4.  In Cluster 
3, there are a number of items that do not have a minimum score of 1 – items 6,7, and 11 have a 
minimum score of 2, and item 15 has a minimum score of 3. All the items have a maximum 
score of 5. In Cluster 4, the minimum score for all the items is 1, and the maximum score for all 
the items is 5. In Cluster 5 all the items have a minimum score of 1, except items 6 and 14, 
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where the minimum score is 2. The maximum score for all the items is 5, except for item 12 
where the maximum score is 4. Finally, in Cluster 6 the minimum scores for all the items are 1, 
except for item 7, where the minimum score is 2. The maximum score for the majority of items 
is 5, except for items 2, 3, and 18 where the maximum score is 4, and item 19 where the 
maximum score is 2.  
 
From the line plot of the item mean scores for each cluster (See Figure 6.8) a number of 
similarities and differences between the clusters can be observed. Starting at item 1, all the 
clusters move up to item 2 except for Cluster 1, which dips down to slightly below 2. For item 3 
Cluster 1 begins rising again, and Clusters 6 and 5 continue increasing, while Clusters 2 and 3 
remain relatively level and Cluster 4 drops comparatively sharply. At item 4, Clusters 6,5 and 3 
rise, while Clusters 1 and 4 drop. Cluster 2 also drops, but very slightly. For item 5, Cluster 1 
remains relatively level, as does Cluster 3. Cluster 6 continues to rise, this item forming the 
peak for that cluster. Cluster 4 also rises, but very gently. Cluster 5 drops sharply for this item, 
with Cluster 2 also dropping, but much more gently. There is very little similarity between any 
of the clusters in relation to item 5. For item 6 Clusters 1, 4, 2 and 3 drop very gently, with 
Clusters 6 and 2 also dropping, but much more steeply. This results in Clusters 6,5,4, and 2 
meeting very closely around a mean score of just under 3. At item 7 the clusters all move 
towards a mean score slightly under 3. Cluster 1 rises sharply, while Cluster 3 drops sharply, 
and the other four clusters continue their previous directions. In particular, Clusters 2, 3, and 1 
all intersect at item 7. For item 8, Cluster 1 drops back sharply again, while Clusters 5, 3, 6, and 
4 all rise relatively sharply. Cluster 2 remains level. For item 9 Clusters 1 and 6 remain 
relatively level, while Clusters 2 and 3 rise quite sharply, and Clusters 4 and 5 drop quite 
sharply. All the clusters drop to varying degrees for item 10, except for Cluster 1 where there is 
a slight increase. Clusters 2 and 3 intersect at a mean score of 3. 25 for this item. For item 11, 
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all the clusters except Cluster 6 increase sharply, with Clusters 2,3, and 5 intersecting at a mean 
score of around 4.50. Cluster 6 drops very sharply for this item, to 1.187, the lowest score for 
that cluster, and in fact the lowest mean score out of all the clusters.  
 
From looking at the cluster sizes and composition, it can be seen that the six-cluster solution 
perhaps offers a more complex and interesting result. With the three-cluster solution, the cluster 
sizes are relatively large, and the clusters seem, for the most part, to be splitting into low, 
moderate, and high scores. While this could be a useful solution, as the aim of the research is to 
attempt to account for the complexity of justice perceptions, the six-cluster solution appears to 
be more appropriate.  This solution has produced some interesting patterns, with some 
similarities and differences between clusters, but which is not simply about low, medium or 
high scores. As such, the six-cluster solution has been retained.  
 
Looking at the belief in a just world six-cluster solution, it can be seen that there are more 
areas of overlap, and less distinct range of scores for the different clusters than there were 
for the organisational justice perceptions solutions. There are a number of notable features of 
this cluster solution, perhaps the most apparent being the merging of the clusters around the 
3 mark for item 7 (“When parents punish their children, it is almost always for a good 
reason”).  The scores for this item range between 2.60 (for Cluster 5) and 3.09 (for Cluster 
6). This is a very small range, and is a clear indication that this particular item is not very 
useful in differentiating between groups. In addition to this all clusters are veering towards a 
mean score of 3 for this item (“Neither agree nor disagree”), indicating that this item is not 
very useful in differentiating between people’s experiences of social justice. It would appear 
that most people neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.  
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The item in question can perhaps be criticised as being difficult to answer with any 
conviction, as it is asking people’s opinions on something that they would presumably know 
relatively little about. The punishment of children is a relatively private phenomenon, unlike 
most of the other items in the scale which either refer to events and issues that are, more 
clearly, cause for public concern (e.g. It is rare for an innocent man to be sent to jail), or are 
more general in nature (e.g. Basically the world is a just place). Even other very specific 
items such as “Students almost always deserve the grades they get at school” can be 
understood to be referring to the education system at large, rather than to a case by case 
basis. It is not entirely surprising that the majority of people might not actually know 
whether the statement about children deserving punishment is true or not. The scale, in 
relation to its original intention, is aiming to assess a more general attitude or trait regarding 
feelings of fairness in the world, and therefore ostensibly assumes that such a trait will cause 
a ‘generalisation’ of attitude to all types of issues or events (Rubin and Peplau, 1973). As 
such, if the theoretical notion of belief in a just world is in fact true, such an item could be 
expected to elicit a response similar to all other questions, regardless of the domain of these 
questions.  This, however, did not happen in the case of this study. This is perhaps because 
in this study the belief in a just world scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1973) is being used as a 
measure of social justice perceptions – in other words as a collection of statements regarding 
people’s social world about which they are likely to have some experience of justice. The 
nature of the study was very carefully explained to participants, both in writing (See 
Appendix A) and verbally by shop stewards and research assistants. As such this question 
might have seemed very out of place in the context of all the other questions, which referred 
to matters of much more wide spread concern. As discussed above, however, the item in 
question is likely to be difficult for anyone to answer in any context, unless one is operating 
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on the basis of a ‘psychological generalisation’. As such this item has proven to not be 
particularly useful in differentiating between cluster profiles.  
 
Another notable feature of this clustering solution is the fact that relatively few of the items 
have a mean score above 4 or below 1.  Unlike the organisational justice perceptions 
clustering solution, there are no clusters of people that are either very high or very low 
scoring. This might be an indication that there might have been a generalised tendency 
towards 3, as a neutral point, or that people in the current sample did not feel particularly 
strongly about the issues presented. There were, however, three items that did elicit more 
definite and extreme responses from participants.  These include items 8 (“Although evil 
men may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out”) – 
which had a mean score range of 1.66 to 4.15 -, item 9 (“In almost any business or 
profession, people who do their job will rise to the top”) – which had a mean score range of 
1.59 to 4.33 -, and item 11 (“Crime doesn’t pay”) – which had a mean score range of 1.19 to 
4.60.  
 
As can be seen, these items elicited a wide range of responses, with extreme points of view. 
All three items can be seen to be of particular concern within the South African context, and 
to people participating in the current study. Item 8 refers to evil political regimes, and the 
extent to which history sees good winning over evil. This is obviously something that has 
particular resonance for South Africans. After 40 years of an oppressive political 
dispensation that served to oppress the majority of citizens, a new democratic political order 
has emerged. Having lived through a historically significant change in power in the country, 
people are likely to have very strong opinions about this particular item. Also very pertinent 
to South Africans is the question of crime, which is particularly rife and often violent in this 
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country. The question of crime prevention and the apprehension and punishment of 
criminals forms a core part of political campaigning, medial coverage, public demonstration, 
the formation of non-governmental organisations, as well as a whole range of other civil 
activities.  Crime forms a central concern for most South Africans, and has become loaded 
with political over tones related to race, gender, class as well as other demographic 
variables. As such it is unsurprising that an item focussing on crime, such as item 11, elicits 
such diverse and extreme responses. The final item, item 9, refers to professional 
development, and the extent to which people control their own rise to the top. As has been 
seen in the previous cluster analysis related to organisational justice perceptions, this issue is 
a highly contested one. It is important to look to the nature of the sample in understanding 
responses to this item. At least half of the sample comprises unionised, largely ‘blue collar’ 
workers. Many of the employees doing semi or unskilled jobs - approximately 200 of the 
respondents are general factory workers or technical staff  (See Table 5.2 in Chapter 5), and 
only 70 respondents form part of the managerial or supervisory function of the organisation 
(See Table 5.2 in Chapter 5). For many of the people in the organisation it is unlikely that 
even if they did do their jobs well they would be able to assume a managerial role in the 
organisation.  Concern about their ability to advance in the organisation was clearly 
demonstrated in some of the clusters of the previous analysis, while it was equally as evident 
that people in other clusters felt that there was ample opportunity and organisational support.  
Similar to the other two items, it is unsurprising that this item should elicit a wide range of 
responses.  
 
Looking more specifically at each cluster, it can be seen that Cluster 3 comprises the highest 
scoring people for most of the items in this scale. Most of the items have a mean score close 
to, or slightly above 4, indicating agreement with the statements. Notable exceptions include 
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item 1 (“Basically, the world is a just place”), which has a mean score of 3.38, item 7 
(“When parents punish their children, it is almost always for a good reason”), with a mean 
score of 2.74, and item 10 (“People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on 
themselves”), with a mean score of 3.25. Given the previous discussion regarding item 7 and 
the fact that it is non-discriminating, this item will not be explored for each cluster. Item 1 
and item 10 are general items, which ask respondents to make broad judgements about the 
world and people at large. A mean score of around 3 indicates a ‘neither agree nor disagree’ 
attitude towards the statements. As such people in this cluster perhaps feel uncomfortable 
making broad generalisations, and rather remain neutral for non-specific items.  Aside from 
item 7, item 10 is the lowest scoring item for this cluster. Item 11, (“Crime doesn’t pay”) is 
the highest scoring item for this cluster, with a mean score of 4.61. Clearly people in this 
cluster believe that those engaging in crime will ultimately fail to benefit from it. This 
cluster thus comprises people who believe that justice will, for the most part, be done, both 
at a personal and a broader social level – that if you work hard you will get good marks, will 
be promoted, will stay healthy, but also that key social institutions such as the political 
system, and the criminal justice system, will prevail.  
 
There is considerable overlap between the next three clusters, Clusters 2, 4, 5, and 6 and it is 
therefore difficult to state which is the next one ‘down’, as was possible in the previous 
cluster analysis. For the purposes of a systematic analysis, clusters will be discussed in order 
of the mean score for the first item (i.e. in descending order of starting points).  Cluster 2 has 
the highest mean score for item 1, and as such will be discussed next. This cluster appears to 
have mean item scores that group largely around 3, indicating that for the most part, people 
in this cluster were undecided about many of the items. The range of scores for this cluster 
was relatively small, with the lowest score being 2.84 (for item 8  “Although evil men may 
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hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out”) and the 
highest 4.49 (for item 11, “Crime doesn’t pay”). This high score, however, is somewhat of 
an anomaly – the score for this particular item is significantly higher than the next highest 
item, which is item 9 with a score of 3.69. In fact a range of between 2.84 and 3.69 is more 
representative of the nature of this cluster, which, as mentioned before, is a largely 
undecided grouping of people. Despite this, there are a number of items for which people 
scored relatively higher, which may help to further define this cluster.    
  
Aside from the very high scoring item 11 (“Crime doesn’t pay”), there are three other items 
for which the mean score is 3.5 or above. These include item 2 (“People who get ‘lucky 
breaks’ have usually earned their good fortune”) with a mean score of 3.54, item 3 
(“Students almost always deserve the grades they get at school”) with a mean score of 3.59), 
and item 9 (“In almost any business or profession, people who do their job will rise to the 
top”) with a mean score of 3.69. While the mean scores for these three items do not indicate 
clear agreement, they are certainly indicative of a somewhat less neutral or undecided 
stance.  These items appear to indicate a clear work ethic – those individuals who work hard, 
be it at school or at work, will derive the benefits they deserve. Good fortune or lucky breaks 
are, in fact, things which people earn through hard work. As a corollary to this, those who 
take benefits without working for them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, benefit. 
As such people in this cluster can be characterised as being largely undecided, particularly 
with regards to the fairness of broader social systems. However, they do seem to feel a little 
more strongly about individual effort and reward, believing that at a personal level you are 
more likely to benefit from your own efforts.  
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The next cluster for discussion is Cluster 4, which can, to some extent, be seen as a mirror 
image of Cluster 2. This cluster also largely comprises mean item scores relatively close to 3 
(indicating fairly undecided scorers), but where there are deviations about this mid-score, 
they tend to be in the opposite direction to the ones discussed in Cluster 2 above.  For 
example, where Cluster 2 lies above 3 for items 3 (“Students almost always deserve the 
grades they get at school”), 4 (“Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a 
heart attack”), 5 (“It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail”), and 10 (“People 
who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves”), Cluster 4 moves below 
this mid point. Where Cluster 2 moves below 3 for item 8 (“Although evil men may hold 
political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out”) it moves above 
3 for Cluster 4.  This is perhaps an indication that people in Cluster 4 put less faith in the 
belief that one’s own hard work will be paid off than those in Cluster 2 - students who work 
hard, or men who keep healthy might still be in danger of getting poor grades or having a 
heart attack, while a man innocent of a crime might still be sent to jail. A person is not all 
that likely to bring misfortune on himself or herself. On the other hand, people in Cluster 4 
seem to have a slightly stronger belief that broader social systems will, in the long run, be 
fair, while the opposite is true for those in Cluster 2.  
 
There are other important differences between Clusters 2 and 4. Cluster 4 has more mean 
item scores in the 2’s than Cluster 2, where the majority of scores are in the 3’s. This is an 
indication that while people in Cluster 4 are, like those in Cluster 2, somewhat undecided in 
their scoring, there is more of a tendency towards a slightly lower perception of social 
justice. As such people in Cluster 4 may be characterised as generally neutral to moderately 
low scorers, who have less faith in an individual’s capacity to influence their own outcomes.   
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Looking next at Cluster 5, it can be seen that people in this group have a relatively varied set 
of responses to the different items. Mean scores in this cluster range from 2.44 to 4.56, a 
somewhat wider range than most of the other clusters. Despite this, there are essentially only 
five items that are markedly removed from a neutral score of 3.The lowest scoring item for 
this cluster is item 10 (“People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on 
themselves”), with a mean score of 2.44. This indicates that people in this cluster do not 
necessarily believe that “bad things happen to bad people” – i.e. bad things can happen to 
people who do not deserve them.  On the other hand there are two items for which this 
cluster has a mean score over 4. These include item 8 (“Although evil men may hold 
political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out”) with a mean 
score of 4.15, and item 11 (“Crime doesn’t pay”) with a mean score of 4.56. In addition to 
these high scoring items, there are two other items that score fairly close to 4, indicating 
agreement with the statements. These include item 3 (“Students almost always deserve the 
grades they get at school”) with a mean score of 3.71, and item 4 (“Men who keep in shape 
have little chance of suffering a heart attack”) with a mean score of 3.83. It would seem that 
there are two sets of beliefs that are indicated by this pattern of scoring. On the one hand, 
while people in this cluster do not believe that people always deserve their misfortune, they 
seem to feel more strongly about people deserving their own good fortune – students who 
work hard get good grades, men who keep in shape will not have heart attacks. As such 
there seems to be the perception within this cluster that bad things can happen to you at 
random, but that good things result from effort exerted by the person.  A second set of 
related beliefs seemingly emerging within this cluster centres on belief, at a broader level, on 
ideas about retribution and the triumph of justice. There is a belief that ultimately, good will 
win out and bad will be punished, both at an individual level and within broader systems - a 
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criminal’s activities will eventually catch up with him, an evil political regime will 
eventually be ousted    
  
As such, people in this cluster can be characterised as having an almost fatalistic approach to 
injustice or misfortune, while on the other hand they have a stronger sense of agency when 
related to the achievement of good. Despite their beliefs related to misfortune, there is also a 
strong belief that ultimately, justice will prevail.  
 
Looking at Cluster 6 it can be seen that people in this group have fairly extreme views about 
a number of issues, with a slight tendency to towards lower mean scores than the previous 
clusters. The mean item scores in this cluster range from 1.19 to 3.94. While this represents 
a fairly large range of scores, the majority of scores are 3 or below, with no scores reaching 
the “agree” level of a 4. This cluster has the lowest scoring item out of all the clusters - item 
11 (“Crime doesn’t pay”) with a mean score of 1.19 – for which all the other clusters scored 
either extremely highly, and one, neutrally.  In addition to this item, people in this cluster 
did not, in general, agree with items 1 (“Basically, the world is a just place”), 2 (“People 
who get lucky breaks have generally earned their good fortune”), and 10 (“People who meet 
with misfortune have often brought it on themselves”). The only statement with which they 
seemed to agree is item 5 (“It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail”).  
 
It is clear that people in this group have a general sense that the world is not a fair place – 
there is no guarantee that anyone will actually get what they deserve. In fact, people in this 
group seem to quite strongly believe that people might benefit from immoral or unjust 
actions, such as crime. At the same time, there does not seem to be sense that bad things will 
happen to people who don’t deserve them – this group agreed that it is rare for an innocent 
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man to be sent to jail. As such people in this group seem to believe that while the world is 
not necessarily a fair place, neither is it unfair.  
 
The final cluster for this variable, Cluster 1, clearly comprises people who are fairly low 
scorers. The range of mean item scores for this cluster is relatively small  - 1.59 – 3.17. Five 
items score around the 1 score, and five around the 2. There is only one item that falls above 3, 
item 11 (“Crime doesn’t pay”). This item marks a noticeable increase in score for this cluster, 
despite 3 being an indication of neutrality. In other words, people in this cluster clearly disagree 
with all the statements in the scale except for this particular one (and item 7, which was 
discussed for all clusters earlier). As such it would appear that they believe justice is unlikely to 
be done, and the world is not a place where each gets his due. The only area in which they are 
less certain about this belief is in relation to the benefits of crime. It seems that there might be 
some sense among this group that people involved in crime might, in fact, not benefit unfairly 
from their activities.       
 
The final cluster analysis looked at the belief in an unjust world. As can be seen from the 
Cluster History Table (See Table 6.28) and the Dendrogram (See Figure 6.9), the first 
cluster splits into Clusters 2 and 3 at a height of 0.1438. Cluster 2 (n=305) then splits into 
Clusters 5 and 6 at a height of 0.0761. Cluster 5 (n=153) in turn splits into Clusters 11 and 8 
at a height of 0.0317. Cluster 11 then splits into Clusters 19 and 49 at 0.0146. Cluster 19 
(n=36) then splits into Clusters 66 and 43. Clusters 49, 66, and 43 split much lower down. 
Cluster 8 (n=101) splits into Clusters 15 and 16 at a height of 0.0183. Clusters 15 (n=56) and 
16 (n=45) split into Clusters 20 and 40, and 30 and 31, much lower down. Cluster 6 (n=152), 
on the other hand, splits into Clusters 10 and 12 at a height of 0.242. Cluster 10 (n=114) then 
splits into Clusters 13 and 34 at 0.0167. Cluster 13 (n=91) then splits into Clusters 27 and 22  
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Table 6.26: Cluster Composition – Belief in a Just World (3-Cluster Solution) 
 
Cluster N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1 185 
 
JW2 
JW3 
JW6 
JW7 
JW9 
JW11 
JW12 
JW14 
JW15 
JW18 
JW19 
2.78 
3.03 
2.82 
2.49 
2.69 
2.61 
2.99 
3.16 
2.79 
2.56 
3.58 
1.18 
1.14 
1.07 
1.05 
1.13 
1.06 
1.01 
1.23 
1.17 
1.02 
1.28 
1  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1  
1 
5 
5 
5  
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 170 
 
JW2 
JW3 
JW6 
JW7 
JW9 
JW11 
JW12 
JW14 
JW15 
JW18 
JW19 
2.97 
3.34 
3.64 
3.57 
3.10 
2.85 
2.74 
3.41 
3.38 
2.91 
4.52 
1.07 
0.96 
0.83 
0.96 
1.02 
1.00 
0.83 
1.08 
1.00 
1.03 
0.71 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5  
5 
5 
5 
5  
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3 110 
 
JW2 
JW3 
JW6 
JW7 
JW9 
JW11 
JW12 
JW14 
JW15 
JW18 
JW19 
3.38 
3.83 
4.02 
4.12 
4.00 
4.01 
2.74 
3.95 
4.33 
3.25 
4.61 
1.17 
0.98 
0.89 
0.86 
0.80 
0.68 
1.14 
0.80 
0.62 
1.15 
0.67 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1  
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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Figure 6.7: Belief in a Just World Mean Score Cluster Profile (3-Cluster Solution) 
   
   301 
Table 6:27: Cluster Composition – Belief in a Just World (6-Cluster Solution) 
Cluster N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 
1 29 JW2 2.20 1.11 1 5 
  JW3 1.90 0.90 1 4 
  JW6 2.48 1.09 1 5 
  JW7 2.10 0.94 1 5 
  JW9 2.03 0.94 1 4 
  JW11 1.89 0.72 1 3 
  JW12 2.96 1.09 1 5 
  JW14 1.66 0.67 1 3 
  JW15 1.59 0.63 1 3 
  JW18 1.79 0.68 1 3 
  JW19 3.17 1.44 1 5 
2 97 JW2 3.13 0.96 1 5 
  JW3 3.54 0.78 2 5 
  JW6 3.59 0.69 1 5 
  JW7 3.38 0.83 1 5 
  JW9 3.19 0.99 1 5 
  JW11 2.90 0.92 1 5 
  JW12 2.84 0.80 1 4 
  JW14 2.85 0.95 1 4 
  JW15 3.69 0.66 2 5 
  JW18 3.26 0.87 1 5 
  JW19 4.49 0.60 3 5 
3 110 JW2 3.38 1.17 1 5 
  JW3 3.83 0.98 1 5 
  JW6 4.02 0.89 2 5 
  JW7 4.12 0.86 2 5 
  JW9 4.00 0.80 1 5 
  JW11 4.01 0.68 2 5 
  JW12 2.74 1.14 1 5 
  JW14 3.95 0.80 1 5 
  JW15 4.33 0.62 3 5 
  JW18 3.25 1.15 1 5 
  JW19 4.61 0.67 1 5 
4 140 JW2 2.96 1.14 1 5 
  JW3 3.31 1.04 1 5 
  JW6 2.85 1.04 1 5 
  JW7 2.43 0.99 1 5 
  JW9 2.68 1.05 1 5 
  JW11 2.72 1.04 1 5 
  JW12 2.99 0.99 1 5 
  JW14 3.42 1.06 1 5 
  JW15 2.96 1.07 1 5 
  JW18 2.78 0.98 1 5 
  JW19 3.94 0.96 1 5 
Table 6:27: Cluster Composition – Belief in a Just World (6-Cluster Solution) Contd... 
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Cluster N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 
5 73 JW2 2.77 1.18 1 5 
  JW3 3.07 1.11 1 5 
  JW6 3.71 0.98 2 5 
  JW7 3.83 1.07 1 5 
  JW9 3.00 1.06 1 5 
  JW11 2.79 1.10 1 5 
  JW12 2.60 0.86 1 4 
  JW14 4.15 0.75 2 5 
  JW15 2.99 1.22 1 5 
  JW18 2.44 1.06 1 5 
  JW19 4.56 0.83 1 5 
6 16 JW2 2.31 1.20 1 4 
  JW3 2.61 0.88 1 4 
  JW6 3.13 1.26 1 5 
  JW7 3.68 0.95 2 5 
  JW9 3.94 1.06 1 5 
  JW11 2.90 1.32 1 5 
  JW12 3.09 1.18 1 5 
  JW14 3.56 1.41 1 5 
  JW15 3.44 1.41 1 5 
  JW18 2.06 1.00 1 4 
  JW19 1.19 0.40 1 2 
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Figure 6.8: Belief in a Just World Mean Score Cluster Profile (6-Cluster Solution) 
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Table 6:28: Cluster Composition – Belief in an Unjust World (6-Cluster Solution) 
 
 
NCL Clusters Joined FREQ SPRSQ RSQ ERSQ CCC PSF PST2 Tie 
30 CL39 CL62 22 0.0058 .621 .591 6.69 24.6 6.6  
29 CL63 CL57 25 0.0062 .615 .586 6.40 24.9 9.3  
28 CL45 CL73 41 0.0067 .608 .581 6.03 25.1 9.5  
27 CL44 CL50 34 0.0071 .601 .575 5.64 25.4 9.1  
26 CL68 CL113 36 0.0076 .594 .570 5.17 25.7 20.1  
25 CL35 CL116 23 0.0077 .586 .564 4.74 26.0 7.4  
24 CL53 CL29 35 0.0077 .578 .558 4.36 26.3 8.2  
23 CL41 CL32 31 0.0078 .571 .552 4.02 26.7 7.8  
22 CL26 CL71 57 0.0084 .562 .545 3.62 27.1 15.5  
21 CL70 CL61 25 0.0085 .554 .538 3.25 27.5 10.6  
20 CL28 CL79 46 0.0089 .545 .531 2.88 28.0 10.1  
19 CL66 CL43 36 0.0103 .535 .524 2.30 28.5 13.2  
18 CL23 CL36 42 0.0103 .524 .516 1.80 29.0 8.2  
17 CL42 CL52 19 0.0118 .513 .507 1.09 29.4 9.0  
16 CL30 CL31 45 0.0118 .501 .498 0.48 30.0 10.8  
15 CL20 CL40 56 0.0120 .489 .489 -.05 30.7 11.6  
14 CL24 CL37 55 0.0136 .475 .479 -.75 31.4 13.3  
13 CL27 CL22 91 0.0141 .461 .468 -1.4 32.2 17.9  
12 CL21 CL54 38 0.0143 .447 .456 -1.9 33.2 14.0  
11 CL19 CL49 52 0.0146 .432 .443 -2.3 34.5 14.4  
10 CL13 CL34 114 0.0167 .415 .428 -2.8 35.9 17.7  
9 CL17 CL18 61 0.0178 .398 .409 -2.4 37.6 11.2  
8 CL15 CL16 101 0.0183 .379 .385 -1.1 39.9 14.3  
7 CL33 CL25 44 0.0232 .356 .357 -.11 42.2 17.1  
6 CL10 CL12 152 0.0242 .332 .325 1.36 45.6 20.9  
5 CL11 CL8 153 0.0317 .300 .288 2.41 49.3 22.8  
4 CL7 CL9 105 0.0359 .264 .244 3.98 55.2 19.2  
3 CL4 CL14 160 0.0444 .220 .191 5.78 65.1 23.7  
2 CL5 CL6 305 0.0761 .144 .112 7.65 77.8 52.4  
1 CL2 CL3 465 0.1438 .000 .000 0.00 . 77.8  
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Figure 6.9: Dendrogram - Belief in an Unjust World 
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at a height of 0.0141. Clusters 34, 22, and 27 split much lower down. Cluster 12 (n=38) 
splits into Clusters 21 and 54 at 0.143. These two clusters then split much lower down.  
 
Returning to the second main branch, Cluster 3 (n=160) splits into Clusters 4 and 14 at a 
height of 0.0444. Cluster 4 (n=105) then splits into Clusters 7 and 9 at 0.0359. Cluster 7 
(n=44) splits into Clusters 33 and 25 at 0.0232. These two clusters then split much lower 
down. Cluster 9 (n=61), on the other hand, splits into Clusters 17 and 18 at a height of 
0.0178. Cluster 17 (n=19) splits into Clusters 42 and 52 at a height of 0.0118, and Cluster 18 
(n=42) splits into Clusters 23 and 36 at 0.0103. Clusters 42, 52, 23, and 36, split much lower 
down. Cluster 14 (n=55), on the other hand, splits into Clusters 24 and 37, both of which 
split much lower down. 
 
Similar to the belief in a just world, two cluster solutions emerge as being potentially useful 
from observing the dendrogram. The first is a three cluster solution, eliminating all clusters after 
Clusters 3, 5, and 6, where the splits start happening much closer together. However another 
potential solution is to retain six clusters, namely Clusters 11,8,7,9,14, and 6. The cluster sizes at 
that level are still suitably large, and the splits are not yet too close together. A six-cluster 
solution may also be more appropriate for this study, in that it could offer more insight into the 
complexity of perceptions of justice.   
 
As there are two possible solutions appropriate for this study, both were explored further. 
Starting with the three-cluster solution, the composition of each cluster is explored (See Table 
6.29). Cluster 1 comprises 153 people, Cluster 2 152 people, and Cluster 3 160 people. The 
mean item scores for Cluster 1 range between 1.78 and 3.46, between 1.54 and 2.62 for Cluster 
2, and between 2.64 and 3.96 for Cluster 3. The minimum scores in Cluster 1 are all 1, while the 
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maximum scores are predominantly 5, except for item 4, where the maximum score is 4. For 
Cluster 2, the minimum scores are also all 1, while all but three of the items have a maximum 
score of 5. Items 5, 13, and 17 have maximum scores of 4. In Cluster 3, the minimum score for 
all the items is 1, and the maximum score is 5.  
 
From the line plot of the item mean scores (See Figure 6.10) it can be seen that while Cluster 2 
appears to comprise lower scoring people, Clusters 1 and 2 comprise people who vacillate 
between moderate to higher scores for the items. There are some similarities and differences in 
the patterns of responses between clusters. Cluster 2 remains below a mean score of 2.5 for all of 
the items (except item 1(just world item 1) where there is a mean score of 2.623). Both Clusters 
2 and 1 drop sharply from item 1 to item 2 (just world item 4) Cluster 1 to the lowest mean score 
for that cluster (1.78). Cluster 3, however, moves sharply up for this item, to the highest item 
mean score for this cluster (3.92). For item 3 (just world item 5), Clusters 2 and 3 both drop 
(Cluster 2 reaching the lowest mean score of 1.542 for that cluster), while Cluster 1 rises. For the 
first three items, Clusters 1 and 3 are virtually mirror images of one another. Both Clusters 2 and 
1 rise up for item 4 (just world item 8), while Cluster 3 continues to drop slightly. Clusters 1 and 
3 almost intersect at item 4, with the mean scores for that item being very similar in each cluster 
(2.88 and 2.81 respectively). For item 5 (just world item 10), both Clusters 2 and 1 drop slightly, 
while Cluster 3 moves up relatively sharply. All three clusters move down for item 6 (just world 
item 13), Cluster 3 relatively sharply. Clusters 1 and 2 move up again for item 7 (just world item 
16), Cluster 1 quite sharply, moving above Cluster 3. Cluster 3 also moves up for item 7, but 
only slightly. Cluster 1 continues moving up for item 8 (just world item 17) , again staying 
above Cluster 3, which moves up very slightly. Cluster 2, on the other hand, drops slightly for 
this item. Both Clusters 1 and 3 drop for item 9 (just world item 20), Cluster 1 very sharply. 
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Cluster 2, however, increases slightly for this last item. It can be seen that between items 3 and 
7, Clusters 1 and 2 share very similar profiles, and differ only in the magnitude of the profiles.  
 
Moving onto the six-cluster solution, an analysis of the cluster composition (See Table 6.30) 
reveals that Cluster 1 comprises 52 people, Cluster 2 152 people, Cluster 3 101 people, 
Cluster 4 44 people, Cluster 5 61 people, and Cluster 6 55 people. The item mean scores for 
Cluster 1 range between 1.77 and 3.86, between 1.54 and 2.62 for Cluster 2, between 1.78 
and 3.55 for Cluster 3, between 2.97 and 3.96 for Cluster 4, between 2.49 and 4.02 for 
Cluster 5, and between 1.93 and 4.25 for Cluster 6. There is no distinct pattern of high or 
low mean item scores for the clusters. Cluster 4 does appear to comprise mean scores of 3 
and above, and thus at face value comprises people who are scoring slightly higher for the 
most part than in the other clusters. With regards to the maximum and minimum scores, the 
minimum score for items in Cluster 1 is mainly 1, with the exception of item 13 and 17, 
which have minimum scores of 3 and 2 respectively. The maximum score for the majority of 
items is 5, with the exception of items 4,8, and 20, where the maximum score is 4.  The 
minimum score for all the items in Cluster 2 is 1, while the maximum score is 
predominantly 5, with the exception of items 5, 13, and 17, where the maximum score is 4. 
The minimum score for all the items in Cluster 3 is 1, while the maximum score is 
predominantly 5, with the exception of items 4 and 13, where the maximum score is 
relatively low at 3. For Cluster 4, the minimum scores are mixed between 1 and 2, while the 
maximum score for all the items is 5. Cluster 5 has two items with a minimum score of 2 
(items 5 and 10), while the rest of the items have a minimum score of 1. All of the items 
have a maximum score of 5. Finally, the items in Cluster 6 have a minimum score of 1, 
except for items 1 and 4, which have a minimum score of 2 and 3 respectively. The 
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maximum scores are a combination of 4 and 5, except for item 20, which has a relatively 
low maximum score of 3.   
When looking at the line plot for the mean item scores for the six-cluster solution (See 
Figure 6.11), it appears that the clusters have points of similarity, but also many points of 
difference. For item 1 and 2 (belief in a just world items 1 and 4), Clusters 1, 2, and 3 are 
almost identical, with their lines overlapping and moving sharply down. Clusters 4, 5, and 6 
move up from item 1 to item 2, Cluster 6 very sharply. For item 3 (belief in a just world item 
5), Clusters 1 and 3 change direction and move up, while Cluster 5 continues its movement 
upwards. Cluster 6 drops very sharply for that item, from a mean score of 4.25 to one of 
1.94 for item 3. Clusters 2 and 4 also drop for this item. For item 4 (belief in a just world 
item 8) all the clusters appear to veer towards the midpoint. Clusters 1, 2, 3, and 6 all move 
upwards , while Clusters 4 and 5 both drop. Between items 4 and 6 (belief in a just world 
items 8, 10, and 13) there appears to be very little pattern within or between clusters. 
Clusters 6 and 3 both move very sharply down to item 6, and these two clusters overlap 
directly for this item and for the sharp increase to item 7 (belief in a just world item 16). At 
item 6 Cluster 1 moves above Cluster 4, but drops back down again for item 7. Clusters 6, 2, 
and 3 almost intersect at item 7, around a mean score of 3. All the clusters remain relatively 
level for item 8 (belief in a just world item 17), but Clusters 1,3, and 6 drop sharply for item 
9 (belief in a just world item 20). Cluster 4 and Cluster 2 move slightly upwards for this 
item, while Cluster 5 drops slightly.  
 
Similar to the belief in a just world solution, from looking at the cluster sizes and 
composition, it can be seen that the six-cluster solution perhaps offers a more complex and 
interesting result. With the three-cluster solution, the cluster sizes are relatively large, and the 
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clusters seem, for the most part, to be splitting into a lower scoring cluster, and two clusters of 
moderate scores (one with lower scores in the beginning and one with higher scores in the  
 
 
 
Table 6.29: Cluster Composition – Belief in an Unjust World (3-Cluster Solution) 
 
Cluster N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1 153 
 
JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
2.86 
1.78 
2.21 
2.88 
2.81 
2.55 
3.15 
3.46 
2.26 
0.94 
0.60 
1.01 
0.97 
1.01 
1.13 
0.94 
0.85 
0.94 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5  
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 152 
 
JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
2.62 
1.92 
1.54 
2.45 
2.30 
1.75 
2.09 
1.96 
2.20 
1.04 
0.77 
0.61 
1.03 
0.86 
0.64 
0.84 
0.71 
1.05 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
3 160 
 
JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
3.02 
3.92 
3.02 
2.81 
3.27 
2.73 
2.95 
3.03 
2.64 
0.95 
0.91 
1.33 
1.06 
1.07 
1.12 
1.07 
1.09 
1.20 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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Figure 6.10: Belief in an Unjust World Mean Score Cluster Profile (3-Cluster Solution) 
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Table 6.30: Cluster Composition- Belief in an Unjust World (6-Factor Solution) 
 
 
Cluster N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1 52 
 
JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
2.73 
1.77 
2.25 
2.46 
2.63 
3.88 
3.06 
3.30 
2.01 
0.93 
0.70 
0.86 
0.83 
0.97 
0.71 
0.98 
0.81 
0.78 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4. 
2 152 JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
2.62 
1.92 
1.54 
2.45 
2.30 
1.75 
2.09 
1.96 
2.20 
1.04 
0.77 
0.61 
1.03 
0.86 
0.64 
0.84 
0.71 
1.05 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
3 101 JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
2.93 
1.78 
2.20 
3.10 
2.90 
1.88 
3.20 
3.55 
2.39 
0.94 
0.55 
1.09 
0.97 
1.02 
0.59 
0.93 
0.86 
0.10 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
3 
5 
5  
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
4 44 JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
3.62 
3.96 
2.97 
3.02 
3.91 
3.28 
3.49 
3.66 
3.87 
0.90 
0.95 
1.31 
1.30 
0.74 
1.10 
1.01 
0.76 
0.94 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
 
 
Table 6.30: Cluster Composition- Belief in an Unjust World (6-Factor Solution) Cont… 
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Cluster N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
5 61 JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
2.68 
3.58 
4.02 
2.69 
3.26 
3.06 
2.49 
2.59 
2.38 
0.89 
1.04 
0.84 
0.96 
1.06 
1.10 
1.01 
1.13 
1.13 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 55 JW1 
JW4 
JW5 
JW8 
JW10 
JW13 
JW16 
JW17 
JW20 
2.93 
4.25 
1.95 
2.77 
2.76 
1.93 
3.04 
3.02 
1.95 
0.84 
0.52 
0.85 
0.92 
1.05 
0.61 
0.96 
1.03 
0.56 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
4 
5 
3 
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Figure 6.11: Belief in an Unjust World Mean Score Cluster Profile (6-Cluster Solution) 
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beginning). While this could be a useful solution, as the aim of the research is to attempt to 
account for the complexity of justice perceptions, the six-cluster solution appears to be more 
appropriate.  This solution has produced some interesting patterns, with some similarities and 
differences between clusters, but which is not simply about low, medium or high scores. As 
such, the six-cluster solution has been retained. 
 
Looking at the cluster solution for belief in an unjust world, it is interesting to note that there 
seems to be a larger concentration of mean item scores below the neutral, midpoint score of 
three. This perhaps indicates that within the current sample, many people do not view the 
world as being unfair.  This is somewhat reflected in the mean score of 23.32 for this scale. 
With a maximum score of 55 and a minimum score of 11, a mean score of 23.32 is 
somewhat lower than a midpoint of 27. As such there is tendency in this sample to 
disbelieve that unjust things can happen to an undeserving person. This can be more clearly 
seen when look at the distribution of scores for this scale in Figure 6.11.  
 
Looking at the cluster patterning as a whole, it appears that there are two points of clear 
convergence/divergence. The first is in relation to item 1, where all of the clusters except 
Cluster 4 veer towards the neutral mid-point of three. Item 1 states “ I’ve found that a person 
rarely deserves the reputation he has”. One possible explanation for this convergence, 
particularly around the three (which indicates neither agree nor disagree), may be that the 
item is difficult to understand. The negative wording can be confusing, and the item may 
need repeated reading before the meaning becomes clear. The term ‘reputation’ may also be 
ambiguous, and it’s meaning unclear to many of the respondents.   
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The second item for which there appears to be a clear pattern of convergence is that of item 
9 (“Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own”). All of the clusters, except 
for Cluster 4, converge around a mean score of two for this item, indicating that there is 
general disagreement with this statement. This is rather surprising given the nature of the 
sample and the history of the country – this sample comprises many people who must have 
felt the unjust effects of Apartheid. Nonetheless, there appears to be a tendency to disbelieve 
that bad things happen to people who do not deserve them. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this. As mentioned earlier, this sample has a tendency to veer towards a 
disbelief in an unjust world. Item 9 is a rather general item, not referring to specific events 
or actions as many of the other items do (e.g. politics, crime, health). As such this item, and 
the low mean score for five of the clusters, can be considered an indicator of an overall 
belief (or in this case, disbelief) in an unjust world.  This generalised belief that bad thing 
will not randomly happen to people may be rooted in the need for people living in post-
apartheid South Africa to believe that the country is now run in a fair and just way – that the 
fight for democracy and a change in government has resulted in real changes to social justice 
in the country.  
 
This final cluster analysis offers less insight into the structures of justice perceptions than 
the previous two analyses.  This is perhaps because the majority of mean item scores fall 
between 2.5 and 3.5, indicating a sample that is largely undecided or neutral about the issues 
presented to them. There appear to be no extreme opinions in any of the clusters, with no 
mean item score falling below 1.5 and only one above 4. There are two clusters that appear 
to comprise higher scoring people (Cluster 4) and lower scoring people (Cluster 1), but even 
within these clusters the mean item scores do not indicate strong agreement or disagreement. 
One possible reason for this tendency to the neutral score of 3 is that all of these items are 
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negatively worded, and this might have caused some confusion or uncertainty about the 
meaning of the items. This problem would have been exacerbated by the translation of the 
items into Afrikaans and Zulu, as well as by the fact that South Africa has eleven official 
languages and some people might therefore not speak fluent English, Afrikaans, or Zulu. As 
such items such as “It is a common occurrence for guilty people to get off free in South 
African courts” or “I’ve found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has” might be 
confusing to many people in this sample and may result in them electing to score themselves 
as undecided.   
 
Another characteristic of this cluster solution that makes the results less valuable than the 
previous two is that often clusters are differentiated from one another by only one or two 
items, which tend to seem almost random. For example Clusters 6 and 3 are virtually 
identical, except for divergent views on item 2 (“Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt 
in traffic accidents as careless ones”). This is an indication that there is not much 
differentiating the clusters from one another, and as such these groups are difficult to 
characterise. The exceptions to this are the two clusters that stand out as have low or high 
scorers and that can therefore be relatively easily characterised.  - Cluster 4 comprises 
people who believe that the world can be an unfair place, while Cluster 2 comprises people 
who do not believe that the world is an unjust place. As will be seen in the following 
discussion, the remaining clusters are, however, more difficult to define.   
 
As mentioned previously Clusters 6 and 3 are almost identical, comprising people who are 
largely neutral or unsure with regards to questions of unfairness in the world, but who do 
have a clear tendency to disbelieve that unfair things happen. The question related to driving 
is the one item that differentiates these two groups, with this being the only item that people 
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in Cluster 6 strongly agree with, and is one of two items that people in Cluster 3 clearly 
disagree with. While at the surface this may appear to be a rather strange and almost random 
item to be particularly concerned about, it may be better understood within the larger South 
African context. South African roads have notoriously high accident rates, with a 
particularly high death toll on the roads. These problems are exacerbated by a very poor 
public transport infrastructure which gave rise to a sprawling public taxi system that is 
difficult to regulate and which is a major contributor to road accidents and deaths. Road rage 
and aggressive driving is also on the increase. The strong feeling about this particular item 
for people in Cluster 6 may be an indicator that people in this cluster are frequent users of 
the roads either as vehicle owners or users of public transport and this is, therefore, one item 
that they are likely to have had direct and personal experience with and are therefore likely 
to feel strongly about. People in this group might also be more likely to have experienced an 
accident themselves. The remaining items are perhaps more removed for them, in that they 
refer to matters such as professional sports, criminal trials, and political candidates – issues 
that may be important or relevant, but which do not necessarily have the same affective 
content. This is further evidenced by the fact that this item is the only item for which none of 
the clusters scored a neutral score. People in each of the clusters either agreed or disagreed 
with the statement. Clearly this issue evokes a relatively strong response from people. The 
exact opposite explanation may be given for the low score on this item for Cluster 3 as was 
for the high score for Cluster 6 – that people in this cluster may not be drivers or frequent 
users of the road, or may have never had any personal experience with an accident, and as 
such would have no reason to imagine this statement to be true and in fact it might seem 
illogical.  
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People in Cluster 5 are also largely neutral or uncertain regarding the majority of items. The 
one item that has elicited a non-neutral response is item 3 “It is common occurrence for 
guilty people to get off free in South African courts”, which people in this group agreed 
with. What is important to note in trying to distinguish this cluster meaningfully from the 
others is that this is the only cluster that agreed with this item. People in Clusters 1, 2, 3, and 
6 all disagreed with this statement, while people in Cluster 4 were neutral on this issue. As 
such this is the only group who believes that the South African legal system is failing.  Once 
again this might be better understood contextually. South Africa has a very high crime rate, 
and crime related stories are given wide coverage in the media. It is a very high profile issue 
that is the cause of much debate and disagreement. Crime levels have been used as political 
platforms during elections, to explain the high rates of emigration, as well as a reason for the 
return of the death penalty. It is a controversial issue because simultaneous with the increase 
in crime is a new emphasis on the rights of all people, including people awaiting trial and 
prisoners, enshrined in the new South African constitution. There is a high profile public 
voice that is calling for harsher punishment for offenders, stricter regulation of the granting 
of bail, as well as more efficient conviction of criminals.  People in this cluster may then 
share this sense that the system is not being effective in dealing with criminals and they are 
therefore getting away with their wrong doings. It is important to note that for the one 
related item “It is often impossible for people in South Africa to receive a fair trial” this 
group scored just over 2.5, indicating slight disagreement with this statement. Clearly they 
do not believe that people get unfair trials. As such they must have the sense that the courts 
are able to provide adequate trials, but that criminals still get off free. This perhaps indicates 
some sense among this group that this is not due to incompetence, but rather to some other 
set of motives.  
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The last cluster, Cluster 1, has a wider range of mean item scores and people in this cluster 
thus arguably held relatively extreme views. This is most noticeable in relation to item 6 
(“Good deeds often go unnoticed and un-rewarded”), with which people in this cluster 
disagree, and items 2 (“Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as 
careless ones”) and 9 (“Many people suffer through no fault of their own”), with which they 
agree. Clearly there is a belief that misfortune happens to people quite randomly, unrelated 
to what they deserve or not, but positive efforts will be acknowledged and rewarded. People 
in this cluster seem to hold the view that people have agency in the good that happens to 
them, but possibly not in the bad.  
 
The three clustering solutions discussed in this section were used as the dependent variables 
within three separate CHAID analyses. The results of these are discussed in the next section. 
CHAID Analysis 
 
Using the clusters described above as dependent variables, a CHAID analysis was conducted for 
each dimension of justice. Two tables are presented for each CHAID analysis - first a decision 
tree which displays the results of the analysis (as described in Chapter 5) is presented, and then a 
competing splits tree, which illustrates the demographic variables that were statistically close to 
the variable selected by the CHAID as a partitioning variable i.e. the demographic variables that 
competed with the selected variable, and that in the absence of that variable would have been 
selected as a partitioning variable.  
   
Looking at the decision tree for organisational justice perceptions (See Figure 6.12) it can be 
seen that the first split is based on job title, with categories 3,5, and 11 (namely general workers, 
supervisors/foremen, and technical workers) splitting off into the first node, and categories 
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1,2,4,6,7,10 (administrative staff, laboratory staff, managerial staff, sales staff, security 
personnel, and human resources staff) into the second node.  There are 222 people in the first 
node. Of those 222 people, 81 (36.5%) are in Cluster 6, 10 (4.5%) are in Cluster 5, 43 (19.4%) 
are in Cluster 4, 18 (8.1%) are in Cluster 3, 34 (15.3%) are in Cluster 2, and 36 (16.2%) are in 
Cluster 1.  Thus the majority of people in this node are in Cluster 6, while the least number of 
people are in Cluster 5. There are also a relatively large number of these people in Cluster 4.  
There are 229 people in the second node, with 44 (19.2%) of these people falling into Cluster 6, 
31 (13.5%) in Cluster 5, 19 (8.3%) in Cluster 4, 43 (18.8%) in Cluster 3, 74 (32.3%) in Cluster 
2, and 18 (7.9%) in Cluster 1. As such, the majority of people in this node are falling into Cluster 
2, with a relatively large number in Clusters 6 and 3. Clusters 1 and 4 have the least number of 
people falling into these job categories.  
 
The first node of job title then splits on the basis of age, where people between the age of 20-40 
fall into one node, and those between the age of 41-63 fall into the other. A total of 108 people 
fall into the 20-40 age group. Of this 108, 35 (32.4%) fall into Cluster 6, 0 (0.0%) fall into 
Cluster 5, 25 (23.1%) fall into Cluster 4, 11 (10.2%) into Cluster 3, 14 (13.0%) into Cluster 2, 
and 23 (21.3%) into Cluster 1. The majority of this node fall into Cluster 6, although a relatively 
large number also fall into Cluster 4. There are no people in this node from Cluster 5. In the next 
node, that of people between the age of 41-63, the largest number of such people (40.4%) are 
falling into Cluster 6. Only 10 (8.8%) are in Cluster 5, while there are 18 (15.8) in Cluster 4. The 
lowest number of such people, that of 7 (6.1%) are falling into Cluster 3. 20 (17.5%) are falling 
into Cluster 2, and 13 (11.4%) into Cluster 1.  
 
Continuing with this leg of the tree, the 20-40 age node then splits on the basis of religion, where 
categories 2,3,5,6,8,11,13, and 14 (namely Muslim, Hindu, Protestants, Baptists, Methodists, 
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Zionist Christians, and New Apostolic Christians) fall into one node, and categories 4, 7, and 9 
(Catholic, Anglican and Dutch Reform Christians) fall into the other. There are a total of 76 people 
of these religious persuasions in the first node. Of this 76, most (28 or 36.8%) fall into Cluster 6, 
none (0%) into Cluster 5, 8 (10.5%) into Cluster 4, 10 (13.2%) into Cluster 3, 8 (10.5%) into 
Cluster 2, and a relatively large number (22 or 28.9%) into Cluster 1. The second node with 
regards to religious persuasion comprises 32 people. The majority of these 32 people fall into 
Cluster 4 (17 or 53.1%), while 0 (0.0%) fall into Cluster 5, and 1 (3.1%) falls into Clusters 3 and 1 
respectively. 7 (21.9%) fall into Cluster 6, and 6 (18.8%) fall into Cluster 2.  
 
At the end of this first branch, the first node of religious persuasion then splits on the basis of 
length of tenure in the organisation. It splits into two nodes, that of people who have been in the 
organisation between 1 to 3 years, and those who have been in the organisation for 4 to 10 years. 
In the first node there are 35 people, of which 12 (34.3%) are in the sixth cluster, 0 (0.0%) are in 
Cluster 5, 2 95.7%) are in Cluster 4, 8 (22.9%) are in Cluster 3, 7 (20.0%) are in Cluster 2, and 6 
(17.1%) are in Cluster 6. In the second node there are 41 people, of which 16 (39.0%) are in 
Clusters 6 and 1 respectively, 0 (0.0%) are in Cluster 5, 6 (14.6%) are in Cluster 4, 2 (4.9%) are in 
Cluster 3, and 1 (2.4%) is in Cluster 2. The second node of religious persuasion splits on the basis 
of investment. However the split is based on whether or not the respondent had a missing score in 
response to the question about investments, on the one hand, or whether they had unit trusts or 
stocks, on the other. As such this split is an artefact of the statistical procedure, rather than a 
meaningful split. While the node pertaining to people with missing values is not particularly 
useful, it is interesting to note that of the 18 people who fall into the node related to having stocks 
or unit trusts, the overwhelming majority of 15 (83.3%) fall into Cluster 3. The other 3 (16.7%) , 
and 0 (0.0%) fall into the other clusters.   
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Returning to the second node of the age split (people between the age of 41 and 63), the next split 
is on the basis of union membership.  The first node comprises people who are members of the 
smaller unions functioning in the organisation (category 3), while the second node comprises 
people who are either members of COSATU or who are not union members at all. The first node 
comprises 41 people, almost half of whom (20 or 48.8%) fall into Cluster 6. 0 (0.0%) fall into 
Clusters 5 and 3, 9 (22.0%) fall into Cluster 4, 7 (17.1%) fall into Cluster 2, and 5 (12.2%) fall into 
Cluster 1. In the second node there are a total of 73 people, 26 (35.6%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 
10 (13.7%) fall into Cluster 5, 9 (13.7%) into Cluster 4, 7 (9.6%) into Cluster 3, 13 (17.8%) into 
Cluster 2, and 8 (11.0%) into Cluster 1.   
 
The first union node, that of category 3, then splits on the basis of length of tenure in the 
respondents current position. The first node is people who have been in their current job for 
between 1 and 7 years, and the second node comprises respondents who have been in their 
current job for 8 to 9 years. The first node consists of a total of 35 people, the majority ( 20 or 
57.1%) of whom fall into Cluster 6.  0 (0.0%) fall into Clusters 5 and 3, while 6 (17.1%) fall into 
Cluster 4, 4 (11.4%) into Cluster 2, and 5 (14.3%) into Cluster 1. The second node of job tenure 
comprises only 6 people, 3 (50.0%) of whom fall into Cluster 4 and 3 (50.0%) of whom fall into 
Cluster 2. The second union membership node (that of categories 2 and 3) splits on the basis of 
pension membership. The first node comprises people who are members of a pension scheme, 
and the second, people who are not.  The first node has a total of 39 people, with the largest 
number (17 or 43.6%) falling into Cluster 6. 3 (7.7%) people fall into Cluster 5, 9 (23.1%) into 
Cluster 4, 1 (2.6%) person into Cluster 3, 5 (12.8%) into Cluster 2, and 4 (10.3%) into Cluster 1. 
The second node comprises 34 people, 9 (26.5%) of whom fall into Cluster 1, 7 (20.0%) into 
Cluster 2, 0 (0.0%) into Cluster 4, 6 (17.6%) into Cluster 3, 8 (23.5%) into Cluster 2, and 4 
(11.8%) into Cluster 1.  
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Returning to the top of the tree, the second job title node splits on the basis of union 
membership, into non-members (1), or members (2 being SACWU members and 3 the other 
smaller unions operating in the organisation). There are a total of 150 people who are not union 
members in the first node. Of this 150 people, 25 (16.7%) fall into Cluster 6, 23 (15.3%) into 
Cluster 5, a very small number (5 or 3.3%) into Cluster 4, 35 (23.3%) into Cluster 3, the largest 
number of 59 (39.3%) into Cluster 2, and the least number of people (2 or 3%) fall into Cluster 
1. There are a total of 79 people in the union membership node. Of that 79, the most number of 
people (19 or 24.1%) fall into Cluster 6, only 8 (10.1%) into Cluster 5, 14 (17.7%) into Cluster 
4, again only 8 (10.1%) fall into Cluster 4, and 15 (19.0%) fall into Clusters 3 and 2 respectively.  
The first union node (that of non-members) then splits on the basis of number of people living in 
the same abode as the respondent. The first node in this split comprises people who live alone or 
share an abode with up to 5 people. The second node comprises people who share an abode with 
between 5 and 19 people. There are 133 people in this first node, a large number (54 or 40.6%) 
of which are falling into Cluster 2. 21 (15.8%) are falling into Cluster 6, 23 (17.3%) are falling 
into Cluster 5, 2 (1.5%) are falling into Cluster 4, 33 (24.8%) are falling into Cluster 3, and 0 
(0.0%) are falling into Cluster 1. The second node comprises 17 people, 4 (23.5%) of which fall 
into Cluster 6, 0 (0.0%) fall into Cluster 5, 3 (17.6%) fall into Cluster 4, 2 (11.8%) fall into 
Cluster 3, 5 (29.4%) fall into Cluster 2, and 8 (17.6%) fall into Cluster 1.  
 
The first node related to number of people sharing an abode then splits on the basis of religious 
persuasion. The first node comprises people who fall into categories 3, 5, 7, and 8 (Hindu, 
Protestant, Anglican and Methodist religions), and the second node comprises people who fall 
into categories 2,4,6,9,13, and 14 (Muslim, Catholic, Baptist, Dutch Reform, and New Apostolic 
religions). Node one comprises 71 people, 11 (14.7%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 18 (24.0%) 
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into Cluster 5, 2 (2.7%) into Cluster 4, 9 (12.0%) into Cluster 3, the largest number, that of 35 
(46.7%) into Cluster 2, and 0(0.0%) into Cluster 1. The second node comprises a total of 58 
people, 10 (17.2%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 5 (8.6%) into Cluster 5, 0 (0.0%) into Clusters 4 
and 1 respectively, 24 (41.4%) into Cluster 3, and 19 (32.8%) into Cluster 2.  
 
The second node related to number of people sharing an abode then splits on the basis of area, 
with node one comprising people who work in the Cape region, Krugersdorp, and Kwazulu-Natal 
Coastal region, and node two people who work in Durban. The first node comprises 12 people, 
none of whom are falling into Clusters 5, 3, and 1. 4 (33.3%) are falling into Cluster 6, 3 (25.0%) 
are falling into Cluster 4, and 5 (41.75) are falling into Cluster 2. The second node comprises 
only 5 people, 2 of whom are falling into Cluster 3, and 3 (6.0%) of whom are falling into Cluster 
1.   
 
Returning now to the second union membership node (that of members of SACWU and 3 the 
other smaller unions operating in the organisation), there is a split on the basis of religious 
persuasion. The first node comprises people in categories 4, 7, and 3 (Catholic, Anglican, and 
Hindu religions), and the second node people in categories 5,8,11,14 (Protestant, Methodist, 
Zionist Christian, and a category comprising people who are members of a range of minority 
religions such as Rastafarians and Buddhists). The first node comprises 35 people, 12 (34.3%) 
of whom fall into Cluster 6, 0 (0.0%) into Cluster 2, 6 (17.1%) into Cluster 4, 7 (20.0%) into 
Cluster 3, 4 (11.4%) into Cluster 2, and 6 (17.1%) into Cluster 1. The second comprises 44 
people, 7 (15.9%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 8 (18.2%) of whom fall into Clusters 5 and 4 
respectively, 1 (2.3%) into Cluster 3, 11 (25.0%) into Cluster 2, and 9 (20.5%) into Cluster 1.  
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The first religious persuasion node splits on the basis of age, with first node comprising 
people between the age of 20-39, and the second node people between the age of 40-63. The 
first node comprises 19 people, 4 (21.1%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 0 (0.0%) fall into 
Clusters 5 and 2 respectively, 6 (31.6%) into Clusters 4 and 1 respectively, and 3 (15.8%) into 
Cluster 3. The second node comprises 16 people, none of whom are falling into Clusters 5, 4, 
and 1. Half the people (8 or 50.0%) fall into Cluster 6, and 4 (2.5%) into Clusters 3 and 2 
respectively. Finally, the second religious persuasion node splits on the basis of medical aid 
membership, the first node comprising people on a medical aid scheme, and the second 
people who are not on such a scheme. The first node comprises 32 people, none of whom are 
falling into Clusters 6 and 3. 8 (25.0%) fall into Cluster 5, 6 (18.8%) into Cluster  4, and 9 
(28.1%) into Clusters 2 and 1 respectively. The second node comprises 12 people, 7 (58.3%) 
of whom fall into Cluster 6, none of whom fall into Clusters 5 and 1, 2 (16.7%) fall into 
Clusters 4 and 2 respectively, and 1 (8.3%) of whom falls into Cluster 3.  
 
A closer look at these results highlights some important information about the impact of 
demographic variables on organisational justice perceptions. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs, the first split occurs on the basis of job title, with the first grouping comprise 
general factory workers, supervisors, as well as technical staff (for example plant electricians 
and engineers). The second grouping comprises all the other job categories, including 
administrative, laboratory, managerial, sales, security, financial, and human resources staff. 
The first grouping can thus be defined as comprising the staff who are engaged in the more 
hands on, factory floor work, while the second group comprise those who do more office type 
work. 
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Looking at the cluster divisions it can be seen that the majority of the first grouping fall into 
Cluster 6, while the majority of the second grouping fall into Cluster 2. This could be 
explained in light of the fact that people in Cluster 6 were characterised as being more 
dissatisfied with the collective relationship between management and employees than with 
practices that impact on individual well being in the organisation. It is employees such as the 
ones falling into this group for whom the collective industrial relationship has the most 
relevance. Everyone in this group except for 1 respondent belongs to a union, and as such 
their working conditions, wage increases, and benefits are negotiated for them by their 
representatives. It is unlikely that they would ever have cause to negotiate individually with 
their seniors, nor are they likely to be subject to individual processes such as performance 
management. Their dissatisfaction is thus more likely to be in the area with which they have 
the most experience rather than the areas that do not necessarily concern them directly.  This 
group were also defined as having moderate/moderately low organisational justice 
perceptions. It is arguably unsurprising that such a group might have relatively lower justice 
perceptions than some other groups in that they are likely to be the lower earners in the 
organisation and to work in harsher conditions and have more monotonous jobs than other 
employees in the organisations.  
 
On the other hand Cluster 2 was defined as comprising people who personally experience the 
organisation as fair, but have concerns about more general practices. Once again this is 
perhaps unsurprising given that the types of jobs that these people do are likely to be 
relatively well paid with better working conditions than people in the first group. They are 
thus likely to experience the organisation as being personally fair, particularly in relation to 
other employees. Their concern for more general practices that affect the organisation as a 
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whole might be seen as part of their job function, particularly for managers, human resources 
personnel, and even financial staff.  
 
Staying with this first grouping of ‘hands on’ employees, age was the next determinant of 
justice perceptions, with the grouping being split into 20 to 40 year olds, and an older group 
ranging from 41-63. The cluster memberships of these two groupings are slightly harder to 
interpret as the majority of people for both groups fall into Cluster 6  - those who are more 
satisfied with human resources practices, but less so with the industrial relationship in the 
organisation. This is consistent with the first split. Perhaps what is more enlightening is the 
clusters into which very few of these people fell. For the first group, that is hands-on 
employees below the age of 40, none fall into Cluster 5. People in Cluster 5 were 
characterised as being relatively satisfied with collective industrial relationship issues, but less 
so with the individual material benefits within the organisation.  The fact that none of these 
younger hands-on employees fell into this cluster is an indication that the central concern for 
this group is the industrial relationship. Once again this makes sense given the nature of work 
they do, the extent to which they are unionised, as well as the fact that people in this age 
group are the ones who would have started work towards the end of Apartheid, and who 
would have thus been central to changes in the labour laws of the country, have felt the 
benefits that the power of unions and solidarity can bring, as well as have a stronger sense of 
their rights. They are also the grouping that will feel the effects of the quality of the industrial 
relationship for a lot longer than the older grouping.     
 
With regards to the second grouping, that of older hands-on employees, very few (6%) fall 
into Cluster 3, which comprised people with high organisational justice perceptions who have 
a generalised positive attitude to the organisation, almost indiscriminately perceiving 
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everything to be just and fair. Once again this is unsurprising given that people in this group 
would have worked in this, or other organisations, right through the worst of the Apartheid 
years, where they would have been discriminated against to their financial and social 
detriment. It is unlikely that these older, less skilled workers would hold generalised high 
justice perceptions about the organisation.  
 
Looking at the next level of splits, the younger hands-on employees are grouped on the basis 
of religion, with Catholics, Anglicans, and Dutch Reform religions being separated out from 
the rest of the religions. All three of these religions are Christian denominations, and all could 
be considered relatively conservative and prescriptive. Within this group a clear majority 
(53.1%) fall into Cluster 4, a cluster defined by a clear move into lower justice perceptions 
and comprises people who, while they are expressing neutrality regarding certain human 
resource practices, are generally feeling that the organisation treats employees unfairly. Such 
people were also particularly concerned with process-driven practices that have less 
observable procedural mechanisms. It is difficult to explain why these particular religious 
backgrounds might impact on organisational justice perceptions in this way, but this could 
possibly be accounted for by the fact that these religions are ritualistic and procedure driven, 
and people who are adherents of such practices might carry such expectations over into other 
spheres of their lives, such as the workplace.  This group of people is already somewhat 
dissatisfied with organisational fairness given their jobs and their age, and their religious 
background might serve to focus their discontent onto more process driven facets.  
 
The older hands-on employees were divided on the basis of union membership, with members 
of SEPPAWU falling into one category and non-members and SACWU members falling into 
the other.  This split makes sense given that SEPPAWU is an affiliate of the Congress of 
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South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a union federation that is politically active and was 
central to the struggle against Apartheid. COSATU is closely aligned with the ruling African 
National Congress (ANC) party and is a relatively militant highly active body. The vast 
majority of South African unions are COSATU affiliates. SACWU on the other hand is not a 
COSATU affiliate, and caters to a more skilled workforce (within this group this is likely to 
be the technical staff). That they should be grouped with non-members who are traditionally 
more skilled employees is thus unsurprising. Once again the majority of both these groupings 
fall into Cluster 6, but significantly higher majority of the hands-on, older SEPPAWU 
members fall into this cluster (48.% vs. 35.6%). Further none of this group fall into Cluster 5 
or into Cluster 3. Again this is unsurprising given the concern people in Cluster 6 have for the 
collective relationship, and the fact that these employees are particularly unlikely to hold 
generalised high justice perceptions. Members of a union like SEPPAWU are likely to be 
more militant and aware of problems in the collective relationship than those in more ‘white 
collar’ unions or non-members.  
 
The final level of splits for the younger, hands –on employees is less meaningful. For the 
“conservative’ religious grouping the next split was made on the basis of whether respondents 
had any financial investments, but the groupings are divided into those who do and don’t 
have, and those who had missing data for that answer. As such that split is meaningless. For 
the other religious grouping the next split is made on the basis of organisational tenure, with 
one group comprising those who have been in the organisation for between 1 and 3 years and 
the other those who have been in the organisation between 4 and 10 years. While this split 
makes sense in that respondents who are relatively new to the organisation are in one group 
and those who have been there for longer are in another, the cluster affiliations are harder to 
interpret.   
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For the longer tenured people, the majority of people fall evenly into Clusters 1 and 6, but 
with proportionally more of people in this group falling into Cluster 1 than in the other group 
(39.0% vs. 17.1%). Once again this makes sense. Cluster 1 comprises the lowest scorers for 
almost every item, with people in this group being particularly concerned with their capacity 
to progress in the organisation. People in this cluster appear to have very little sense of hope 
with regards to moving out of their current positions, and have particularly low justice 
perceptions about direct and related practices that would potentially enable them to do so. 
This grouping have been in the organisation for relatively long periods yet they remain in 
more general or hands-on jobs, as such it is unsurprising that they would hold such 
perceptions.  
 
With regards to the shorter tenured people, proportionally more of this group fall into Clusters 
3 and 2 than do the longer tenured people. Cluster 3 comprised generalised high justice 
perception scorers, while people in Cluster 2 were defined as people who personally 
experience the organisation as fair, but have concerns about more general practices that may 
or may not affect them directly. Both of these clusters comprise people who have higher 
justice perceptions than other groups. This is perhaps an indication that people who are newer 
to the organisation have less direct experience with organisational practices and therefore they 
have higher justice perceptions or more generalised concerns.  
 
Moving onto the final split for the older, hands-on workers, those who are SEPPAWU 
members were split on the basis of job tenure, with those who have been in the same job for 
between 1 and 7 years falling into one group, and those who have been in the same job for 8 
to 9 years falling into the other. The much wider range for the first group is a possible 
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indication that job tenure has more of an impact on justice perceptions when it reaches a 
relatively long period – it seems to reach some sort of critical point. At this point it appears 
some of the justice concerns shift. There are no longer-tenured people in Cluster 6, while 
57.1% of the shorter tenured group fall into this cluster. Cluster 6 has had relatively high and 
consistent representation from this branch of the CHAID all the way through the tree, so this 
marks a departure from this trend. Instead 50% fall into Cluster 4 and 50% into Cluster 2. 
Cluster 4 comprises people who generally feel that the organisation treats employees unfairly 
but seem to be less concerned with the more visible, measurable organisational practices, and 
more concerned with process-driven practices that have less observable procedural 
mechanisms. Cluster 2, on the other hand, was defined as comprising people who personally 
experience the organisation as fair, but have concerns about more general practices that may 
or may not affect them directly. Both these clusters have a concern for more general, 
unobservable practices in common. As such, people who occupy the more hands on jobs in 
the organisational, are older, members of a more militant union and have occupied the same 
job for a relatively long period of time are more inclined to have concerns about 
organisational processes rather than specific practices. This could be because this group 
would have seen a range of policies come and go, particularly post-Apartheid. They arguably 
would have a sense of these specific practices being temporal and subject to change quite 
quickly, whereas the underlying process issues are more consistent and pervasive.  
 
With regards to the group comprising people who have been in their jobs a shorter period of 
time, the vast majority (57.1%) fall into Cluster 6. As mentioned previously this cluster was 
characterised as having moderate/moderately low organisational justice perceptions, with 
employees in this group being more dissatisfied with the collective relationship between 
management and employees than with practices that impact on individual well being in the 
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organisation.   Once again it is unsurprising that this group of people have a propensity to fall 
into Cluster 6, particularly given their union affiliation. The fact that they have remained in 
the same job for a shorter period of time than people in the other group perhaps contributes to 
their emphasis on the industrial, collective relationship in the organisation. For this group the 
collective relationship is the one of the only ways that their work conditions and benefits will 
improve, including opportunities to move to other jobs. Their emphasis is thus likely to be on 
the collective relationship.   
 
Finally, the non union and SACWU members are split on the basis of whether they are 
members of a pension or not, with the first grouping belonging to a pension and the second 
not. Pension membership as a predictor of justice perceptions makes sense in that this variable 
might be picking up on the extent to which employees feel cared for or looked after by the 
organisation. The organisation provides pensions for certain employees who meet particular 
contractual requirements. Not being on a pension thus may have implications for the 
interpersonal justice relationship between employees and the organisation. Having said that, 
the cluster affiliations for this variable are not particularly clear. Those who are not pension 
members seem spread relatively equally across clusters.  Further to this they differ on cluster 
membership relative to the other group for almost every cluster. The most marked 
differentiation however is in relation to Cluster 4, where there are no non-pension members 
relative to 23.1% pension members. Cluster 4 marked a much clearer move into lower justice 
perceptions and comprises people who are generally feeling that the organisation treats 
employees unfairly. They are also more concerned with process-driven practices that have 
less observable procedural mechanisms. The fact that none of the non-pension people fell into 
this group might be an indication that their concerns are about specific human resource 
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practices such as the provision of a pension. It might also be an indication that at this level, 
people’s concerns are for the more material benefits of organisational life.   
 
Moving onto the second branch of the organisational justice CHAID diagram, it can be seen 
that the more office-based jobs were then split on the basis of union membership. Unlike for 
the first branch, this split is based on non-members versus members, with SACWU and 
SEPPAWU members forming one group. This is appropriate for this grouping of job types. 
This is because there are likely to be more non-members in this group as there is not a strong 
tradition of more highly skilled people in this country joining unions. Unions have historically 
catered to ‘blue-collar’ or semi-skilled employees. This group of people is also more likely to 
be characterised by a non-member/member split as it is likely to comprise more skilled 
workers and more highly educated workers. Further more people higher up in the 
organisational hierarchy, such as managers, are in this group, and they are seen to stand in 
opposition to the people that the unions represent.  
 
When looking at the cluster affiliations for this variable, it can be seen that there are four 
noticeable differences between the two groups. There are significantly more non-union 
members than union members in Clusters 3 and 2, and significantly more union members in 
Clusters 4 and 1. This makes sense when looking at the cluster characterisations. Cluster 3 
comprises generalised high justice perception scorers Cluster 2 was defined as comprising 
people who personally experience the organisation as fair, but have concerns about more 
general practices that may or may not affect them directly. Both of these clusters comprise 
people who , for the most part, feel that the organisation is fair. People in Cluster 4, on the 
other hand, were characterised by a strong distributive concern, as well as dissatisfaction with 
the less observable aspects of organisational practices, while people in Cluster 1 were 
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characterised as having a general sense of injustice regarding most organisational practices 
with particular emphasis on those practices that allow people to progress and develop within 
the organisation, as well as the quality of the relationship between managers and employees, 
particularly with regards to the use of authority.  As such it is unsurprising that non-union 
office based employees would have higher organisational justice perceptions. If they are 
happy with the work they are doing and the way in which the organisation treats them, they 
are unlikely to feel the need to join a union. On the other hand those who feel more 
disgruntled with the organisation and have lower justice perceptions would seek the 
protection and power of a union. 
 
Office workers who are not union members were then divided on the basis of how many 
people live in the same abode as them, with 0 to 5 falling into one group and 6 to 19 into the 
other. This split seems sensible in that up to 6 people living together could constitute a regular 
size family, while larger than that might be an indication of people taking on financial 
responsibility for more than one family unit, or crowded living conditions implying some 
financial pressure. There are only 17 members of the second group, and the results have to be 
interpreted in light of this. Looking more closely at the cluster membership it can be seen that 
there are significant differences between every cluster between the two groups. The most 
marked however pertain to Clusters 5, 4, and 1. There are significantly more people in the 
first group falling into Cluster 5, with more of the second group falling into 4 and 1.  
These two clusters both comprise people with low organisational justice perceptions, with 
people in Cluster 4 having a strong distributive concern, and people in Cluster 1 being 
characterised as having a general sense of injustice regarding most organisational practices. 
Thus it is unsurprising that people who are living in arguably overcrowded conditions would 
have a strong distributive justice concern and would experience the organisation generally as 
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unfair. This might be exacerbated by the fact that they are working more closely with people 
who are not living under such financially constrained conditions as themselves. Ironically 
people living with fewer people had a higher membership in Cluster 5 than those living with a 
lot of people, with people in Cluster 5 being characterised as being relatively satisfied with 
collective industrial relationship issues, but less so with the individual material benefits within 
the organisation. This is particularly confusing given that this group also do not belong to a 
union.  
 
Looking now at office workers who do belong to a union, the next split was on the basis of 
religion, with Catholics, Anglicans, and Hindus falling into the first group, and Methodists 
and Zionists falling into the second. This grouping is very difficult to interpret, and there is no 
clear reason why these religious groups would have clustered together. This cell thus has 
limited value. The same is true when looking at the final level of splits, where people sharing 
a house with fewer people were then divided on the basis of religion with Hindus, Anglican 
and Methodists falling into one group, and Muslims, Catholics, Dutch Reform, and Baptists 
into the other.  In fact much of the last part of this branch is less valuable. Office workers who 
are not union members and who live with more than six people were divided on the basis of 
area, but the one group, that comprising people from Durban only had 5 members, making 
comparison less meaningful.  Further, given that the religion nodes are difficult to interpret, it 
makes interpretation of the final splits for those group (that of age and medical aid) also 
meaningless. 
 
When looking at the competing splits tree for organisational justice perceptions (See Figure 
6.13) it can be seen that race, at 0.503, comes in very closely after job title at 0.514  for the 
first split. Ownership of a vacuum cleaner and area follow relatively closely, at 0.469 and 
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0.454 respectively. Ownership of a car is the final competing split, at a score of 0.386. For the 
first node of the second split, age is followed closely by level of education at 0.232 and union 
membership at 0.223. These are followed by marital status at 0.215, and membership of a 
pension scheme at 0.207. For the second node of the second split, union membership at a 
score of 0.672 is followed very closely by race at 0.637. Race is followed by salary at 0.610. 
There is then a relatively large gap, where ownership of a vacuum cleaner follows with a 
score of 0.462, and area comes after that with a score of 0.333. 
 
At the next level of splits, religion was clearly the strongest criteria with a score of 0.620. 
Investments follow at somewhat of a distance, with a score of 0.352. Province and language 
tie at the next level, with a score of 0.307. Number of dependants is the last competing split 
for that node, with a score of 0.285.  For the next node, union membership is followed 
relatively closely by level of education, with a score of 0.455. Ownership of a washing 
machine at 0.396 is followed very closely by religion at 0.395. Membership of a pension 
scheme is the last competing split for this node with a score of 0.386. For the next node, the 
number of people sharing an abode is the strongest criteria with a score of 0.569, with the next 
competing split, that of province, only having a score of 0.460. Area and religion follow 
province quite closely, with a score of 0.437 and 0.427 respectively. Looking at the final node 
at this level, religion is clearly the strongest criteria at 0.756, with the next split, age, having a 
score of 0.621. Membership of a religious discussion group follows with a score of 0.568, and 
type of abode is the fourth competing split for that node, with a score of 0.493.  
 
At the next level, tenure is the strongest criteria with a score of 0.349, with type of 
employment contract following at 0.273. Province follows with a score of 0.244, and 
frequency of religious worship comes next with a score of 0.220. Property is the last 
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competing split for this node, with a score of 0.219. At the next node, investments, with a 
score of 1.312 is followed closely by marital status, with a score of 0.115. Number of 
dependants then follows with a score of 0.965, and age closely thereafter, with a score of 
0.942. Length of tenure in current position is clearly the strongest criteria for the next node, 
with a score of 0.802. Number of people sharing an abode follows at a distance with a score 
of 0.668. That is followed by number of jobs in the last five years with a score of 0.554, and 
very closely after that is job title with a score of 0.534. For the next node, pension is the 
splitting criteria by a very short distance, with a score of 0.810 and education following with a 
score of 0.804. The next nearest split is membership of a religious youth group, with a score 
of 5.53, very closely followed by number of jobs in the last five years with a score of 0.525. 
At the fifth node on this level, religion with a score of 0.383 is closely followed by number of 
jobs in the last five years with a score of 0.317. This is followed by operation (i.e. the 
respondent or a dependent having needed an operation in the last year) at 0.317 and area at 
0.297. Area is the splitting criteria for the next node with a score of 2.720. This is followed by 
age at 2.020, having Ds-TV at 1.996 and job title at 1.890. For the next node, age, with a 
score of 1.216 is followed by length of tenure in the organisation at 0.919. This is followed by 
property ownership at 0.758, home ownership at 0.740, and type of abode at 0.721.   The final 
node is headed by medical aid at 0.939, but this is very closely followed by number of people 
sharing an abode at 0.902. Salary follows with a score of 0.809, ownership of a vacuum  
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Figure 6.12: CHAID Tree: Organisational Justice Perceptions 
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Figure 6.13: Competing Splits Tree - Organisational Justice Perceptions 
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cleaner at 0.703, and frequency of religious activity very closely after that with a score of 
0.702.  
 
The second CHAID analysis focussed on belief in a just world.  Looking at the decision tree 
for Belief in a Just world (See Figure 6.14), it can be seen that the first split is on the basis of 
religious persuasion, with categories 6,7,9,11,13, and 14 (Baptists, Anglican, Dutch reform, 
Zionist Christian, New Apostolic, and minority religions) falling into the first node, and 
categories 2,3,4,5, and 8 (Muslim, Hindu, Catholic, Protestant, and Methodist religions) 
falling into the second node. In the first node there are a total of 268 people. 12 (4.5%) 
people fall into Cluster 6, 39 (14.6%) fall into Cluster 5, the largest number of 80 (29.9%) 
fall into Cluster 4, 67 (25.0%) fall into Cluster 3, 44 (16.4%) fall into Cluster 2, 26 (9.7%) 
fall into Cluster 1. The second node comprises 197 people. 4 92.0%) of which fall into 
Cluster 6, 34 (17.3%) fall into Cluster 5, 60 (30.5%) fall into Cluster 4, 43 (21.8%) fall into 
Cluster 3, 53 (26.9%) fall into Cluster 2, and 3 (1.5%) fall into Cluster 1.  
 
The first religious preference node then splits on the basis of area (i.e. the area in which their 
place of work falls), with people working in the Cape region and the head office in 
Johannesburg (areas 1 and 2) falling into one node, and those working in Krugersdorp, 
Durban, and Kwazulu Natal coastal regions (areas 3, 4, and 5) falling into the second node. 
There are a total of 63 people in the first node, 4 (6.3%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 6 
(9.5%) into Cluster 5, 23 (36.5%), 14 (22.2%) into Cluster 3, 1 (1.6%) person into Cluster 2, 
and 15 (23.8%) into Cluster 1. Continuing with this leg of the tree, the first area node then 
splits on the basis of ‘Operation’ (i.e. whether the respondent or any of their dependants 
have required an operation in the past year), with the first node being people who have 
required operations, and the second node being those who have not. There are a total of 17 
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people in the first node, the majority of whom (11 or 64.7%) fall into Cluster 1. 1 (5.9%) 
person falls into Cluster 6, 3 (17.6%) into Cluster 5, 2 (11.8%) into Cluster 4, and none into 
Clusters 3 and 2.  There are a total of 46 people in the second node, the largest number of 
whom fall into Cluster 4 (21 or 45.7%). 3 (6.5%) people fall into Clusters 6 and 5 
respectively, 14 (30.4%) into Cluster 3, 1 (2.2%) person falls into Cluster 2, and 4 (8.7%) 
into Cluster 1.  
 
The first ‘operation’ node then splits on the basis of union membership, with non-members 
falling into node 1, and SACWU members into node 2. Both nodes are relatively small, with 
there being a total of 13 people in the first node, and 4 in the second. In the first node the 
majority of the 13 people (10 or 76.9%) fall into Cluster 1, 1 (7.7%) person falls into Cluster 
6, none fall into Clusters 5, 3, and 2 respectively, and 2 (15.4%) people fall into Cluster 4. In 
the second node, 3 (75.0%) of the 4 people fall into Cluster 5, 1 (25.0%) into Cluster 1, and 
none into Clusters 6, 4, 3, and 2.  The second ‘operation’ node splits on the basis of religious 
persuasion, with categories 6 and 7 (Baptist and Anglican religions) falling into the first 
node, and categories 9, 13, and 14 (Dutch Reform, New Apostolic, and minority religions) 
falling into the second node. There are a total of 26 people in the first node, 18 (69.2%) of 
whom fall into Cluster 4, 7 (26.9%) into Cluster 3, 1 (3.8%) of whom falls into Cluster 5, 
and none of whom fall into Clusters 6, 2, and 1. There a total of 20 people in the second 
node, 3 (15.0%) of whom fall into Clusters 6 and 4 respectively, 2 (10%) into Cluster 5, 7 
(35.0%), 1 (5.0%) into Cluster 2, and 4 (20.0%) into Cluster 1.  
 
Returning to the second ‘area’ node, this splits on the basis of job title , with job categories 
1,3,4,5,6,7,10, and 11 (administrative staff, general workers, managerial staff, supervisors, 
security personnel, sales staff, H.R. personnel, and technical staff) falling into node 1, and 
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job categories 2 and 14 (laboratory staff and accounting staff) into node 2. There are a total 
of 180 people in node 1, 8 (4.4%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 28 (15.6%) into Cluster 5, 50 
(27.8%) into Cluster 4, 45 (25.0%) into Cluster 3, 43 (23.9%) into Cluster 2, and 6 (3.3%) 
into Cluster 1. There are a total of 25 people in the second node, none of whom are falling 
into Clusters 6 and 2. 5 (20.0%) are falling into Cluster 5, 7 (38.0%) into Cluster 4, 8 
(32.0%) into Cluster 3, and 5 (20.0%) into Cluster 1.  
 
The first job title node then splits on the basis of those engaged in religious community 
outreach and those who are not. In the first node, those who are not involved in community 
outreach, there are a total of 155 people. 8 (5.2%) are in Cluster 6, 22 (14.2%) are in Cluster 
5, 43 (27.7%) are in Cluster 4, 36 (23.2%) are in Cluster 3, 43 (27.7%) are in Cluster 2, and 
3 (1.9%) are in Cluster 1. In the second node, those who are involved in religious 
community outreach, there are a total of 25 people. None of these people fall into Clusters 6 
and 2, 6 (24.0%) fall into Cluster 5, 7 (28.0%) into Cluster 4, 9 (36.0%) into Cluster 3, and 3 
(12.0%) into Cluster 1. The second job title node splits on the basis of number of people 
sharing an abode, with 0-8 people in the first node, and 9-19 in the second. There are a total 
of 22 people in the first node, none of whom fall into Clusters 6 and 2, 5 (22.7%) into 
Cluster 5, 7 (31.8%) into Cluster 4, 8 (36.4%) into Cluster 3, and 2 (9.1%) into Cluster 1. 
The second node comprises only 3 people, all of whom are in Cluster 1.  
 
Returning to the first main split on the basis of religious persuasion, the second node of this 
split then splits on the basis of ownership of a fridge, with the first node being those people 
who do own a fridge, and the second node those who do not. There are 159 people in the 
first node, 3 (1.9%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 22 (13.8%) into Cluster 5, 55 (34.6%) into 
Cluster 4, 35 (22.0%) into Cluster 3, 44 (27.7%) into Cluster 2, and none of whom fall into 
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Cluster 1. There are 38 people in the second node, 1 (2.6%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 12 
(31.6%) fall into Cluster 5, 5 (13.2%) into Cluster 4, 8 (21.1%) into Cluster 3, 9 (23.7%) 
into Cluster 2, and 3 (7.9%) into Cluster 1.  
 
The first fridge ownership node then splits on the basis of job title, with job categories 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7, and 11(administrative staff, laboratory staff, general workers, managerial staff, 
supervisors, security personnel, sales staff, and technical staff) falling into the first node, and 
job categories 10 and 14 (H.R. staff and financial staff) falling into node 2. There are a total 
of 142 people in the fist node, 2 91.45) of whom fall into Cluster 1, 22 (15.5%) into Cluster 
5, 50 (35.2%) into Cluster 4, 35 (24.6%) into Cluster 3, 33 (23.2%) in Cluster 2, and none of 
whom fall into Cluster 1. The second node comprises 17 people, the majority of whom (11 
or 64.7%) fall into Cluster 2. 1 (5.9%) person falls into Cluster 6, none fall into Cluster 5, 3, 
and 1respectively, and 5 (29.4%) fall into Cluster 4. The second fridge ownership node splits 
on the basis of the number of jobs the respondent has had in the past 5 years, with 1-2 jobs 
falling into the first node, and 3-6 jobs into the second node. There are a total of 23 people in 
the first node, none of whom fall into Cluster 6, 9 939.1%) into Cluster 5, 4 (17.%) into 
Cluster 4, 5 (21.7%) into Cluster 3, 2 (8.7%) into Cluster 2, and 3 (13.0%) into Cluster 1. 
The second node comprises 15 people, 1(6.7%) of whom falls into Clusters 6 and 4 
respectively, 3 (20.0%) into Clusters 5 and 3 respectively, 7 (46.7%) into Cluster 2, and 
none of whom fall into Cluster 1.  
 
The first job title node then splits on the basis of area, with areas 1,3,4,and 5 (Cape region, 
Krugersdorp, Durban, and Kwazulu Natal coastal) falling into the first node, and area 2 
(Head Office in Johannesburg) falling into the second node. There are a total of 125 people 
in this first node, with only 2 (1.6%) falling into Cluster 6, 20 (16%) into Cluster 5, 38 
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(30.4%) into Cluster 4, 35 (28.0%) into Cluster 3, 30 (24.0%) into Cluster 2, and none of 
whom fall into Cluster 1. The second area node comprises 17 people, the majority of which 
(12 or 70.06%) fall into Cluster 4, 2 (11.8%) of whom fall into Cluster 5, 3 (17.6%) into 
Cluster 2, and none of whom fall into Clusters 6, 3, and 1 respectively. The second job title 
node then splits on the basis of length of tenure in the organisation, with 1-3 years falling 
into the first node, and 4-10 years falling into the second node. These nodes are relatively 
small, with a total of 4 people in the first node and 13 in the second. In the first node, 1 
(25.0%)of the 3 people falls into Cluster 6, while the remaining 3 (75.0%) fall into Cluster 4. 
In the second node, 11 (84.6%) of the 13 people fall into Cluster 2, while the remaining 2 
(15.4%) people fall into Cluster 4.  
 
The first ‘number of jobs in the last 5 years’ node then splits on the basis of chronic 
medication (i.e. whether the respondent or any of his/her dependants have required chronic 
medication over the past year), with the response ‘no’ falling into the first node, and ‘yes’ 
into the second. There are a total of 20 people in the first node, none of whom fall into 
Cluster 6, 9 (45.0%) of whom fall into Cluster 2, 1 (5.0%) into Cluster 4, 5 (25.0%) into 
Cluster 3, 2  (10.0%) into Cluster 2, and 3 (15.0%) into Cluster 1. There are only 3 people in 
the second node, all of whom fall into Cluster 4. The second ‘number of jobs in the last 5 
years’ node splits on the basis of property ownership, with property owners falling into node 
1 and non-owners into node 2. There are only 5 people in the first node, 3 (60.0%) of whom 
fall into Cluster 3, and 1(20.0%) of whom falls into Clusters 4 and 2 respectively. There are 
10 people in the second node, 6 (60.0%) of whom are in Cluster 2, 3 (30.0%) in Cluster 5, 
and 1 910.0%) in Cluster 6.  
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Looking more closely at the belief in a just world, as was mentioned previously the first split 
was made on the basis of religion, meaning that of all the demographic variables included in 
the analysis, religious affiliation was the best determinant of social justice perceptions. This 
is unsurprising in that religions are aimed at providing a basis for judging what constitutes 
moral behaviour, and therefore are used to facilitate followers in judging right or wrong 
action. Religion affiliation is, therefore, likely to impact on social justice perceptions as 
different religions advocate different kinds of morality. This can be seen more clearly when 
looking at the different groupings. The first group comprised Baptists, Anglicans, Dutch 
Reform Christians, Zionist Christians, as well as New Apostolic Christians, while the second 
group comprised Muslims, Hindus, and Catholics. Clearly Muslims, Hindus, Catholics and 
Methodists were separated out from the different denominations of the Protestant church.  At 
a broad level the religions in this second grouping could perhaps be considered to be 
doctrinal in nature in that they are based on a corpus of texts that are prescriptive – the texts 
prescribe what one should believe and how. The Second group of religions, on the other 
hand, arguably tend towards evangelical individualism – they emphasise an individuals 
emotional relationship with God and prize individual conviction and emotion above 
prescriptive doctrine. While Methodism is a Protestant religion it is one of the earliest forms 
of Protestantism, and is very structured. It arguably has more in common with Catholicism 
than the other Protestant religions.   
 
Looking at the cluster affiliation it can be seen that there are 3 clusters for which there are 
markedly different membership proportions, namely Clusters 1, 2, and 6. The Protestant 
religion groupings have a higher proportion of members in Clusters 1 and 6, and a lower 
proportion in Cluster 2 when compared with the more doctrine based religions. Cluster 2 
comprises people whose beliefs about justice are based on a clear work ethic – those 
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individuals who work hard will derive the benefits they deserve. As a corollary to this, those 
who take benefits without working for them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, 
benefit. On the other hand, Cluster 1 comprises people who are, for the most part, fairly low 
scorers, believing that justice is unlikely to be done, and the world is not a place where each 
gets his due. Similarly people in Cluster 6 have a general sense that there is no guarantee that 
anyone will actually get what they deserve, and believe that people might benefit from 
immoral or unjust actions, such as crime.  
 
Clearly people in the Protestant religion groups have a stronger sense of the world as an 
unjust place than those in the doctrine based group who tend towards a belief that effort will 
yield results. This could possibly be explained by the more prescriptive nature of the 
doctrine based religions which strongly entrenches the notion that moral and religious 
behaviour will be rewarded, both on earth and in the afterlife. While the Protestant religions 
would also express this belief they would be less prescriptive in interpreting what such 
behaviour was. As such there might be more flexibility that leads to a less definite sense of 
the relationship between effort and reward. Further, given that these religions have a more 
open and flexible base would allow for followers to question the ambiguity that exists in the 
world and recognise injustice. As such they could possibly be more likely to see the world as 
unjust.  
 
The Protestant based religions then split on the basis of the area in which people live, with 
people living in the Cape and Gauteng falling into one branch and those living in Durban, 
Durban coastal, and Krugersdorp falling into the other. This grouping appears to divide 
areas into the two major provinces in South Africa (Gauteng and the Cape) and three smaller 
areas (Durban, Durban coastal, and Krugersdorp). Looking at the cluster affiliation it can be 
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seen that there are two notable differences between the groups, namely in relation to 
Clusters 2 and 1. The larger provinces group has proportionally more people in Cluster 1 
than the smaller areas, who in turn have proportionally more members in Cluster 2. Cluster 2 
comprises people whose beliefs about justice are based on a clear work ethic – those 
individuals who work hard will derive the benefits they deserve. As a corollary to this, those 
who take benefits without working for them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, 
benefit. On the other hand, Cluster 1 comprises people who are, for the most part, fairly low 
scorers, believing that justice is unlikely to be done, and the world is not a place where each 
gets his due. People living in the larger provinces thus have lower social justice perceptions 
than those living in the smaller area. This is possibly unsurprising given that the larger 
provinces are prone to more social problems such as crime, overcrowding, and 
unemployment. On the other hand the smaller areas possibly facilitate more of a ‘small 
town’ mentality which promotes the idea of hard work and reward, and in which people are 
exposed to fewer of the problems of large city living.  
 
Looking at the next level of splits, the Cape and Gauteng group then split on the basis of 
whether or not they or any of their dependants have required an operation in the last two 
years. This seems like an unlikely determinant of justice perceptions in that this question 
was included as part of a series of questions exploring health and financial status. On its own 
it might seem rather arbitrary. Despite this it is indicating some clear cluster affiliations. 
Possibly this variable has emerged as important in that it signifies a possibly traumatic event 
or an event which could call into question perceptions of justice. There are 3 marked 
differences in cluster affiliation for this group, in relation to Clusters 1, 3, and 4, with their 
being significantly more people who have had an operation in Cluster 1, and significantly 
more who haven’t in Clusters 4 and 3. Cluster 3 comprises the highest scoring people for 
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most of the items in this scale and comprises people who believe that justice will, for the 
most part, be done, both at a personal and a broader social level. People in Cluster 4 did not 
have faith in the belief that one’s own hard work will be paid off but did have a slightly 
stronger belief that broader social systems will, in the long run, be fair. On the other hand, 
Cluster 1 clearly comprises people who are, for the most part, fairly low scorers, believing 
that justice is unlikely to be done, and the world is not a place where each gets his due. It 
seems likely that people who have experienced something as negative as an operation (along 
with all the complications related to engaging with the health system in this country) might 
be more prone to negative justice beliefs. Obviously the reverse cannot necessarily be said to 
be true, in that the absence of an operation wouldn’t prompt feelings of justice. However it 
might mean that people in this group have not had their justice perceptions challenged in the 
same way as people in the other group have. 
 
People living in the smaller areas of South Africa were then split on the basis of job title, 
with laboratory and financial staff being separated out from all the other job titles. As 
mentioned previously job title is representative of a range of variables in a person’s life, not 
all of which are confined to work life. As such it is unsurprising that it is such a relatively 
strong determinant of social justice perceptions. It is, however, more difficult to interpret the 
nature of the groupings. One possible explanation could be that both financial and laboratory 
staff, the latter comprising jobs such as technicians, research chemists, and colour 
technicians, are likely to be particularly strong mathematically and might have an orientation 
to more logical, procedural, and structural thinking.  The other jobs, however, may require 
more of a mix between logic and creativity.  
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The most notable differences in cluster membership for this split relate to Clusters 1 and 2, 
with more financial and laboratory staff falling into Cluster 1 and fewer into Cluster 2.  
Cluster 1 comprises people who are, for the most part, fairly low scorers, believing that 
justice is unlikely to be done, and the world is not a place where each gets his due. People in 
Cluster 2, on the other hand, have a stronger belief that those individuals who work hard, be 
it at school or at work, will derive the benefits they deserve. As a corollary to this, those who 
take benefits without working for them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, benefit. 
 
The final level of splits are not all interpretable given the sizes of some of the groups. For 
example the group of people who had operations split on the basis of union membership, but 
the two groups comprise 13 and 4 people respectively. Similarly financial and laboratory 
employees split on the basis of the number of people with whom they share an abode, but 
the groupings comprise 22 and 3 people respectively.  These grouping sizes make any 
conclusions limited in value. Further, the non-operation group was split on the basis of 
religious affiliation, with one group comprising Baptists and Anglicans, and the other Dutch 
reform and New Apostolic members. While there may be some significance for this split, 
the meaning is not apparent. There does not seem to be any obvious reasons for this type of 
grouping, making any interpretation difficult.  
 
One final split that does warrant mention is that of the first grouping of job title, namely not 
laboratory or financial staff, splitting on the basis of their involvement in community 
outreach as part of their religious activities. The groupings were made on the basis of those 
who were involved in community outreach and those who were not. Such a split makes 
sense particularly in light of the fact that religious affiliation was the first determinant of 
social justice perceptions. The community outreach variable possibly points to the degree to 
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which people are engaged with their religion of choice or the extent of their religiosity, 
adding more depth to simple religious affiliation. The most marked difference relates to the 
membership of Cluster 2, where 27.7% of people who are not involved in religious 
community work belong to this cluster as opposed to none from the other group. Cluster 2 
comprises people who believe that those individuals who work hard, be it at school or at 
work, will derive the benefits they deserve and those who take benefits without working for 
them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, benefit. To some extent this affiliation 
makes sense. If people believe that if you work hard you will reap the benefits, they might 
be less sympathetic to people who have fallen on hard times, possibly believing that they 
have not worked hard enough. As such they would be less likely to engage in community 
work aimed at helping those less fortunate. 
 
Moving onto the second main branch of the social justice decision tree, it can be seen that the 
more doctrine based religions split on the basis of whether or not the respondent owned a 
refrigerator. Like the question pertaining to whether or not people have had an operation, this 
seems like an unlikely predictor on its own. Again this question was asked as part of a series 
of questions aimed at exploring financial status, yet out of all of these questions (including 
those related to salary, number of financial dependants, or ownership of one’s house) owning 
a refrigerator emerged as the strongest predictor of social justice perceptions. This could 
possibly be explained by looking at what types of people are likely to own a refrigerator - they 
would have to have enough money to buy a fridge, live somewhere that had electricity, they 
would have enough money to buy food for relatively longer periods of time, and would not 
live a nomadic type of existence. While people who do not own a refrigerator do not 
necessarily fit the opposite description, it must be noted that a fridge is one of the first basic 
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items that people acquire when setting up a home. A refrigerator can thus be seen as 
indicative of a particular type of lifestyle that extends beyond just pure financial matters.  
 
There are three noticeable differences between the two groups in relation to cluster affiliation. 
There are more members of Cluster 4 among people who do own a fridge than those who 
don’t, and more members of Clusters 5 and 1 among those who don’t own a fridge than those 
who do.  People in Cluster 4 put less faith in the belief that one’s own hard work will be paid 
off but did have a slightly stronger belief that broader social systems will, in the long run, be 
fair. For people living in relatively stable conditions such as those described above, the 
broader social system is, to some extent, working. They would be more likely to believe that 
it is fair than those living more unstable lives. On the other hand, Cluster 1 clearly comprises 
people who are, for the most part, fairly low scorers, believing that justice is unlikely to be 
done, and the world is not a place where each gets his due. Again it seems unsurprising that 
people who do not own refrigerators might tend slightly more to a belief in broader social 
injustice. Despite this, people in Cluster 5 do not believe that people always deserve their 
misfortune but seem to feel more strongly about people deserving their own good fortune. It 
might seem contradictory that people who are not living with even the most basic of 
household appliances, particularly one so closely linked to a certain quality of life, have a 
stronger belief that people deserve their own good fortune, in that there would be an 
implication that they have not earned a better quality of life. However this belief is coupled 
with a belief that people do not deserve their own misfortune, which would presumably apply 
to themselves.  
 
People who do own a refrigerator were then split on the basis of job title, with Human 
resources and financial jobs falling into one grouping and all other job titles into the other. 
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The human resources and financial functions in organisations are usually closely linked in that 
the employees and their performance are essential to the healthy financial functioning of the 
organisation. Human resources is often seen as one of the mechanisms used to keep pay roll 
costs contained as well as to keep such costs relative to performance. Both such types of jobs 
will take a keen interest in employee performance (albeit sometimes for very different 
reasons). This is not, therefore, an unlikely grouping. Looking at the cluster affiliations it can 
be seen that significantly more of this group belong to Cluster 2 than of the other group. In 
fact the majority of people in this group (64.7%) belong to Cluster 2. People in Cluster 2 hold 
beliefs about justice that are based on a clear work ethic – those individuals who work hard 
will derive the benefits they deserve. As a corollary to this, those who take benefits without 
working for them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, benefit. This is congruent with 
the nature of these two particular jobs, were what a person does and how well they do it has 
directly visible results in the form of salary and other benefits including status. There is some 
indication that this particular focus on exchange relationships at work is also apparent in their 
ideas about social justice at a broader level.  
 
People who do not own a refrigerator were then split on the basis of the number of jobs 
respondents have had in the last five years. This question is representative of the extent of 
stability in one’s work life, and in turn, to some extent, in one’s social life. This is arguably 
particularly true within the South African context where there are many industries that make 
use of casual or seasonal labour, and where the practices of smaller employers is not 
monitored resulting in high turnover of staff. As such there is a relatively large contingent of 
unskilled workers who change jobs frequently, often not out of their own volition. Given that 
the previous split was also an indicator of domestic stability, it makes sense that one should 
follow the other and interact in this way. The two groups were divided into those who had one 
   
   354 
or two jobs, a fairly stable history, and those who had between 3 and 6, a more unstable 
record. When looking at the cluster affiliations, two differences are apparent – there are more 
of the people with a stable work history in Cluster 5 than those with a more unstable history, 
and there are more of the unstable group in Cluster 2 than of the stable group.  People in 
Cluster 2 hold beliefs about justice that are based on a clear work ethic – those individuals 
who work hard will derive the benefits they deserve. As a corollary to this, those who take 
benefits without working for them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, benefit. This 
affiliation is quite difficult to explain, as intuitively one would imagine that this group of 
people would be more cynical and likely to believe that hard work is not rewarded. However, 
despite having a relatively unstable work history, they do persist in finding employment. This 
is arguably indicative of a determination to earn any benefits rather than, for example, taking 
them through welfare or becoming financially dependent on other family.  
 
The final level of this branch is limited in its value due to the cluster sizes, which make 
comparison meaningless. 
 
Looking at the competing splits for belief in a just world (See Figure 6.15) it can be seen 
area, with a score of 0.18, came in very closely behind religion, which has a score of 0.189 
that for the first split. This is closely followed by job title with a score of 0.179, race with a 
score of 0.171, and ownership of M-Net with a score of 0.136. For the first split at the next 
level, area came in first with a score of 0.468. This is followed by province with a score of 
0.397, operation with a score of 0.378, job title considerably further down with a score of 
0.291, and finally salary with a score of 0.288. For the second split, ownership of a fridge, 
with a score of 0.317 comes in first, but is followed relatively closely by age with a score of 
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0.287. Age is narrowly followed by job title with a score of 0.266, marital status with a score 
of 0.260, and finally race, with a score of 0.255.  
 
For the first node at the next level, an operation in the last year came in first by a very strong 
lead, with a score of 1.482. Age follows with a score of 0.909, requiring hospitalisation next 
with a score of 0.883, then number of people sharing an abode with a score of 0.783, and 
finally religion with a score of 0.741. For the second split at this level, job title comes in first 
by a narrow margin with a score of 0.369. Province follows with a score of 0.352. Length of 
tenure in the organisation is next with a score of 0.323, then length of tenure in current job 
with a score of 0.316. Finally involvement in religious community outreach follows with a 
score of 0.292. Job title comes in relatively strongly for the third split at this level, with a 
score of 0.358. This is followed by area with a score of 0.247, and then race with a score of 
0.238. Ownership of Ds-TV then follows with a score of 0.229, and finally frequency of 
religious activity, with a relatively low score of 0.192.  The final split at this level is headed 
by number of jobs in the past five years with a score of 1.771. Age then follows with a score 
of 1.440. This is followed by frequency of religious activity with a score of 1.417, then 
ownership of property with a very similar score of 1.412, and finally religion with a score of 
1.367.  
 
At the fourth level of splits, while the first node is headed by union membership with a score 
of 1.661, this is tied with number of people sharing an abode and frequency of religious 
activity. Ownership of a vacuum cleaner and salary tie in the next place, with a very close 
score of 1.547. The second node is headed by religion with a score of 1.193, which is 
followed by age (1.051), frequency of religious worship (0.885), frequency of religious 
activity (0.846), and finally length of tenure in the organisation (0.781). The third split at 
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this level has involvement with religious community outreach at the forefront with a score of 
0.455. Language follows with a score of 0.386, which is followed by province with a score 
of 0.300. Area comes next with a score of 0.290, and finally age with a score of 0.263. For 
the next split, number of people sharing an abode comes in first with a score of 1.696. This 
is followed relatively closely by number of dependants with a score of 1.416. Salary comes 
next with a score of 1.321, and attending prayer meetings with a score of 1.284. Finally 
length of tenure in the organisation comes in, with a score of 1.161. The fifth split at this 
level is headed by area (0.263) but is narrowly followed by race with a score of 0.259. 
Frequency of religious activity and ownership of Ds-TV follow closely with score of 0.253 
and 0.225 respectively. Job title then comes in with a score of 0.187. Length of tenure in the 
organisation heads up the sixth split with a score of 1.098, followed by union membership 
(0.950). Type of abode, number of people sharing an abode and number of children all tie 
for third place with a score of 0.923. The seventh split has the taking of chronic medication 
at the forefront (1.591). This is followed by frequency of religious activity (1.315), length of 
tenure in current position (0.958), ownership of a video machine (0.952), and finally 
ownership of a personal computer (0.948). While property ownership is first for the final 
split with a score of 2.176, this is in fact tying with the taking of chronic medication, age, 
and frequency of religious activity. Education comes in last with a score of 1.974. 
 
The final CHAID analysis focussed on belief in an unjust world. Looking at the decision 
tree for belief in an unjust world (See Figure 6.16), it can be seen that the first split occurs 
on the basis of religious preference, with the first node comprising categories 2, 3, 5, and 8, 
(Muslim, Hindu, Protestant, and Methodist religions) and the second node, categories 
4,6,7,9,11,13,and 14 (Catholic, Baptist, Anglican, Dutch Reform, New Apostolic, and 
minority religions). In the first node there are a total of 212 people, 26 (12.3%) of whom are 
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in Cluster 1, 25 (11.8%) are in Cluster 5, 13 (6.1%) are in Cluster 4, 54 (25.5%) are in 
Cluster 3, 82 (38.7%) are in Cluster 2, and 12 (5.7%) are in Cluster 1. In the second node 
there are a total of 253 people. Of these people 29 (11.5%) are in Cluster 6, 36 (14.2%) are 
in Cluster 5, 31 (12.3%) are in Cluster 4, 47 (18.6%) are in Cluster 3, 70 (27.7%) are in 
Cluster 2, and 40 (15.8%) are in Cluster 1.   
 
The first religion node then splits on the basis of job title, with the first node comprising job 
categories 1, 6, and 14 (Administrative staff, Sales staff, and Financial staff) and the second 
node, job categories 2,3,4,5,7,10, and 11 (Laboratory staff, General Workers, Managerial staff, 
Supervisors/Foremen, Security staff, H.R. staff, Technical staff).  There are a total of 72 people 
in the first node, of which 10 (13.9%) are in Cluster 6, 9 (12.5%) in Cluster 5, none in Cluster 4, 
28 (38.9%) in Cluster 3, 21 (29.2%) in Cluster 2, 4 (5.6%) in Cluster 1. There are 140 people in 
node 2. 16 (11.4%) of these people are in Clusters 6 and 5 respectively, 13 (9.3%) in Cluster 4, 
26 (18.6%) in Cluster 3, 61 (43.6%) in Cluster 2, and 8 (5.7%) in Cluster 1.  
 
Following this branch, the first node of job title splits on the basis of number of dependants, with 
1-7 dependants falling into node 1, and 9-10 dependants into node 2. The first node comprises 
51 people, the largest number (24 or 47.1%) of which fall into Cluster 3. 6 (11.8%) people fall 
into Cluster 6, 9 (17.6%) into Cluster 5, none fall into Clusters 4 and 1 respectively, and 12 
(23.5%) fall into Cluster 2. In the second node there are 21 people. Of these 21 people there are 
4 (19.0%) in Clusters 6, 3, and 1 respectively, none in Clusters 5 and 4 respectively, and 9 
(42.9%) into Cluster 2.    
 
This first node splits again on the basis of number of dependants. The first node comprises those 
with 1-4 dependants and the second those with between 5 and 7 dependants. There are 45 people 
   
   358 
in the first node, 6 (13.3%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 5 (11.1%) into Cluster 5, none fall into 
Clusters 4 and 1 respectively, 24 (53.3%) into Cluster 3, and 10 (22.2%) into Cluster 2. There 
are 6 people in the second node. None of these people fall into Clusters 6, 4, 3, and 1 
respectively. 4 (66.7%) people fall into Cluster 5, and 2 (33.3%) into Cluster 2.  
 
The second ‘number of dependants’ node splits on the basis of number of jobs in the past five 
years, with 1-2 jobs in node 1 and 3-6 jobs in node 2. In this first node there are 14 people, the 
majority (9 or 64.3%) of whom are in Cluster 2. 2 (14.3%) fall into Clusters 6 and 3 
respectively, and 1 (7.1%) falls into Cluster 1. None of these people fall into Clusters 4 and 5. In 
the second node there are a total of 7 people, 2 (28.6%) of whom fall into Clusters 6 and 3 
respectively, and 3 (42.9%) of whom fall into Cluster 1.  
 
Returning to the first split on the basis of job title, the second node in this split then splits on the 
basis of hospitalisation (i.e. if the respondent or any of his or her dependants have required 
hospitalisation in the past year), with people who have required hospitalisation in node 1 and 
people who have not in node 2. There are 50 people in the first node, 6 (12.0%) of whom are in 
Cluster 6, 4 (8.0%) are in Cluster 5, 7 (14.0%) are in Cluster 4, 8 (16.0%) are in Clusters 3 and 1 
respectively, and 17 (34.0%) are in Cluster 2. There are 90 people in the second node, the largest 
number (44 or 48.9%) of who fall into Cluster 2.  10 (11.1%) fall into Cluster 6, 12 (13.3%) into 
Cluster 5, 6 (6.7%) into Cluster 4, 18 (20.0%) into Cluster 3, and none of whom fall into Cluster 
1.  
 
The first hospitalisation node then splits on the basis of length of tenure in the organisation, with 
people having been in the organisation for 1-8 years falling into node one, and those who have 
been there for 9-10 years into node two. There are 42 people in node 1, 5 (11.9%) of whom fall 
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into Cluster 6, 3 (7.1%) into Cluster 5, 6 (14.3%) into node 4, 7 (16.7%) into Cluster 3, 17 
(40.5%) into Cluster 2 and 4 (9.5%) into Cluster 1. There are 8 people in the second node, with 1 
(12.5%) person falling into Clusters 6, 5, 4, and 3 respectively.  4 (50.0%) people fall into 
Cluster 1. The second hospitalisation node splits on the basis of number of dependants, with 
those having between 1 and 5 dependants falling into node one, those with between 6-10 
dependants falling into node 2. There are 79 people in this first node, the majority (43 or 54.4%) 
of whom falls into Cluster 2. 10 (12.7%) fall into Cluster 6, 8 (10.1%) into Cluster 5, 6 (7.6%) 
into Cluster 4, 12 (15.2%) into Cluster 3, and none of whom fall into Cluster 1. There are 11 
people in the second node, none of whom fall into Clusters 6, 4, and 1. 4 (36.4%) fall into 
Cluster 5, 6 (54.5%) into Cluster 3, and 1 (9.1%) into Cluster 2. 
 
Returning to the second main branch of the tree, the second node of religious preference splits 
on the basis of job title, with categories 3, 6, 10, and 14 (General Workers, Sales staff, H.R. 
staff, and Finance staff) falling into the first node, and categories 1,2,4,5,7, and 11 
(Administrative staff, Laboratory staff, Managerial staff, Supervisors/Foremen, Security staff, 
and technical staff) falling into the second. There are 133 people in the first node, 11 (8.3%) of 
whom fall into Cluster 6, 15 (11.3%) into Cluster 5, 22 (16.5%) into Cluster 4, 13 (9.8%) into 
Cluster 3, 45 (33.8%) into Cluster 2, and 27 (20.3%) into Cluster 1. There are 120 people in the 
second node, 18 915.0%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 21 (17.5%) into Cluster 5, 9 (7.5%) into 
Cluster 4, 34 (28.3%) into Cluster 3, 25 (20.8%) into Cluster 2, and 13 (10.8%) into Cluster 1.  
 
The first ‘job title’ node then splits on the basis of race, with black and coloured people falling 
into node one and white people falling into node two. There are 111 people in the first node, the 
largest number of whom (42 or 37.8%) are falling into Cluster 2. 10 99.0%) are falling into 
Cluster 6, 14 (12.6%) into Cluster 5, 19 (17.1%) into Cluster 4, 12 (10.8%) into Cluster 3, and 
   
   360 
14 (12.6%) into Cluster 1. There are 22 people in the second node, with 1 (4.5%) person falling 
into Clusters 6, 5, and 3 respectively, and 3 (13.6%) people falling into Clusters 4 and 2 
respectively. 13 (59.1%) people fall into Cluster 1.  
 
Following this branch, the first ‘race’ node splits on the basis of number of dependants, with 
those who have 1 dependant falling into the first node, and those who have between 2 and 10 
falling into the second node. There are 5 people in the first node, 4 (80.0%) of whom fall into 
Cluster 1, and 1 (20.0%) who falls into Cluster 3. In the second node there are 106 people, 10 
99.4%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 14 (13.2%) into Cluster 5, 19 (17.9%) into Cluster 4, 11 
910.4%) into Cluster 3, 42 (39.6%) into Cluster 2, and 10 (9.45) into Cluster 1. The second 
‘race’ node splits on the basis of property ownership. This node is really an artefact of the 
statistical process, as the first node comprises both those who do and do not own property, and 
the second node comprises those who had a missing value for this question. As such this split 
has very little meaning for this study.  
 
Returning to the second ‘job title node’, this splits on the basis of whether or not people engage 
in praying, with those who do falling into node one, and those who don’t falling into node 2. 
There are 56 people in the first node, with 11 (19.6%) people falling into Clusters 6, 3, and 1 
respectively. 13 (23.2%) people fall into Cluster 5, 4 (7.1%) into Cluster 4, and 6 (10.7%) into 
Cluster 2. There are 64 people in the second node, the largest number (23 or 35.9%) of whom 
fall into Cluster 3. 7 (10.9%) fall into Cluster 6, 8 (12.5%) into Cluster 5, 5 (7.8%) into Cluster 
4, 19 (29.7%) into Cluster 2, and 2 (3.1%) into Cluster 1.  
 
This first ‘praying’ node then splits on the basis of home ownership, with those who do own 
their own home falling into the first node, and those who don’t into the second. There are 32 
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people in the first node, 2 (6.3%) of whom fall into Cluster 6, 10 (31.3%) into Cluster 5, 4 
912.5%) into Cluster 4, 8 (25.0%) into Cluster 3, 3 (9.4%) into Cluster 2, and 5 (15.65) into 
Cluster 1. The second ‘praying’ node splits on the basis of religion, with categories 4,6,7,9,11, 
and 13 (Catholic, Baptist, Anglican, Dutch Reform, Zionist Christian, and New Apostolic 
religions ) falling into the first node, and category 14 (Minority religions) falling into the second. 
There are 59 people in the first node, with 7 911.9%) people falling into Cluster 6, 8 (13.6%) 
into Cluster 5, 2 (3.4%) into Cluster 4, 22 (37.3%) into Cluster 3, 19 (32.2%) into Cluster 2, and 
1 (1.7%) into Cluster 1. The second node comprises 5 people, 3 (60.0%) of whom fall into 
Cluster 4, and 1 (20.0%) of whom falls into Clusters 3 and 1 respectively.  
 
In looking at which variables were competing splits in the belief in an unjust world decision tree 
(See Figure 6.17), it can be seen that for the first split religion won relatively narrowly with a 
score of 0.178. Property ownership follows with a score of 0.152, Praying with a score of 0.131, 
and number of dependants with a score of 0.121.  For the second level of splits, job title heads 
the first node with a very narrow margin (0.256). Number of dependants follows with a score of 
0.252. Property ownership then follows with a score of 0.244, age with a score of 0.221, and 
finally chronic illness with a score of 0.218. For the second node at this level job title once again 
came in first with a score of 0.310. Race follows relatively closely, however, with a score of 
0.293. This is followed by level of education (0.202), and area (0.201). Investment is the last 
competing split, with a score of 0.187.  
 
At the next level, the first node is headed up by number of dependants with a score of 0.949. 
This is closely followed by property ownership with a score of 0.888. Worship comes next 
(0.853), followed by religion (0.673), and length of tenure in the organisation (0.596). 
Hospitalisation heads the second node relatively comfortably with a score of 0.595. Number 
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of jobs in the past five years follows with a score of 0.474. Worship comes next with a score 
of 0.393, and is followed by number of dependants with a score of 0.363. Race follows 
closely with a score of 0.347. The third node at this level is headed by race, which came in 
very strongly with a score of 0.616. Area, the next competing split, has a score of only 0.394. 
This is closely followed by worship and number of dependants, both with a score of 0.392. 
Investment comes in last with a score of 0.348. Praying tops the final node at this level with a 
score of 0.447. The next split, that of marital status, has a score of 0.377. This is followed by 
province (0.350), number of children (0.303), and religion (0.266).  
 
At the final level of splits, the first node is headed quite comfortably by number of dependants 
(0.598). The next split, that of salary, follows with a score of 0.409. Engaging in social 
activity within a religious context follows with a score of 0.399. This is followed by property 
ownership with a score of 0.368, and number of people sharing an abode with a score of 
0.308. Number of jobs in the last five years heads up the second node (1.933). This is 
followed by property ownership 91.621), worship (1.425), having financial investments 
(1.420), and length of tenure in the organisation (1.395). Length of tenure in the organisation 
heads the next node (0.869), which is followed by worship (0.778), number of jobs in the past 
five years (0.764), number of children (0.728) and requiring an operation (0.723). The next 
node is headed by number of dependants (0.505), which is then followed by having insurance 
policies (0.328), province 90.314), number of children (0.294) and race (0.270). Number of 
dependants heads the next node relatively strongly with a score of 0.541. the next split, that of 
education, follows with a score of only 0.439. Number of children follows this very closely 
(0.438). This is then followed by number of jobs in the past five years with a score of 0.375. 
Property heads the next node with a score of 2.121. This is followed by education (1.912), age 
(1.620), and ownership of a fridge and salary, both with scores of 1.565. Home ownership 
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heads up the next node by a small margin, with a score of 0.975. Marital status, with a score 
of 0.951, follows closely. This is then followed by number of children (0.940), language 
(0.900), and finally car ownership (0.863). The final node is headed with religion (0.706). 
Having a partner with an income follows (0.576), as does type of abode (0.473), number of 
children (0.470), and age (0.468).  
 
This belief in an unjust world CHAID, is more difficult to interpret than the previous two. The 
first reason for this is because the cluster analysis itself was not particularly meaningful (as 
discussed above) and as such associating the demographic determinants with a set of clear and 
explicit set of justice perceptions was effected – if the justice perceptions are not expressively 
defined than it becomes unclear what the demographic variables are determining. A second 
reason for the difficulty in interpreting the results is because, for the most part, there does not 
appear to be a very clear or discernible pattern of cluster affiliation. As can be seen by looking 
at the decision tree (See Figure 6.16), for many of the splits there are differences in cluster 
membership across most of the clusters. In this way it is not always possible to determine 
where the differences between the groups actually lie.  A third reason for the difficulty in 
interpreting the results is the fact that the demographic groupings are not always easy to 
account for – often there is no apparent reason for the variables to group in the way that they 
do. This can all be seen more clearly when taking a closer look at the belief in an unjust world 
CHAID diagram.  
 
The first split, the one based on religious affiliation, has separated out Muslim, Hindu, and 
Methodist religions from the others. This is very similar to the belief in a just world split, 
where the doctrine-based religions are separated from the more individualist/affective 
orientated ones. One difference is that within the belief in an unjust world decision tree the 
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Catholic group falls into the other grouping. This is somewhat surprising as it is arguably one 
of the clearest examples of a doctrine-based religion. Given the interpretation of the belief in a 
just world CHAID, it would be difficult to explain while Catholics would be placed with the 
other group. None the less this still remains the best explanation for the grouping defined by 
the CHAID analysis.  Looking at the cluster affiliations it can be seen that there are two 
important differences between the two groups, these being in relation to Cluster 4 and Cluster 
1. Cluster 4 comprises people who believe that the world can be an unfair place, and there are 
significantly more of the individualistic/affectively-focussed religions in this cluster than of 
the doctrine-based ones. Once again this is a somewhat similar pattern to the one found in the 
belief in a just world tree, where affiliates of these religions are possibly more prone to seeing 
the injustice in the world. Alternatively there are more of the affiliates of the doctrine based 
religions in Cluster 1 which was characterised as comprising people who seem to hold the 
view that people have agency in the good that happens to them, but possibly not in the bad. 
This is arguably consistent with the doctrines of these religions that exhort people to work 
hard in order to do well, but also to except the will of God when bad things happen. Again 
this is echoed in the just world beliefs decision tree.  
 
Both of these religious categories then split on the basis of job title, with relatively similar 
groupings emerging. For the doctrine-based religions administrative, financial, and sales 
staff are separated out from the other job titles. For the most part the jobs described refer to 
the back up or auxiliary functions within the organisation, rather than those who are 
involved in the manufacturing aspects. These jobs also have somewhat of a financial 
emphasis, and people involved in such jobs are likely to have a clearer sense of the 
profitability of the organisation than people doing more task specific jobs. Looking at the 
cluster affiliations, it can be seen that there are four notable differences between these two 
sets of job groupings. There are more people in the auxiliary jobs category in Cluster 3, and 
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fewer of them in Clusters 4 and 2. Cluster 4 comprises people who believe that the world 
can be an unfair place, while Cluster 2 comprises people who do not believe that the world is 
an unjust place. Arguably people in this job grouping are not extreme or generalised scorers 
and they do not hold one set of consistent ideas about social injustice. On the other hand 
Cluster 3 comprises people who are largely neutral or unsure with regards to questions about 
social injustice, but who do have a clear tendency to disbelieve that unfair things happen. As 
such there could be an indication that people falling into these job categories are more 
ambivalent or have the capacity to hold more ambiguity than people in the other job 
grouping.  
 
The auxiliary jobs then split on the basis of the number of people who are dependent on 
them for financial support, with the first group comprising those with between 1 to 7 
dependants and the second group 9 or 10 dependants. This split seems to be based on the 
most extreme group separating out – 9 or 10 financial dependants is arguably relatively 
extreme. When looking at the cluster affiliations it can be seen that there are a number of 
significant differences between the groups – in fact in all but Clusters 6 and 4. The most 
marked of these relate to Clusters 2 and 5, with noticeably more of this extreme group in 
Cluster 2 and fewer (in fact none) in Cluster 5. People in Cluster 5 are also largely neutral or 
uncertain regarding the majority of items, but is the only group who believes that the South 
African legal system is failing, while Cluster 2 comprises people who do not believe that the 
world is an unjust place. It is difficult to explain why people who have so many people 
financially dependent on them are still convinced of the justness of their world. A tentative 
explanation could be the influence of the interactions of the previous variables. Firstly, this 
grouping belongs to a grouping of jobs that are relatively well paid, particularly in relation to 
more unskilled jobs in the organisation. As such having so many financial dependants might 
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be less of a financial strain on them. Secondly, this group are also affiliates of the more 
doctrine based religions that arguably have particularly cogent church structures that have a 
strong emphasis on organised charitable work. As such people in this group may be more 
accustomed to the notion of assisting others.  
 
The second group of job titles splits on the basis of whether they or any of their financial 
dependents have required hospitalisation in the past two years. This bears some resemblance 
to the belief in a just world CHAID discussed above, where a similar question related to 
having had an operation in the last two years emerged as significant. At first such a question 
might seem rather arbitrary, but on closer inspection can be understood as an indicator of 
other things, for example some degree of hardship or trauma, the possibility of increased 
financial burden, or even the frustration of having to deal with a highly problematic health 
system. It is difficult to assess where meaningful differences in cluster affiliation lie between 
these two groups. There does seem to be a relatively noticeable difference in relation to 
Clusters 1 and 2, with more people who have had operations being in Cluster 1, and fewer in 
Cluster 2. Cluster 1 was characterised as comprising people who seem to hold the view that 
people have agency in the good that happens to them, but possibly not in the bad, while 
Cluster 2 comprises people who do not believe that the world is an unjust place. It is 
possibly plausible that people who have had the experience of either themselves or their 
family being hospitalised might be less likely to believe that people bring on their own bad 
fortune. Similarly, it also seems understandable that fewer of them would be likely to see the 
world as a uniformly just place. 
 
With regards to the last level of splits for this first branch, the grouping sizes become either 
too small or have too disparate sizes between groups to make any meaningful comparison.  
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Arguably, however, the nature of the splits themselves holds some insight. For example, 
those with fewer dependants were again split on the basis of number of dependants. 
Effectively the CHAID made the first split on the basis of separating out the very extreme 
group, but then split the remaining group, which covered quite a large range, into two more 
groups – the first comprising those with 1to 4 dependants, and the other with between 5 to 7 
dependants. This is interesting in itself as it is an indication that groups can be split in 
different ways at different times – i.e. having a certain number of dependants is not as 
relevant under certain circumstances as it is under others. This points to the extent of 
complexity that exists when looking at he predictive power of demographic variables. 
Further to this, number of dependants features twice more in this last row of splits, 
indicating that it is an important determinant of justice perceptions. Once again this is 
perhaps because it is indicative of more than just financial circumstances. It changes the 
quality of domestic life people have, and arguably even the quality of social life.  
 
Moving back up to the second main branch of this CHAID, for the second religious 
grouping, sales staff, financial staff, human resources staff, and general factory workers are 
separated out from the other job categories. Again, there seems to be no apparent reason as 
to why these particular jobs should be separated out from the others. While sales, human 
resources, and financial staff could be explained in a similar way to the job title split in the 
first branch, i.e. as jobs with an auxiliary function and with a focus that emphasises the 
financial profitability of the organisation. One big anomaly in this grouping, however is that 
of the inclusion of general factory workers. There is no apparent reason what this job title 
has in common with the three other job titles. In fact, it is only their differences that are 
particularly noticeable – they are different in the level of skill needed to do each set of jobs, 
the nature of the work done, as well as the conditions under which people doing these two 
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sets of jobs work. Further to this Cluster affiliations differ relatively substantially between 
almost every cluster for this group. As such this split is difficult to contextualise or explain 
in any meaningful way. This does have implications for the rest of this branch, as the other 
splits are contingent upon this split. These other splits thus become more difficult to 
understand as well.  
 
This first grouping of jobs splits on the basis of race, with black and coloured respondents 
forming one group, and white respondents another. In and of itself this is perhaps 
unsurprising given both the history of this country, where white people were dominant 
culturally, socially, and economically, and the present, where attempts at redress have more 
negative implications for white people. Again while there are a number of differences 
between the groups with regards to cluster affiliation, the most marked are in relation to 
Clusters 1 and 2. There are significantly more white people in Cluster 1 than black or 
coloured. People in Cluster 1 have relatively extreme views, with there being some general 
sense that misfortune happens to people quite randomly, unrelated to what they deserve or 
not, but positive efforts will be acknowledged and rewarded. People in this cluster seem to 
hold the view that people have agency in the good that happens to them, but possibly not in 
the bad. Cluster 2,on the other hand, comprises people who do not believe that the world is 
an unjust place. Given that the Apartheid government was defeated and that there is now a 
democratically elected government in place that is representative of the majority of people in 
this country, it makes sense that black and coloured people would be more prone to 
believing that the world is not an unjust place.  
 
The second grouping of job titles was split on the basis of whether or not they prayed when 
nor at their place of worship. Again this might seem like a somewhat particular question, but 
   
   369 
it was asked as part of a series of questions aimed at gauging the extent of religious life a 
respondent was engaged in. The first group thus comprises people who pray even when they 
are not at their place of worship and the second group, people who do not. This seems an 
appropriate split given that he first split was made on the basis of religious affiliation. 
Arguably this split is delving further into this initial determinant by seperating out those who 
are more religiously active than those who are not. The cluster affiliations, however, are less 
meaningful in that there are differences between the two groups on almost every cluster. As 
such it is not clear where specific differences between these two groups lie.  
 
As with the first branch of this CHAID decision tree, the last level of splits becomes difficult 
to interpret as the groupings become too small or disparate in numbers to compare. Further 
some groupings are made on somewhat arbitrary grounds. For example the property 
grouping is done on the basis of missing data versus both those who do own property and 
those who do not.  
 
As can be seen, this CHAID is somewhat less meaningful than the previous two. 
Interpretations are difficult to make, and the explanations become slightly clumsy and 
increasingly speculative. Arguably the real value of this CHAID is in looking at which 
variables were identified as the more central determinants of justice perceptions. This will be 
discusse din more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
Through the course of this chapter the results of the statistical analyses used to analyse 
the measuring instruments, explore the data set, and answer the research questions have 
been reported. A number of significant findings have emerged. Starting with the 
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validation of the measuring instruments, it was found that the organisational justice 
perceptions scale was both valid and reliable, with results found in the pilot study 
(described in Chapter 5) replicating themselves in the main study. The belief in a just 
world scale, developed by Rubin and Peplau  (1973), however, reported a very low 
Cronbach’s alpha, indicating an unreliable scale. A factor analysis was conducted and a 
two factor solution indicated the possibility of two separate scales or variables under 
investigation – that of just and unjust beliefs. Given that these two variables have a 
significant but very weak relationship, it was argued that they were measuring related 
but separate constructs. As such social justice perceptions were split up into perceptions 
of social justice and perceptions of social injustice. The two sub scales reported 
satisfactory Cronbach alphas.  
 
With regards to the cluster analyses, each of the three justice variables were analysed 
individually. A six-cluster solution was retained for each of these justice dimensions. 
Looking at the organisational justice perceptions clusters, people in Cluster 1 may be 
characterised as having a general sense of injustice regarding most organisational 
practices. There is a particular emphasis on those practices that allow people to progress 
and develop within the organisation, as well as the quality of the relationship between 
managers and employees, particularly with regards to the use of authority. Cluster 2 can 
be defined as comprising people who personally experience the organisation as fair, but 
have concerns about more general practices that may or may not affect them directly. 
Cluster 3 can be defined as comprising “generalised high justice perception scorers” who 
have fairly consistent perceptions across all the items. People in this cluster have a 
generalised positive attitude to the organisation indiscriminately perceive everything to 
be just and fair. People in Cluster 4 may be characterised by a strong distributive 
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concern, as well as dissatisfaction with the less observable aspects of organisational 
practices. Cluster 5 comprises people who are less consistent with regards to their 
perceptions of justice in relation to different areas of organisational functioning and are 
characterised as being relatively satisfied with collective industrial relationship issues, 
but less so with the individual material benefits. People in Cluster 6 can be characterised 
as having moderate/moderately low organisational justice perceptions, being more 
dissatisfied with the collective relationship between management and employees than 
with practices that impact on individual well being in the organisation. People in this 
cluster also seem to have more trust in their colleagues’ capacity to act fairly.    
 
Looking at perceptions of social justice, people in Cluster 1 can be characterised as 
believing that justice is unlikely to be done, and the world is not a place where each gets his 
due. People in Cluster 2 can be characterised as being largely undecided, particularly with 
regards to the fairness of broader social systems. However, they do seem to feel a little more 
strongly about individual effort and reward, believing that at a personal level you are more 
likely to benefit from your own efforts. Cluster 3 comprises people who believe that justice 
will, for the most part, be done, both at a personal and a broader social level – that if you 
work hard you will get good marks, will be promoted, will stay healthy, but also that key 
social institutions such as the political system, and the criminal justice system, will prevail.  
People in Cluster 4 may be characterised as generally neutral to moderately low scorers, 
who have less faith in an individual’s capacity to influence their own outcomes. They do, 
however, have a slightly stronger belief than people in Cluster 2, that broader social systems 
will, in the long run, be fair. People in Cluster 5 can be characterised as having an almost 
fatalistic approach to injustice or misfortune, while on the other hand they have a stronger 
sense of agency when related to the achievement of good. Despite their beliefs related to 
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misfortune, there is also a strong belief that ultimately, justice will prevail. Finally, Cluster 6 
can be defined as comprising people who have a general sense that the world is not a fair  
Figure 6.14: CHAID Tree - Belief in a Just World 
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Figure 6.15: Competing Splits Tree - Belief in a Just World 
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Figure 6.16: CHAID Tree - Belief in an Unjust World  
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Figure 6.17: Competing Splits Tree - Belief in an Unjust World  
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place – there is no guarantee that anyone will actually get what they deserve. In fact, people 
in this group seem to quite strongly believe that people might benefit from immoral or unjust 
actions, such as crime. At the same time, there does not seem to be sense that bad things will 
happen to people who don’t deserve them. As such people in this group seem to believe that 
while the world is not necessarily a fair place, neither is it unfair.  
 
The final cluster analysis was conducted on perceptions of social injustice. The cluster 
analysis grouped the high and low scorers together respectively, and has differentiated 
between the middle scorers according to particular items of difference. Cluster 4 comprise 
people who believe that the world can be an unfair place, while Cluster 2 comprises people 
who do not believe that the world is an unjust place. Cluster 6 comprises people who, for the 
most part, do not view the world as being unjust and who do not seem convinced that 
injustice will happening to undeserving people. Similarly Cluster 3 comprises people who 
are largely neutral or unsure with regards to questions of unfairness in the world, but who do 
have a clear tendency to disbelieve that unfair things happen. The question related to driving 
is the one item that differentiates these two groups, with this being the only item that people 
in Cluster 6 strongly agree with. Cluster 5 comprises people who are more neutral or 
undecided about questions of injustice but feel relatively strongly that the South African 
legal system is failing. Like Clusters 6 and 3 above, it is this item that differentiates people 
in this cluster from the other more ‘neutral’ clusters. Finally, people in Cluster 1, while 
largely neutral or undecided, can be characterised as veering towards having a stronger sense 
of social justice, where bad things do not happen to people who do not deserve them.  
 
The last step in the analysis was the CHAID, which explored the ways in which the 
demographic variables predicted perceptions of justice (based on the clusters).  The 
   
   377 
organisational justice perceptions and belief in a just world decision trees indicated some 
important interactions between demographic variables and highlighted the ways in which 
these might impact on justice perceptions. The belief in an unjust world CHAID decision 
tree, however, was less meaningful and provided only limited insight into the relationship 
between demographic variables and justice perceptions. These will be considered in more 
detail in the next chapter, which has the discussion of these results as its central focus. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 5, three research questions were outlined that form the thrust of the current study. 
Different statistical procedures were used to answer these questions, the results of which 
were presented in Chapter 6. The aim of the current chapter is to discuss these findings, both 
in relation to the conceptual framework of this study described in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, as 
well as in relation to the research questions framed in Chapter 5.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of matters pertaining to the first research question, that 
regarding the nature of the relationship between organisational and social justice 
perceptions.  The second section then looks at the notion of different justice dimensions, 
focusing on the cluster analysis results and the themes that emerged from this analysis. The 
third section of this chapter focuses on the relationship between demographic variables and 
justice perceptions, discussing the key points to emerge from the CHAID analysis. Finally, 
the limitations of the current study are discussed, as are implications this study has for future 
research.  
Organisational and Social Justice: The Importance of Context 
 
The first research question pertained to the relationship between different dimensions or 
types of justice, particularly social and organisational justice. As was discussed in Chapter 3, 
researchers have argued that organisational justice concerns are autonomous and 
independent of other justice concerns (Cropanzano, 2001). This assertion has resulted in the 
emergence of a distinct ‘variable’, that of organisational justice, that is seen to be discrete 
from the rest of the justice literature. Despite this, there is no clear evidence that this claim 
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to autonomy is true. Organisational justice research has not focused on providing empirical 
evidence for this contention, nor has a body of theory specifically aimed at addressing 
workplace concerns emerged. Currently, what delineates this variable as something distinct 
is the context in which it is investigated – the workplace.  It is, therefore, clear that the 
notion that organisational justice is something separate from other types of justice requires 
debate and empirical investigation. To this end, the first research question addressed by the 
current study pertained to the interface between different ‘types’ of justice, more specifically 
that of organisational and social justice, and asked whether people’s experiences of 
organisational justice related to their experiences of social justice.  
 
As was described in Chapter 6, social justice perceptions were divided into two sub-scales, 
that of belief in a just world and belief in an unjust world.  This was because the belief in a 
just world scale reported a very low Cronbach alpha (0.40), indicating that there is 
insufficient inter-item correlation to assume that all the items in the scale are measuring the 
same construct – that is, belief in a just world. A factor analysis was therefore conducted in 
order to explore the scale further. This revealed the existence of two factors related to ‘just’ 
and ‘unjust’ dimensions respectively. Looking at the relationship between belief in a just 
and unjust world, it can be seen that there is a significant, albeit fairly weak, negative 
correlation between these two constructs (r<0.00, p=-0.25). The fact that they are correlated 
is unsurprising, given that just and unjust experiences have traditionally been spoken about 
as opposite ends of one continuum (Lerner, 1986; Cropanzano, 2001). The decision to use 
these two sets of perceptions as two separate variables is documented in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis, where this low correlation has been understood as evidence towards the fact that 
these constructs are not simply opposite ends of the continuum, but can be viewed as 
separate sets of perceptions. The low correlation indicates that if one has high beliefs in a 
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just world that does not necessarily mean that one would have a corresponding low belief in 
an unjust world.  For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, one could believe that the world 
was not a just place (good things don’t necessarily happen to good people, or bad to bad 
people), without believing that it is in fact an unjust place (bad things will happen to good 
people and good things to bad people). For this reason a low correlation between these 
variables makes sense. Why then is there a significant relationship between these variables 
at all? Some discussion of the existing relationship between these two variables is important.  
 
If one works from the assumptions of Lerner (1986) and the subsequent work on the Belief 
in a just world construct (Bruhn, 1998; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Rubin & Peplau, 1973, 
Couch, 1998; Ambrosia & Sheehan, 1990; Hyland & Dann, 1987), this variable can be 
understood as a personality trait – a fairly consistent and stable feature of an individual. If 
we extend the idea of a belief in a just world, as described by Lerner (1986), to incorporate 
the notion of two separate constructs – a belief in a just world and a belief in an unjust world 
as two separate personality traits – it is plausible to assume that within this framework of 
understanding, they are mutually exclusive. A person cannot hold high beliefs in a just and 
an unjust world simultaneously.  As such these theorists argued that people are disposed 
towards a particular attitude to the world (Lerner, 1986; Rubin and Peplau, 1973), almost a 
form of justice ‘optimism’ or ‘pessimism’.  Working from this understanding, a person who 
is disposed to seeing the world as a just place might then be less prone to seeing possible 
injustice, and vice-versa. So while these variables do not work as complete opposites to one 
another, there might be a tendency for a person registering high in one set of perceptions to 
be slightly lower in the other set, as a consequence of the lens through which they tend to 
see the world. It could be argued that it is the personality factor that relates these variables to 
one another, albeit it rather weakly. 
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However the notion that belief in a just world is exclusively a personality trait is somewhat 
contested.  Research has indicated that context and experience cannot be discounted as 
important factors – in fact are more important than individual disposition - that influence 
one’s attitude towards the world (Furnham, 1985; Furnham, 1993; Witt, 1989; Graham, 
1989). A similar argument could be made for looking at context and experience, as one 
could for personality. Personality variables are arguably not the only factors that dispose 
people to certain attitudes, perceptions, or beliefs. A person’s experience in the world, 
particularly relating to the context in which they find themselves, could potentially provide a 
‘lens’ through which they would judge certain situations. For example, a black person living 
in Apartheid South Africa and experiencing the injustices present within that context, might 
not have a personality disposition to seeing the world as an unjust place, but rather a 
disposition based on experience, i.e. they may be high in belief in an unjust world, and 
because of their experiences have a tendency to not see justice where it exists, situating them 
lower in terms of belief in a just world.  They might be prone to seeing less justice, but not 
necessarily injustice. These two variables, we can deduce, while essentially functioning 
independent of each other, could also quite plausibly be related.  
 
This has important implications for social psychology’s approach to understanding justice. 
There is an indication that, perhaps, perceptions of justice and injustice cannot be spoken of 
as opposite ends of the same thing, or treated interchangeably.  Each might have different 
antecedents, correlates, and outcomes. For example, perceptions of organisational injustice 
might result in poorer work output whereas perceptions of justice might not result in better 
performance. Similarly perceptions of social justice might result in positive citizenship 
behaviours and civic pride, where perceptions of social injustice might not be linked to acts 
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of public vandalism or disregard for civil property. Perceptions of injustice might evoke 
stronger emotions and reactions than perceptions of justice; less might need to happen to 
evoke a sense of injustice as opposed to a sense of justice. Perceptions of injustice might be 
more pervasive than perceptions of justice. For this reason, theory and research is warranted 
that explores each of these variables independently.  
 
This preliminary work laid the foundation for the way in which social justice is understood 
and analysed in the rest of the study, namely in relation to two sets of independent beliefs. 
Correlations were then used to explore the relationship between organisational justice 
perceptions, belief in a just world, and belief in an unjust world.  
 
The correlations between all three justice variables (See Table 6. 22) were very low, some 
not even significantly so. This is interesting in that it indicates that not all facets or 
dimensions of justice perceptions operate in the same or similar ways. Organisational justice 
perceptions are not significantly related to belief in an unjust world (r=-0.01, p=0.85), 
indicating that a person may have low social justice perceptions, but this may not necessarily 
transfer into the organisational setting. Organisational justice perceptions are only very 
slightly correlated to belief in a just world (r=0.107, p=0.021). This means that where the 
one increases or decreases there would be a slight increase or decrease in the other. As such 
high social justice perceptions would be slightly related to high organisational justice 
perceptions.   
 
It is interesting to note that while the correlation between organisational justice perceptions 
and belief in a just world is low, it is still significant, unlike that of organisational justice and 
belief in an unjust world. This is a further indication that beliefs about the fairness of the 
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world do not function as opposite ends of a continuum – if this were true we could expect 
there to be similar, but inverted, correlations between these two variables and organisational 
justice perceptions. Why, then, would the one be significantly correlated to organisational 
justice perceptions (albeit very slightly so) and not the other? A possible explanation could 
be related to the extent of personal exposure to the different issues being explored.  
Organisational justice perceptions are perhaps more likely to be based on a greater amount 
of personal experience than social justice perceptions. Perceptions of organisational justice 
are based on factors such as the salary that I earn, my relationship with my manager, my 
opportunities in the organisation – all matters that directly affect me and with which I am 
directly engaged. Social justice perceptions (as measured in this study), on the other hand, 
are based on beliefs about, for example, fair trials, the punishment of criminals, or the 
performance of politicians in society. While people may have strong opinions of such 
matters, the majority of respondents will not have been through a trial, or have had a close 
encounter with a politician. As such, these perceptions are not based on as much personal 
experience as organisational justice perceptions. A person may have very strong beliefs 
about social injustice, without those beliefs being related to their actual experiences of 
justice in their own workplace. 
 
Belief in a just world and social fairness, on the other hand, may have particular importance 
for people in the South African context, particularly for the type of sample involved in this 
study (see Table 5.1). Given that the majority of respondents are black, and the average age 
of respondents is 39, this is a group of people who, for the most part, are likely to have been 
very deeply affected by the injustices of Apartheid. They would have grown up under 
restrictive and prejudicial laws that would have prevented them from accessing a range of 
opportunities and resources. They also would have experienced the end of Apartheid, and 
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the introduction of a range of new laws that have attempted to rectify prejudicial legislation 
as well as redress past imbalances. It is likely that, for the majority of these respondent’s, 
broad social changes would have had a direct positive impact on their lives. There is some 
evidence of this in the summary statistics for the variables (see Table 6.18). The mean score 
for belief in a just world is 36.67, which indicates a moderately high score. The mean score 
for belief in an unjust world, on the other hand, is 23.32, a moderately low score. This means 
that, on average, perceptions of a just world were higher than that of an unjust world. These 
broad societal changes have also had a direct impact on the workplace, where a range of 
labour laws have been introduced since 1995 that have addressed a number of workplace 
injustices. This legislation has introduced, among other things, more favourable conditions 
of employment for workers, stricter procedures for the dismissal of workers, affirmative 
action measures aimed at previously disadvantaged groups, a greater emphasis on workplace 
safety, as well as broader and more entrenched rights for unions and employee 
representatives. These aspects of improved workplace fairness are directly related to broader 
social justice initiatives. As such it is unsurprising that there is some correlation between 
organisational and social justice perceptions.  
 
The fact that the correlation is not higher deserves some exploration. As discussed, the 
summary statistics (see Table 6.18) indicate a mean score of 68.86 for organisational justice 
perceptions, a moderately low score. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, there is a 
moderately high score for belief in a just world. This indicates that people are experiencing 
their broader social world as being fairer than their workplace.  This could indicate that 
transformation into a more just society is happening more visibly or more quickly at a 
societal level, whereas changes are occurring more slowly in the workplace. As discussed in 
the previous paragraph, there are some aspects of the workplace that have become more just, 
   
   356 
simply due to new labour legislation. Other aspects of the workplace, however, may still be 
experienced as unfair to employees. The workplace is one arena where people of different 
races mix at very close quarters. There are a number of different competing interest groups 
within organisations, all of which are fighting for limited resources. Many practices and 
policies are contested (for example, the implementation of affirmative action policies). 
Transformation and organisational change are partly dependent on the personalities and 
dispositions of managers, union representatives, and employees, and are affected by the 
industrial relations climate. Many aspects of workplace fairness are, therefore, not 
necessarily closely related to social justice initiatives. Therefore, while we can expect some 
correlation between organisational and social justice perceptions, it is also understandable 
that such a correlation be limited.    
 
From the above discussion it can be seen that the three variables used in this study, while all 
measuring aspects of justice, are in fact measuring independent, and to a large extent, 
uncorrelated aspects of justice. This points to the interesting notion that one cannot talk about 
‘justice perceptions’ as a unified entity. This is in line with arguments made by Walzer 
(1983), who states that there are spheres of justice that must be kept distinct from one another.  
He argues that justice is about the distribution of goods, but considerations will differ 
depending on the type of goods in question. Therefore, we cannot have one set of standards or 
criterion for the distribution of disparate goods/conditions as money, love, work, religion, 
political power etc. He argues that we can have inequalities in one sphere without having 
inequalities in another sphere.  Clearly justice takes on different meanings within different 
contexts, and one’s beliefs about justice in one context cannot be taken as indicative of beliefs 
in another context.  
   
   357 
This is perhaps indicative that personality or personal disposition might have less of an 
influence on justice perceptions than previous researchers may have believed (Lerner, 1986; 
Rubin and Peplau, 1973) as evidence points to the fact that a person may not have a consistent 
set of beliefs about justice across all contexts in their lives. This arguably points to the 
importance of more objective criteria when exploring perceptions of justice, i.e. some people 
may experience a particular context as fair/unfair, not because they have a disposition or 
particular type of personality, but because that context either facilitates or prevents their 
access to valued resources. This implies that perhaps psychologist’s need to move beyond a 
purely relativist understanding of justice.  
 
Further, the importance of context with regards to the impact on perceptions of justice 
indicates that more context-specific social-psychological theory and research is warranted. 
Arguably it is not sufficient to operate from one theory base in an attempt to explain or 
describe experiences of justice across different settings. For example, the tripartite justice 
model might be valuable when exploring justice perceptions within an organisational setting 
(where formalised policies highlight the divisions between procedures and outcomes, and 
organisational structures and hierarchies result in a distinct set of social relations and 
centralised mechanism of decision-making), but a different conceptualisation might be more 
beneficial when looking at social justice (where such distinctions are not as clear).  
 
Given the indication that justice perceptions function differently across contexts, it is 
important to look at why only two contexts – that of social and organisational – have been 
distinguished as important sites for social-psychological research, and why an increasing 
proportion of research is focussing exclusively on the workplace setting. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the organisation functions as a microcosm of the larger society, with distinct 
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rules, processes, boundaries, and ways of functioning, making it an interesting, as well as 
easy, context for the study of justice. Further to this, however, within this paradigm, justice 
theory is seen predominantly as a theory of motivation.  Tyler and Blader (2000), argue that, 
“Justice must be able to motivate both the acceptance of rules and decisions and efforts to 
help the group even when either departs from individual or group self-interest. In terms of 
social co ordination, justice has little value if it does not influence how people feel and what 
they do.” (p. 70). They argue that research findings that support the notion that justice 
perceptions influence people’s attitudes and behaviours point to important policy 
implications in that, “They suggest that we can encourage desirable behaviour from the 
people in groups by creating group frameworks that are experienced as fair” (Tyler and 
Blader ,2000,p. 8). 
 
The view that justice perceptions can be used to mitigate the negative effects of certain 
workplace policies or enhance employee functioning is a common thread running through 
organisational justice research. As described in Chapter 3, employee commitment, morale, 
turnover intentions, organisational citizenship behaviours, productivity, theft and a host of 
other attitudinal and behavioural variables have all been explored in relation to perceptions of 
organisational justice (Greenberg, 1990; De More, Fisher & Baron, 1988; Skarliki & Folger, 
1997; Schwarzald, Kowslowsky & Shalit, 1992; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Cowherd & 
Levine, 1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993; Schwarzald, Kowslowsky and Shalit, 1992). 
Organisational justice research has arguably emerged as a primary concern for organisational 
behaviourists because organisations are a context in which profit-making is the primary 
motive, and human behaviour is key to this motive. In this way, organisational justice is 
perhaps emerging as a managerial science, rather than a social science.  
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While there is clearly a considerable amount of value to be gained from this type of 
organisational research, the results of this study perhaps indicate that a focus on a range of 
different contexts is warranted. A number of different settings pose particular challenges and 
nuances that might significantly impact on the factors that become salient when making a 
justice judgement. Such settings include prisons, courts, schools, families, unions, hospitals, 
and welfare institutions. By expanding justice research in this way, other factors and 
priorities might emerge, allowing for a more nuanced and complex understanding of 
experiences of justice. 
 
As will be seen in further discussions in this chapter, the independence of these types of 
justice from one another is further evidenced by the CHAID results, which indicate that 
perceptions of each of these variables are predicted by very different demographic variables. 
 
Dimensions of Justice: Moving beyond the Tripartite Framework. 
 
In Chapter 2, the tripartite or three-factor model most commonly used as a framework for 
investigation by social psychologists was described. This model comprises distributive 
justice concerns which focus on the perceived fairness of outcomes, procedural justice 
concerns, which focus on the way in which outcome decisions are made, and interpersonal 
justice perceptions which are understood to refer to the quality of treatment received from 
decision-makers (Cropanzano et al, 2001). As was demonstrated in both Chapters 2 and 3, 
these three dimensions are most commonly taken to account for justice perceptions, and this 
model is used as the foundation for the vast majority of research taking place in the area of 
justice studies. It was further argued that there seems to have been an over emphasis on this 
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three-factor model, and that this framework presents some concerns that may serve to limit 
research in the area (Lind, 2001).  
 
Following from this, one of the aims of the current study was to explore alternate 
conceptualisations or dimensions of justice. This was partly done through the use of more 
global scales for the measurement of both organisational and social justice perceptions, but 
was also addressed through the cluster analysis, which explored the ways in which people 
group together in terms of their perceptions of justice. Score profiles based on responses to 
each of the items in the respective scales were cluster analysed in order to explore what 
similarities or shared profiles existed among respondents. While this was also the 
preliminary step for the CHAID analysis, it also provided some interesting insights in and of 
itself, in that it indicated possible alternative patterns of concerns that people might share. 
This was particularly important given that the structure of justice perceptions was not 
assumed in the current study, and that exploring alternate dimensions of justice concerns that 
might emerge became central. The second question addressed by the current study, 
therefore, refers to similarities in experiences of justice and asked in what ways people 
clustered together in relation to their experiences of justice.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the cluster analyses explore the ways in which respondents’ 
profiles of responses cluster together based on similarities in these responses. Such a method 
avoids an overly reductionist approach to analysis in that an entire scale is not reduced to 
one index through adding up all the responses to form a score total. In this way each of the 
respondent’s answers is taken into account, and the differences between respondents 
becomes more apparent. With regards to organisational justice perceptions, as discussed in 
the results section (Chapter 6), a six-cluster solution appeared to be the most suitable 
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explanation of similarities of responses. This meant that six groupings of people who shared 
similar response profiles were extracted from the cluster analysis. These six clusters were 
then described and defined in relation to what these profiles indicated about their 
perceptions of organisational justice.  
 
Cluster 3 comprised people with high organisational justice perceptions who have a 
generalised positive attitude to the organisation, almost indiscriminately perceiving 
everything to be just and fair. This cluster was, therefore, defined as comprising “generalised 
high justice perception scorers”.  People in Cluster 2 also appeared to be fairly consistent in 
their perceptions across items, but were slightly more critical than those people in Cluster 3. 
This cluster was defined as comprising people who personally experience the organisation as 
fair, but have concerns about more general practices that may or may not affect them 
directly. People in Cluster 5 had more moderate justice perceptions than those in Clusters 3 
and 2, and were characterised as being relatively satisfied with collective industrial 
relationship issues, but less so with the individual material benefits within the organisation. 
Cluster 6, on the other hand, appeared to follow the opposite trend to this, with people in this 
group appearing to be more satisfied with human resources practices, but less so with the 
industrial relationship in the organisation. People in Cluster 6 were, therefore, characterised 
as having moderate/moderately low organisational justice perceptions, being more 
dissatisfied with the collective relationship between management and employees than with 
practices that impact on individual well being in the organisation.  
 
Cluster 4 marked a much clearer move into lower justice perceptions and comprised people 
who, while they express neutrality regarding certain human resource practices, were 
generally feeling that the organisation treats employees unfairly. Their concerns rested with 
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process-driven practices that have less observable procedural mechanisms, such as 
employees being part of the decision making process. Finally, Cluster 1 comprises the 
lowest scorers for almost every item, with people in this group being particularly concerned 
with their capacity to progress in the organisation. People in this cluster appear to have very 
little sense of hope with regards to moving out of their current positions, and have 
particularly low justice perceptions about direct and related practices that would potentially 
enable them to do so. Their concerns appear to rest more substantially with highly visible, 
observable procedures. This is contrary to the pattern observed in Cluster 4.  These two 
clusters, while both having low organisational justice perceptions, are quite clearly 
differentiated by their areas of concern.   
 
These different clusterings indicate some important justice concerns that differentiate groups 
from one another. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the traditional psychological justice 
model creates three dimensions of justice, which form the basis for most enquiries. This 
cluster analysis indicates other dimensions that such a model neglects. For example, there 
seems to be a differentiation between collective and individual issues with regards to justice 
perceptions, where people are discriminating between those policies, procedures, and 
practices that affect them individually and those that refer to collective groups in the 
organisation, such as union members or managers. There is a clear indication that people 
might judge issues that effect them personally (e.g. salary) differently from those that don’t 
(e.g. selection procedures if one is not applying for a job or promotion), or that apply to a 
grouping of people of which they may or may not be a member (e.g. performance appraisals 
may be judged as fair for managers and senior people, but as unfair for employees below a 
certain level of seniority). As will be discussed further on in this section, similar concerns 
emerged when looking at social justice perceptions.  
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This differentiation should not simply be interpreted as relating to the notion of self-interest 
(i.e. if it benefits me it is fair, if it prejudices me it is unfair, if it does not apply to me I don’t 
care). It is clear that people form justice judgements about a range of events, policies, 
procedures, decisions, and distributions, even those of which they have no personal 
experience or which will not impact on them at all. For example, people are likely to have 
opinions about the fairness of a dismissal of an employee for theft, the disciplinary 
procedures in place in the organisation (even though they are likely to feel sure they will 
never be subject to them), or management’s relations with unions (even if they are not a 
union member). Clearly, justice concerns do extend beyond pure self-interest. The 
differentiation between collective, individual, and personal matters emerging in this study 
can be accounted for by a range of other factors such as the impact of real-life experience 
people have had with the matters that they are judging, the extent to which they would have 
to deal with the consequences (both good and bad) of the procedure or outcome, whether or 
not they are invested in what happens to other people in the organisation, as well as the 
impact the procedures or outcome may have on their relationships with others around them. 
Further, this may be particularly relevant to the South African context, where there is a 
highly unionised work force and a history of union activity and instrumentality both 
politically and within the work arena. Much of the industrial relationship in South African 
organisations is played out at a collective level, and there is a clear differentiation between 
collective and individual organisational politics.  
 
Another dimension around which clusters seem to differ relates to organisational practices 
that are unambiguous and easily observable (and are process or administratively driven) 
versus those that rely on more subjective individual input (and are most often driven by 
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managers). This dimension could be seen as a content driven – people trust that jobs get 
advertised, that they can apply for training programmes, and that management will meet 
with unions regularly – versus process driven – they are less trustful of how an applicant is 
selected for a job or for training, the ways in which management might co operate with 
unions, how a disciplinary hearing chair makes a decision. This clearly links to some of the 
concerns outlined in Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group-value model of justice, which identifies 
three elements that become of value to people when making justice judgements, namely 
trust, standing and neutrality. The differentiation between more visible, content driven issues 
and process issues might be reflecting particular concerns with trust and neutrality - where 
trust pertains to the perceived intentions of the third parties, and involves the belief that they 
desire to treat people in a fair and benevolent manner and neutrality to the extent to which an 
individual believes decision-makers are neutral and free from bias with regards to such 
decision-making (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Arguably it is a lack of trust and belief in neutrality 
that would result in some scepticism or concerns about less visible processes as opposed to 
the policies and processes that are more visible and for which managers are more 
accountable.  
 
An additional dimension around which the clusters differed relates to the way in which the 
employment relationship is defined. There seems to be some indication that people 
differentiate between relationships with their peers and relationships between management 
and employees when making justice judgements. This might be an indication that notions 
about social group membership (as described by Tjafel and Turner (1975) and discussed in 
Chapter 4) extend into the organisational setting, and employees assess events or matters of 
concern to their own group differently from that of other groups. For example, a person 
might consider that managers should be held to different standards or rules given their 
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position in the organisation, and as such while the disciplinary procedures are fair to general 
workers they should be more stringent for managers. Once again this might be particularly 
pertinent for South African organisations, which are heavily unionised. Union membership 
provides a salient social identity position for many employees, and support of and loyalty to 
unions is strong. Members might then assess standards for justice differently among 
members than non-members – where for example non-members should not be entitled to the 
same wage increases or benefits negotiated by union leaders, or union membership should 
be a contributing factor to promotion or choice of work allocation.  
 
Such findings might suggest that notions of interpersonal justice should be extended to 
incorporate relations beyond those involving just the decision-makers, in the most traditional 
sense. Research into questions about interpersonal justice have predominantly focused on 
relations between those with authority and those who are imagined to have no, or less, 
authority (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996, Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Huo, 
Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996). There is some indication that other types of relations in the 
organisation may carry different types of power that can also be influential with regards to 
people’s experience of justice in the workplace. Clearly a more complex and nuanced 
understanding of work relations and the different types of rewards and benefits that have 
valence for people needs to be explored in relation to questions of justice.  
 
 
The cluster analysis thus revealed different sorts of concerns that may emerge for employees 
within the workplace setting. While tThese are not necessarily an alternative to the tripartite 
framework, they but they may help to extend and expand thinking within this model and 
thus to create a more multi-dimensional understanding of justice. While it is not the aim of 
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this study to provide a definitive alternative model for exploring perceptions of justice, these 
results could arguably , in a move towards such a model, be used in a number of ways. 
Firstly, from the above discussion, four dimensions of justice concerns could be seen to 
emerge. These are a collective vs individual dimension, a personal concern vs concern for 
others dimension, a content vs process driven dimension, and a peers vs management 
dimension. It is not clear that these dimensions represent a ‘structure’ of justice perceptions, 
only that they are dimensions along which perceptions of justice appeared to differ. As such 
there are a number of ways in which they could provide a point of departure for an 
alternative model of justice perceptions (if in fact such a model is necessary or desirable).  
 
 A first option might be to start exploring the existing tripartite model in relation to the four 
dimensions described above i.e. begin understanding distributive, procedural, and 
interpersonal justice concerns as manifesting on a collective as well as individual level, in 
relation to personal concerns as well as concerns for others, in relation to content driven 
concerns as well as process driven concerns, as well as in relation to relations with peers as 
opposed to relations with managers. In this way a 4X3 model begins to emerge, where each 
of the traditional justice dimensions can be understood to be influenced by the complexities 
of organisational relations. In this way the context begins to assume a more central role in 
understanding justice perceptions, and a more nunaced understanding of the three justice 
dimensions can be explored. It is important to note that the four dimensions extracted from 
the cluster analysis in the current study are only a starting point, emerging from exploratory 
research using statitistical procedures open to interpretation. Other dimensions or factors 
will undoubtedly emerge as being central to justice concerns, and as such this is a proposed 
model, one that requires considerable further exploration.  
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 A second way of using the cluster analysis results towards an alternative model of justice 
would be to begin a closer examination of how justice perceptions function in relation to 
each of these dimensions. Exploring the ways in which, for example, perceptions about 
distributions to collectives differ from those made in relation to individuals, or how concern 
for others influences perceptions of allocations is an important first step in incorporating 
these results into an alternative model of justice perceptions. Understanding the subtleties of 
how these dimensions work will allow us to begin seperating out structural dimensions (i.e. 
those factors that are essential to the structure of justice) versus those that are moderating or 
mediating influences.  
 
While an alternative model to the tripartite model does not necessarily completely present 
itself, iIt is also clear that the workplace context raises very particular issues and concerns 
(such as unionisation, centralised decision-making power, access to jobs, training and 
development, as well as a rigid hierarchy) that might suggest the need for theoretical 
developments of their own. A model of justice for the organisational setting might look very 
different to that of social justice, and would have to incorporate a range of context-specific 
concerns, some of which emerged through the cluster analysis results presented here. This 
becomes increasingly evident when looking at the cluster analysis results for social justice 
perceptions.  
 
With regards to the belief in a just world six-cluster solution, there were more areas of 
overlap than there were for the organisational justice perceptions solutions, indicating that 
the clusters were not as distinct from one another as in the previous clustering solution.  This 
suggests that the different groups have some similar perceptions, and are distinguished by 
only a few items. This is further evidenced by the small range of man item scores - even the 
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highest and lowest scoring clusters  (Cluster 3 and Cluster 1 respectively) do not extend 
much beyond a mean score of 4 or below a mean score of 2.5 for any of the items. Both 
these characteristics of the clustering solution are an indication that people in this sample 
held less extreme views in relation to questions about social justice than with regards to 
organisational justice.  
 
A further feature of this cluster solution is the considerable overlap between the four middle 
clusters, Clusters 2, 4, 5, and 6. At first glance it appeared that there was a relatively high 
scoring cluster, a relatively low scoring cluster, and then these three more and somewhat 
indistinguishable clusters in between. However, a closer inspection revealed that despite the 
extent of the overlap, there were important points of divergence that made these groups 
distinguishable from one another in significant ways. This is perhaps a good indication of 
what might get missed by adding scores up to provide a single index for a variable – these 
people might have ended up with very similar overall scores, yet they feel differently 
(sometimes quite strongly) about a range of different issues. This becomes clearer when 
looking at each cluster. 
 
Cluster 3 comprised the highest scoring people for most of the items in this scale. This 
cluster was thus seen to comprise people who believe that justice will, for the most part, be 
done, both at a personal and a broader social level. On the other hand, Cluster 1 clearly 
comprised people who were, for the most part, fairly low scorers, believing that justice is 
unlikely to be done, and the world is not a place where each gets his due. Looking at Cluster 
2, it can be seen that the items that people in this group felt more strongly about, and thus 
distinguished this cluster from the other three clusters, related to beliefs about justice that are 
based on a clear work ethic – those individuals who work hard, be it at school or at work, 
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will derive the benefits they deserve. As a corollary to this, those who take benefits without 
working for them (i.e. through crime), will not, in the long run, benefit. Cluster 4 is a mirror 
image of Cluster 2 in that people in Cluster 4 put less faith in the belief that one’s own hard 
work will be paid off but did have a slightly stronger belief that broader social systems will, 
in the long run, be fair. As such people in Cluster 4 may be characterised as generally 
neutral to moderately low scorers, who have less faith in an individual’s capacity to 
influence their own outcomes.  Looking at Cluster 5, it can be seen that people in this cluster 
appeared to not necessarily believe that bad things can happen to people who do not deserve 
them. However they seemed to feel more strongly about people deserving their own good 
fortune  – i.e. bad things can happen to you at random, but good things result from effort 
exerted by the person.  A second set of related beliefs emerging within this cluster centres on 
belief at a broader level that, ultimately, good will win out and bad will be punished, both at 
an individual level and within broader systems. Finally, looking at Cluster 6 it can be seen 
that people in this group had a general sense that the world is not a fair place – there is no 
guarantee that anyone will actually get what they deserve. In fact, people in this group seem 
to quite strongly believe that people might benefit from immoral or unjust actions, such as 
crime. At the same time, there does not seem to be sense that bad things will happen to 
people who don’t deserve them. As such people in this group seem to believe that while the 
world is not necessarily a fair place, neither is it unfair.  
 
Like with organisational justice perceptions, the cluster analysis has revealed a number of 
central concerns and dimensions along which perceptions of social justice may vary. The 
first theme relates to the question of personal versus larger social systems – family, work,  
and personal relationships versus society as a whole, political systems and regimes, the 
prison system, and the judiciary. This echoes some of the organisational justice findings 
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where a differentiation between collective and individual issues with regards to justice 
perceptions was made. It was found that people possibly discriminated between those 
policies, procedures, and practices that affect them individually and those that refer to 
collective groups in the organisation, such as union members or managers. This is in line 
with Rawls (1971), who defines the scope of his theory as pertaining specifically to that of 
social justice, which he differentiates from other justice concerns.  While he acknowledges 
that it is not only laws, institutions, and social systems that can be considered just or unjust, 
but people, actions, decisions, accusations, even attitudes or traits, he argues that social 
justice focuses on the basic structure of society, and more specifically on the ways in which 
the major institutions of society distribute basic rights and duties as well as the benefits 
resulting from social co-operation. In this way he differentiates social justice from questions 
about justice in other, possibly smaller, contexts. Similar to belief in a just world, there is an 
indication that people might judge issues that effect them personally (e.g. getting a lucky 
break or preventing a heart attack) differently from those that refer to broader social systems 
that, at most, affect them indirectly  (e.g. whether a political candidate gets elected or the 
larger course of history).  
 
Once again, this cannot be accounted for simply as being about personal self-interest. People 
still might feel very strongly about issues that do not concern them directly, such as the 
death penalty, conditions in prison, or the competence of police and judges, but arguably 
may use different standards, consider different factors, consider the issues more or less 
frequently, or use different standards of comparison than when considering matters that are 
more personal to them. Whether I, personally, am subject to just practices or events might 
mean something different to me from whether broader social systems are just.   
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A second dimension that emerged as differentiating clusters from one another is closely 
linked to this first dimension, and refers to the notion of personal agency or control over 
events. Some groups seem to have a stronger sense of individuals’ control over their social 
world and others adopt a more fatalistic view about justice seeing such matters as being 
beyond their control or out of their hands (even such matters as preventing a heart attack by 
staying healthy).  Such a distinction can be understood with particular reference to the South 
African context. The previous government’s policy of Apartheid meant that people were 
treated differently to one another on the basis of quite random characteristics. The injustices 
that were meted out were undeserved, and individuals were often impotent in the face of the 
mechanisms adopted to implement such policies. The issue of agency and power thus 
became central to questions of justice, as there was very little that most individuals could do 
to influence the way in which they were treated or the way in which the social system was 
operating. The distinction between situations in which one has the power to influence 
outcomes (such as at home or in the immediate social environment) and where one does not 
thus seems an almost natural result of such a history and is likely to have salience for this 
sample.    
 
Finally, it is important to note that, by looking at profiles of responses, it is clear that people 
do not necessarily function at two ends of a justice continuum, with justice and injustice 
being at either pole. Rather people appear to have much more capacity for ambiguity with 
there being some evidence that while some might believe that people get the justice they 
may deserve, they don’t necessarily believe that they will be the victims of injustice without 
due warrant. This is further support for the idea that perceptions of social justice and social 
injustice might operate independently of one another.  
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The belief in an unjust world cluster analysis offers less insight into the structures of justice 
perceptions than the previous two analyses. A number of reasons were given for this in the 
previous chapter, including the fact that the majority of mean item scores fall between 2.5 
and 3.5, indicating a sample that is largely undecided or neutral about the issues presented to 
them, and that often clusters were differentiated from one another by only one or two items, 
which tended to seem almost random. There were two clusters that stood out as have low or 
high scorers and that were therefore more easily characterised.  - Cluster 4 comprised people 
who believe that the world can be an unfair place, while Cluster 2 comprised people who do 
not believe that the world is an unjust place. The remaining clusters were more difficult to 
define.  Clusters 6 and 3 were almost identical, comprising people who were largely neutral 
or unsure with regards to questions of unfairness in the world, but who did have a clear 
tendency to disbelieve that unfair things happen. Only one item, that related to good drivers 
having as much chance of being injured as bad drivers, differentiated these two groups, with 
this being the only item that people in Cluster 6 strongly agree with, and is one of two items 
that people in cluster 3 clearly disagree with. People in Cluster 5 were also largely neutral or 
uncertain regarding the majority of items. The one item that elicited a non-neutral response 
was item 3, “It is common occurrence for guilty people to get off free in South African 
courts”, which people in this group agreed with. This was the only group who believes that 
the South African legal system is failing. Cluster 1 had a wider range of mean item scores 
and people in this cluster thus arguably held relatively extreme views. People in this cluster 
seemed to hold the view that people have agency in the good that happens to them, but 
possibly not in the bad.  
 
As can be seen, then, the issues that differentiated the clusters from one another are not 
particularly clear indicators of the cluster’s overall character. However, while the clusters for 
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the belief in an unjust world cluster analysis were more difficult to characterise and define, 
there are still some of the dimensions emerging here that were discussed earlier in relation to 
belief in a just world. In particular the question of agency was central in many of the 
clusters. This is evidenced by the relatively strong reaction by all clusters to the question 
related to driving (“Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as 
careless ones”). This is clearly tapping into notions of whether people are able to control 
what happens to them by how they behave (which would be considered a state of justice, as 
each is getting their due), or whether good and bad happen randomly (a state of injustice).  
 
A further point of interest to emerge from this final cluster analysis is the importance of 
particular issues. As mentioned previously, what differentiated many of the clusters from 
one another were one or two particular concerns such as the state of the South African legal 
system. These matters do not necessarily have to be representative of or related to a whole 
set of other issues e.g. if you have low perceptions of the justice system you are also likely 
to feel XYZ about the prison system. Further, strong feelings about one social issue do not 
necessarily mean someone is prone to strong feelings about other social issues. As such it 
might be very difficult for people to assess how fair their society or social world as a whole 
is. In other words perceptions of social injustice are not necessarily a consistent, and 
therefore additive, variable as they are arguably issue-driven, and people’s opinions vary 
from issue to issue. Once again, this possibly provides some evidence that perceptions of 
justice are less personality or trait driven than particular theorists argue (Lerner, 1980).  
 
Similar to that of organisational justice, the cluster analysis results for perceptions of social 
justice do not necessarily present a complete alternative to the tripartite model, but do 
present some possible points of departure for such a discussion. Arguably two dimensions 
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emerge that can be seen to be important adjuncts to the tripartite model, or alternatively the 
beginnings of an alternative model. The first is the personal versus the social, and the second 
relates to questions of agency. Once again these two dimensions might not necessarily be 
indicators of the structure of justice perceptions, but might be moderators or mediators of the 
relationship between allocations and the perceptions thereof. As such, if they are to be used 
as a model for understanding perceptions of justice, further research will be required in order 
to explore the ways in which they function and influence people’s experiences of fairness.   
 
All three cluster analyses, but in particular those conducted in relation to organisational justice 
perceptions and belief in a just world, indicate that a range of concerns underpin perceptions of 
justice. While the tripartite model of justice is valuable in exploring and understanding particular 
questions about justice within certain contexts, these findings arguably provide alternative or 
additional dimensions to explore when postulating about the structure of justice perceptions. 
Furthermore they are an indication of what issues emerge when justice perceptions are looked at 
more holistically. This is line with arguments made by Lind (2001) who questions the value in 
drawing distinctions between types of justice perceptions. He argues that people can distinguish 
between different types of justice when responding to questionnaire items measuring different 
types of justice, but that the real impact of justice judgements depends on a more holistic or 
overall perception. In a similar vein Greenberg (2001), too, argues that people forming 
perceptions of justice are more likely to be making holistic judgements in response to 
information that is salient and available, rather than distinguishing between different types of 
justice dimensions. In this spirit, it is arguably important to begin questioning the value of one 
model that accounts for the structure of justice perceptions (such as the tripartite model). While 
some emphasis has been placed on exploring the ways in which the cluster results can provide 
the basis for an alternative model of justice perceptions, arguably it should not be assumed that 
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this is either necessary or desirable. Perhaps more emphasis needs to be placed on a return to 
exploratory research that asks people how they define justice or what they consider when 
making justice judgements, before attempts are made to find a ‘bottom line’ model. In this way 
we can begin asking whether such a model – one that accounts for the structure of justice across 
contexts, countries, and cultures  - is even possible.  
 
In this way the cluster analysis results should perhaps be understood as a turn of the 
kaleidoscope – an attempt to change the way in which patterns are looked at – in order to 
allow for the possibility of asking different types of questions. These clusters also provide 
more nuanced and detailed insight into perceptions of justice, and account for differences 
between people that otherwise would have been flattened out by the reduction of individual 
scores into one score. While this is a valuable exercise in and of itself, it also provided the 
point of departure for the CHAID analysis, which aimed at exploring the final research 
question under consideration. The results of this analysis will be discussed next. 
 
Demographics as predictors of Justice Perceptions 
 
 
The final question under investigation in the current study looked at the relationship between 
demographic variables and experiences of justice, and asked whether these demographic 
variables were determinants of experiences of organisational and social justice. To this end, 
a wide range of biographic, work, financial, and religious demographic variables were 
collected through the use of a demographic blank. These were then analysed in order to 
explore which of these demographic variables emerged as being more significant in terms of 
predicting peoples’ experiences of justice as well as how these demographic variables 
interacted with one another in predicting experiences of justice. The cluster analyses formed 
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the first step in this investigation, as justice perceptions were not considered in terms of one 
total score index, but rather in relation to profiles of responses. As such the study explored 
whether demographic variables were determinants of cluster membership, i.e. whether 
groups of people who hold similar social justice perceptions can be characterised by 
similarities in demographic variables. A CHAID analysis, a technique used for the 
classification of data by evaluating complex interactions among predictors and partitioning 
data into mutually exclusive, exhaustive groupings that best describe the dependent variable 
(Kass, 1980), was used in order to answer these questions.  
 
Before looking at the decision tree resulting from the CHAID analysis, it would perhaps be 
useful to discuss the demographic variables that formed the basis of the node splits. In this 
way an overview of which demographic variables were found to be more significant in 
predicting different justice perceptions can be looked at, before a closer analysis of how 
these impacted on cluster membership is conducted.  
 
Starting with the analysis of organisational justice perceptions, it is important to note that the 
predictors identified by the CHAID comprised a mixture of employment related and 
biographic, financial, and religious demographic variables. This is an indication that factors 
external to the workplace impact on organisational justice perceptions. For example in the 
first branch of the organisational justice decision tree, age and religious affiliation were 
identified as predictors quite high up in the decision tree hierarchy, indicating that they are 
relatively strong predictors of organisational justice perceptions.  Religion also featured as 
an important determinant of organisational justice perceptions in the second branch, as did 
the domestic variable related to the number of people living with respondent in his/her  
domicile. All of these variables point to the importance of personal circumstance and beliefs 
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in impacting on workplace justice perceptions. This has important implications for 
organisations in that it means there are factors beyond their control impacting on how people 
receive organisational decisions and procedures. Justice perceptions therefore have to be 
understood as a part of a larger set of experiences, attitudes and beliefs; and attempts to 
influence organisational justice perceptions need to incorporate this understanding.  
 
This might seem contrary to previous findings, which have provided evidence for a clear 
distinction between different spheres of justice. There is however a clear indication that a 
more holistic approach – one that does not view these spheres or contexts in isolation from 
one another - is needed. This is in line with Campbell (1998), who argues that there is a 
danger is distinguishing too much between spheres. He says that we can work from a basis of 
understanding that distributions in different spheres need not be identical, while still 
considering the overlaps and commonalties behind the determinants of justice in each sphere.  
 
Further to this, the CHAID results arguably provide some evidence for the complexity that 
exists in relation to organisational justice perceptions and work place demographics. The 
variable that emerged as being the best determinant of justice perceptions, namely job title, 
is illustrative of this complexity. At first it might seem surprising that other variables such as 
gender, race or salary were not the strongest determinants of organisational justice 
perceptions, given the importance these factors have for people working in South African 
organisations and the salience they have within the larger societal discourse. However, it can 
be argued that job title is perhaps one arena where these and many other variables become 
inextricably interlinked. Job title is not only an indicator of the type of work a person does, it 
is also has implications for factors such as salary, organisational status, power, level of 
education, and autonomy. These factors in turn have an impact on employees’ broader social 
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life and demographic pattern. For example, salary influences financial status and social class 
which affects where a person lives, under what conditions, how many dependants they are 
able to support and for what reasons, and so on.  
 
Also significant is that job title is likely to be race and gender inflected, particularly in a 
country such as South Africa, which has a long but recent history of job reservation for 
whites as well as preferential hiring of men. This is evidenced by employment equity laws 
that make affirmative action policies targeted at blacks, coloureds, Indians, and women a 
legal imperative for organisations. Despite the existence of such laws, job titles in South 
Africa have quite distinct race profiles. For example, within the current sample, of the 35 
managerial staff, 20 were white men and only 8 were women. Only 3 managers were black. 
Similarly out of the 37 laboratory staff only 5 were women. On the other hand the vast 
majority of the human resources staff were women (8 out of the 9). Out of the 162 general 
factory staff, only 6 were white. Clearly job title is also very closely linked to race and 
gender, as well as a range of other variables. Given the complexity and the importance of job 
title, it is unsurprising that it emerged as such a strong determinant of organisational justice 
perceptions.  Once again there is a clear indication that these variables cannot be seen in 
isolation from one another.  
 
While it is important to note which demographic variables emerged as determinants of 
organisational justice perceptions, it is arguably as valuable to note which did not feature in 
the classification tree. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a number of identity 
components that have been argued by social psychologists to carry ‘master status’ – that is 
this component will dominate all other components in nearly all social situations. These 
include among others, race, gender, and class (Jaret & Reitzes, 1999).  These variables have 
   
   379 
received considerable attention from researchers and are viewed as being central to 
questions of justice (for reviews of this research see Chapter 4). Despite the perceived 
centrality of these variables, race and gender were not identified as predictors at any level 
in the organisational justice classification tree, not only in relation to job title.  
 
This means that they were not identified by the CHAID process as being particularly strong 
predictors of workplace justice perceptions, and that other variables had a stronger bearing 
on such perceptions. This is perhaps evidence of what can be considered an over emphasis 
on these particular individual characteristics without any reference to other variables that 
may be closely linked to such characteristics. As was argued in Chapter 4 as well as in the 
preceding paragraph, this may lead to a spurious connection being made between variables. 
For example the variable of race may actually be picking up on issues related to financial 
status or job title, particularly in the South African context where groups of people were 
disadvantaged on the basis of race, and are still experiencing the repercussions of this 
disadvantage, financially and socially. The fact that the CHAID analysis picked up on a 
range of other variables but not on race, is an indicator that it was not a strong determinant 
of justice perceptions, but that other related variables, such as job title, financial indicators, 
and domestic conditions, were.  
 
This is further evidenced by the competing splits tree. Where race was a potential predictor 
of organisational justice perceptions, union membership and job title proved to be stronger 
determinants. This is perhaps unsurprising in that both of these variables have strong racial 
foundations, particularly within a South African context. There is still a race imbalance in 
terms of the types of jobs people do, largely because of Apartheid education policies that 
have left black, Indian and coloured people at a disadvantage. Further, the union movement 
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in South Africa is also somewhat racially divided. Certain unions, particularly those that 
cater to ‘blue collar’ workers, have a very strong support base among black workers, largely 
because of the role they played in opposing the Apartheid government. However trade 
unions – those unions that cater to people in trades such plumbing, electrical works, boiler 
makers  - have a largely white support base, as it is these jobs that historically were occupied 
by white employees, but that needed ‘protection’ from black, cheaper labour. As such while 
race might be a significant determinant of justice perceptions, the results of the CHAID are 
indicating that it is not necessarily because of race in and of itself, but rather because of a 
related set of financial and social issues.  
 
As mentioned earlier, gender and salary, two variables that have received a lot of attention 
from justice researchers (as can be seen in chapters 2, 3, and 4), did not appear in the 
classification tree, and nor did they appear in the competing splits tree. This implies that 
they did not emerge as determinants of organisational justice perceptions at all. There were 
other financial indicators, such as whether someone had investments, the number of 
dependants a person had, and whether they were members of a medical aid or pension fund.  
There is, therefore, an indication that it is not salary that has particular salience for people, 
but rather what it is they are able to do with their money and how much disposable income 
they have. This provides some evidence for Sen’s (1999) assertion that there are many 
factors that effect the extent of the utility or range of opportunities one may get from a 
particular distribution. As discussed in Chapter 4, Sen (1999) argues that two people with 
exactly the same amount of money but who operate in varying contexts will get a different 
degree of benefit from that money. As such he contends that justice cannot be understood by 
focussing only on the end state distribution.  Once again this has important implications for 
organisational justice researchers, who have emphasised salary as being an important aspect 
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of justice perceptions.  There is a clear indication that this is a more complex issue, 
influenced by personal circumstances.  
 
The CHAID diagrams also reveal some important information about the impact of 
demographic variables on justice perceptions. Firstly, the results challenge the perceived 
homogeneity of groups both in organisations and more broadly. For example union members 
have often been considered as one group, with no consideration being given to the 
differences that may lie within different factions, or Christians have also often been seen as 
one group versus other religious groups, with no consideration being given to 
denominational differences. As can be seen from the CHAID results splits were made in 
quite complex and unpredictable ways, indicating that within group differences are 
important determinants of organisational justice perceptions, and that the homogeneity of 
large, complex groups cannot be assumed.  
 
Further to this divisions were also made in quite unforeseen ways, challenging assumptions 
that underpin our understanding of demographic variables.  For example, the main split was 
made on the basis of job title, which has often been associated with organisational hierarchy. 
The CHAID, however, split job titles on the basis of the type of work people do, with there 
being a mix of hierarchies in each group. For example, supervisors fell into a different group 
from managers despite the fact that they have more authority than general workers with 
whom they were grouped. Further, technical staff members (such as engineers and 
electricians) were also classified with general factory workers and supervisors despite being 
of a different skill and education level. Given this, these results encourage a more complex 
understanding of demographic groupings and the ways in which these influence justice 
perceptions.   
   
   382 
 
The organisational justice CHAID results also emphasises the importance of considering 
how demographic variables interact with one another. For example, in a country like South 
Africa it seems logical that job title, particularly on the basis of the nature of work being 
done, would interact with age and union membership in relation to justice perceptions. This 
country has a unique history that has deeply impacted on individuals, organisations, and 
institutions alike. As mentioned previously unions have played an important role in that 
history and in the fight against Apartheid. Further to this, there are generational differences 
in terms of how Apartheid was understood and experienced, for example some younger 
people benefiting from attempted redress and older people only experiencing the negative 
discrimination, or older people having made more sacrifices than younger ones. The 
hierarchy of splits that emerged from the CHAID created a logical interaction of variables 
that provided a holistic picture of how demographic variables impact on justice perceptions.  
 
Further by accounting for the interactions between demographic variables the CHAID 
highlighted the ways in which justice concerns can differ between groups. The two main 
branches of the CHAID tree differed quite substantially in terms of justice perceptions. For 
the most part people in the first branch i.e. general factory workers, supervisors, and 
technical staff tended to belong to clusters that held more negative justice perceptions, while 
the opposite was true for the second branch. Within these branches however, there were 
important shifts in emphasis, with different concerns emerging for different sub-groupings. 
For example within different groupings in the first branch collective concerns emerged as 
central, while for other sub groups individual concerns were highlighted. Within the second 
branch distributive and individual benefit issues emerged quite strongly.  Once again this 
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emphasises the benefits of departing from more ossified understandings of justice 
perceptions as well as for the importance of accounting for demographic complexity.  
 
Moving onto the belief in a just world CHAID results, an overview of the demographic 
variables in the hierarchy shows that, like with organisational justice perceptions, a range of 
variables from different spheres of life emerged as determinants of social justice 
perceptions. The best determinant of social justice perceptions was religious affiliation, 
obviously a variable that has a strong bearing on how people perceive right and wrong 
action. However other factors such as job title, the area in which people live, as well as 
factors related to financial status and health all emerged as being related to experiences of 
social justice. Once again this is a clear indication that different contexts do not stand in 
isolation to one another. While there are indications that organisational justice perceptions 
are somewhat independent of social justice perceptions there is also clearly important 
overlap between them. What happens to a person within the work context has an important 
bearing on how he/she experiences other contexts. Once again this is in line with arguments 
made by Campbell (1998), which state that while we must be aware of how justice operates 
within different spheres, so too should we consider the overlaps and commonalties behind 
the determinants of justice in each sphere. Any understanding of justice perceptions has to 
account for this type of reciprocity, and an account of justice that does not can arguably be 
considered limited in its value. While it is, therefore, important to look at the different ways 
in which justice operates within different contexts, an overly bounded or isolationist view 
prevents a more realistic understanding of the variable.  
 
As with the organisational justice CHAID results, gender and race do not appear anywhere 
in the decision tree, and low down in the competing splits diagram, indicating that they were 
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not important determinants of social justice perceptions and that other demographic 
variables were more central. Again, some of these variables such as ones related to financial 
status might be race and gender inflected, but others such as area or some of the health 
related variables are not. The importance of looking beyond these two variables is once 
again highlighted – this is not to say that their impact and importance for people is over 
estimated, but that they work in conjunction with and in relation to other variables that have 
considerable valence and salience for people. Thus looking at race or gender alone will not 
necessarily add much insight into the impact of demographic variables on attitudes, 
perceptions and experiences. Further to this, it is important to note that while a number of 
financially related variables came up in the decision tree, salary was not one of them. Again 
this is perhaps an indication that salary has been over emphasised as a marker of financial 
status. For example whether people owned a fridge features relatively high up in the 
decision hierarchy. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, this might seem slightly odd 
at first, but it is possibly an indicator not only of the possession itself, but of the standard of 
life a person or family has. Once again this relates back to Sen’s (1999) arguments that link 
what someone is able to do with the distributions they are given to the notion of justice.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the belief in an unjust world CHAID was more difficult to 
interpret than the previous two. The first reason for this is because the cluster analysis itself 
was not particularly meaningful (as discussed in Chapter 6) and, therefore, associating the 
demographic determinants with a set of clear and explicit set of justice perceptions was 
affected. In other words, if the justice perceptions are not expressively defined then it 
becomes unclear what the demographic variables are determining. A second reason for the 
difficulty in interpreting the results relates to the fact that there were not always very clear or 
discernible patterns of cluster affiliation. It was, therefore, not always possible to determine 
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where the differences between the groups actually lay.  A final reason for the difficulty in 
interpreting the results is the fact that the demographic groupings were not always easy to 
account for as there were often no apparent reasons for the variables to group in the way that 
they did.  
 
While this CHAID was more limited in its value than the previous two, it did also highlight 
some of the points mentioned above. Similar to the belief in a just world analysis, some 
unlikely variables were determined by the CHAID to be predictors of perceptions of social 
injustice. These included variables such as whether the respondent or any of his/her 
dependants had required hospitalisation in the past two years, or whether they prayed while 
not at their place of worship. Once again these variables were understood to be indicators of 
quite complex sets of circumstances, and a source of insight into peoples’ experiences. On 
their own they might seem quite random, but read in relation to the other demographic 
variables with which they are interacting, they can possibly be understood as more refined 
facets of the larger picture. Once again this is a possible indication that demographic 
variables need to be understood in a more holistic, integrative way, rather than as isolated 
characteristics that have a consistent impact on the people belonging to a particular 
grouping.  
 
A second point relates to the way in which the CHAID grouped the various demographic 
variables, as this was often indicative of the complexity of within group differences and 
highlighted the importance of and the way in which categories are used to describe such 
differences. For example the variable that related to the number of dependants a respondent 
had emerged four times in the decision hierarchy, each time being split in different ways. 
Sometimes the groupings emphasised people on the very extreme sides of the continuum 
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(i.e. having only 1 dependant or having 10 dependants), while at other times the groupings 
were less extreme with each category incorporating larger ranges.  Similar patterns occurred 
with variables such as job and organisational tenure, and even in relation to religious 
affiliation and job title. As was discussed in Chapter 6, the way in which these variables 
were grouped varied from CHAID to CHAID as well as within one CHAID. While this did 
make the belief in an unjust world CHAID more difficult to understand, it is arguably an 
indication that the way in which we understand the impact of demographic variables need 
not remain consistent, and need not be confined to static categories. For example, under a 
particular set of circumstances Catholicism might have more in common with Islam than 
with other Christian religions, while in other contexts the opposite may be true. This 
illustrates the way in which reducing information (e.g. grouping all Christian religions 
together, or categorising tenure into short, medium, and long-term) might limit our 
understanding of the way in which variables impact on one another.  
 
In general the three CHAID analyses were arguably most valuable when looking at which 
demographic variables were selected as the best determinants of justice perceptions, and the 
ways in which these were split and grouped. Clearly demographic variables are important 
indicators of social position, which in turn plays an important role in determining 
experiences of justice.  While the results of these point to the relevance of demographic 
variables as determinants of justice perceptions, these results, along with all of the others 
conducted in this study, need to be considered in light of the limitations of the study. Such 
limitations will be discussed in the following section.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
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There are a number of factors that need to be taken into account in relation to the 
significance and generalisability of the results of the current research.  These relate to 
issues about the measuring instruments used, the sample, data collection methods, as 
well as the statistical analyses used.  
 
 The first set of concerns relates to the measuring instruments used in the study, with 
particular reference to the belief in a just world scale and the demographic blank. The 
belief in a just world measure was used in order to assess perceptions of social justice. 
Initially this seemed like an appropriate measure to use as the scale comprises a series 
of statements about different aspects of the social world, and asks respondents about 
the extent of their agreement with these statements. The items relate to a range of 
different concerns, from personal matters to more broad-based issues. As such it seems 
plausible that such a scale would be useful in assessing perceptions of social justice. 
Despite this the scale proved to have a very low reliability, and as such was ultimately 
split into two different sub-scales. While this is not problematic in itself, as the sub-
scales appeared to shed some light on the structure of social justice perceptions, it does 
raise some questions about the usefulness of this measure as it stands. Arguably a scale 
that was specifically designed to measure perceptions of justice would have been more 
appropriate for the current study, particularly one that was more suitable to a South 
African sample as well as one that looked at notions of social justice more specifically. 
For example, such a measure might include questions about health care, public 
transport, the education system, attempts at redress, as well as matters such as 
HIV/AIDS, all of which have particular importance within the South African context. 
Further, questions that seemed less significant, such as those related to whether 
children deserve punishment or students get the grades they deserve, could have been 
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excluded from the study. So while the belief in a just world scale was an adequate 
measure, particularly in light of the steps taken to address the low reliability, another 
instrument might have yielded a better understanding of social justice profiles in South 
Africa.  
 
Further to this, some theorists might insist that Belief in a Just World is a personality 
trait, and as such using that scale to measure social justice perceptions is conceptually 
flawed. Again, while this is countered by the fact that the questions were never used as 
a psychometric scale, it does give further weight to the need for a measure of social 
justice perceptions that does not rely on the tripartite framework described in the first 
half of this thesis.  
 
The second measuring instrument that raised some limitations was that of the 
demographic blank. While it was the aim of this study to avoid reductionism in the 
measurement of variables, particularly the demographic variables, arguably there were 
a number of questions that could have been merged with others or even clustered 
themselves in order to provide a more cohesive profile of the respondents. Individual 
questions, while useful in forming a picture of a respondent, could become less 
meaningful in isolation. As such the demographic profiles could possibly have 
undergone some preliminary analyses to assist a more meaningful understanding, or 
alternatively fewer, more strategic questions could have been asked in order to elicit 
more critical demographic information from respondents.  
 
Finally, the new global organisational justice scale also presents some limitations. 
While it was an attempt to develop a measure of justice that does not rely on the 
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tripartite framework, more work needs to be done on the scale to ensure that it actually 
does this. In other words it is not clear the ways in which this scale differs from the 
tripartite scales, or if it does so in a sufficiently meaningfully way. Once again, while 
this cannot be considered a fatal flaw of the research as the statistical tools used do not 
make use of scales per se, but rather individual items, a different set of questions might 
have yielded more theoretically relevant results. 
 
A second set of concerns relates to the nature of the sample used in this study. Questions 
related to organisational and social justice are arguably sensitive ones, particularly in South 
Africa where a certain degree of hostility and mistrust exists between various groups on the 
basis of such perceptions. Many workers do not trust management to treat them fairly, and 
they are often worried about expressing their concerns in writing, despite the guarantee of 
confidentiality. With regards to social justice perceptions, the need to be politically correct 
often restricts what people are prepared to admit to or to discuss. Thus, while the sample was 
representative of the organisation, it may not necessarily be representative of the full range 
of attitudes to and perceptions about the organisation or society as a whole. Arguably people 
with very extreme views might have been reticent to commit their views to paper or to 
participate in the study at all. As such employees who did not participate in the study may 
have been able to provide the researcher with additional important information pertaining to 
justice perceptions.   
 
A further limitation of this study is the different means of data collection used. Due to the 
diversity of the sample, geographically, in literacy levels, and in language, several different 
methods of data collection had to be used. The method used to collect information may 
impact on the data yielded (Anastasi, 1976). If only one method of data collection is used, 
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the effects of that method are controlled for. Due to the number of methods utilised in the 
present study, it was not possible to control for the different impacts these methods may 
have had on responses. A further limitation of the data collection involves the reliance on 
self-report data. While this is an easy and time effective method to use, there may have been 
biases in individual responses. Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991) describe what they term the 
good subject effect, where respondents may provide answers they feel the researcher or 
company would want to find. Social desirability bias may have caused respondents to try 
and present themselves in a favourable light. There also may have been a tendency for 
respondents to respond all positively or all negatively to items.  
 
While the statistical procedures used were carefully selected in order to maximise the 
amount of data use and thus account for some of the complexities of the variables under 
investigation, these may have raised some related concerns. As can be seen by both the 
results and the discussion (Chapters 6 and 7 respectively) a certain amount of qualitative 
analysis is used in order to interpret the results of both the cluster and CHAID analyses. 
Unlike many other statistical procedures there is no clear indication of significant vs. non-
significant results, and many of those kinds of decisions are left up to the researcher to 
make. For example the researcher deduces how many clusters to retain from the cluster 
analysis. While these decisions are made on the basis of statistical evidence, there is a 
degree of subjectivity involved in the data interpretation. While this can also be seen as a 
strength of the analysis tools, it also raises the limitations of subjectivity. 
 
Another concern related to the statistical tools used refers to the micro level at which the 
analysis took place i.e. the extent to which the analysis immerses itself in the detail of the 
data. Again, while this was one of the key reasons such tools were selected (in order to avoid 
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a reductionistic approach), it does come with some concomitant limitations, namely a 
difficulty in reaching any ‘bottom line’ conclusions. This does limit the immediate utility of 
the results in that they do not, for example present an alternative model for the structure of 
justice, or of the relationship between demographic variables and perceptions of justice. 
Rather they present an alternative view of patterns of experiences. Further, a move away 
from reducing data does leave the researcher and the  reader with the complexity of having 
to navigate a dense set of results making an overview of the results difficult to obtain.  
 
At a theoretical level the above limitation has some important consequences, namely that 
while an argument has been made for the limitations of the tripartite model, no alternative 
model is suggested. Arguably this effectively eliminates the only useful framework that 
exists for analysis, and does not provide another such framework, making analysis difficult. 
This is perhaps reflected in the measuring instruments used (which had to be improvised as 
they could not be based on existing understandings of justice), as well as in the difficulty in 
drawing any concrete conclusions towards such a model. This research is very exploratory in 
nature, and is thus arguably more of an intellectual exercise aimed at shifting understandings 
of justice and creating new points of departure for further investigation rather than being 
able to provide a new and complete alternative model.   
 
 
 
 
 
Directions for Future Research 
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As with much research, the current study raises more questions than it does answers, 
indicating a number of directions for future research.   
 
The results of this study indicated that justice perceptions potentially operate 
differently within different settings. While much emphasis has been placed on looking 
at organisational justice perceptions as something separate from social justice 
perceptions, this notion warrants further investigation with more emphasis being 
placed on the difference between workplace perceptions and those related to other 
contexts. Questions about how antecedents and outcomes of justice perceptions may 
differ need attention, as does research into the relative importance such perceptions 
have. The extent of the differences between such contexts also warrants investigation. 
Further to this other contexts should also be explored in relation to their impact on 
justice perceptions and judgements. Such contexts might include schools and 
universities, prisons, families and social unions, hospitals, and welfare institutions. In 
general questions about context and justice perceptions need to be empirically explored 
both to support the direction research has already taken as well as to direct future 
investigations.  
 
Another set of results that has implications for future research is those related to the 
structure of justice. The cluster analysis indicated some justice dimensions around 
which people aggregated. As discussed these dimensions are not intended as an 
alternate model of the structure of justice perceptions. Rather they simply provide 
some alternative points of departure for exploring justice perceptions. These 
dimensions warrant further exploration both in the work place but in other contexts as 
well. Further to this studies that do not assume the tripartite justice model as their point 
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of departure are needed in order to further explore other dimensions or themes related 
to experiences of justice that can add to our understanding of this variable. To this end 
research that incorporates more qualitative data collection and analysis methods are 
called for. Such methods will allow researchers to more fully explore the ways in 
which people experience exchanges as well as make justice judgements, and thus move 
away from a purely a priori understanding of these matters.  
 
Additional research is required to explore more adequately the relationship between 
demographic variables and justice perceptions. There are a number of ways in which 
this can be done. Ways of refining demographic profiles (without becoming overly 
reductionist) are needed, preferably on the basis of additional exploratory research. To 
this end, research that more adequately explores demographic variables in themselves, 
as well as their relationship to each other, are needed. Possibly different sub sets of 
demographic variables (e.g. financial or domestic) can be used on their own in order to 
explore different areas more in depth.  More specifically, two sets of variables raised 
sets of particular questions, namely religious affiliation and job title. These two 
variables emerged as relatively important in all of the CHAIDS, and arguably warrant 
particular investigation.  
 
More generally, despite its significance for the South African context, social-psychological 
research on justice issues in this country is lacking. Many organisations and societal 
institutions are in a process of transition, and insight into the psychological dimensions of 
justice can facilitate the more effective and acceptable development of appropriate policies 
and procedures. The psychological study of justice needs to become more relevant to the 
South African context.  For example research into the experiences of lower level employees  
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is essential, if we are to move away from a managerial definition of organisational justice. 
Further to this the impact that unions have on people’s experiences of justice as well as their 
reactions to organisational life is also needed.  At a broader level research that looks at the 
impact of Apartheid on the way in which people experience justice now is essential, as are 
studies that explore the impact of some of our more pressing social problems on experiences 
and perceptions of justice. Both qualitative and quantitative research could be beneficial in 
these areas. Quantitative research can provide insight into the relationships between justice 
perceptions and other relevant outcome variables. In relation to this, the development and 
validation of South African scales to measure justice perceptions is needed in order to 
establish means of accurately assessing these perceptions.  Qualitative research could 
provide more in depth information about experiences of justice as well as the way in which 
people define and think about justice. Such studies would facilitate a more appropriate 
understanding of justice within the South African context and would be an essential first step 
in the development of further research questions as well as the development of measuring 
instruments.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has focussed on discussing the results of the statistical analyses presented in 
Chapter 6. These analyses were conducted in an attempt to address some concerns related 
to the relationship between different types of justice as well as the relationship between 
demographic variables (as indicators of identity and social position) and perceptions of 
justice raised in the first half of this report. Three research questions emerged from these 
concerns. The first pertained to the interface between different ‘types’ of justice, in the 
case of this study, that of organisational and social justice, and asked whether people’s 
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experiences of organisational justice were related to their experiences of social justice. As 
was discussed in this chapter, these different justice perceptions were not strongly related 
to each other indicating that they possibly function differently within different contexts. 
Despite this there was additional evidence to argue that different contexts cannot be seen 
in isolation from another, and that a more integrative or reciprocal approach to 
understanding different justice perceptions needs to be adopted.  
 
The second research question referred to similarities in experiences of justice and asked 
in what ways people clustered together in relation to their experiences of justice.  This 
was particularly important given that the structure of justice perceptions was not assumed 
in the current study, and as such exploring alternate dimensions of justice concerns that 
might emerge was central. The cluster analysis results demonstrated that a range of key 
concerns differentiated groups from another, including collective versus individual 
concerns, personal versus impersonal events, as well as concerns related to the different 
types of relationships that exist.  
 
 Finally, the last question looked at the relationship between demographic variables and 
experiences of justice, asked whether demographic variables determine experiences of 
organisational and social justice. The CHAID analysis shed some light on which 
demographic variables were the best determinants of social and organisational justice 
perceptions, and the ways in which demographic variables interacted with one another in 
relation to peoples’ experiences of justice. This chapter was concluded with a discussion 
of the limitations of this research as well as the implications the current study has for 
future research.  
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As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, in many ways this study has raised more 
questions than it has answered. Arguably this is true of most studies of justice. Campbell 
(1998, p.2) states, “ Indeed, because the concept of justice is so prevalent, and so 
contested, there is little prospect of presenting any reasonably specific analysis of justice 
which will find general acceptance...”  (Campbell, 1998, p2). Instead of answering 
specific questions definitively, perhaps this investigation provides an alternative way of 
looking at and understanding justice perceptions and their relationship to individual 
experiences.  
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